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JOHANNES BJELKE-PETERSEN: A STUDY IN POPULIST LEADERSHIP 
ABSTRACT 
The primary aim of this dissertation is to explain the former Queensland Premier's 
leadership style, together with its development and role in his government's repeated 
electoral success. Governments he led were, between 1968 and 1987, re-elected seven 
times despite the authoritarian nature of his leadership and a constant stream of 
allegations covering corruption, repeated conflict of interest and the politicisation of 
the state public service. Although the Bjelke-Petersen government manipulated the 
political system in order to stay in power, it did so with at least the acquiescence, if 
not active support of the Queensland electorate. 
To understand the success of his leadership style it is essential to explore 
Queensland's political culture, owing to the high degree of congruence between the 
attitudes and expectations of Queensland society, and the values and performance of 
the Bjelke-Petersen government. Any examination of Queensland's political culture 
leads inevitably to a consideration of the so-called "Queensland difference". There is 
sufficient evidence of this to suggest that Queensland's political culture warrants 
separate consideration. There is also a considerable amount of evidence to link the 
narrow, social circumstances experienced by many Queenslanders with the 
development of authoritarian tendencies that, in turn, lent support to populism. 
Bjelke-Petersen's own childhood socialisation, in rural Queensland, mirrored the 
circumstances associated with the development of such authoritarianism. In his case, 
the influences of family, religion and education were cumulative, and his childhood 
sociahsation fitted him well for the role of state premier. Additionally, previous 
incumbents had established a pattern of authoritarian leadership, which, in the 
Queensland case, became associated with strength and purposefulness. 
As a young man he was ambitious. At first his ambitions were directed to business 
ventures, but eventually were transposed into the political arena. Bjelke-Petersen 
disguised this later ambition by encouraging the perception that he was a reluctant and 
accidental politician. I argue in this thesis, however, that the contrary was the case. 
Although Bjelke-Petersen could not plot the path his career might take, his ambition 
drove him to seize opportunities as they arose and to consolidate power as he achieved 
it. As Premier he took increasingly immoderate policy decisions, but there were no 
concurrent electoral penalties, in part, because he was able to convince the electorate 
that 'Joh gets things done'. 
In every political relationship, Bjelke-Petersen strove for dominance. The only person 
who came close to matching his power was Sir Robert Sparkes. For most of his 
premiership, theirs was a formidable partnership which, in 1983, culminated in the 
return of a National Party Government in its own right. The seeds of his eventual 
defeat lay in this victory, as Bjelke-Petersen, buoyed by success, turned from Sparkes 
to a group of flatterers who encouraged his federal ambitions. His 1987 assault on 
Canberra was a failure, removing his primary attention from Queensland and 
revealing the extremity of his ambition. This, in turn, lost him the support of his 
parliamentary colleagues, his party organisation and most importantly, the electorate 
which, he had come to believe, would support him in any and every endeavour. 
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When I contacted Allen Callaghan, Sir Johannes Bjelke-Petersen's former news and 
information officer, regarding an interview, he asked: 'Are you writing "Jackboots 
Bjelke" or "Saint Joh"?" These two contrasting images are indicative of the strong 
feelings which populist leaders such as Bjelke-Petersen inspire. He was Premier of 
Queensland between 1968 and 1987 and governments led by him were re-elected 
seven times. His repeated success at the polls and continuing personal popularity 
persisted despite the authoritarian nature of his leadership, his Government's 
contempt for parliament and due process and a steady trickle of allegations of 
corruption and conflict of interest. The principal aims of this dissertation are to 
explain his leadership style, how it developed and its significance for his 
government's repeated electoral success. In a community overtly committed to 
democratic values, it is important to understand why a leader who treated those values 
with contempt was supported. The easy answer is to say that the Bjelke-Petersen 
government 'worked the system', as indeed it did, but it did so with the acquiescence, 
if not the support of the Queensland people.^ 
In order to fulfil the aims of this dissertation, a focus on both the leader and the milieu 
in which he operated is essential. Leaders are both actors and acted upon, shapers of 
their environment and shaped by it. The most successful studies of Bjelke-Petersen 
recognise this interaction and incorporate consideration of Queensland's political 
culture in their explanations for Bjelke-Petersen's success.^ Despite criticism of the 
government and opposition from various groups, there was a high degree of 
congruence between the attitudes and expectations of the Queensland community and 
the values and performance of the Bjelke-Petersen government. 
Because this government appeared to deviate fi-om the contemporaneous Australian 
pattern, some writers have argued that 'Queensland is different' and draw attention to 
' Throughout this study, I use the term 'Bjelke-Petersen' to refer to Sir Joh. This avoids the 
necessity of distinguishing between the periods before and after he was knighted in 1984. Other 
members of the Bjelke-Petersen family are referred to either by their full names or their first 
names. 
^ P. Coaldrake, Working the System, University of Queensland Press, St.Lucia, 1989. 
^ P. Charlton, State of Mind: Why Queensland is Different, Methuen Hayes, North Ryde, 1983; H. 
Lunn, Joh: The Life and Political Adventures of Sir Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, paperback edn, 
traditions within the state of authoritarianism, anti-intellectualism, pragmatism, 
corruption and suspicion of Canberra and the southern states.^ These characteristics 
have not been noticeably absent from the rest of Australia, but the evidence which 
suggests that they were more pronounced in Queensland is convincing. The reasons 
can be found in the state's decentralised nature, low levels of education, small 
numbers of migrants from non-English sources and lack of media diversity. Various 
studies link such characteristics with both authoritarianism and populism.^ 
Bjelke-Petersen grew up in the rural South Burnett, an area of small farms and 
businesses, which to this day remains fertile ground for populism. He was the middle 
child of Danish immigrants but the values and attitudes which he acquired in 
childhood were consistent with those of the broader Queensland community. In his 
case, the various agencies of socialisation were mutually reinforcing. His family was 
religious and conservative. In their different ways, his parents were strong influences. 
As is the case with many children, he shared his parents' party allegiance. He appears 
to have imitated his father's authoritarianism, whilst rejecting his bookishness in 
favour of his mother's strong work ethic and pragmatism. As he aged, he became 
more like his father, flying into rages and insisting that his will be done. As a young 
man, he was motivated by his family's poverty to expand from farming into earth 
moving, other entrepreneurial activities and eventually, politics. Additional spurs may 
have been a desire to compensate for his immigrant status and the effects of childhood 
polio. 
Because Bjelke-Petersen combined a strong work ethic with an ascetic life-style some 
commentators have analysed him in Calvinist terms.* He was, however, a Lutheran 
and thus rejected works as the means of salvation. Queensland Lutheranism, though, 
had been corrupted by pietism which places strong emphasis on personal asceticism 
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1987, Introduction; H. McQueen, 'Queensland: A State 
of Mind', Meanjin, vol. 38, no.l, pp. 41-51. 
Charlton, loc. cit; Lunn, loc.cit; Humphrey McQueen, loc. cit. 
For example, T. W Adomo, E. Frankel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson and R. N. Sanford, The 
Authoritarian Personality, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1950; J. P. Kirscht and R. C. 
Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory, University of 
Kentucky Press, Lexington, 1967; S. M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. 
Doubleday, New York, 1959. 
and individual moral reformation. In rural Queensland, the doctrines central to 
classical Lutheranism were either poorly taught or misunderstood, so to suggest, as 
some have, that Bjelke-Petersen was influenced in an authoritarian direction by 
Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, is misguided.^ Bjelke-Petersen's religious 
training left him with an emphasis on personal piety, a firm belief in his own rectitude 
and a conviction that he was carrying out God's will. Thus armed, he felt no need for, 
and indeed was offended by, the checks and balances of a parhamentary democracy. 
Education at the local state primary school, with its emphasis on discipline, order and 
skill development, reinforced the values acquired from family and religion. Bjelke-
Petersen, never more than an average student, missed a year's schooling when he 
contracted polio. He failed to catch up and, like many rural children, left school early 
to work hill time on the family farm. He added contract ploughing to his work load, 
and then scrub clearing and aerial spraying. By the time he was thirty, Bjelke-Petersen 
was a prosperous farmer and businessman, with values and attitudes broadly shared 
by the wider community. 
At this time, according to Bjelke-Petersen, he had no political ambitions.* 
Nevertheless, in 1946 he was persuaded to stand for the state parliament by his mentor 
and local federal member, Charles Adermann. There is evidence to suggest, however, 
that two years earlier he had contested a Country Party plebiscite for the state seat of 
Nanango against the sitting member.'' He was unsuccessful but that failure has been 
expunged from published accounts in favour of his recruitment by Adermann. 
Throughout his political career, Bjelke-Petersen continued to present himself as the 
reluctant and accidental candidate, but I argue in this dissertation that this was a 
fiction. Although politics is too unpredictable for any politician to plot an undeviating 
course, Bjelke-Petersen seized opportunity whenever it presented and held tenaciously 
to power. A reluctant politician may have given up when a ministry took so long to 
* For a summary, see John Harrison, Faith in the Sunshine State: Joh Bjelke-Petersen and the 
Rehgious Culture of Queensland, PhD thesis, University of Queensland, February 1991, pp.l6-
20. 
^ Ian Gillman, 'The Influence on Political Leadership of Christian Traditions in Australia', Journal 
of Religion, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 11th May, 1983, Audio; Phil Muston, 'A 
Christian in Polities', On Being, vol.4, Feb/March, 1977, p. 5. 
* J. Bjelke-Petersen, Don 't You Worry About That! The Joh Bjelke-Petersen Memoirs, Angus and 
Robertson, North Ryde, Sydney, 1983, p.45. 
come, been less diligent in building support once that ministry was his, given way 
when threatened by a party room 'coup' in which the numbers were against him, and 
retired graciously when it was clear that both the organisational and parliamentary 
wings of the party wanted him to go. Bjelke-Petersen did none of these things, but 
remained convinced that his own leadership was essential to the well-being of the 
state, if not the nation. 
For a professional politician, the socialisation associated with political activity is very 
important. Bjelke-Petersen entered the Queensland Parliament as an Opposition 
backbencher. The Labor Premier at the time was Ned Hanlon, an autocrat with a 
confrontationist style, defender of Queensland against southern interests and the 
politician responsible for introducing the zonal electoral system to Queensland. 
Hanlon was succeeded by Vince Gair, another autocrat. For the second time, Bjelke-
Petersen was presented with an authoritarian model of the premiership. The Gair 
government fell in 1957 to be replaced by a Coalition Government led by Frank 
Nicklin. Although Nicklin appeared to break the mould of autocratic premiers, he, too, 
was a tough and effective politician, ready to take a confrontationist stand on 
industrial and civil liberties issues. Under the premierships of all three men, police 
corruption was a fact of life, and politicians combined business and parhamentary 
activities unconcerned by potential conflicts of interest. 
Once his party obtained power, Bjelke-Petersen nursed ministerial ambitions, but he 
was passed over on a number of occasions until 1963 when Nicklin appointed him 
Minister for Works and Housing. This was a fortuitous appointment because of the 
opportunity it gave for doing favours. His colleagues, he told me, 'came . . . like bees 
to a honey-pot', and despite his low public profile, elected him Deputy Premier in 
1968. Later that year he became Premier when the incumbent, Jack Pizzey, died of a 
heart attack. Bjelke-Petersen, maintaining the fiction of reluctant candidate, claimed it 
never occurred to him that he would one day be premier. Pizzey, however, had already 
had one heart attack and there had been speculation that ill health might force him to 
Harrison, op. cit., p. 219 
retire.'" It seems unlikely that Bjelke-Petersen gave no thought at all to the state's 
uhimate political prize. 
It took him some time to find his feet as Premier, but once he did, it was clear that 
Queensland had another premier cast in the authoritarian mould. His management of 
cabinet and parliament demonstrated his quest for autonomy, intolerance of 
opposition and disregard for the checks and balances which a parliamentary system is 
supposed to provide. More often than not, cabinet functioned as a rubber stamp for his 
views, despite the occasional opposition of some of his Liberal coalition partners. 
Ignoring their concerns, he thrived on confrontation and was the driving force behind 
Government decisions such as the declaration of a State of Emergency during the 
1971 Springbok tour, the harming of street marches and the mass sacking, in 1985, of 
striking South East Queensland Electricity Board employees. 
Throughout his premiership there was a steady stream of allegations of conflict of 
interest, impropriety and police corruption. None prevented his re-election on seven 
occasions. At each election a skilful campaign would point to the State's booming 
economy and the Premier's role in fostering development. With economic 
development as his major policy priority, Bjelke-Petersen left routine administration 
to the bureaucrats. He did, however, intervene frequently on behalf of special interests 
or in pursuit of those he perceived as opponents. Such intervention led to 
politicisation of the public service, conflict of interest and the routinisation of 
corruption. Nowhere was this more pronounced than in the Queensland Police Force. 
Throughout his premiership and beyond, Bjelke-Petersen denied knowing anything 
about corruption but the evidence suggests that this is untrue. He ignored it because to 
acknowledge its presence was to hand a weapon to his political enemies and because 
he was prepared to trade off corruption for police loyalty. 
Although Bjelke-Petersen is reluctant to share the credit for his success with anyone 
else, for most of the premiership he was guided by a small team of advisers with good 
strategic and tactical skills. The most significant of these was National Party 
President, Sir Robert Sparkes. Theirs was a formidable partnership which, in 1983, 
C. Hazlehurst, Gordon Chalk, A Political Life, Darling Downs Institute Press, Toowoomba, 
culminated in the return of a National Party government in its own right. The two men 
were never close, however, and over time their relationship deteriorated. The Premier 
turned increasingly to followers who flattered him and encouraged his ambitions. The 
success which he and Sparkes had worked towards sowed the seeds of his eventual 
downfall. Aided by the 1985 redistribution, the Nationals also won the 1986 election 
in their own right, a feat which prompted Bjelke-Petersen, increasingly isolated from 
organisational and bureaucratic advice, to set his sights on Canberra. The failure of 
this ill-advised assault on the prime-ministership together with the establishment, in 
1987, in his absence, of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, signalled the end of his premiership. 
This dissertation explores these issues, beginning broadly with an examination of 
political culture and justifying the political culture/political socialisation approach 
which underpins this study. I argue that Queensland's political culture is sufficiently 
different to warrant detailed examination and devote a chapter to putting flesh on the 
bones of Queensland difference. The focus then shifts to a detailed examination of the 
regional milieu in which Bjelke-Petersen grew to adulthood and traces the influence 
on his character of family, religion, education and occupation. Drawing on Abraham 
Zaleznick's distinction between a 'first' career in politics, during which power is 
sought and a 'second' career when power is achieved, the dissertation proceeds to 
examine the flowering of Bjelke-Petersen's political ambitions, first as a backbencher 
and minister, and then as Premier." In order to make the latter task manageable, the 
premiership is analysed as a series of relationships between premier and party 
organisation, cabinet, parliament, public administration, media and people. 
There have been other studies of Bjelke-Petersen, but none as comprehensive as this 
one. The most useful and reliable biography is Hugh Lunn's Joh: The Life and 
Political Adventures of Sir Johannes Bjelke-Petersen.^^ As a journalist Lunn reported 
extensively on Bjelke-Petersen and his book is a good general account of Bjelke-
Petersen's life and times until 1986. It was, however, written for a general audience 
and lacks citation of sources. Its greatest flaw is Lunn's willingness to accept Bjelke-
Petersen's own interpretation of events, especially those which present him as a 
reluctant politician. James Walter draws on Lunn as a source for his partially 
1987,p.l98. 
Abraham Zaleznik, 'Psychopathology and Politics Reconsidered', Bulletin of the Menninger 
Clinic, vol. 39, no. 2, 1975, p. 160. 
psychobiographical interpretation of Bjelke-Petersen's authoritarianism.'^ As might be 
expected of a work in this genre, Walter places considerable emphasis on Bjelke-
Petersen's relations with his parents, especially his father. Walter suggests that 
Bjelke-Petersen's resentment of his father's authority influenced his own behaviour, 
but other, equally convincing psychological theories suggest that authoritarian 
behaviour may have its origins in imitation, rather than resentment.'^ Although Walter 
is aware of controversy associated with Bjelke-Petersen's plebiscite win, he, like 
Lunn, emphasises the role of Charles Adermann, rather than Bjelke-Petersen's own 
ambitious drive. Because Walter's study forms one chapter in a series on Queensland 
premiers, it is necessarily comparatively brief Jigsaw, by Derek Townsend, whilst 
providing some valuable historical information, comes close to hagiography in its one 
sided treatment of its subject.'^ Bjelke-Petersen's autobiography is similarly 
unreliable, made even more so by the author's tendency to rewrite history in order to 
present himself in the best possible light, and his enemies, like Sir Robert Sparkes, in 
the worst.'^ 
Whilst Bjelke-Petersen's childhood and the premiership are examined with varying 
degrees of comprehensiveness and reliability in all four sources, his 'first' career in 
politics, as a backbencher and minister, is treated only sketchily. This is a serious 
omission, not only because of the lessons he drew for his own premiership from the 
operations of Queensland politics and parliament, but because in the apparently 
diffident backbencher from Nanango, there are intimations of the leader he was to 
become. The socialisation associated with his pohtical activity in the period from 
1947 to 1967 is vital for understanding his premiership and this dissertation fills that 
gap-
Other books focus on various aspects of the Premiership, such as public policy, 
political institutions, corruption, the National Party organisation, the 1983 split with 
Lunn, op. cit. 
J.Walter, 'Johannes Bjelke-Petersen' in The Premiers of Queensland, 2nd edn, ed. D. Murphy, R. 
Joyce and M. Cribb, University of Queensland Press, St.Lucia, 1990. 
E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1977, 
p.499; G. Little, Politics and Personal Style, Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, 1973, p.105. 
D. Townsend, Jigsaw, The Biography of Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, Sneyd & Morley, Brisbane, 
1983. 
"^  Bjelke-Petersen, op.cit, 1990. 
the Liberals, street march legislation and the Springbok rugby union tour.'^ I have 
drawn extensively from these various sources, as well as from archival material, 
Queensland parliamentary debates from 1947 to 1968, available cabinet documents, 
statistical data, video and radio tapes, and personal interviews with Sir Joh Bjelke-
Petersen and a representative selection of people who knew and worked with him. 
Some of the interview material may be unreliable because memories have faded or 
been coloured by later events and the strong emotions which a leader like Bjelke-
Petersen arouses. Newspaper articles may also be inaccurate for a variety of reasons, 
including bias, reliance on government press releases and carelessness. Wherever 
possible, I have tried to verify such material by cross referencing other sources. For 
example, so many interviewees refer to Bjelke-Petersen's rages that their veracity is 
not in doubt. When I have not been able to confirm controversial information, the fact 
is acknowledged. 
A further hmitation of the study arises from the length of time Bjelke-Petersen spent 
in public life. He was a member of parliament for 40 years and Premier for nineteen of 
those. Inevitably, in dealing with such a span of time, some material has been omitted 
and some has been dealt with only briefly. Generally speaking, when aspects of the 
Bjelke-Petersen premiership have been dealt with thoroughly in other sources, I refer 
the reader to these, providing only sufficient explication to develop understanding and 
argument. 
It is now more than ten years since the end of the Bjelke-Petersen era. At that time. Sir 
Robert Sparkes intimated the movement from the Petersen era to the post-Petersen era 
was a watershed in Queensland's political history and most commentators agreed.'* 
Indeed, when I commenced this dissertation, I believed, that with Bjelke-Petersen's 
departure and the election to office of the Labor Party led by Wayne Goss, populism 
A. Patience ed., The Bjelke-Petersen Premiership, 1968-1983, Issues in Public Policy, Longman 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1983; Coaldrake, op. cit; E. Whitton, The Hillbilly Dictator, ABC, Crows 
Nest NSW; P. Dickie, The Road to Fitzgerald and Beyond, University of Queensland Press, 
St.Lucia, 1989; A. Metcalfe, In Their Own Right, The Rise to Power of Joh 's Nationals, 
University of Queensland Press, St.Lucia, 1984; L Miller and T. Koch, Joh 's KO, Boolarong, 
Brisbane, 1983; F. Brennan, Too Much Order with Too Little Law, University of Queensland 
Press, St. Lucia, 1983; S. Hams, Political Football, The Springbok Tour of Australia, Gold Star, 
Melbourne, 1972. 
P. Bongiomo, 'Why Job's Pickle Has a Federal Flavour?' The Bulletin, 17 November, 1987, p. 
17. 
had finally died in Queensland. Yet the rise of Pauline Hanson's One Nation indicates 
that if populism is dying in Queensland, its death throes are not yet over. This study, 
which endeavours to throw light on the reasons for Bjelke-Petersen' success, may also 
provide insights into the reasons for the lasting appeal of populism and into the 
connections between populist and authoritarian leadership. The continuities and 
discontinuities of Queensland politics provide a friiitful area for further study. 
CHAPTER 1 
POLITICAL CULTURE 
The political culture of Queensland has been explored in numerous books and articles 
dealing with the Bjelke-Petersen era. Varied accounts draw attention to Queensland's 
authoritarianism, anti-intellectualism, political pragmatism, tolerance of corruption 
and suspicion of Canberra and the Southern states, all to emphasise Queensland's 
difference from the rest of Australia.' Because these characteristics appeared to be 
incarnate in the person of the Premier, the 'Queensland is different' argument 
frequently, and often implicitly, relied on syllogism: Bjelke-Petersen is different fi-om 
other political leaders in Australia; he was elected Premier of Queensland by 
Queenslanders; therefore Queensland is different. 
According to this argument, Bjelke-Petersen was both a symptom and a cause of 
Queensland uniqueness: a product of the environment and an actor who maintained 
Queensland's difference through his leadership style and the policies he espoused. The 
argument is complete when it is noted that he did so with the acquiescence, and 
sometimes enthusiastic support, of Queenslanders themselves, who demonstrated 
their difference from other Australians by conferring legitimacy upon Bjelke-
Petersen's leadership. Although these ideas were sometimes rather crudely put and 
often ignored claims of Queensland's difference prior to the Bjelke-Petersen era,^  the 
underlying assumption was that, between 1968 and 1987, nowhere else in Australia 
would a Bjelke-Petersen have been continuously re-elected. That this appears to have 
I For example, P. Charlton, State of Mind: Why Queensland is Different, Methuen Haynes, North 
Ryde, 1983; P. Blazey and A. Campbell, The Political Dice Men, Outback, Fitzroy, 1974, p. 58; 
H. Lunn, 'Introduction', Joh: The Life and Political Adventures of Sir Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, 
University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Qld. 1987; H. McQueen, 'Queensland: A State of 
Mind' Meanjin, vol. 38, no. 1, 1979; P.Mullins, 'Queensland: Populist Politics and Development' 
in The Politics of Development in Australia, ed. B. Head, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1986, pp. 138-
62. 
A. A. Morrison, 'The Government of Queensland' in The Government of the Australian States, 
ed. S. R. Davis, Longmans, Melbourne, 1960, p. 251. In his history of secondary education in 
Queensland, Rupert Goodman argues that as early as the mid-nineteenth century it is probable 
that Queenslanders saw themselves 'in many ways different from those who lived in other parts 
of Australia'. See R. Goodman, Secondary Education in Queensland, 1860-1960, Australian 
National University Press, Canberra, 1968, p. 20. Sir Robert Menzies claimed that 'Queensland is 
all wrong' after a swing to Labor in Queensland in 1961 almost unseated his government. See R. 
Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland From 1915 to the 1980s, University of Queensland Press, St. 
10 
some foundation can be understood, in part, by reference to Queensland's political 
culture. As well as 'working the system',^ Bjelke-Petersen was also able to derive 
support by tapping into ideas and impulses which, although widespread in his 
electorate, were not as prevalent in other states.'* 
In attempting to explain Queensland's political culture, most commentators draw on 
environmental factors that differentiate Queensland fi"om the rest of Australia. Among 
the most often cited are climate, decentralisation, rural orientation, reliance on 
primary production, distance between centres of population, lower levels of schooling 
and proximity to frontier days.^ These would seem to belong to general rather than 
political culture, and while the separation of the two, as Sidney Verba acknowledges, 
is somewhat artificial, the distinction permits one to focus on those attitudes which 
are most relevant for politics.* It is, nevertheless, likely, but not inevitable, that a close 
relationship will exist between political and general culture. Verba illustrates this with 
an example which, co-incidentally, is applicable to the Queensland of the Bjelke-
Petersen era: 
...if the basic cultural orientation toward the environment is one of mastery over 
nature rather than passivity, this too would have an effect on political 
orientations...Insofar as the political culture committed a society to master and 
manipulate its physical environment, it is likely that the government will be expected 
to be an active agent in the process.' 
Because of the linkages between general and political culture, this chapter explores 
the factors most often cited as defining Queensland difference. For example, there is a 
considerable body of research that suggests the acceptance of an authoritarian 
government and a premier whose leadership style was primarily populist, was related 
to the rural nature of the state. Although the main focus of this chapter and the next 
Lucia, 1984, p. 223. 
P. Coaldrake, Working the System, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1989. 
Richard Hofstadter makes a similar point about the American Right. See The Paranoid Style in 
American Politics and Other Essays, Vintage Books, New York, 1964, p. xi. 
Lunn, op. cit; M. B. Cribb, 'Queensland' in Country to National, ed. B. Costar and D. 
Woodward, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985, pp. 68-81. 
S. Verba, 'Conclusion' in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. L. W. Pye, and S. 
Verba, Princeton University Press, Princton, N.J., 1965, p. 522. 
II 
will be on political culture during the Bjelke-Petersen era, it also ranges beyond these 
years. Many of the characteristics attributed to the Bjelke-Petersen era were cleady 
visible before his time and many continued after his demise. I have, however, drawn a 
line at this point, first for the sake of tidiness, and second, because the election of the 
Goss Labor government soon after Bjelke-Petersen's enforced retirement, may have 
indicated a shift in Queensland's political culture.* It is, however, beyond the scope of 
this thesis to explore that possibility. First, though, the concept of political culture 
requires clarification. 
Political culture 
The study of political culture in a general sense is as old as history and human 
curiosity.^ The recognition that political institutions will function most effectively 
when supported by a compatible culture is not a new idea. Montesquieu, for example, 
suggested that 'government most comfortable to nature is that whose particular 
disposition relates best to the disposition of the people for whom it is established."" In 
the modem era, the formal study of political culture owes much to Gabriel Almond 
and Sidney Verba's cross cultural study. The Civic Culture.^^ This grew, in part, from 
an earher article by Almond in which he defines political culture as a term which 
refers to 'specifically political orientations - attitudes towards the political system and 
its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system."^ Variations 
in the patterns of orientation mean that each community has a distinctive political 
culture shaped by a range of factors that include 'traditions, historical memories, 
ibid. 
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motives, norms, emotions and symbols.'" Following Talcott Parsons and Edward 
Shils, Almond and Verba see these orientations as including cognitive, affective and 
evaluative dimensions. In other words, citizens have knowledge and feelings about 
aspects of the political system and make judgements about it. 
The Civic Culture focuses on the political attitudes and beliefs about democracy held 
by the residents of the five countries surveyed. Almond and Verba suggest that there 
are three broad political orientations: the parochial, the subject and the participant. In 
parochial political cultures, such as African tribal societies, there are no speciahsed 
political roles and nothing is expected of the political system. Subject political 
cultures have high expectations of the output of political systems, but the subjects 
themselves are not active participants. In participant political cultures, members are 
oriented to both inputs and outputs. Almond and Verba argue that democracy is 
sustained by the civic culture, which they define as an allegiant participant culture of 
the kind found in the United States and Britain.'" Their assumptions about democracy 
and the civic culture produced a spate of criticism and some reconsideration by 
Almond and Verba themselves.'^ Whilst much of the criticism dwelt on the notion of 
civic culture and Almond and Verba's suppositions about the nature of democracy, 
some of the critical comment does suggest that a refinement and clarification of the 
concept should be undertaken prior to concentrating upon an examination of 
Queensland's political culture. 
One problem highlighted by a section of the debate on The Civic Culture is the 
difficulty of establishing a causal link between political culture and various political 
outcomes. Although Almond and Verba make it clear that they believe that certain 
attitudes affect the attainment or maintenance of democracy, this is by no means easy 
to prove.'^ Kavanagh articulates the problem clearly: 'if we establish a connection 
between (1) stable democracy and (2) the civic culture, or (3) a deferential political 
culture, or (4) congruent authority relations, then how do we establish the direction of 
D. Kavanagh, Political Culture, MacMillan, London, 1972, p. 10. 
''' Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 30. 
Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited. 
B. Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, Collier, MacMillan, London, 1970, p. 50 
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the causal link?"^ Instances like post-Nazi Germany, where there were deliberate 
attempts to transform the political culture into one supportive of democracy, and 
Margaret Thatcher's Britain where there were attempts to change behaviour by the 
creation of an 'enterprise culture', demonstrate the belief that political culture has a 
direct effect on the political system. It is unlikely, however, that changes to political 
culture will occur quickly, or indeed, that they can be brought about by 'top-down' 
decree. In the then West Germany, political institutions also changed, lending support 
to Barry's suggestion that it is plausible to reverse the sequence and argue that 
democratic institutions produce a civic culture.'* Thatcher's government also altered 
the tax system and social policy, providing institutional support for the development 
of the firee market economy and enterprise culture her government favoured." It 
seems clear that cultural and systemic factors are usually mutually supportive and that 
isolating the impact of culture with any degree of precision may be too ambitious a 
project. Rather, culture is most usefully seen as a context in which social events, 
behaviours and institutions can be described intelligibly.^" 
In Queensland, the political culture has supported a series of authoritarian, 
development oriented and anti-intellectual governments.^' These governments, to 
which can be added that of Bjelke-Petersen, have been accepted as legitimate by the 
Queensland voters whether or not such persons in fact voted for them. This is so of 
most democratic and all Westminster systems which are predicated on a legitimate 
political role being accorded to both the duly elected government and the opposition. 
Such conflict as occurs between government and opposition 'concerns only secondary 
aims and means, whilst a general political philosophy and the fundamental bases of 
the system are accepted by both sides.'^^ There is a high degree of congruence 
between the citizens' attitudes towards the political system and the values and 
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Almond and Verba accounted for the political stability of Britain and the United 
States by assuming that, as democracies, they already possessed a civic culture." 
Democracy, however, remains undefined and the democratic standard against which 
groups are being measured is not specified.-" Although those particular criticisms 
were generated by The Civic Culture, they raise questions about the general concept 
of political culture, and the standards by which specific cultural orientations are 
measured. Political culture is a concept that often derives meaning through 
comparison. Thus Britain is said to have a deferential culture, especially when 
compared with that of the United States; Germany's political culture is authoritarian 
when compared with Britain and the United States, but may not be dramatically so 
when compared with Austria; and, the evidence suggests, Queensland's political 
culture is authoritarian, rurally oriented and conservative." In most instances, the 
reader must infer from the text that a comparison is being made between Queensland 
and the rest of Australia - or possibly other representative democracies in the 
developed world which are more participatory, more urban and less conservative. The 
standards against which Queensland's political culture is being measured are not 
always made explicit. In all probability, Queensland's political culture would be 
perceived differently if comparisons had been made with South Africa or Alabama 
during the same era. 
Other criticisms suggest that the political culture approach, concentrating as it does on 
both observable and recorded behaviour, subjective judgements and feelings is biased 
towards a one-dimensional view of power. Marxist critics refute the assumption, 
implicit in the concept of political culture, that the values and attitudes of ordinary 
citizens matter and are independently generated. Instead, they return to Marx's 
proposition that, in any era, the ruling ideas will be the ideas that support the interests 
of a ruling class. Political culture, therefore, is hegemonic, being derivative of the 
social and economic structure.^* Even if this is so, it does not invalidate a political 
culture approach in order to understand why and how the ruling ideas in Queensland 
Kavanagh, op. cit., p. 66 and C. Pateman,'The Civic Culture: A Philosophic Critique' in The 
Civic Culture Revisited, pp. 57-102. 
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were different in emphasis from those in other parts of Australia and why a populist 
premier survived in Queensland when most of his contemporaries in other Australian 
states fitted the new managerialist mould. 
Critiques relying on either Marxist or elite theory do, however, draw attention to the 
fact that ruling class or elite ideas carry more weight than do those of an ordinary 
citizen, and indeed, will tend to shape the views of ordinary citizens. It is highly likely 
that when the 'Queensland is different' theme was articulated by politicians, 
joumahsts and academics, it influenced the view Queenslanders held of themselves. 
Certainly there are likely to be differences between the culture of the rulers and the 
ruled although the magnitude of such differences will probably vary considerably 
depending on whether the culture is parochial or participatory." 
The reality, that even in the most participatory of societies there exists a large 
uninvolved mass public, has provoked further criticism of the concept of political 
culture, on the grounds that it assumes most people actually hold reasonably coherent 
and meaningful political opinions and attitudes. A body of empirical research 
suggests that this may not be the case.^ ^ Philip Converse found the mass of people in 
the United States to be 'remarkably innocent' concerning participation in the creation 
and understanding of those ideas which resulted in political behaviour.^' Erwin 
Hargrave suggests that as few as ten per cent of American voters have consistent 
liberal or conservative ideologies.^" Hans Klingemann's survey of citizens in five 
nations confirms that 'only a relatively small segment of the population in the 
countries under study gives ideological concepts high centrality in political belief 
systems.'^' Local research is consistent with these findings. Ian McAllister found that 
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in other liberal democracies, most citizens display liftle, or at best, modest levels of 
ideological thinking'." Only three out of ten Australian voters 'demonstrate a 
reasonable level of sophistication in evaluating polities'." Such findings, however, are 
contradicted by the results of surveys in Great Britain undertaken by Elinor 
Scarbrough and surveys of voters in British Columbia by David Elkins. Scarborough 
found that over half the respondents held 'a set of beliefs as ideologically well-
ordered as we find in the political thinking of leading figures in the Conservative or 
Labour Parties'.^'' Elkins found that on issues which voters considered of great 
importance, they were able to provide sophisticated analysis.^^ Some of the 
differences in findings may be accounted for in the different ways in which 
ideological conceptualisation was defined and measured. Klingemann, for example, 
suggests that while the proportion of the population with sophisticated ideological 
knowledge is small, a considerable portion of the population in the countries surveyed 
has the capability for ideological thinking when it is mobilised by an elite and 'if one 
sets the definition widely and does not demand a high degree of active use of 
ideological concepts'.•** He rejects a simple elite-mass model in favour of a model 
with differentiated strata of ideologues whose use of ideological arguments is affected 
by situational factors such as the presence of public debate carried on in ideological 
terms." Such situational factors might explain the growth in the proportion of 
ideologues in the United States from 1956 to 1974.^ ^ So too might the greater 
availability of higher education. If education is a factor, it is likely that the number of 
ideological sophisticates in Queensland during the Bjelke-Petersen era was low 
because educational levels in the state at this time were also low.-'' 
The variable results of surveys designed to test ideological knowledge make it 
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informs the attitudes of voters in representative democracies. Analysts are on firmer 
ground when they shift from tests of ideological sophistication to an examination of 
knowledge of the political system itself In Australia, researchers have found that 
political knowledge is limited. For example, a 1994 survey commissioned by the 
Civics Expert Group who reported on the need for civics and citizenship education in 
Australia found that: 
Only 19 per cent of people have some understanding of what Federation meant for 
Australia's system of government. Only 18 per cent know something about the 
content of the Constitution. Only 40 per cent can name the two federal houses of 
parliament and only 24 per cent know that senators are elected on a state-wide basis. 
Sixty per cent lack knowledge about how the Constitution can be changed, despite 
having voted in referendums. Only 33 per cent have some knowledge of the rights 
and responsibilities of citizens... "" 
In Queensland, Colin Hughes found that voters' knowledge of their parliamentary 
representatives and ministers was severely limited. In a 1963 survey, only 29% of 
voters in the electorate of Ryan could name their MHR, who had been representing 
them for almost fourteen years."' In 1966 Hughes asked voters to identify ministers in 
the Nicklin Cabinet. Just six out of twelve ministers were known to 10 per cent or 
more of the sample."^ Twenty-three years later, in 1989, Whip and Hughes, referring 
to four surveys conducted between 1977 and 1989, observe that 'overall it is clear that 
knowledge of cabinet ministers is not widespread. A substantial proportion of the 
electorate manages without knowing, or perhaps one should say on the evidence of 
the surveys, being able to recall, any of them.'"^ This may be related to lack of 
interest. A 1972 survey of Brisbane voters, taken three weeks before the state election, 
found that 19% of the sample had no interest in politics at all, and less than half were 
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Such surveys, which appear to reveal a great divide in knowledge between political 
elites and the mass of voters, are dealing with specific, if not targeted, political 
knowledge. The focus is on the cognitive dimension of political orientation. Inglehart, 
however, argues that surveys like Converse's, which focus on the cognitive 
dimension, fail to reveal underlying affective orientations."^ Many people may hold 
strong feelings about political systems, but be unable to present a coherent view in 
response to surveys, although this is disputed by Scarbrough. Citizens do, 
nevertheless, have feelings about political issues and are prepared to pass political 
judgements on the basis of what may appear to be flimsy and anecdotal information. 
Indeed, as the last surveys above would indicate, the voters in Queensland apparently 
do so regularly. Findings which indicate that many citizens' political knowledge is 
sparse and contradictory do not diminish the usefulness of the political culture 
approach, but require recognition that a political culture is not a monolith, but rather 
an aggregate of sub-cultures including informed elites, the politically ignorant and 
many in-between."* Such distinctions have rarely been acknowledged in any treatment 
of Queensland political culture, albeit that Christine Smith recognises regional and 
sub-regional differences and Humphrey McQueen acknowledges class and sectional 
divisions."^ More often than not, in order to accentuate the perceived difference 
between Queensland and other states, the former's political culture has been treated as 
an integrated whole. Yet any examination of political culture which relies on public 
documents and the activities of politicians will necessarily be biased towards the 
political opinions and orientations of elite males with relatively high socio-economic 
status and wielding considerable political power. Even within this group, there are 
meaningful cultural differences. For example. Sir Robert Sparkes' membership of 
Queensland's squattocracy distinguished him from Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen's origins 
in an immigrant farming community. Nevertheless, the widespread acceptance of the 
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Fitzgerald era, suggests considerable overlap between elite and mass political cultures 
or perhaps hegemonic dominance by the former of the lafter. Lack of congruence 
between elite and mass political culture would probably have led to considerably 
more conflict than was then evident in Queensland. Such overt opposition as there 
was to the Bjelke-Petersen government over issues such as the Springbok tour, street 
march legislation and the destruction of the Bellevue hotel did not jeopardise that 
govemjnent's electoral success and may even have enhanced it."** 
Although political culture is a rather ambiguous concept, it remains extremely helpful 
in explaining and understanding a government like Bjelke-Petersen's, which appeared 
broadly in harmony with the attitudes and expectations of the Queensland community. 
The political culture was not monolithic and many Queenslanders were ignorant of 
aspects of the political system, but there was sufficient congruence between the values 
and attitudes of the society's major groups, and those of the Bjelke-Petersen 
government, for the latter to be accepted as legitimate by the former. Many of these 
beliefs and attitudes, along with the Bjelke-Petersen government itself, appeared to 
deviate from the contemporaneous Australian pattern. It was the extent of this 
perceived divergence that fostered arguments as to whether and to what extent 
'Queensland was different'. 
'Queensland is different' 
There are two main schools of thought on the 'Queensland is different' issue. One 
school agrees with the proposition, whilst the second concurs with Denis Murphy that 
claims of Queensland difference are based on image or myth, rather than reality."' The 
arguments from both sides of the debate will be considered, but the view which I will 
put in this chapter is that despite many characteristics shared with other Australian 
states, Queensland's political culture was sufficiently different to warrant separate 
consideration. There appears to be ample evidence to support Holmes and Sharman's 
'hypothesis of "diversity in unity", identifying both homogenous and non-
The Bjelke-Petersen government won two by-elections during the Springbok Rugby Union tour: 
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homogeneous strands which give the Australian political culture a characteristic 
federal cast.'^° 
Enough homogeneity between Queensland and the rest of Australia existed, however, 
for Denis Murphy to dismiss claims of Queensland difference and consign them to the 
realms of political mythology, largely manufactured by a Premier who promoted a 
close identification of himself and Queensland. Although the separation of myth from 
reality is important for Murphy's argument, effective political myths are rarely 
perceived as false because, their 'fundamental assumptions, whether they be actually 
true or false, are believed by the mass of the world to be true with such confidence 
that they hardly bear the character of assumptions.'^' Belief is likely to be 
strengthened when the myth in question, like 'Queensland is different', is highly 
functional in uniting Queensland voters in support of their state government, in 
providing the Labor opposition with a useful tag as a cover for its own ineptitude, and 
in providing food for journalistic and academic speculation." Even if Murphy were 
correct, and Queensland was not markedly different from the rest of Australia, the 
widespread belief that it was, is significant for an understanding of Queensland 
politics. 
It is worth noting for any attempt to understand and define Queensland's political 
culture that Murphy does not dispute the reality of state authoritarianism, anti-
intellectualism, political pragmatism and tolerance of corruption. His argument is not 
that these hallmarks were absent from Queensland, but rather that they were not 
unique: 
I am not aware that the histories of the other states indicate that they are without the 
sins of authoritarianism, gerrymandering or political jobbery and therefore qualified 
to cast the first (and subsequent) stones. Authoritarianism and anti-mtellectualism 
don't seem to have been any weaker in other states than they have been in 
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Queensland." 
Australian political culture 
Certainly, many analysts of Australian culture have identified national characteristics 
matching those claimed for Queensland. In Almond and Verba's terms, Australia has 
a subject-participant political culture where the orientation is towards the outputs of 
government rather than the inputs of citizens.^" Only a minority of citizens actively 
participates in the political process. The majority is passive. The political system 
periodically displays 'strong paternalistic tendencies, which may seriously restrict 
both the experience and self-confidence of the small minority of active participants'." 
Don Aitkin captures the nature of the subject-participant orientation well: 
...a society with an initiating government is likely to have poorly developed 
institutions of local response and a poorly developed sense of personal political 
responsibility among its citizens. The whole point of our politics is not, alas, to 
develop the powers and self-confidence of the citizen but to gain control of central 
government or to become its official adviser.^* 
These characteristics have long been evident in Australia. French socialist, Albert 
Metin, visiting Australia at the turn of the century, wrote that both labour and capital 
were motivated by material rather than ideological considerations, and were prepared 
to use the state to advance those interests." These views were reinforced by Charles 
Henry Pearson whose researches during twenty years in Australia caused him to 
portray a domineering, 'all-embracing state ... able to compel obedience' which had 
expanded not according to 'the English theory of government' but in response to 







Enduring Legend', Social Alternatives, vol. 5, no. 4, November, 1986, p. 45. 
Murphy, op. cit., p. 89. 
See, for example, C. A. Hughes, 'Political Culture' in Australian Politics: A Third Reader, ed. H. 
Mayer and H. Nelson, Cheshire, 1973, p. 140. Hughes finds 'overtones of a subject aspect to 
Australian political culture' and suggests an equilibrium between subject and participant cultures'. 
Hugh Emy classifies Australia as a subject-participant culture. See 'The Roots of Australian 
Politics' Politics, vol. VII, no.l. May, pp. 12-30. 
ibid., p. 27. 
D. Aitkin, 'Australian Political Culture', Australian Cultural History, no. 5, 1986, p. 9. 
Albert Metin in S. Encel, Equality and Authority: A Study of Class, Status and Power in 
Australia, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1970, pp. 200-201. 
Charles Henry Pearson in A. W. Martin, 'Australia and the Hartz "fragment" Thesis', Australian 
22 
Australian geography meant that the state had an early and interventionist role as a 
provider of goods and services. 
The most celebrated articulation of these ideas can be found in Sir Keith Hancock's 
Australia.^'^ In what was to become an enduring theme in analyses of Australia's 
political culture, Hancock finds a paradoxical relationship between individualism, 
egalitarianism and the growth of state power. The collective power of the state is at 
the service of the individual, each of whom felt free to lobby government on behalf of 
particular interests. According to Hancock, 'swarms of petty appetites attack the great 
common services for which the Government has made itself responsible. A multitude 
of fi"agmented interests assail the common interest.'^" In responding to this assault, the 
paternalistic state must ensure equality even at the expense of talent: 
Australian democracy has done much to equalise opportunities, but it has also done 
something to narrow them. It is properly anxious that everybody should run a fair 
race. It is improperly resentful if anybody runs a fast race. Indeed, it dislikes 
altogether the idea of a race, for in a race victory is to the strong. Its solicitude is for 
the weak, and its instinct is to make merit take a place in the queue.*' 
Forty years after Hancock, Encel describes the consequences of egalitarianism 
bluntly: 'the search for equality of the redistributive kind breeds bureaucracy: 
bureaucracy breeds authority; and authority undermines the equality which bred it'." 
Richard Rosecrance, in his application of Louis Hartz's 'fragment' theory to 
Australia, also emphasises the significance of utilitarian and egalitarian values in 
shaping Australia's culture." Hartz had argued in The Founding of New Societies that 
colonies were shaped by the beliefs which had dominated the parent society at the 
time of their foundation. The United States, for example, was characterised by 
Lockean liberalism because that was the dominant belief in Britain at the time the 
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influences in Great Britain and therefore was shaped by utilitarian and egalitarian 
values. Rosecrance was criticised for overstating the 'Irish-convict Chartist' influence 
to the detriment of local environmental factors"" and for failing to recognise the 
bourgeois values of many Australians," but no one questioned his attribution of 'the 
philosophy of practical materialism' as 'an operative creed' in Australia."" Indeed, 
there is a long tradition of claiming that material 'progress' and 'development' have 
been the central pillars of Australian politics, society and economy."^ 
In such an environment politicians have held their jobs by providing railways, roads, 
water supply, better working conditions, tariffs and marketing schemes."^ Their status 
has always been low and this, combined with an emphasis on practical materialism, 
has fostered low standards of public behaviour that sometimes bordered on the 
corrupt. Encel reports, drawing on the observations of other commentators, that 
among members of parliament 'lack of standards, or abuse of privilege, are 
widespread.'"' The Australian component of the 1983 International Values Survey 
found that less than half the respondents were willing to express much confidence in 
either the Commonwealth parliament or public service.™ Perhaps cynicism and low 
public standards are to be expected in the light of Australia's convict origins and the 
depredations of the 'Rum' Corps, but the pattern of corruption established in these 
early years continued, with confusion among colonial Treasury men as to where the 
boundary between public duty and private interest lay.'' Whilst it could be argued that 
patronage was a characteristic of British and Australian governments until the 
Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of 1854, corruption was still 'the bread and butter of 
New South Wales politics by the 1890s'.'^ The twentieth century has also been 
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especially at state level. The following are examples of corruption or impropriety 
conspicuous enough to warrant official inquiry: Commonwealth: Costigan Royal 
Commission on the Activities of the Federated Ship Painters' and Dockers' Union; 
Williams Inquiry into Drugs; Royal Commission into the Australian Meat Industry; 
Inquiry into M. J. Young's Customs Declarations; Special Parliamentary Inquiry into 
the Conduct of the Hon. Justice Murphy; Stewart Royal Commissions into the 
Activities of the Nugan Hand Group, Drug Trafficking and the Alleged Telephone 
Interceptions (Age Tapes); New South Wales: Moffit Royal Commission into 
Organised Crime in Clubs in New South Wales; Woodward Royal Commission into 
Drug Trafficking; Nagle Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons; Lusher 
Inquiry into New South Wales Police Administration; Street Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into Certain Committal Proceedings against K. E. Humphreys; Cross Special 
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Allegations by the Right Honourable Ian 
McCahon Sinclair; Slattery Special Commission of Inquiry into Certain Allegations 
by R. Boftom; Victoria: Beach Board of Inquiry into Allegations Against Members of 
the Victorian Police Force; Gowan Board of Inquiry into Certain Land Purchases by 
the Housing Commission and Questions Arising therefrom; Frost and Ellwood Royal 
Commission into Certain Housing Commission Land Purchases and Other Matters; 
Nicholson Board of Inquiry Relating to Certain Mafters within the City of Richmond; 
Queensland: Gibbs Royal Commission into the National Hotel Allegations; 
O'Connell Inquiry into the Southport Befting Case; Lucas Committee of Inquiry into 
the Enforcement of Criminal Law in Queensland; Sturgess Inquiry into Sexual 
Offences Involving Children and Related Matters." 
Abuse of office is but one of many characteristics in Australian political culture which 
observers have identified. In a summary of the literature, McAllister identifies five 
major cultural themes: utilitarianism; egalitarianism; conformism; collectivism and 
materialism.^" According to McAllister, utilitarianism left a legacy of a pragmatic, 
rather than an ideological approach to politics, and a rehance on law to regulate 
society. He draws on Russel Ward's interpretation of Australia's frontier experience 
" ibid., p. 12 
S. Prasser, 'The Fate of Inquiries' in Prasser, Wear and Nethercote, op. cit., pp. 118-19. 
"^ I. McAllister, Political Behaviour, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1992, pp. 21-27. 
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to explain the importance of egalitarianism in Australia." Whilst the American 
frontier of small landholders produced an emphasis on liberalism, the Australian 
pastoral frontier with its large itinerant workforce fostered egalitarianism. This was 
reinforced by the experience of Gallipoli and led to an emphasis on the role of the 
state in ensuring a 'fair go' for all. Other writers have extended Ward's rather 
romantic view to suggest that this process fostered the growth of a dominant, if not 
authoritarian state, with 'a passion for rule making'. Conformism too, can be traced to 
the frontier and the settlers' reliance on each other for survival. It can be found in 
contemporary Australia in the enthusiasm for legalism and opposition to 'tall-
poppies'. Collectivism also has its origins in the frontier experience of a rural 
workforce that led to the establishment of the union movement, the Labor Party and 
the utilitarian state which Hancock described. Collectivism in Australia was expressed 
not in the development of co-operative movements, but in the growth of state power. 
The final theme which McAllister finds is materialism which manifests itself in 'an 
undue emphasis on physical lifestyle' and anti-intellectualism.^" Even an historian like 
Humphrey McQueen, who disagrees with Russel Ward over the origins and nature of 
Australian radicalism, identifies similar characteristics to those already cited." 
McQueen, too, finds that Australia's political culture is materialist, pragmatic, 
repressive and racist. The last characteristic is associated with authoritarian 
personalities and cultures. McQueen also provides some support for the proposition 
that the urge for material gain was so strong among Australians that it could lead to 
dishonesty. Colonial culture, he argues, was dominated by the necessity to make 
money, 'honestly if you can, but you must make money'.^* 
The linkages between egalitarianism, authoritarianism, materialism and anti-
intellectualism are apparent. In Australia, egalitarianism sought expression in material 
terms and relied on state authority to provide an environment in which the individual 
could prosper. How these relationships work is described nicely by a backbench 
member of the federal parliament: 
R. Ward, The Australian Legend, Oxford University Press, Melboume, 1958. 
"^ McAllister, op.cit., p. 27. 
H. McQueen, A New Britannia, Penguin, Ringwood, Vic, 1986. 
'^  ibid., p. 130. 
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There's a very strong commitment to the tangible, to the here and now in Australia. It means 
that people are not really interested in political ideas ...you can make a very effective appeal 
to fear or greed or anxiety, which turns people towards a kind of simple-minded authoritarian 
approach^' 
This is aided by Australia's hybrid political system. The combination of federalism 
with parliamentary government provides a confusing and complex environment in 
which corruption is often overlooked.^" Added to this is the usually long terms of 
electoral dominance either by non-Labor or the ALP, in which the opposition is seen 
not as an alternative government but as an enemy to be kept at bay.^' The material 
orientation is further enhanced by geographic and demographic factors which have 
combined to facilitate 'the view of politics as a continuous and timeless exercise in 
"development."*^ Consistently high living standards and little direct contact with the 
effects of war meant that Australians were confronted by few problems that could not 
be solved in practice.^^ As Richard Hofstadter observed of the United States, such a 
practical bias translates into a suspicion of intellect and intellectuals who, as an elite, 
offend not only against pragmatism but egalitarianism too.^" In addition, it is 
conceivable that these characterisfics are connected with the rather 'easy-going 
standards' that the Australian public applies when confronted by possible conflicts of 
interest between ministerial position and private interests.*^ Being over-scrupulous 
about such matters could be seen as elevating oneself above the crowd, many of 
whom do not rank the pursuit of material advancement at the expense of government 
as much of a crime. It may be the case that if government is perceived as the servant 
of special interests, rather than as an embodiment of the general will, official 
corruption is seen as an extension of the former, rather than an offence against the 
latter. If, as also appears to be the case, there is little respect for government, breaking 
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regulation by business in Australia are rarely enforced, there is seldom any public 
reaction to this omission.^" 
This brief survey indicates widespread agreement among commentators on the 
essential characteristics of Australian political culture. The overwhelming impression 
is that it is authoritarian, anti-intellectual, pragmatic and rather ambivalent about 
official malfeasance, all of which have been attributed to Queensland. This tends to 
support Denis Murphy's dismissal of claims that 'Queensland is different' and his 
belief that similar characteristics can be found in other states. Further evidence for this 
position can be found if two other long state premierships are examined: that of 
Playford in South Australian and Bolte in Victoria. 
Like Bjelke-Petersen, Playford and Bolte had their values shaped by rural 
backgrounds and all were remarkable for the self-confidence displayed from an early 
age.*^ Perhaps because of their rural upbringing, the three premiers shared a highly 
pragmatic, materialist approach to life which led to an enthusiastic pursuit of 
'development' for their respective states. Playford concentrated on transforming 
South Australia from an agricultural to an industrial state, luring investors with cheap 
land and generous infi^astructure provisions, and relegating areas such as social 
services, health, the arts and education to 'low priority' and low budget status.** Bolte, 
for his part, argued 'that development should never stop'*' and referred to his 
government's record of progress at virtually every election campaign. He made 
numerous trips abroad seeking industrial development funds and on one of these, his 
authorised biographer recounts a story that might have been told of Bjelke-Petersen; 
that Bolte preferred to stay in his room mulling over possible business deals rather 
than visit Cologne Cathedral which was opposite his hotel.''" Like Bjelke-Petersen, 
Bolte was also accused of giving favourable treatment to business friends such as Reg 
Ansett, whom he helped avoid having an unwanted dam placed on his property, and 
87 
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Jackson and Nelson, op. cit., p. 138. 
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by legislating to have Ansett Industries protected from take-over by rival firm, TNT.'^ ' 
Pragmatism also frequently characterises 'self-made' men who reach the top without 
the advantages of formal education. In the case of the three premiers, all were marked 
by a deep-seated anti-intellectualism and an antipathy towards institutions of higher 
learning. Playford, who left school at 13, referred to Adelaide's East End Market, 
where he delivered fruit fi-om the family orchard, as 'my university'.'' There are 
parallels with Bjelke-Petersen's claim that living alone in a cowbail for fifteen years 
taught him more than taking a degree at Oxford.'^ None of the premiers could hide his 
contempt for academics to whom Bolte referred as 'snoozers' and 'bullfrogs'.'" 
All three premiers dominated their respective states, although Playford was less 
pubUcly intransigent than either Bolte or Bjelke-Petersen. Like Bjelke-Petersen, 
however, Playford was assisted in holding power by a system of rural weightage 
based on a 2 : 1 ratio. In arguing for the retention of the 'Playmander', Playford made 
the rather astonishing and Bjelke-Petersen-like claim that 'I have studied this matter 
extensively and can find no mandate for even supposing that there is such a principle 
in electoral matters as "one vote one value".''^ A further illustration of the similarides 
among the three premiers lies in the fact that they all acted as if they were leaders of 
unitary states rather than of sub-national portions of a federation. All resented having 
their power curtailed by the Commonwealth, even when federal government was 
dominated by their own parties. 
Although Playford and Bolte were the premiers most like Bjelke-Petersen, other 
examples can be found: 
. . . premier 'presidents' are not a new phenomenon in state politics. Premiers with 
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anything, a characteristic of state politics.'" 
Given the overlap of state and national political cultures, it is not surprising to find 
shared characteristics among these 'small time autocrats, often disguised ... as State 
premiers'.'' For example, Tasmanian Premier Eric Recce (1958-69, 1972-75) 
exhibited a contempt for parliamentary procedure that was the equal of Bjelke-
Petersen's.'* Sir Robert Askin (New South Wales 1965-1975) accepted polifical 
donations personally." Like members of Bjelke-Petersen's cabinet and family, and Sir 
Henry Bolte, Askin also accepted shares in Comalco Ltd before they were publicly 
listed.'°° Also like Bjelke-Petersen, Premiers Dowding (Western Australia 1988-90), 
Cain, (Victoria, 1982-90) and Holgate (1981-82) all adjourned parliament before an 
election in order to protect their government's position from opposition attack.'"' 
David Brand (Western Australia 1959-71) and Robin Gray (1982-89) both portrayed 
opponents of development as unpatriotic wreckers. Charles Court (Western Australia, 
1974-82) 'was so psychologically committed to the development of Western Australia 
that it made it well-nigh impossible for him to accept the views of those who sought 
to quesfion the policy of helter-skeUer development'.'"' Neville Wran (New South 
Wales 1976-86) prioritised the development of Hunter Valley coal over 
environmental considerations.'"^ His government was weakened by 'a steady barrage 
of allegations regarding, in particular, corruption in the administration of justice in the 
lower courts, the police force and the prison system...""" Brian Burke (Western 
Australia, 1983-1988) the principal architect of WA Incorporated presided over a host 
of deals • which 'reveal[ed] a web of government, personal and financial 
interrelationships'.'"' Both he and his Liberal predecessor, Ray O'Connor, were 
imprisoned for corruption. Unfil the 1995 state election, Wayne Goss (Queensland, 
'" E. Chaples, H. Nelson and K. Turner (eds). The Wran Model, Electoral Politics in New South 
Wales 1981 and 1984, Oxford University Press, Melboume, 1985, p. 245. 
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1989-1995) dominated his state as Bjelke-Petersen had, giving credence to Eckstein's 
claim that modem societies will adapt to situational change by cultural pattern 
maintenance: in other words, the more things change, the more they will remain the 
same.'"" 
Clearly many similarities exist between Queensland and Australian political culture 
and aspects of the leadership styles of Bjelke-Petersen and some other state premiers. 
Indeed it is reassuring for anyone attempting to describe Queensland's political culture 
to find so much consensus on the nature of both Australian and Queensland political 
cultures. Arguments about Queensland's difference, then, are not about the basic 
characteristics of Queensland's political culture. Rather they concern the extent to 
which such characteristics were shared with the rest of Australia. The evidence as 
presented above, suggests a considerable degree of overlap. However, similarities can 
be perceived between states - and countries- without leading to the conclusion that 
they are identical. For example, few countries have remained untouched by 
corruption; only in recent years have the virtues of material progress or 'development' 
been consistently doubted anywhere in the modem world, and pragmatism rather than 
idealism has long characterised both the British political system and its offshoots.'"' 
Whilst overarching similarities can be recognised, Kavanagh's criticism of The Civic 
Culture, that 'greater appreciation of the variations within the overall pattem is 
certainly in order', is apposite.'"* This is particularly so in a federation like Australia 
where the various colonies had different historical foundations and had already forged 
separate identities prior to federation. State boundaries 'represent real discontinuities 
between different patterns of social interaction.""' Holmes and Sharman remark: 
that there are significant differences between the political behaviour of the residents 
of the six states that cannot be explained without some reference to the political 
salience of region and the existence of regional political cultures. Both of these 
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factors, the existence of dual loyalties and regional political diversity are a part of the 
working and maintenance of a federal form of government "" 
Holmes and Sharman found variations in state responses to a range of issues. For 
example, in an index of conservatism constmcted from the results of a 1973 survey, 
albeit from a limited range of questions, they found that the highest number of 
conservative responses was from Queensland.'" Further support for variations in state 
perspectives is given by Anderson and Westem's survey of state differences in 
authoritarian attitudes. They report that whilst 'Australian teachers are generally more 
authoritarian than those from New Zealand, U.K. and U.S.A ... the teachers from 
Queensland stood out among the Australian states as most authoritarian.'"^ Ann and 
Roger Scott also point to variations among the states and territories in decision 
making styles and dominant values which impact on education policy making, and 
presumably, on other policy decisions."^ Opinion polls conducted in 1971, that asked 
questions about sexual behaviour, found Queensland 'the most conservative and least 
permissive state.'"" 
The fact that Bjelke-Petersen governed long after Playford had been replaced by Don 
Dunstan, then Steele Hall, Dunstan again, Des Corcoran, David Tonkin and John 
Bannon, and Bolte had been superseded by Rupert (Dick) Hamer, then Lindsay 
Thompson and John Cain, suggests, at the very least, that Queensland was different in 
persisting with a populist premier long after the species had died out in other states."^ 
This was a difference in degree and anchored in the reality of the spread of primary 
industry, regionalism, low levels of migration and education. As Humphrey McQueen 
observes: 
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...there is something to the view that Queensland residents are different; on average, 
they are much less educated, very much less urbanised, more likely to be Australian 
bom, and less likely to work in a factory."" 
Research in both Australia and elsewhere has found consequences for political culture 
in these characteristics. 
"" McQueen, 'Queensland: A State of Mind', p. 43. 
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CHAPTER 2 
QUEENSLAND DIFFERENCE EXPLORED 
Seymour Lipset's observation that 'every country has a South'^ appears vindicated in 
the Australian context by the common epithet applied to Queensland during the 
Bjelke-Petersen era: the 'Deep North'. Like the American South, Queensland seemed 
to be distinguishable from the rest of the nation by its rural nature and comparative 
backwardness and intolerance. Much evidence suggests that factors such as low levels 
of education and lack of cultural diversity were related to Queensland's decentralised 
mral economy. Thus, Queenslanders were exposed to a comparatively limited range 
of views and were inclined to be conservative, if not authoritarian, in their political 
and social choices. 
An authoritarian personality is one who is 'submissive to powerful figures, 
discomforted by the ambiguity and uncertainties of democratic processes, and 
rejecting toward different or unfamiliar groups.'2 It is likely that authoritarian leaders 
will prove attractive to followers whose personality stmcture is similar and whilst the 
leaders themselves are not necessarily submissive to another person, they may act 
under the command of a higher power, such as God, Fate, History or Nature.3 
Queensland has had a succession of authoritarian premiers, culminating in Bjelke-
Petersen, who pushed the role to the limit.^ Once established, authoritarian 
institutions and practices become part of the political socialisation process whereby 
institutions and culture are mutually reinforcing. Politicians like Bjelke-Petersen, most 
of whose early socialisation occurred in mral Queensland, are part of this evolving 
interactive process. 
In Queensland, the erosion of civil liberties, the close relationship between 
^ S. M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Doubleday, New York, 1959, p. 258. 
^ J. P. Kirscht and R. C. Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and 
Theory, University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, 1967, p. 57. 
^ E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1960, pp. 191- 55. 
4 R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland from 1915 to the 1980s, University of Queensland Press, 
St Lucia, 1984; M. B. Cribb, 'Preface', The Premiers of Queensland, eds D. Murphy, R. Joyce 
and M. B. Cribb, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1978. The type may not have died 
out. Wayne Goss was frequendy accused of authoritarianism. 
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government and police, and the disregard for parliamentary traditions, all of which 
demonstrated the Bjelke-Petersen Government's scant regard for democratic practice 
and traditions, were widely accepted. Those who opposed such practices were 
portrayed as 'outsiders'. For example, one of the obstacles which Police 
Commissioner, Ray Whitrod could never overcome in his battles with the Queensland 
Police Union and the Queensland Government was that he was seen as an 'outsider' 
by both education and birth.^ Even conservative church groups who protested against 
the ban on street marches were accused by Bjelke-Petersen of being 'manipulated into 
supporting the communists',^ the ultimate outsiders. The critics, however, were 
unable to galvanise the majority of Queenslanders who tolerated Bjelke-Petersen's 
policies, even if they did not positively support him. A close examination of the 
characteristics which have been linked consistently with the development of 
authoritarian attitudes shows that these are more pronounced in Queensland than most 
other Australian states. These characteristics have also been associated with support 
for populist leaders. 
Authoritarianism 
The most influential attempt to examine the formation of authoritarian attitudes was 
The Authoritarian Personality in which Adomo and his colleagues devised the nine 
point F scale as a means of measuring the various facets of authoritarianism.^ Kelman 
and Barclay sum up the differences between high and low scorers: 
A low scorer is a person whose psychological universe is relatively wide. He sees 
events in a variety of contexts. He is aware of the existence of a range of customs, 
values and approaches to life. He expects differences between people and is tolerant 
of them. A high scorer, by contrast, is a person who moves in very narrow circles. He 
sees events only in the context of his own limited frame of reference. He does not 
recognize the existence of a range of values and approaches, and is intolerant of 
5 J. Larkin, 'Land of Thou Shalt Nots', The Age, 8 April, 1972, p. 7. 
6 H. Lunn, Joh: The Life and Political Adventures of Sir Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, University of 
Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1967, p. 261. 
^ T. W. Adomo, E. Frenkel-Bmnswik, D. J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian 
Personality, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1950. 
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differences. ° 
The Authoritarian Personality was criticised on methodological grounds and for its 
assumption that authoritarian behaviour was necessarily associated with right wing 
political beliefs.9 Nevertheless, after lengthy examination of the concept and its 
critics, Kirscht and Dillehay write that it is valid to conclude that 'those exposed to an 
impoverished and constricted social context are more likely to develop authoritarian 
tendencies'. 10 This opinion received confirmation by Levy's study of a group of 
German anti-Nazis. He found that, compared with pro-Nazis, members of this group 
came from a broader world with fewer religious, social and intellectual boundaries 
and with greater freedom from conventional thinking. ^  ^ One indicator of an 
impoverished social background is a low level of education which has also been 
linked with authoritarianism. ^ 2 Richard Christie reports after examining a range of 
studies utilising the F Scale that, 'a sizeable negative correlation exists between 
education and acceptance of F scale items'.^^ Lipset cites data gathered fi^om many 
countries to argue that education is the most important single factor differentiating 
those giving democratic responses from those who do not: 'The higher one's 
education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support 
democratic practices. All the relevant studies indicate that education is more 
significant than either income or occupation.'^^ For example, the most isolated and 
poorly educated German farmers shifted their support most dramatically to the Nazi 
Party. 15 Phillip Converse cites American data which indicate that political 
" Quoted in Kirscht and Dillehay, op. cit. p. 9. 
" On methodology, see Kirscht and Dillehay and H. H. Hyman and P. B. Sheatsley, '"The 
Authoritarian Personality" - a Methodological Critique' in Studies in the Scope and Method of 
"The Authoritarian Personality" ed. R. Christie and M. Jahoda, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 
1954, pp. 11-24; On Left authoritarianism, see Edward A. Shils, 'Authoritarianism: "Right" and 
"Left"' in Christie and Jahoda, op. cit., pp. 11-24, and M. Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, 
Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Svstems, Basic Books, New 
York, 1960. 
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involvement and knowledge decline from urban to mral areas where mean education 
also declines. 16 
Although there is evidence to support the linkage of authoritarianism with cultural 
isolation and low levels of education, caution must be exercised in claiming that this 
has been proved definitively. For example, education is difficult to isolate from other 
factors such as age, innate intelligence, economic status and opportunities. 1^  Some of 
the F scale items, especially those which measure factors such as 'belief in mystical 
determinants of the individual's fate' and 'disposition to believe that wild and 
dangerous things go on in the world' may simply reflect reality for people who are 
relatively powerless in the face of government, market forces, and physical 
environment. Lack of political participation on the part of mral dwellers may not 
indicate sentiments unsupportive of democracy but the realities of dawn to dusk 
occupations where there is often little spare cash with which to fund involvement. 
Nevertheless the empirical evidence tends fairly consistently to bear out hnks between 
cultural isolation, low levels of educafion and authoritarian attitudes. As Chrisfie puts 
it: 'One point appears well established. Scores on the F scale vary inversely with 
various measures of cultural sophistication'. 1^  Cultural sophisticafion has been 
difficult to acquire in a community like Queensland where diversity has been limited 
by rehance on mral and mining industries, decentralisation, low levels of 
immigration, patriarchy and, significantly, comparatively low levels of education. 
Most of these factors have also been associated with support for populism. 
Populism 
Populism is a term which resists easy definition, having been applied to movements as 
diverse as the U. S People's Party, Peronism in Argentina and the narodniki of Russia, 
movements characterised respectively by grass roots rebellion, authoritarian 
dictatorship and leadership by an intellectual elite. 19 It is therefore, an extremely 
elastic term, having been used to describe such contradictions as anti-elitist 
D. E. Apter, Free Press of Glencoe, London, 1964, p. 25'r 
16 ibid, p. 253. 
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movements, leadership by an elite, democracy, authoritarianism and movements of 
the Left and the Right. Writing of populist thinking in the United States, Richard 
Hofstadter portrays it as 'an undercurrent of provincial resentments, popular and 
"democratic" rebelliousness and suspiciousness, and nativism'.^O Its major premise is 
that virtue resides in the ordinary people and populist movements have been largely 
revolts by 'the people' against various elites who represent a threat to popular values 
and ways of life. Bjelke-Petersen took a typically populist position when he said: 
I believe I represent the views, thoughts and aspirations of the average person. I 
don't think of myself as other than an average person with his two feet on the 
ground. Whether you call that conservative I don't know. I call it practical and 
having sound common sense. '^ 
Popuhsm tends to emphasise 'the special quality, the "uniqueness", of the idenfity, 
culture or current situation which has produced the movement'.22 Bjelke-Petersen, for 
example, stated that 'we are not Australians - we are Queenslanders'.23 An 
advertisement for 'Joh' posters placed in regional newspapers described 'Queensland 
as the greatest country on earth' and further claimed that 'Joh helped make it that 
way.'24 By focusing on particular communities as unique, populism effectively cuts 
across class lines to form alliances among groups more usually in opposition. Support 
for Bjelke-Petersen came from mral areas, working class voters, especially in new 
growth areas like the Gold and Sunshine Coasts, the mining industry, and various 
entrepreneurs known collectively as the 'white shoe' brigade.25 
Populism has not been inconsistent with authoritarian leadership, so long as the leader 
has represented the people's will. Indeed Almond and Verba warn that authoritarian 
regimes which arise in subject-participant cultures are likely to have populist 
20 R. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, From Bryan to F. D. R., Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963, p. 
5. 
^ ' Quoted in P. Muston, 'A Christian in Polities', On Being, vol. 4, 1977, p. 6. 
^^ A. Stewart, 'The Social Roots' in Populism, Its Meanings and National Characteristics eds. G 
lonescu and E. Gellner, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969, p. 192. 
23 Quoted in C. Greenfield and P. Williams, 'Stmggling for the People: Populism V. Democracy in 
Queensland', Social Alternatives, vol. 5, no. 4, November, 1986, p. 37. 
24 Toowoomba Chronicle, 3 Oct., 1991. 
25 p. Mullins, 'Queensland: Populist Politics and Development' in The Politics of Development in 
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overtones.26 Although normally reliant on strong leaders, even without them, 
populism is almost always bound to be intolerant. The populist is a backward looking 
person who wants to return to a community where the fragmentation and complex 
division of labour of the modem world is absent. In such a homogeneous situation, 
each person would be complete and self contained. In a world without major 
divisions, there would be no reason for some people to be 'different': 
Complete men, living ideally m independent agrarian virtue, would agr^e with one 
another. Their insights would be sound, healthy, bound to appropriate pieties. Their 
judgements would be free but would coincide. Their society would be essentially 
consensual and uniform ... Moral consensus rules, or, in different language, society is 
and should be a self-righteous moral tyranny.27 
However, a form of consensus could also be achieved by overriding constitutional 
barriers designed to protect individual rights and difference. According to Lipset and 
Raub, 'the specific populist movements in American history developed a contempt for 
laws or legal institutions, legislators, agencies, or politicians, all seeming to thwart the 
direct satisfaction of the people's will.'28 For example, Huey Long, the demagogue 
Governor of Louisiana, whilst promising a better way of life for the masses, took 
control of the legislature, executive and judiciary and attempted to eliminate all 
opposition.29 In much the same way, Bjelke-Petersen demonstrated scant regard for 
institutional checks and balances, as a revealing comment on majority mle illustrates: 
'I try to do what I believe is right in accordance with this. [Christian faith] We've got 
to abide by majority mle from time to time on certain issues ...'30 When asked why he 
had declared a state of emergency over the Springbok tour but had failed to do so 
during the 1974 Queensland floods, he repUed: 'it was quite different from the 
Australia, ed. B. Head, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1986, p. 154. 
26 G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, Little Brown, Boston, 1965, pp. 25-6. 
27 
D. MacRae, 'Populism as an Ideology' in lonescu and Gellner, op. cit. 
28 
S. M. Lipset and E. Raub, The Politics of Unreason, Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-
1970, Harper & Row, New York, 1970, p. 13. 
T. Harry Williams, Huey Long Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1970. 
30 
-'^  Quoted in Muston, op. cit. pp. 4 -5. 
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Springbok tour, when people were trying to hinder us...'31 Pressure groups supporting 
the established values of the government had ease of access to decision makers whilst 
those who questioned or opposed policy, like trade unions, had their civil liberties 
curtailed.32 Writing of the reasons behind his 'Job for Canberra' campaign, Bjelke-
Petersen reveals a disturbing contempt for parliament and constitution: 
I had a long list of priorities which I knew instinctively could be done by decree 
without needing Acts of Parliament. I intended overhauling the taxation system, 
bringing the unions under control, reversing Aboriginal land rights grants, cutting out 
wasteful duplication in Canberra, stopping the use of external affairs powers to 
override state powers, and acting to end divisiveness in Australia and get the country 
going again." 
There are further similarities between the bases of Bjelke-Petersen's support and those 
of many American populists. Long's backing, like that of Father Coughlin, Joseph 
McCarthy and George Wallace, came disproportionately from people of low 
economic status with non-metropolitan backgrounds and low education levels. This is 
unsurprising, given that all emphasised the importance of better material conditions 
for low status groups as well as offering simplistic causes and solutions for the 
problems besetting America. Support for Father Coughlin amongst Catholics and 
Protestants alike, was greatest among people of low economic status. The ratio 
between support and opposition was most favourable for Coughlin in mral areas and 
small towns which were attracted by his anti-elitist and anti-cosmopolitan attitudes.34 
Support for Senator McCarthy was also disproportionately high among farmers, self-
employed businessman and manual workers.35 Survey findings indicated that: 
the relationship between less education and support of McCarthy is consistent with 
what is known about the effect of education on political attitudes in general: higher 
31 ibid, p. 243. 
32 R. Scott, P. Coaldrake, B. Head and P. Reynolds, 'Queensland', Australian State Politics, ed. B. 
Galligan, Longman Cheshire, Melboume, 1986, p. 53. 
33 
•^^ J. Bjelke-Petersen, Don't You Worry About That! The Joh Bjelke-Petersen Memoirs, Angus and 
Robertson, North Ryde, 1990, p. 214. 
Lipset and Raub, op. cit. pp. 175-8. 
35 ibid., p. 228. 
41 
education often makes for greater tolerance, greater regard for due process, and 
increased tolerance of ambiguity.36 
The pattem of support for George Wallace was similar to that for Father Coughlin and 
Joseph McCarthy, and was strongest among the less-educated mral, small-town and 
working class people.37 
In the United States, the populist revolt against the elites took many forms, including, 
in the 1970s and 80s, religious fundamentalism. In some of its manifestations, 
religious extremism, which appears to be a product of the same social forces which 
support authoritarian political attitudes, can be authoritarian.38 The fundamentalist 
God is often portrayed as a harsh and vengeful authority figure who punishes sinners, 
and many fundamentalists view the role of government in the same light.39 Like other 
varieties of populism, much of fundamentalism's appeal lies in its simplistic solutions 
to social, economic and international problems and in its response to feelings of 
anxiety about threats to traditional values such as the changing role of women, the 
rising divorce rate, and the acceptance of homosexuality. Fundamentalists reject 
debate on these issues because they believe they are already in possession of the 
revealed tmth, so that fundamentalism easily leads to intolerance and the suppression 
or denigration of altemative views.^O The fundamentalist mind is essentially 
Manichean and is not prone to seeing shades of meaning and difference: 
It cannot find serious importance in what it believes to be trifling degrees of 
difference: liberals support measures that are for all practical purposes socialistic, 
and socialism is nothing more than a variant of Communism, which, as everyone 
knows, is atheism. ^ 1 
Bjelke-Petersen used the same logic to accuse the Federal Labor Government of 
communist sympathies, the Liberal Party executive of being a Communist Party ally, 
36 ibid., p. 226. 
37 ibid., p. 361. 
38 Lipset, op. cit, p. 106; Kirscht and Dillehay, op. cit, p. 70. 
3 " E. Douvan & J. Adelson, The Adolescent Experience, John Wiley, New York, 1966, p.331. 
^^ Lipset and Raab, op. cit, p. 8. 
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and the World Council of Churches of being 'communist infiltrated'.^2 Further, the 
Council's programme to combat racism 'was formulated in Moscow and ... a 
President of the WCC was a KGB colonel'.43 JQ Bjelke-Petersen, 'Labour policy is 
socialism and the ALP is on the threshold of communism. "^ "^  He urged that Australian 
cities be ringed with a missile defence system 'something about equal to that around 
Moscow, Peking and Hanoi'.^5 Russell Hinze, Minister for Local Government and 
Main Roads, in similar vein, claimed that if the Whiflam Labor Government were re-
elected 'we will become part of this Communist scene - the USSR of the Pacific, if 
you like - and very quickly.'46 The Country Party member for Gregory, Wally Rae, 
announced that seven members of the ALP were communists with a mission to 
destroy the AWU. Even the Liberal Party was not immune. Rae claimed that the 
Liberal member for Hawthome had been elected with the support of people 
'associated with the Communist platform and outlook.'^7 These wild claims were 
supported in parliament by Jim Houghton, the Country party member for Redcliffe. In 
clinging to a cold war mentality long after it had disappeared fi-om other states, 
Bjelke-Petersen and his party colleagues were continuing a pattem established by Gair 
and Nicklin of indiscriminately applying the word 'communist' to all shades of the 
political spectmm.'^8 Bjelke-Petersen also demonstrated on this and other issues that 
he clearly believed he was possessed of the tmth: 
And if you oppose socialism and communism and people call you Right-wing, well, I 
don't mind that either. No matter what they call it, the main thing is to do what you 
are sure is the right thing to do."' 
41 R. Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963, p. 135. 
4^ Quoted in H. Lunn, 'Bananalanders - Under the Skin', The Bulletin, 28 June, 1975, p. 30; D. 
Wells, The Deep North, Outback Press, Collingwood, 1979, p.54. 
43 Quoted in D. Rivers, Aboriginal and Islander Policy as a Focus for Church-State Relations in 
Queensland, B. A. Honours, University of Queensland, 1992. 
4'^ Queensland, Legislative Assembly 1970, Debates, vol. 254, p. 24. 
^•^ M. B. Cribb, 'Chronicles', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 21, no. 3, December, 
1975, p. 104. 
46 Wells, op. cit p. 88. 
G, St. J. Barclay, 'Chronicles', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 13, no. 1, April, 
1967, p. 115. 
4o Fitzgerald, op. cit p. 136. 
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In rejecting the social and cultural manifestafions of modemity, religious 
fundamentalism is also anti-urban and anti-elitist and easily slides into supporting the 
proposition that where matters of faith were concemed, 'humble ignorance' was 
superior to learning and cultivation.^0 Fundamentalist religion is not, however 
opposed to material progress. Rather, the entrepreneurial fundamentalist preachers of 
America embrace both moralism and materialism. Jim Bakker, for example, told his 
flock; 'if you pray for a camper, be sure to tell God what color'.^1 In Queensland, the 
most fundamentalist of Bjelke-Petersen's supporters overlooked material cormption to 
focus on issues like homosexuahty, capital punishment, pomography and abortion. 
This schizoid character can be observed in much American moralism. Voices are 
heard in vehement opposition to areas of culture and conduct which are perceived as 
permissive but are raised only sporadically about business depredations or political 
cormption.52 The same quality can be observed in the comments of Howard Carter, 
the Director of the Logos Foundation, a mral religious fundamentalist group which 
gave strong support to the Bjelke-Petersen government. Carter told his followers that 
the issue in the 1989 state election was not 'the Fitzgerald Report or the gerrymander. 
It is values versus permissiveness'.^3 Carter resigned soon after 'because of serious 
moral misconduct over a period of time'54 ^nd his organisation disintegrated. 
Bjelke-Petersen, like the modem American fundamentalists, was vehemently opposed 
to the urban, educated elite who were his greatest critics but, unlike the American 
agrarian populists, he was not antipathedc to big business, especially if it was 
associated with the development of Queensland's natural resources. Populism in 
Queensland looked backwards to a golden era where traditional values prevailed and, 
paradoxically, forward to an era of perpetual material 'progress' and 'development' 
which must incidentally destroy those same values. The link between the two eras lay 
D. H. Bennett, The Party of Fear From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American 
History, Vintage Books, New York, 1990, p. 391; R. Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American 
Life, footnote, p. 48. 
51 Quoted in Bennett, op. cit, p. 381. 
D. Bell, 'Interpretations of American Politics (1955)' in D. Bell ed. The Radical Right, Anchor, 
New York, 1963, p. 63. 
53 J. Phillips, 'In the Name of Logos', The Courier Mail 10th November, 1989, p. 9. 
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in the way in which the pragmatic 'pioneer spirit' was transferred fi-om pioneer 
farmers, pastoralists and miners to the property and tourism entrepreneurs who 
continued the transformation and 'opening up' of Queensland.55 In Allan Patience's 
opinion, Bjelke-Petersen's reliance on business to further his development goals, 
disqualifies him as a populist.56 Before reaching this conclusion, however, it is 
necessary to consider the context of the American agrarian populists' opposition to 
business. Farmers in the Westem United States were hostile towards the railroad 
operators, the grain elevator operators and the deregulated currency. The farmers were 
at the mercy of the market and the solutions they proffered were to modify the market. 
One of their favoured proposals was the subtreasury plan whereby the government 
was to provide warehouses for produce and lend farmers money with the produce as 
security.57 
In the Australian context, however, the collective power of the state had long been 
hamessed to serve the interests of the farmers, much of the hamessing having 
occurred at the behest of Bjelke-Petersen's own party. Until recently, government 
ownership of railways and grain silos, and a plethora of subsidies and marketing 
schemes, provided Australian farmers with the support which the American populists 
sought. The incentive to be anti-business in an environment which already closely 
resembled the Populist Utopia portrayed by Ignatius Donnelly in Caesar's Column was 
greatly reduced.58 In addition, populists tend to be less opposed to capitalists engaged 
in 'productive' enterprise than to those engaged in finance and banking, who figure 
strongly in populist demonology.59 Bjelke-Petersen, for example, confessed to having 
greater admiration for Lang Hancock and Les Thiess than for Alan Bond. Whereas 
-'^ Logos Foundation, Press Release, 27th August, 1990. 
55 B. Head, 'Queensland Political Culture: A Critical Note on an Enduring Legend', Social 
Alternatives, vol. 5, no. 4, 1986, p. 46. 
56 Patience, op. cit, p. 279. 
57 J. D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, University of Nebraska Press, 1959, pp. 186-204 
5° Canovan, op. cit, p. 57. In Donnelly's Utopia 'The government there owns all the roads, rails, 
mines, and telegraph, provides education, healthcare, and entenairnueai ("concerts and 
lectures"), settles wages and prevents usury - a fairly socialistic program. However, Donnelly 
emphasises that land and business remain in private hands, subject only to upper limits to prevent 
the emergence of the plutocrats who had wrecked America.' 
P. Wiles, 'A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism', in lonescu and 
Gellner, op. cit, p. 169. 
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Bond's wealth came from 'investment and acquisition', Hancock and Thiess had, 
'with the sweat of their brow' built their mining and constmction businesses fi"om 
nothing.60 American and Australian populists were not opposed to private property. 
Indeed, most of them were businessmen, because farming in both countries was 
commercial and speculative. What most of them wanted was government intervention 
on their behalf This is consistent with Bjelke-Petersen's stance. As Paul Reynolds 
observes: 
the leader must articulate the parochial concerns of the audience, raise these to prime 
importance on the political agenda, and set about in a demonstrable and material way 
to satisfy these needs by the manipulation of resources at his, and his government's 
disposal.*' 
In fulfilling these tasks, populist leadership readily takes an authoritarian path. 
Reynolds traces the steps along the way: 
in order to remain successful in this task, the leader must co-opt all the significant 
political, social, cultural and other institutions and symbols, while simultaneously 
neutralizing those which might be used by his opponents to threaten his hegemony. 
Consequently the supposedly evenhanded coercive institutions of police force and 
judiciary are pressured and politicized, while the formal and informal bureaucracies 
are stacked with pliant political allies in an endless cycle of jobs for the boys (and 
girls). The formal apparatus of state patronage, including honours, positions on 
QUANGOS, directorships of state enterprises and government contracts are all used 
to retain the loyalties of key actors, and to demonstrate to would be aspirants the 
route they must travel to satisfy their ambitions - the price they must pay being their 
support and continued loyalty to the regime. ^^ 
Hosfile groups are cmshed and vilified, parliament is side-stepped and dominated by 
the executive and the media are manipulated by the government. Supporters are 
rewarded and disloyalty punished. Bjelke-Petersen made it clear that electorates which 
^^ Bjelke-Petersen, op. cit., p. 212. 
P. Reynolds, 'Queensland Politics: The Rise and Rise of Populism', Social Alternatives, vol. 5, 
no. 3 Sept, 1986, p. 51. 
62 ibid. 
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voted for the Nationals would be entitled to greater benefits than those which voted 
for the Opposition.63 Retiring National Party ministers with huge superannuations 
were rewarded by further employment in well paying posifions. For example, Ron 
Camm, the deputy leader of the party was made chair of the Queensland Sugar Board. 
Allegations were often made that successful tenderers for State government projects 
had made donations to The Bjelke-Petersen Foundation. However, as Margaret Cribb 
comments, in a statement reminiscent of Encel's suggestion that rather easy going 
public standards prevail in Australia, there 'was no observable reaction from the 
general public to these accusations of impropriety.'64 
The blurring of ethical boundaries is characteristic of a materialistic society which 
values the 'self-made man' and where success or failure rests on personal effort. In 
such a climate 'the moral mandate to achieve success thus exerts pressure to succeed, 
by fair means if possible and by foul means if necessary.'65 Indeed, where 
utilitarianism is the dominant moral framework the disfincfion between good acts and 
expedient ones has already been undermined.66 The view appears to have been 
widespread that 'Job may cut a few comers, but he's done a lot for Queensland.'67 It 
even received academic endorsement when Scott Prasser, whilst not condoning 
cormption, appears to accept it, by saying that 'in Queensland, the roads were built, 
the dams constmcted, the pipelines laid and major projects completed without adverse 
effects on public finances'.68 
Like most populist leaders, Bjelke-Petersen appealed to supporters on both material 
and psychological grounds. He promised 'development' in order to improve material 
conditions for Queenslanders, but also pledged to uphold traditional and comfortable 
63 SeeWells, op. cit,pp. 45-6. 
64 M. B. Cribb, 'Queensland Polities', Current Affairs Bulletin. 1 Oct., 1981, p. 30. 
R. Merton, quoted in Lipset and Raub, op. cit, p. 26. 
B. L. Payne, 'Devices and Desires: Corruption and Ethical Seriousness', in Public Duties: The 
Moral Obligations of Government Officials, ed. J. L. Fleishman, L. Liebman, M. H. Moore, 
Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 175. 
6*7 E. Whitton, The Hillbilly Dictator, ABC, Crows Nest NSW, 1989, p. 86. 
S. Prasser, 'The Need for Reform in Queensland: So What was the Problem?' in Keeping Them 
Honest, Democratic Reform in Queensland eds. A. Hede, S. Prasser and M. Neylan, University of 
Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1992, p. 21. 
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values under threat by outsiders such as urban 'trendies', Southemers and the 
government in Canberra. His authoritarian style was consistent with the already 
established pattem of political leadership in Queensland. The linkage between 
authoritarianism, isolation from aUemative views, and low levels of education is well 
documented, and it is these factors which form the basis of the Queensland being 
different thesis. 
How Queensland is different 
Compared with the other Australian states, Queensland, like Westem Australia, has 
been dependent for its wealth on the mral and mining sectors which successive 
governments of all complexions fostered. State budgets were skewed towards mral 
subsidies for transport, power and irrigation and Queensland regularly spent less than 
other states on welfare, education, public health and urban requirements.69 Whilst 
spending well above the national average on services to agriculture and mining, it 
spent far less than other Australian states on support for manufacturing. In 1983-84, 
Queensland spent $2.46 per capita in this area compared with a national average of 
$8.02.70 Relatively speaking, few Queenslanders were employed in manufacturing 
and many of these worked in industries which processed primary products. The 
principal reason for the low levels of manufactures can be attributed to the fragmented 
nature of state development and the consequent lack of strong domestic markets. This 
situation was exacerbated by government preference for the mral sector.71 The bias 
against manufacturing was shared by all parties. Labor Premier W. Forgan Smith 
declared that 'primary production is the natural occupation of mankind ... no one 
would desire for this state the industrialised type of civilisafion which exists in many 
countries today'.72 On the basis of such economic foundations, the percentage of 
Queenslanders employed in manufacturing was smaller than that of all other states, 
69 
70 
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bar Westem Australia. The following table, compiled from 1981 and 1986 census data 
shows the percentages of state workforces employed in agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing. 
STATE 






























Although the percentage of the workforce employed in manufacturing is declining 
throughout Australia in favour of the service industries, the historically low levels of 
manufacturing in Queensland have been both a cause and an effect of decentralisation. 
Most Queenslanders live outside the capital and, for most of Queensland's history, 
Brisbane metropolitan electorates have retumed fewer than one quarter of Legislative 
Assembly members.73 In 1976, a point almost midway in Bjelke-Petersen's 
premiership, the Census shows that 44% of Queenslanders lived in their state capital 
compared with 58% in New South Wales, 68% in Victoria 69% in South Australia 
and 64% in Westem Australia. Only Tasmania, with 33% of the population living in 
Hobart was more decentralised than Queensland.74 Brisbane's location in the South-
East comer of the state, and Queensland's long coastline, meant that major provincial 
cities developed to service populations remote from Brisbane.75 The railways, which 
linked provincial cities like Townsville, Toowoomba, Rockhampton, Bundaberg and 
73 D. J. Murphy and R. B. Joyce, 'Introduction' in Murphy, Joyce and Cribb, op.cit, p. 7 
' 4 D. T. Roland, 'Population Growth and Distribution', Population of Australia, vol. 1, Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1982, p. 27. 
'-' I. H Burnley, The Social Environment: A Population and Social Geography of Australia, 
McGraw-Hill, Sydney, p. 17. 
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Maryborough with each other and their hinterlands, rather than radiating from the 
state capital as in other states, enhanced the process of decentralisation. 
Decentralisadon was furthered by the fact that a number of the larger provincial cities 
were also ports which meant that shipping was spread among a number of coastal 
towns rather than concentrated in the capital. Provincial cities which were railheads 
and ports continued to retain strong economic and social links with their hinterlands. 
Indeed many were defined in terms of their dependence on regional commodity 
production, as the following example from a booklet on mral-urban interdependence 
in Queensland nicely illustrates: 
Population 
19,951 Bundaberg; a regional centre for the sugar industry m 
the south-east environmental sector. 
6,691 Charters Towers; a historic and once-flourishing gold 
town. 
4, 464 Kingaroy: a regional centre for the South Burnet 
District - dependent upon peanuts and 
dairying ... '^' 
With a shift of focus, hinterlands could just as accurately be defined in terms of their 
dependence on local towns for the supply of goods and services, transport, 
communication and so on, but the status of farming and mining in Queensland means 
that this was rarely perceived. 
In addition to the economic activities which linked farmers with their adjacent towns, 
many farmers also belong to town based sporting or service clubs. It is also likely that 
significant numbers of regional town citizens were once farmers who have conformed 
to the Australian pattem of migrating to a small city from adjacent territory, rather 
than moving further to a state capital.77 The shift to a small town is unlikely to shake 
traditional values which have been shaped by land ownership in a relatively stable 
mral environment. Such small town dwellers are inclined to practice that majoritarian 
M. Juppenlatz, Some Observations on the Rural-Urban Interdependence Problems in 
Queensland, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1961, p. 45. 
77 
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tyranny which De Tocqueville feared, by repressing 'not only all contest, but all 
controversy.'78 Qeser and Emery in their study of a mral community found that the 
pressures towards conforming with polifically conservative values were strong.79 
Even the labour market in mral districts has been known to discriminate against those 
who are different. Research undertaken for the Henderson Commission of Inquiry into 
Poverty found that in mral areas: 
Where jobs are scarce implicit rules exist as to who will and who will not be given 
them, and these mles are likely to take into account other things beside a person's 
capacity to do the job in question. Members of a small community tend to have more 
knowledge of each other than members of a larger community. Since the employer is 
likely to know and perceive the potential employee as more than just a pair of hands, 
and since he has to do the hiring and firing before a wider audience than the city, his 
decisions are likely to be influenced by considerations of social status as well as of 
economics. The labour market is likely to operate so as to maintain the social values, 
and the prejudices, of the local community. 
People with good reputations in the community will be preferred to people with bad 
reputations; people from good families will be preferred to people from disreputable 
families; and people from majority ethnic or cultural groups will be preferred to 
people from minority groups.^" 
By such means, conformity is fostered and difference side-stepped. 
A further constraint on diversity in Queensland has been the domination of public life 
by men. Since European seftlement, Queensland 'has consistently been more 
statistically male dominated than Australia' although the gap has narrowed from 150 
males for every 100 females in the colonial era to the far less significant 101.3 males 
to 100 females in 1986.81 The rafio in outback Queensland (neariy 20% of Local 
'° Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America trans. H. Reeve, Longman, Green, Longman & 
Roberts, London, 1862, p. 309 
'^ O. A. Oeser and F. E. Emery, Social Strucure and Personality in a Rural Community, Routledge 
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Report, April 1975, Canberra, pp. 189-90. 
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Government authorities) was sfill high in that year, with more than 120 males for 
every female.^2 This statistical domination has undoubtedly been matched by a 
cultural, political and social domination which has its origins in Queensland's pastoral 
and farming frontier. The shearers, ringers, fencers and railway gangers of legend had 
a powerful influence via the union movement on the ALP in Queensland. The Trades 
Hall connection was 'particularly anti-intellectual [and] totally male-dominated.'^3 
The small farmers who formed the foundation of the Country Party also came from a 
background which prioritised the male. On the family farm, the main productive work 
was carried on by the farmer and his sons, supported by mothers and daughters. The 
family farm typically passed from father to son, rarely to daughter. Mining, 
Queensland's other major wealth producer, was similarly a source of male power and 
influence. 
Education in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reinforced the subordinate 
position of women and was designed to fit them for their 'natural and inevitable 
destiny' as mothers and homemakers.84 gy the 1920s there was a recognition that 
girls were entitled 'to special training to fit them for future careers in such positions 
for which they are peculiarly fitted, - as typists, nurses, dressmakers, etc.85 Typical 
subjects for instmction were cookery, laundry work, housewifery, ambulance and 
home nursing, household accounts, domestic science, English and arithmetic.^^ 
Although there were incremental improvements in the opportunities available to 
women they were insufficient to erode the view that a woman's primary fimction was 
as a homemaker. Cabinet documents from the Nicklin era reveal that the Queensland 
Government rejected equal status for female public servants in 1966 on the grounds 
that their physiological and psychological make-up fitted them for the role of home 
maker rather than for a career, and that dominance by female officers 'would be 
82 ibid., p. 57. 
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striking at the very fundamental laws of nature.'87 During the Bjelke-Petersen era, 
there was a lower participation rate by women in the labour market compared with 
other states.88 
The under-representation of women in Queensland's parliament is further indication 
of the patriarchal nature of Queensland society, although Queensland is not unique in 
this. The absence of an upper house, however, meant that women were even more 
conspicuously under-represented in Queensland's parliament than the rest of 
Australia. Throughout Australia there have been more female representatives in state 
upper houses and the Senate than in state assemblies.89 Although women obtained the 
right to vote in Queensland in 1905 and the right to stand for parliament in 1915, few 
women have successfully stood for election. In fact there was a gap of over thirty 
years separating the first two women to be elected: Irene Longman in 1929 and Vi 
Jordan in 1966. Both experienced discrimination, a state of affairs which has 
confinued for female members of parliament.90 From federation to 1989, the year 
which marked the end of the National Party government, only seven women had been 
elected to the Queensland parliament.91 A survey of the proportion of women elected 
to Australian Houses of Parliament in 1983 indicated that Queensland had the lowest 
percentage of women: 2 per cent.92 
Just as Queensland's primary industry base intensified male domination, so also did it 
influence .the comparatively low levels of overseas immigration, especially during 
Australia's post-war immigration boom. Brisbane was last port of call for European 
shipping and successive Queensland governments eschewed the development of 
secondary industry in favour of agriculture and mral settlement. Most migrants, 
therefore, disembarked at the major ports of Melboume and Sydney where jobs could 
° ' M. Madigan, 'Equality of Sexes "Against Nature'", Courier Mail, 4 Jan., 1997, p.l. 
°° Scott et al , op. cit, 'Queensland', p. 67. 
89 J. Clarke and K. White, Women in Australian Politics, Fontana, Sydney, 1983, p. 123. 
90 J. WiUiams, 'Women in Queensland State Polities', Refractory Girl, 4, Spring, 1973, pp. 13-17. 
See Joan Sheldon, 'Women in Politics: Obstacles and Opportunities' in Women in Government 
eds. M. Neylan and R. Wear, Royal Institute of Public Administration, Brisbane, 1994, pp. 25-32. 
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Queensland Parliament 1930-1980, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1982. 
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be found in manufacturing, constmction and service industries. Once a migrant group 
has established a community, new immigrants are drawn to it through the process of 
chain migration, thus concentrating the immigrant population further. An additional 
factor deterring non-English speaking migrants in particular may have been 'a 
reputation as a less cosmopolitan and liberal society.'93 The 1976 census indicates 
that whilst 10.8% of the Australian population was bom in non-English speaking 
countries, the figure for Queensland was 5.5%.94 in a 1979 article, Humphrey 
McQueen cites figures which indicate that the percentage of Italians and Greeks in 
Brisbane was 1.4 per cent compared with 4.4 per cent in Perth and 7.7 per cent in 
Melboume.95 By 1986, the proportion of overseas-bom in Queensland was still low 
despite rapid population growth, an expanding economy and a rapid growth rate of 
overseas-bom between 1981 and 1986.96 Most of the population growth which 
occurred in Brisbane from 1976-86 was as a result of inter and intra-state migration.97 
This, combined with the attraction Queensland held for New Zealand immigrants, 
maintained the dominance of English speaking groups in Queensland.98 
Queenslanders therefore were less exposed than many other Australians to the wide 
range of views which an urbanised and ethnically diverse culture brings. 
Queenslanders were also further disadvantaged in access to information and exposure 
to altematives by the limited local media outlets, leading to the situation where 'the 
"average" Queenslander is therefore less likely than other Australians to encounter 
dissident views'.99 The media in Queensland were dominated by the Brisbane daily. 
The Courier-Mail and to a lesser extent, The Telegraph. These papers had an 
arrangement with Australian Associated Press (AAP) which permitted AAP to recycle 
Q3 
^^ Grossman et al., op.cit, p. xviii. 
A. Scott and R. Scott, Reform and Reaction in the Deep North: Education and Policy-Making in 
Queensland, Centre for the Study of Higher Education, University of Melboume, Parkville, 1980, 
p. 4. 
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Trends and Prospects 1988, AGPS, Canberra, p. 76. 
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stories written by joumalists at the two Brisbane papers. Regional print and electronic 
media, in tum, were heavily reliant on AAP for their material. Even the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission based much of its news on issues first covered by The 
Courier-Mail. ^'^^ As a consequence: 
As one looks at the journalistic channels of information that exist within Queensland, 
one is struck by the omnipresent ingredient of AAP - Courier-Mail news. The further 
one gets from the centre of state politics, the more one is aware that there is no 
healthy babble of voices. The preconditions of pluralistic democracy hardly seem to 
be satisfied. *^^ ^ 
Much of the material published on state politics during the Bjelke-Petersen era came 
direct from the Premier's press secretary Allen Callaghan. Callaghan's role in the 
Bjelke-Petersen premiership will be examined later in this thesis, but there is 
widespread consensus that, in conjunction with a formidable government PR machine, 
he was adept at manipuladng the willing local media.^^2 According to one joumalist, 
the State Government was second only to Queensland Newspapers as the state's 
largest employer of joumalists. ^ 03 The Opposition and the Liberals had one publicly 
funded press secretary each, hardly enough to counter the 'government PR 
juggemaut'.^04 jj^ addition the local media lacked the finances to undertake 
investigative joumalism and, fearing the threat of defamation writs, invoked self-
censorship. One local editor said that his newspaper had not pursued allegations of 
police cormption because no one wanted to read about it, everyone knew about it and 
that such news was too complicated for his readers. ^ 05 without a tradition of a Fourth 
Estate, there was virtually no public pressure for media to be anything other than 
^^^ J. Wallace, 'Reporting the Joh Show' in Cribb and Boyce, op. cit, p. 204. 
101 ibid., p. 208. 
102 ibid., pp. 211-217 
103 J Phillips, quoted in Bruce Grundy, 'Who Sets the News Agenda: The Turkeys or the Chooks?' 
in Corruption and Reform, The Fitzgerald Vision, eds S. Prasser, R. Wear and J. Nethercote, 
University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1990, p. 30. 
104 ibid., p. 30. 
105 M. W. Jackson and H. G. Nelson, 'The Forbidden City: Ethics in Australian Government' 
Corruption and Reform, vol. 6, 1991, p. 136. 
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conservative and relatively complacent. 106 
Education in Queensland also lagged behind that of the other states and this in tum 
appears to be related to the decentralised nature of Queensland. Australian research 
has shown that children in urban areas continue with education for longer than 
children in mral areas. 107 The development of secondary education was, to a great 
extent, dependent on the development of a middle class able to appreciate its benefits. 
The growth of this class awaited the development of large cities which was 
comparatively slow in Queensland: '...so long as much of life in Queensland was 
based on primary industries, then for so long did further and higher education lack a 
motivating force.'108 As education developed, it was utilitarian in its orientation, with 
an emphasis on commercial, technical, agricultural and domestic skills. 109 Sir Robert 
Herbert, first premier of Queensland summed up the prevailing view succinctly: 
'There is no necessity in this country for high classical attainments.'HO Nor were 
libraries and art galleries given a high priority: 
By 1906 Brisbane Public Library had far fewer books than in the corresponding 
library in any other capital city except Hobart; there was a National Art Gallery with 
sixty-two 'pictures', and a museum which attracted many visitors, especially on 
Sundays. In general, Queensland found its cultural pleasures out-of-doors. 111 
The nineteenth century attitudes to education carried over into the twentieth century. 
Queensland was the last state in Australia to raise the compulsory school age from 12 
to 14.112 Education beyond the primary grades was not encouraged for other than a 
gifted few. Country Party MP, T. R. Roberts felt that 'there was such a thing as too 
106 p Applegarth, 'Self-Censorship of the Media in Queensland', Social Alternatives, vol. 5, no. 3, 
Sept, 1986, pp. 60-63. 
107 A. F. Davies and S. Encel (eds), Australian Society, A Sociological Introduction, Cheshire, 
Melboume, p.91. 
lO'' Goodman, op. cit, p. 202 
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Education Journal, 1 Jan., 1912, p. 218. 
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much education' and that 'too much money can be spent on secondary education' 113; 
These views undoubtedly strengthened the foundations of a tradition in Queensland 
that further education and training should be carried on by part-time (evening) 
classes and the relative lack of development of full-time (day) technical training, the 
prolongation of the pupil teacher training system, and the slow approach to the 
establishment of a teacher's college, the extension of evening tutorial classes, and the 
importance attached to the study at the university by evening and external courses. 
The tradition of part-time training was for long in accord with the thoughts of 
politicians that the state should not be asked to pay for further education, and with 
the realistic approach by many parents that they could not afford the luxury of full-
time education for their children in a society which still had to wrest a safe, secure, 
and consistent means of livelihood from a difficult and stubborn tropical 
environment. The emergence of such a society was to take longer in Queensland than 
in other states; the tradition was to die harder and the idea of full-time secondary 
education for all was consequently slower to be accepted. 114 
Goodman judged Queensland in the early 1950s as 'the most backward Australian 
state' in the field of secondary education. 115 No new high schools were built in 
Brisbane between 1924 and 1952.116 Hughes suggests that Queensland ranked 'fifth 
or sixth among the states in all forms of educational activity and expenditure'117 a 
course set by the state ALP whose egalitarian philosophy encouraged the prioritisation 
of land settlement, unemployment rehef and public hospitals. 118 Continuous neglect 
of education led to the finding by the Schools Commission in the early 1970s that 
Queensland was the most disadvantaged state with respect to schools outside major 
urban areas. 119 By 1980, Ann and Roger Scott found Queensland to be 'peculiar 
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when compared to the rest of Australia'. 120 Although there is some evidence to 
suggest that Queensland students performed well in basic writing and mathematics 
compared with pupils in other states, 121 there appeared to be an ongoing fear of 
developing students' crifical and imaginative faculties. This was illustrated by the 
banning by the Bjelke-Petersen government of two social studies courses, MACOS 
(Man: A Course of Study) and SEMP (Social Educafion Materials Project). This issue 
will be examined in more detail in a later chapter, but the impact of the two courses in 
Queensland compared with New South Wales, where opponents of the courses 'failed 
to cause any ripple on the surface of the State's polities',122 is perhaps indicative of 
state differences. The Bjelke-Petersen Government appeared to be strongly influenced 
in its response to the two courses by Mrs Rona Joyner and her groups STOP (Society 
to Outlaw Pomography) and CARE (Committee Against Regressive Education). Mrs 
Joyner made her philosophy of education clear: 'Children don't go to school to learn 
to think. They go to leam to read and write and spell correctly.'123 Her friend, 
Florence Bjelke-Petersen was of the opinion that 'today they talk an awful lot about 
humanifies. My feeling is that they ought to leam a lot more about practicalities.'124 
Backbenchers and cabinet ministers expressed similarly functional expectations of 
education. The multi-millionaire and former National Party member for Toowoomba 
South, Clive Berghoffer, believed that 'we are getting over-educated and we send our 
children to school to be turned into geniuses instead of doing an honest day's 
work.'125 The Premier himself, who signalled his regard for education by giving the 
portfolio to his most junior minister, 126 declared 'that we only allow wholesome, 
decent, pracfical material in schools'127 and Russell Hinze, the Minister for Main 
AGPS, Canberra, 1978, p. 9. 
120 Scotland Scott, op. cit, p. 1. 
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Roads announced that he wanted: 
... to be sure that expenditure on education represents value for money. If it isn't I'll 
fight to get It to put down a few more miles of road, where I'll know it will be value 
for money spent 128 
Even the Deputy-Director of Educafion in Queensland, Bill Hamilton, doubted the 
value of the most academically gifted. He raised his doubts in an address to High 
School Principals in 1978: 
As well as shedding the incompetent we could also do without some of our most 
academically qualified teachers, who also possess great teaching skill, because of the 
attitudes and beliefs with which they deliberately or unwittingly infect students: they 
may be subversive, anti-establishment, anarchistic, revolutionary, permissive, amoral 
or immoral, irreligious or over-religious. Too many young teachers belong to the 
counter-culture.' ^ ' 
Spending on education under Country-Liberal Party Governments was the lowest of 
any state in Australia. 1^ 0 They, like their Labor predecessors, preferred to keep free 
hospitals rather than increase expenditure on schools. 1^ 1 In the mid 1960s only 26 per 
cent of Queensland teachers had degrees and only 10 per cent had a degree and 
diploma in educafion. 1^ 2 Although this improved in the 1970s with a shift away from 
teacher training to teacher education, Queenslanders were generally less likely to be 
graduates than the citizens of other states. The differences between the states were not 
huge, but in each census from 1976 to 1986, the percentage of Queenslanders with 
Bachelors degrees was consistently the lowest in Australia. The following table has 
been compiled from 1976, 1981 and 1986 census data. 
Percentage of persons with bachelor degree 
128 Quoted in Scott and Scott, op. cit, p. 9. 
129 Hamilton, quoted in R. Smith and J. Knight, 'Political Censorship in the Teaching of Social 
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Educafion's relatively low priority is unsurprising given the educational achievements 
of Queensland ministers. Indeed, their lack of educational attainment was used by the 
Queensland Police Union to oppose proposals by Commissioner Whitrod to insist that 
candidates for promofion should pass a number of subjects in the police arts-science 
course. The pohce union Secretary 'produced survey figures showing that Queensland 
state cabinet ministers had no better education than the average pohceman.'133 Like 
Russell Hinze, most of the former had been educated at the 'University of Life' rather 
than in academe. 134 Holmes and Sharman confirmed this when they found that from 
1965 to 1975 no federal or state cabinet minister from Queensland held a university 
degree, although they appear to have overlooked Peter Delamothe, a Liberal and 
medical pracfifioner who was Attomey General and Minister for Justice from 1963 to 
1972. Even with this oversight, the comparative figures are so startling that it is 
illuminating to reproduce Holmes and Sharman's table. 135 
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My own comparison of the number of graduates among Queensland ministers from 
1930 to 1989 with their Westem Australian and Victorian counterparts presents a 
similar picture. 136 For this exercise, graduates were classified as those with a 
minimum of a bachelor's degree listed in the Biographical Register for their 
respective states. Ministers with diplomas or those who qualified in law or 
accountancy by means other than a degree have been excluded. This depresses the 
qualifications of cabinet ministers somewhat, but it makes comparison clear-cut. 
Twelve out of 71 cabinet ministers in Queensland, or 16.9 per cent had university 
degrees. One had a masters degree. In Westem Australia, 22 out of 87 or 25.3 per cent 
had degrees. Three had higher degrees. In Victoria, 44 out of 140 ministers or 31.4 per 
cent had degrees. Eleven had higher degrees. As might be expected, in all three 
parliaments education levels climbed progressively over the years. This trend was 
very marked in Queensland, however, with a third of the graduates, all ex-school 
teachers, becoming cabinet ministers after 1987. For most of this century, Queensland 
13" 1930 was chosen because Volume 2 of the Biographical Registers of both the Queensland and 
Westem Australian parliaments commence in this year and include only state members of 
parliament. The preceding volumes included colonial parliamentariansas well. 1989 marked the 
end of an era, with the election of the Goss Labor Government. Westem Australia was chosen 
because it seemed the state most like Queensland. Victoria was chosen because on Holmes and 
Sharman's figures, Victoria had the most highly educated ministers. The statistics were compiled 
from D. B Waterson, Biographical Register of the Queensland Parliament 1981-92, Casket 
Publications, Sydney, 1993; D. B Waterson and J. Amold, Biographical Register of the 
Queensland Parliament 1930-1980, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1982: D. 
Black and G. Bolton assisted by P. Simpson, Biographical Register of Members of the Parliament 
of Western Australia, vol. 2, 1930-1990, Westem Australian Parliamentary History Project, Perth, 
1990; G. Browne, Biographical Register of the Victorian Parliament 1900-84, Victorian 
Government Printing Office,North Melboume, 1985: The International Yearbook and 
Statesman's Who's Who, Thomas Skinner Directories, East Grimstead, 1985, 86, 87, 88, 89. 
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was govemed by men whose formal education had ceased by the end of secondary 
school at the latest. By far the dominant occupation was farmer/grazier. 137 Thirty 
ministers, or an extraordinary 42.25 per cent of all Queensland ministers between 
1930 and 1989 were mral producers, albeit sometimes in combination with other 
business interests. The executive arm of government in Queensland for most of this 
century has been dominated by men from mral backgrounds. The comparable figures 
for Westem Australia are 14 out of 87 or 16 per cent and for Victoria, 39 out of 140 or 
28 per cent. 
Clearly, the basis of Queensland difference can be found in the strength of primary 
industries and in the comparatively high degree of decentralisation. In tum, these 
factors meant that non-English speaking immigration levels were low, men were 
dominant, media outlets were limited and education was of relatively low priority. 
These characteristics were reflected in the composition of successive cabinets, so that 
policy was being made by men of limited experience, disproportionately drawn, even 
for Queensland, from mral occupations. Queenslanders were therefore, to a greater 
degree than most other Australians, insulated from ideas and values which threatened 
the status quo. It is unsurprising in these circumstances that mdny Queenslanders were 
ultra conservative, even authoritarian, in their outlook. 
This conservatism was reflected and reinforced by the major parties. Both the Labor 
and National Parties had their roots in the bush. One source of Queensland difference 
lies in the state ALP's growth from the organisation and combination of the early bush 
workers, rather than in an urban proletariat. 138 Whereas in New South Wales and 
Victoria, Labor's goal had been to expand from the capital into the country, in 
Queensland, the reverse was the case. 139 The conservative and powerful Australian 
Workers Union has exercised a strong influence on the Queensland ALP and ensured 
that 'agrarian corporatism, used to win the confidence of Queensland's economically 
dominant mral community, was likewise included in Labor rhetoric as a natural 
^•^ ' Sometimes the listing specifies 'cane farmer' or 'fmit grower'. I have classified these as farming. 
138 M. B. Cribb, 'Queensland Polities', pp. 23-31 
13^ C. A. Hughes, Images and Issues: The Queensland State Elections of 1963 and 1966, Australian 
National University Press, Canberra, 1969, p.2. 
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working class demand'. 140 For much of its history, the Queensland branch of the 
ALP shared the anti-intellectual atfitudes of the Nafional Party, its contempt for 
parliamentary procedure and its willingness to manipulate the electoral system in its 
favour. The Liberal Party, the party of urban Queensland, was relegated to minority 
status. The parties which split from the Liberals, and embraced a more small '1' liberal 
stance than their parent party, the Liberal Reform Group/Australian Reform 
Movement/ Australia Party and the Australian Democrats had little impact in 
Queensland during the Bjelke-Petersen era. 1^ 1 
The authoritarian and populist strands in Queensland's political culture were thus 
institutionally reinforced. Native Queenslanders grew up in an insular and 
conservative environment where many of the social changes associated with 
modemity were seen as threatening. They were used to governments led by strong 
men with little time for parliamentary niceties. They expected pragmatic leaders who 
would focus on the job of furthering state development. If somefimes the pursuit of 
material wealth meant that ethical borders were crossed, many were prepared to tum a 
blind eye. 
This chapter has described in general terms the political culture in which Johannes 
Bjelke-Petersen grew up and later govemed. Seymour Lipset argues that to understand 
the values of the middle-aged leaders who dominate political life, it is necessary to 
examine the problems of their youth, l'^ ^ with this in mind, the next chapter explores 
Bjelke-Petersen's childhood and youthful socialisation in the South Burnett, a district 
of small farms and businesses not unlike those regions in the American Mid -West 
that provided fertile ground for American populism. 
I'^ O Fitzgerald and Thomton, op.cit, p. 24. 
C. A. Hughes, The Government of Queensland, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1980, 
p. 78. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BJELKE-PETERSEN: 1913 - 1946 
Although the values and attitudes acquired in childhood are extremely important, they 
are not immutable. Attitudes towards a political system are usually revised in 
response to particular events throughout life and in accord with individual 
dispositions. For these reasons, the political self is never 'finalised' and alters over a 
lifetime in response to experience of the political system.' As Easton and Dennis put 
it, 'the political marks on the tabula rasa are entered early and are continually 
refurbished thereafter.'" In the case of political activists like Bjelke-Petersen, political 
socialisation intensifies through increasing participation. The evidence indicates that 
for professional politicians, adult socialisation is much more important than the 
shaping of political attitudes which occurs in childhood.^ Generally speaking, whilst 
attitudes and judgements about specific policies appear to be best explained by adult 
experience, early socialisation shapes basic dispositions and outlooks. 
Bjelke-Petersen's early socialisation occurred in mral Queensland and this chapter 
focuses on the mral immigrant sub-culture in which he grew up. It concentrates on the 
period from childhood to his entry into politics. Exploration of the probable impact of 
family, religion, education and occupation leads to the conclusion that there was no 
discord between this regional culture and the wider political culture of Queensland. 
Indeed, Bjelke-Petersen spent his childhood and youth in the constrained social 
circumstances that have been associated with the development of authoritarian 
attitudes. 
The impact of politics, its history and institutions, will be examined in the next 
chapter. The media, another agency of socialisation, is not considered because no 
demonstrable evidence of its impact can be found. Bjelke-Petersen indicates that his 
family shared a subscription to The Kingaroy Herald with a neighbouring farmer, but 
1 R. E. Dawson, K. Prewett, K. S. Dawson, Political Socialisation: An Analytic Study, Little 
Brown, Boston, 1977, p. 46. 
D. Easton and J. Dennis, 'The Child's Image of Government', The Annals of the American 
Academy, Sept. 1965, p. 43. 
R. Rose, People in Politics, Faber & Faber, London, 1970, p. 57. 
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unfortunately copies prior to 1954 are unavailable. 
Although the various agencies are treated separately for the purposes of analysis, their 
influence is neither monopolistic nor necessarily sequential. Rather, 'agency based 
socialisation would seem to be a layered affair, with increasing age adding fiarther 
dimensions based on experiences with later agencies."* Indeed, the separate impacts 
of the various agencies of socialisation are hard to isolate. It is extremely difficuh to 
disassociate the effects of schooling from the changes associated with physical and 
cognitive maturation.^ A further difficulty occurs in attempting to isolate family 
influence from socio-economic factors such as social strata and place of residence. It 
is not easy to gauge whether agreement between parents and children is a result of 
parental influence or shared socio-economic environment.^ In a religious family like 
Bjelke-Petersen's, the impact of religion is hard to isolate from the impact of a pious 
family, especially when it tends to push in the same direction as religion.^ In Bjelke-
Petersen's case the difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that it is over eighty years 
since he arrived in Australia. Influential people have died; memories have faded, 
much usefijl information has been destroyed and that which remains is patchy. 
Nevertheless, sufficient information exists to constmct an account of influences and 
their possible impacts, although this must inevitably be somewhat speculative. In the 
context of this chapter, however, the lack of precision is not a major drawback, 
especially.as in Bjelke-Petersen's case, the influences of the various agencies appear 
to have been cumulative rather than contradictory. The main purpose here is to 
suggest an understanding of Bjelke-Petersen in terms of his socialisation, not to 
measure the precise impact of various agencies. In this context, Greenstein's advice is 
apposite: an understanding of political socialisation is necessary for understanding 
subsequent individual behaviour, but it is not sufficient.^ A full explanation must take 
into account situational variables, which later chapters of this thesis will endeavour to 
P. L. Reynolds, Political Sociology. An Australian Perspective, Longman Cheshire, Sydney, 
1991, p. 18. 
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In numerous accounts of political socialisation, the family takes pre-eminent 
position,^ although some doubt has been cast on this assumption by findings which 
suggest that there is little correlation between the attitudes of parents and children on 
a range of issues.'" Occasionally, in the case of the rebellious child, the family impact 
is a negative one. In two key areas, however, there is widespread agreement on family 
influence. There is a substantial body of evidence which suggests the existence of a 
high degree of correspondence between the party loyalties of parents and children." 
In addition, it appears likely that the family directly or indirectly transmits 
fijndamental beliefs about authority, tmst, efficacy and morality which in tum are 
transferred to the political system. In the words of Robert Lane, 'the sources of 
political socialisation (may) lie less in the classroom and more in the home, less in 
what is taught than in how a child is treated, less in civics and more in the subtle 
communication of interpersonal relations."" The family also affects the impact of 
other agencies by deciding on schooling, place of residence and choice of books and 
newspapers'^ In circumstances where parents are homogeneous and where 
orientations are frequently reinforced, as was the case in Bjelke-Petersen's family, 
these orientations are more likely to be reproduced by the offspring."* Bjelke-Petersen 
appears to have shared his father's party political allegiance, authoritarianism, and, in 
his later years, his quick temper. From his general family circumstances, he acquired 
an acceptance of a patriarchal power stmcture, the courtesy which many who have 
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met him recall, pragmatism linked with anti-intellectualism, and a desire to 'better 
himself through hard work. In the last, he was undoubtedly allied with his mother in 
taking a pragmatic approach, and in doing so, rejected his father's and brother's 
bookish interests. 
Bjelke-Petersen was the middle child of Danish-born parents. His father, Carl, known 
to the family as George, emigrated to Tasmania with his family when he was twenty-
two years old. He had qualified as a school teacher in Denmark, and taught at Scotch 
College in Hobart but did not stay long in his profession, choosing instead to join the 
church. Bjelke-Petersen's cousin, Les Hoey, says that in family circles his ordinafion 
was viewed negatively. His sister, Marie became an author and his other brothers 
operated a well-known gymnasium in Sydney. George was ordained as a Lutheran 
pastor and posted to New Zealand in 1893. From New Zealand, where he had 
resigned his post 'because of a misunderstanding', he was sent to Kangaroo Point, 
Brisbane.'^ 
Bjelke-Petersen's mother, Maren Poulsen, was seven and a half years old when she 
arrived in Queensland with her family, who eventually settled in the South Burnett 
district of Southern Queensland. By 1901, Queensland accounted for more than half 
of Australia's Danes, many of whom had been attracted by free and assisted passages 
and the prospect of land grants upon arrival.'^ Most of the Scandinavian immigrants 
were Lutheran, and from his base in Brisbane George Bjelke-Petersen ministered to 
their religious needs. His flock included the congregation at Edenvale in the South 
Burnett where he met his wife to be. The Queensland congregation was not, however, 
affiliated with any of the Lutheran Churches in Australia, but with the Scandinavian 
Lutheran Church in New Zealand so that in 1903 George was posted again to New 
Zealand where he and Maren married.'^ Their first two children. Christian and 
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bom when they returned to Australia, in 1913, when Bjelke-Petersen was two years 
old. Their return was prompted by the deteriorating health of George Bjelke-Petersen 
which had caused him to forsake the ministry for sheep farming 'to try to regain his 
strength'.'* However, the climate of New Zealand proved too harsh for the ailing 
George, and the family came back to Australia to establish a farm, 'Bethany', near 
Kingaroy, where Maren's relations could help them get established. 
Bjelke-Petersen refers in his autobiography to his father's 'fragile' health and an 
operation for go i t re" There is no suggestion that any of his father's health problems 
were other than physical but George Bjelke-Petersen's description of a profound 
crisis of faith during his first tour of duty in New Zealand indicates that he suffered 
from depression. Like Luther as a young priest, George was beset by doubt and 
distress. In a yearly report written in 1896, he wrote: 
As long as we honestly wish to obey God's will, then God in time and with His ways 
will send help. With the aid of the Cross He will break the ngid unbreakable will and 
disintegrate everything that would hinder us ... 
In this recently passed year, it has saddened the Lord to place such a Cross upon my 
shoulders. The Lord knew how much I lacked in obeying His will and in His wisdom 
He knew the time was right to open my eyes. Now was the right time. The cluster of 
grapes was ripe, therefore he cut it off and threw it in the winepress so that the grapes 
could be cmshed and transformed into good wine. It is painfiil to be cmshed, it is 
painful to become less than nothing. But it is necessary ...In the period before 
Christmas, I encountered many events. I did not understand why God asked these 
thorns to grow on my track, in the end they became too sharp, and I was frightened to 
continue my walk and tmly thought in my heart, that it was God's will that I should 
discontinue my work in his vineyard and I did this the following Sunday to the 
surprise of the Congregation. Contrary to my expectations, this change did not bring 
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George Bjelke-Petersen asked his congregation for their forgiveness and returned to 
the pulpit and declared himself 'well in soul and body.' His later history, however, 
suggests that this happy state did not last. 
Most accounts of Bjelke-Petersen's family portray his father as a scholarly, well-
educated man who spoke five languages.'' Bjelke-Petersen says that his father 'had 
studied at Copenhagen and at Heidelberg' and 'was a city man and an academic 
through and through'." As Premier, he was reported in 77?^  Sunday Sun as saying: 
'My father was a very learned man. He'd been to Heidelberg University in Germany 
until he was 22 and spoke different languages.''^ In a 1988 videotape interview he 
claimed that his father attended University at Copenhagen and Heidelberg.^'' Derek 
Townsend throws a slightly different light on George Bjelke-Petersen's education.^^ 
As Bjelke-Petersen's authorised biographer, Townsend had access to Bjelke-Petersen 
family letters and documents, so that despite its sycophantic tone, it is the best 
documented account of the Bjelke-Petersen family history. Although George had 
spent fime in Meissen and Heidelberg in his early years, and received further 
schooling in Meissen, at the age of fifteen he was apprenticed to a cellar master in 
Heidelberg. Ill health forced a return to Denmark where his schooling was completed 
at Jonstmp Seminary, a teacher training academy in Copenhagen. The Dean and 
Director of the Seminary testified that George Bjelke-Petersen: 
has with great diligence, conscientious earnestness and a lively interest availed 
himself of the instmction of the seminary. By his exactitude in studying, his attention 
to all details and possessing already by a sojourn abroad, an intellect of a 
proportionally uncommon extent he has not only gathered up a not ordinary share of 
knowledge, not a little surpassing the more limited sphere demanded for the 
examination, but he has appropriated himself of this knowledge with a rare tmstiness, 
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has learned 26 
George Bjelke-Petersen's education recommenced, when, prior to his ordination, he 
studied theology with an older pastor in Tasmania for ten months. According to John 
Harrison this is an exceptionally short period, even in nineteenth century terms, and 
may have been 'less than adequate'." Although George Bjelke-Petersen was 
generally well educated by the standards of the time, he appears not have the 
university education that his son has claimed. The testimonial from his Dean, with its 
emphasis on diligence and the committing of knowledge to memory suggests an 
education designed to produce conformity rather than enquiry. His collection of Zane 
Grey adventure novels,^^ co-incidentally recommended by Ronald Reagan for their 
tradifional values,*' suggests less than highbrow tastes. The fact that no substantive 
references to Carl/George Bjelke-Petersen can be found in either the Australian or 
New Zealand Lutheran archives, nor in the Dannevirke library, indicates that it is 
unlikely that he contributed to theological debate or speculation.^ *^ It may be that the 
poor health which prevented him from taking an active role in farming, combined 
with the time he devoted to 'reading, writing and translating' gave him, in the eyes of 
his family, a reputation for emdition which may not be entirely warranted. The family 
may also have exaggerated the quality of George's education to compensate for the 
fact that for 'the last forty or so years of his life he didn't really work, he did a bit of 
pottering around . they had a vegetable garden down near the windmill; that was his 
job.'^' Certainly, his education was not the kind to lead to liberal or unconventional 
views. 
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towards authoritarianism. Even his son acknowledged that 'Father was by nature a 
conservative man.'^' Les Hoey recalls that the whole family supported 'George's 
view of the worid . . . He was a powerful force in the family ... Daddy, as they called 
him controlled everything, including finance.' Until he was married, Bjelke-Petersen 
had to ask his father if he could buy a new plough or other farm equipment.^^ 
According to Bjelke-Petersen, 'Father's message was to be strong in discipline and 
strong in faith.' His teaching focused strongly on sin and Jesus as our saviour.^'' Life 
was austere, with no drinking, smoking, dancing or working on the Sabbath, and 
exhortations 'that the spiritual side is really much more important than the material 
side'. There was a daily reading from the New Testament and Church on Sunday.^^ 
Maren Bjelke-Petersen taught Sunday School classes and Christian led a home bible 
study group. Such godliness may have been the product of conservative and pietistic 
influences which were strong in the New Zealand Scandinavian Lutheran Church.^^ It 
was certainly not universal amongst Scandinavian immigrants to Australia and New 
Zealand. The Brisbane Scandinavian community enjoyed Saturday evening dances 
which continued 'sometimes well into the Sabbath day'." The Scandinavian Society 
in Sydney held a boat trip on the Harbour at which chicken was served from baskets 
and beer and wine flowed so freely that the Society's finances never recovered.^^ The 
majority of Scandinavian pioneers in New Zealand reportedly demonstrated a 
'regrettable...lack of interest in spiritual things.'^' George Bjelke-Petersen complained 
of the lack of enthusiasm for worship among the Danish families in the Makaretu 
Congregation in New Zealand, a lack which was especially pronounced on those 
Sundays when the weather was beautiful.'*° 
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number of services conducted in English. In doing so, he hoped 'to reach the so-called 
"Scandinavian" youth. It has an unexplainable dislike towards the language its fathers 
loved so dearly.'"" Maren Bjelke-Petersen, who began speaking English as an eight 
year old was similarly supportive of the substitution of English for Danish in her own 
congregation because of the barriers the use of Danish placed between immigrants 
and native born and between the various language groups of the Lutheran Church.^" 
Despite his acceptance of English language sermons, George Bjelke-Petersen, who 
had a thick Scandinavian accent, insisted that Danish be spoken in his own household. 
This was unusual because, according to Jens Lyng, Scandinavian immigrants 
assimilated swiftly and 'in Australia, it is quite an exceptional occurrence for the 
Scandinavian language to be passed on to the second generation, even where both 
parents are Scandinavians.'^^ In order to promote Sunday School attendance amongst 
the children of Scandinavian immigrants, 'few of whom had learned the language of 
their ancestors', Luther's catechism had to be translated into English for use in the 
Queensland diocese.'*^ English was adopted as the language of worship at Edenvale in 
1920 which suggests that even in this community, Danish was dying out."*^  The 
language shift towards English was hastened by the anti-German feeling which 
gripped Australia during the years of the First Worid War and which often extended 
to Scandinavians.^ In addition, both officially and unofficially it was deemed 
desirable that immigrants assimilate and assume the characteristics of native born 
Australians. The fact that the Bjelke-Petersen children's first language remained 
Danish in this environment suggests a conscious attempt to conserve links with the 
past, especially on the part of their father, a high degree of isolation which prevented 
ready assimilation, and an imposition on the family of the language George was most 
comfortable with, or, as is most likely, a combination of the three. Bjelke-Petersen 
records that his father was 'very proud of his Danish roots and thought we ought to 
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critical about Denmark'."*^ 
The family's retention of the Danish language was probably also aided by its 
isolation. After his operation for goitre, George Bjelke-Petersen was left with a 
nervous twitch which made him self-conscious and reclusive."^* He ceased to 
participate in the life of the congregation to which he had once ministered. It is likely, 
given his history, that he continued to suffer from a troubled mind and spirit. Bjelke-
Petersen refers obliquely to 'the other troubles in his life."*^ Les Hoey recalls that 
George 'could fly into a rage, so they built a separate little house away from the main 
house where they could look after him.' Despite his isolation, he still managed to 
impose his will on the family, as his insistence on the retention of Danish 
demonstrates. Les Hoey, recalls that Bethany was 'a place where Uncle could not 
tolerate noise and where I had to be very careful of my behaviour.'^" Their home 'had 
this funereal tone to it.' Apart from visits to and from relatives, the need to work hard 
and lack of income kept the family socially isolated and unlikely ever to be exposed 
to altemative views. The only respite was Church and related activities, which, given 
the overwhelming evidence to suggest that regular church attenders are more 
conservative than non-attenders, was only likely to reinforce family beliefs.^' 
George Bjelke-Petersen's conservatism was reflected in his politics, in which, 
according.to Bjelke-Petersen, he was, 'particularly interested'." Whilst poor health 
made political participation difficult, it permitted time for reading and speculation 
which may explain findings which suggest that low health levels tend to increase 
interest in politics." For whatever reason, political discussions were not infrequent in 
the Bjelke-Petersen household, with George taking the lead. There is no indication 
that Maren Bjelke-Petersen did not support her husband's views. Indeed, in such a 
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Father was particularly interested in politics, and from time to time I heard him 
discussing with Mother different aspects of the government's activities - e. g. I can 
remember when the government introduced a 3d in the pound unemployment relief 
tax. Father was angry because he said it would become part of the tax system and 
would increase. 
He was right. I can remember him discussing it again years later when it had reached 
l/3d in the pound. ^ 
According to Bjelke-Petersen, most of his information on politics came from his 
father. So too, did opinion of the Labor Party and his Country Party allegiance: 
I grew up with a complete distmst of Labor Governments, following no doubt my 
Father's attitude - they never had anything for the poverty stricken country people... 
My father believed that the Country Party was the only Party that took a broader 
approach to life and people's problems overall." 
It is likely that this family background, where politics was discussed and political 
allegiances were known, pre-disposed Bjelke-Petersen towards a political career. 
American research tends to support the view that family members who are interested 
in politics play a significant role in shaping the interests and party identification of 
political acfivists.^^ In New Zealand 44 per cent of members of parliament surveyed 
by Austin Mitchell considered that their fathers had been 'very interested' in 
politics." In the Australian context, this process is illustrated by the accounts of three 
of the five party activists whom A. F. Davies studied in Private Politics. Each gives a 
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been interested in politics ... got it from my mother who was a very strong Liberal 
woman';^^ Neil Webb, Country member, had a father who 'was always very 
interested and very active in politics';^^ Leonard East, public servant, 'learnt my 
politics first of all from my father.'^ 
Bjelke-Petersen attributes his decision to enter pariiament not to his father, but to the 
influence of Sir Charles Adermann, fellow lay-preacher and the local federal member 
and Minister for Primary Industries.^' Les Hoey, however, confirms George Bjelke-
Petersen's influence on his son's politics and says that that 'in a sense Joh has become 
the public mouthpiece for what was the very private life of his father' " He believes 
that Bjelke-Petersen had a mission to carry his father's view of life to the masses. 
Unlike many second sons who rebel against the double authority of father and elder 
brother, Bjelke-Petersen never overtly rebelled against his father's basic conservative 
values or his partisan affiliation.^^ According to Les Hoey, Bjelke-Petersen 'put his 
father up on a pedestal' but he concedes that he probably resented his father's 
inability to do things. If there was resentment, however, it remained buried and 
unconscious. It is hinted at by his rejection of his father's scholarly pursuits despite 
accepting his assistance in preparing sermons and debates, and the pride with which 
he occasionally mentioned his father's emdition. An underlying contempt can be seen 
in his reference to his father as a 'city man and an academic' In an era dominated by 
a belief in. the moral and economic supremacy of mral life, to call someone by these 
terms was not really to flatter him, but to suggest a parasitic and, in pragmatic terms, 
useless, existence." Bjelke-Petersen's feelings on the topic are clear in his account of 
his older brother. Christian, who, because he was a keen student, was sent to Brisbane 
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was never much of a help around the farm. He took after our father. He wasn't the 
slightest bit interested in the farm or in sport or in anything else out of doors. ... I 
used to try to get him to come out and help me on the farm, but he was never 
interested ... he would have his eye on his watch and leave the minute he could. 
There is an echo in Bjelke-Petersen's remarks of the resentment which Leonard East, 
another second son, expresses about his elder brother. East, one of five activists 
examined by A. F. Davies, talks about his brother in similarly hostile tones, although 
in this instance it is anti-intellectualism that provokes brotherly disapproval: 
we've never been close, he always modelled himself on my father (and grandfather), 
had the same interests and opinions ... both of them really have always been 
definitely anti-intellecmal; but my brother has revelled in it." 
Throughout his life, Bjelke-Petersen showed little respect for academics and 
universities. Compared with 'the School of Life, the hard knocks of life ... the average 
fellow who goes up to the universities and the schools ... you leave them for dead for 
initiative... they are mass produced down a long line'.^^ Bjelke-Petersen's dismissal of 
the value of education, as well as being representative of the political culture of his 
era, may also reflect an underlying resentment of his father and/or the remnants of 
early sibling rivalry, neither of which he was able to express openly, the more so 
because of his brother's early death aged twenty two. Many years after both his father 
and brother's death, animosity towards a person who had bettered him, in this 
instance his successor as Premier, Mike Ahern, surfaced as hostility towards 
education. Asked if he would have been a better leader with a university degree, he 
responded: 'how much worse would I have been if I had that? The present Premier, 
he's got a degree in agriculture. Let you work it out for yourself ...Compare the 
two.'' ' 
James Walter suggests that underiying feelings about his father were likely to have 
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had their foundation in George Bjelke-Petersen's retention of patriarchal authority 
despite leaving the practicalities of mnning a farm to his wife and middle son.™ 
According to Bjelke-Petersen, his mother did all the heavy work on the farm until he 
was old enough to help her, and eventually take over. The weight of George's 
authority was clearly feU when, even though Bjelke-Petersen ran the farm, his father 
refused to give it to him before he died to avoid death duties. He recalls his father 
saying: 
I'm not going to give the property to Joh before I die. I don't know who you are 
going to marr\' and I'm not going to be kicked out and all this sort of stuff.. '^ 
This situation undoubtedly fuelled Bjelke-Petersen's later desire to rid the state of 
death duties. The lack of tmst shown by his father must have been hurtful and the 
twenty years it took to pay the duties may have caused resentment to simmer.^" In 
addition, if George's illness was not entirely physical, in an era when mental illness 
was frequently misunderstood and stigmatised, Bjelke-Petersen may have felt that his 
father was malingering. The fact that George Bjelke-Petersen's immediate family 
made no direct reference to his 'breakdown' suggests a reluctance to confront the 
problem, possibly associated with feelings of embarrassment. 
Nevertheless, although the workload divisions in the Bjelke-Petersen household 
differed from the conventional pattern because of George's poor health, the power 
stmcture remained traditional and was consistent with the Queensland and Australian 
patterns: 
The Australian mother is chief executive, doing everything, often without help from 
her husband ...Mother is skilled and energetic but powerless, or powerful only in 
lesser matters while the man is over the woman without having to earn his position. 
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In mral Australia, during the first half of the century, suggestions of wifely 
dominance were especially frowned upon and sons who worked on the family farm 
did not challenge their father's authority.^'* American research has confirmed this 
pattern and elaborated on its effects. Douvan and Edelson found that mral children in 
the United States were slower to acquire independence than other groups and more 
acquiescent in accepting traditional authority patterns.'^ Like them, Bjelke-Petersen 
submitted, but James Walter suggests that the resulting resentment of his lack of 
autonomy influenced his behaviour as Premier in an authoritarian direction: 
Having been at the mercy of a (resented) patriarch for so long, he later refused to be 
accountable to anyone: rather than explaining himself or answering questions, he 
demanded to be taken on tmst. In fact as Premier he himself played the strong 
patriarch, and on a grand scale.^' 
Other possible psychological explanations are provided by Erich Fromm and Graham 
Little. Fromm argues, along lines similar to Walter's, that children brought up in 
oppressive situations will have a tendency to overcome their childhood defeat by 
'doing actively what one was forced to endure passively: to mle when one had to 
obey; to beat when one was beaten; in short, to do what one v^?is forced to suffer. '" 
Little takes a different approach and suggests that dominating behaviour may have its 
origins not in resentment, but in imitation. He holds that because of boys' need to 
identify with their fathers 'the stage is set for the admiration of mantle-like authority' 
and the equation of office (father or premier) with power.^* Les Hoey uses almost 
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taken the mantle of authority worn by his father until Joh was well into his forties.' 
Further, 'when Daddy died . . . Joh became like the big daddy and treated everyone 
like children . . . particularly as he got older he's got more into his father's mould.' 
The longer Bjelke-Petersen remained as Premier, the more pronounced became the 
equation of office with power. Whenever attempts were made to constrain him, his 
resentment of the perpetrator was profound, as his feelings about National Party 
President, Sir Robert Sparkes, Governor, Sir Walter Campbell and political rival, 
Mike Ahern demonstrate. These relationships will be examined in later chapters but it 
is not inconceivable that attempts to make him submit to another's will evoked 
memories of his father's power, both as something to be resented and/or something to 
be imitated. Diffijse feelings of resentment which surfaced as hostility towards those 
who did not share his values and opinions, appear never to have left him. In turn, his 
own brand of populist politics allowed his supporters to vent their own feelings of 
resentment against various outsiders. 
Unlike his father, Bjelke-Petersen's mother, Maren, earned his unalloyed respect. He 
sfill called her 'mummy' when she was in her eighties.™ She was, in his words, 'like a 
bright and steady beacon', a hard worker who was up before daylight to cook 
breakfast, still up at midnight, if needs be, 'with the fire going and a hot meal on the 
table and fresh clothes, cleaned and pressed.'^° In her devotion to duty and 
commitment to toil, Maren seems to have followed in the footsteps of her own 
mother, Agneta, who, as a bush nurse in the Kingaroy district, combined the duties of 
a midwife with serving as a housemaid and washerwoman.^' These pioneering women 
served as models for the women Bjelke-Petersen was later closest to, such as his 
sister, Neta, who was his business partner and confidante for many years. Like his 
mother, she encouraged and helped him, persuading him to study by correspondence 
and joining him on the local debating team. When he was elected to the Kingaroy 
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the pair were commissioned to select library books to the value of 50 pounds.^^ James 
Walter traces Bjelke-Petersen's subsequent relationships with 'supportive and 
influenfial female loyalists' like his wife, and pilot Beryl Young, to the positive 
relationships he had with his mother and sister. ^^  The women in his family appear to 
have disposed him towards competent and practical women. In his autobiography he 
recalls being impressed by Florence Gilmour's 'brisk, efficient way'*"* as a secretary 
and by Beryl Young's performance of her duties as a pilot with 'a degree of skill, 
efficiency, safety, punctuality and plain good sense that would have been hard to 
match'.^' According to Allen Callaghan, Bjelke-Petersen's news and information 
officer from 1971 to 1979, 'Florence and later Beryl Young had the same attributes 
[as his mother] and could dress the Premier down and make demands that would not 
be tolerated from a man'.^^ 
From his family and their mral background he also acquired the courtesy and charm 
which many who knew him in later life comment upon. Even well known Labor 
staffer. Bob Ellis, found 'the eerie charm, the hypnotism the disarming courtesy 
for which he is justly famed . . .' seductive." Long after his demise as Premier, 
Bjelke-Petersen retained the intense loyalty and admiration of public servants like Sir 
Leo Hielscher and of personal staff like Allen Callaghan and Beryl Young, whom he 
treated as family or part of an extended clan.. Callaghan returns to this attribute often: 
How many times have you heard anybody ever betray a tmst with Joh? Not one, and 
he has a lot of staff. He has had a lot of employees, a big family and not one of them 
has ever spoken against him in public. 
As Bjelke-Petersen grew older, he took on more of the farm work. Failure to pass the 
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His successful management of the enterprise appears to have given him a self-
confidence that never deserted him. It also filled him with a desire to escape from 
poverty. This urge to make money sat uncomfortably with family teachings about the 
moral dangers of wealth*^ and caused his cousin, Les Hoey, to speculate that from his 
early years Bjelke-Peteresen was able to isolate the religious and the secular in 
separate realms.'*^ His brother Christian, before he died in 1929, aged 22, echoed his 
father's words about the temptations of the material world: 'Job, never go over to the 
world. Never sell your soul for filthy lucre.'^' Bjelke-Petersen himself claimed that 'I 
am one of those people who believe life has much more to it than the material'.'^ It is 
instmctive, however that Bjelke-Petersen's childhood heroes were Henry Ford and R. 
G. Le Tourneau, the personifications of the self-made men who buih fortunes without 
the benefits of formal education.*^ Ford, from a mral Methodist background, remained 
mrally oriented all his life and was never converted to the cause of education, unless 
it had a practical bias."^ "* He refiised to allow his son, Edsel, to go to college and 
rejected reading books on the grounds that 'they muss up my mind'.'' In his book. My 
Life and Work, which impressed Bjelke-Petersen so much. Ford constantly re-iterates 
the importance of work and suggests that: 
Being greed>' for money is the surest wa\' not to get it, but when one serves for the 
sake of service - for the satisfaction of doing that which one believes to be nght - then 
money abundantly takes care of itself 
Money comes naturally as the result of service. 
Le Tourneau's philosophy was similar. He was an inventor of heavy earthmoving 
equipment, multi-millionaire as a result of his inventions, founder of the Le Tourneau 
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sinner saved by grace. Just a mechanic that the Lord has blessed.' Further, 'we do 
not give to God because it pays, but it does pay to give to God and to serve Him 
faithftil [sic]."' 
Bjelke-Petersen followed in Ford and Le Tourneau's entrepreneurial footsteps by 
building up a contract harvesting and earth moving business to the point where he 
claimed to be making more money in a day than his parents did in a year on their 
farm.^ 
His success seemed to bear out the advice of Norman Vincent Peale whose Power of 
Positive Thinking, 'a book which teaches effective living through right thinking and 
practical religious faith','°*^ was another Bjelke-Petersen favourite.'°' A similar 
materialist philosophy underpins modern fundamentalism and appears to have guided 
Bjelke-Petersen, who, throughout his parliamentary career, continued his involvement 
in various entrepreneurial ventures seemingly oblivious to conflicts of interest. His 
pleasure appeared to come from making money, rather than spending it. As Premier, 
he continued to live in the modest brick farmhouse that he buih upon his marriage to 
Florence Gilmour. Although, as Premier, he eventually acquired a taste for wine, he 
remained a modest and plain eater. Hugh Bingham, his first media adviser, describes 
his astonishment at his new employer's fare: 
I was sitting in the nice little Premier's dining room and the cook came in with this 
beautiful tureen, the table was beautifully set with wine glasses and he lifted up the 
top of the tureen and it was boiled pumpkin and potatoes. Beautifully set out. They 
were just flawless. Absolutely flawless pumpkins and potatoes. 
Such a combination of diligence and fmgality was characteristic of Calvinism, but 
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and Peele did in their different ways, in salvation linked with work. 
Religion 
Religion played an important part in Bjelke-Petersen's life, as it did for many mral 
Australians.'°^ As Premier, he continued to attend church regularly, just as he had as a 
child and a young man, and he commented frequently on the importance to him of 
daily prayer and Bible reading. As might be anticipated, this religious observance 
influenced him in a conservative direction. But beyond this general statement lies a 
great deal of confusion about the nature and significance of his Lutheran faith. This 
confusion occurs for two main reasons, the first in the distinction between Lutheran 
and Calvinist beliefs and the second in how to interpret the impact of Luther's 
teaching, especially concerning the role of the state. Resolving the confusion requires 
the recognition of differences between classical Lutheranism and its manifestation in 
Queensland. 
Bjelke-Petersen's behaviour and his enthusiasm for the works of Ford and Peale seem 
to indicate that he was a believer in the Protestant work ethic that links hard work and 
success with salvation. Indeed, his character stmcture appeared to be that of the 
classical puritan 'who sought to master the world rather than adjust to it.'"" Work was 
a lifelong habit and, in his years as Premier, four hours sleep was usual.'°^ He lived 
for considerable periods of time, until he was thirty, in an old cow bail with only the 
most basic of facilities'*^ By his own account, he was nearly forty before he asked a 
woman out because 'somehow work always came first,''°^ The fit between Bjelke-
Petersen's beliefs, lifestyle and the ascetic work ethic described by Max Weber in The 






There is a wodd-wide U-end for rural people to be more religiously involved than city people. See 
H, Mol, Religion in Australia: a Sociological Investigation, Tliomas Nelson, Melboume, 1971, p. 
116. Also Don Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics 2nd edn, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra, 1982 . p. 185. 
H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Character and Social Structure. The Psychology of Social 
Institutions, Harcourt Brace and Worid, 1953, p. 188. 
pers. comm., Oct 1993. 
Bjelke-Petersen, op. cit, p. 26 
ibid. His sister Agneta, also married late in life. Strong ties to their parents may also have been a 
84 
Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins. The span of 
human life is infinitely short and precious to make sure of one's own election. Loss 
of time through sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary for 
health, six to at most eight hours, is worthy of absolute moral condemnation . . 
inactive contemplation is also valueless, or even directly reprehensible if it is at the 
expense of one's daily work ...Labour is .,,an approved ascetic technique ... It is in 
particular the specific defence against all those temptations which Puritanism united 
under the name of the unclean life ,., Along with a moderate vegetable diet and cold 
baths, the same prescription is given for all sexual temptations as is used against 
religious doubts and a sense of moral unworthiness: "work hard in your calling".'°* 
Because Bjelke-Petersen so clearly prioritised work and eschewed sociability, sleep, 
contemplation and sexual temptations, it is not surprising that some commentators 
have analysed him in Calvinist terms,'°^ Bjelke-Petersen himself, however, knew that 
Luther explicitly rejected good works as a means to salvation that could be achieved 
by grace and faith alone. In his words, 'faith is something you can't earn ,,, God's 
plan of salvation is there if you accept it',"° More formally, the Augsburg Confession, 
the chief document of belief of the Australian Lutheran Church, states that: 
Men cannot be justified before God 1 coram Deo] by their own strength, merits or 
works, but are justified freely [gratis] through Christ by faith , Our Churches 
condemn the Anabaptists and those who think that the Holy Spirit comes to men 
without an outward word, merely by their own preparation and works ...[Good works, 
which God commands of us, are the issue of faith, not the means of earning 
justification.]'" 
Further, Luther's Small Catechism, which explained Church doctrine to generations 
of Lutheran Sunday school children, states unequivocally that the doctrine of 
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which teach salvation by works.'"" Nevertheless, although Luther was opposed to 
works, he was in favour of work done with faith, including such mundane tasks as 
piling up manure, washing babies and cleaning the house."^ Bjelke-Petersen's 
enthusiasm for work was thus not incompatible with Lutheranism and undoubtedly 
reflected the views of the wider mral community in which the work ethic was no 
longer necessarily linked with Calvinism, nor indeed to Protestantism. For Catholics 
too, in the quest for upward mobility, work assumed a high priority. 
The uncoupling of the work ethic from Calvinism characterises modem capitalist 
economies, where, Weber suggests, the work ethic has 'escaped from the cage' of 
religion and been stripped of its religious and ethical meaning."'* It has been 
extremely functional for capitalism because hard work and asceticism permit the 
accumulation of capital required to drive the system. Colonial Australia was no 
exception and the dominant social values of 'industry, sobriety and fmgality' were 
taught by Catholic and Protestant alike"^ In pioneering economies like Queensland, 
both individual and social development were well served by the postponement of 
immediate gratification and the storing up of wealth. According to Weber, in 
capitalist environments religious sensibility is replaced by a 'utilitarian worldliness': 
the bourgeois business man, as long as he remained within the bounds of formal 
correctness, as long as his moral conduct was spotless and the use to which he put his 
wealth was not objectionable, could follow his pecuniary interests as he would and 
feel that he was fulfilling a dut>' in doing so. 
Indeed, entrepreneurship allowed the creation of opportunities for the unemployed 
and dependant to prove their own worth through fmgality, sobriety and hard work."^ 
Bjelke-Petersen appears to fit this model of the businessman which is consistent with 
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Queensland's political culture In this context, it is unsurprising that Bjelke-Petersen's 
behaviour appears to personify the (Protestant) work ethic. The belief in salvation by 
grace did not prevent him from working hard and living fmgally, especially in an 
environment in which classical Lutheran teachings had been cormpted by pietism. 
According to Harrison, pietism marks all religious denominations in Queensland and 
was very influential within the antipodean Scandinavian Lutheran Church."* Lutheran 
teaching in Australia and New Zealand was thus differentiated from the worldly 
Lutheranism of Germany and Scandinavia where the Church also had the advantage 
of establishment."' In order to understand the impact of religion on Bjelke-Petersen, 
it is necessary to understand the difference pietism made to classic Lutheran doctrine. 
Pietism places a strong emphasis on individual moral reformation and frowns upon 
hedonism and those physical appetites which detract from the spiritual aspects of 
existence. In this emphasis it differs from classical Lutheranism which is not an 
ascetic religion. Luther himself wrote enthusiastically about the delights of beer and 
food and Weber records that, compared with ascetic Protestantism's emphasis on self 
control and regulation, Lutheranism 'left the spontaneous vitality of impulsive action 
and naive emotion more nearly unchanged'.'^° In its moralistic emphasis, pietism 
shares some of the characteristics of fundamentalism and has been called 
'fiindamentalism's tap roots.''"' This may account for Richard Campbell's suggestion 
that fundamentalism pervades all denominations in Australia and accounts for their 
moralistic and judgmental attitudes, Australian ftindamentalism, he contends, is 
associated with a simplistic focus on a few doctrines and practices, which are deemed 
essential to salvation, and with a theological mood which is positivistic, assertive, 
conservative, dogmatic, authoritarian and confessional.'^^ The eariy pietist influence 
in Queensland may partially explain the later success of more extreme uhra-
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them and their adherents. Certainly, the pietist influences at work in Bjelke-Petersen's 
family and religion, and commended by the wider community, were sufficient to 
account for his diligent and ascetic behaviour and undoubtedly influenced him in his 
condemnation of departures from traditional patterns of behaviour. 
Australian Lutherans, Baptists, Churches of Christ, Reformed Church, Pentecostal 
Groups and Assemblies of God have been classified as 'Right Wing' Protestant 
groups because of their conservative theology, high levels of church attendance and 
belief in a personal God,'-^ Pastor Reinhard Meyer of the Brisbane Lutheran Church, 
concurs with the description of Australian Lutherans as conservative, and argues that 
the stmggle for survival in a new land, for identity during the hostile social climate 
created by two Worid Wars and by the need to unite people of diverse background 
produced in Australian Lutherans 'a peculiar tenacity, sometimes even seen as 
isolated arrogance,''"^ This characteristic may have been exacerbated by the small 
numbers of adherents to the Lutheran faith. In the 1921 census, 4,1 per cent of 
Queenslanders described themselves as Lutheran, aUhough the percentage for the 
South Burnett was 11,9 per cent,''^ By 1986, the percentage of Lutherans in 
Queensland had declined to 1,7 per cent,'^ ^ The tiny numbers of Lutherans and their 
dispersal over a large number of districts meant that it was impossible for the Church 
to form an organisation or synod, despite early attempts to do so. The first 
Queensland synod was formed in 1885 and combined German and Scandinavian 
Lutherans, The Danish Lutherans split from this group four years later and from that 
point their organisational stmcture remained congregational.'" This meant that 
individual pastors and congregations followed their own religious doctrines and 
explains, in part, the large number of schisms and splits within the Australian 







R, Campbell, 'The Character of Australian Religion', Meanjin, vol 36, no, 4, 1977, pp, 182-3, 
G. D. Bouma and B. R. Dixon, 77?^  Religious Factor in Australian Life, MARC AusU-alia, 
Melboume, 1986, p, 4, 
R. J, Mayer, 'Luther Speaks in a New Land' in New Beginnings; The Germans in New South 
Wales and Oueensland, ed, J, H. Voigt, Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations, Stuttgart, 1983, 
p. 184. 
Harrison, op, cit p. 46 
ibid. 
ibid., p. 52. 
88 
Australia.'"^ In a History of the United Evangelical Lutheran Church in Australia, 
Hebart describes the conftision in the Church in Queensland: 
,,,churches sprang up like mushrooms, and it was no uncommon sight to see two or 
three Lutheran churches in one locality. Moreover, the shortage of pastors, too, 
permitted many sectarian abuses to enter the Church. Laymen preached and even 
women offered prayer in the services. It was also detrimental to the welfare of the 
Church that pastors who were unworthy of the position offered their services 
,,,Lutheran consciousness was hardly to be found amongst these men. On one 
occasion, one of these "Lutheran" pastors, conjointly with a Baptist preacher, 
ordained an aspirant to the ministry in the Lutheran Church! '^' 
It is clear that many of those who ministered in Queensland were poorly trained. 
Harrison suggests that in all religions, 'levels of theological illiteracy were 
undoubtedly high, coupled with a tendency towards individualism in belief and 
practice'.'^° Each congregation developed its own religious practices and 
interpretation of doctrine against a backdrop of pragmatic Christianity rather than 
informed theological discussion,'^' Brauer, in his history of the Lutheran Church, 
confirms that in the early years, 'lack of Lutheran consciousness, want of 
indoctrinafion, lack of proper organisation [and] disorderly church pracfices' were 
among the characterisfics which contributed to the 'chaos and confijsion' of the 
Lutheran Church in Queensland,'^' It was not until 1928 that a uniform order of 
service was adopted for the Queensland Lutheran Church and even then not all 
congregations introduced it,'" In such fluid circumstances it was understandable that 
classical Lutheranism was diluted, especially as relations between Lutheranism and 
other evangelical Protestant denominations appear to have been close, Maren Bjelke-
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Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians and Lutherans, At nearby Coolabunia, the 
Church building was shared by Baptists, Presbyterians and the Salvation Army, 
although the last had to meet outside because the small building could not 
accommodate their brass band.'^ '^  At Meringandan, on the Darling Downs, a 
Methodist Pastor served the Lutheran congregation,'^' Such heterogeneity can be 
explained by the rarity of visits by clergymen to bush communities. Whenever a 
clergyman came to a small mral community, believers of all denominations turned up 
because such visitations were so spasmodic and random. In exile in Tasmania in the 
1990s, Bjelke-Petersen seemed to take the same approach when, in the absence of a 
Lutheran Church, and despite the anti-Catholicism of his upbringing, he attended 
Catholic Mass.'^' 
In this context, it would be unsurprising if doctrines central to classic Lutheranism 
were poorly taught or misunderstood. This is especially likely in the case of Luther's 
Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms that some commentators have suggested was a 
possible influence on Bjelke-Petersen ' " Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms is 
complex and asserts that the Christian lives in both the kingdom of God and the 
kingdom of the world, which, although distinct 'are involved in each other and must 
not be separated ''^ '* So as to preserve order, from the chaos created by people's 
wickedness, government is necessary and people must submit to its authority. Whilst 
in his private life the Christian prince may forgive wrongdoers, as a mler, he acts as a 
patriarch who is forced to punish offenders in order to preserve law and order. Luther 
drew on the Petrine Epistles' injunction to 'Fear God. Honour the King', to teach: 
Because the sword is a very great benefit and necessary to the whole world, to 






M. Bjelke-Petersen, op, cit, p, 6, ff 
Hebart, op, cit,, p, 292, 
H. Brown, 'Out of E.xile', The Courier .Mail Weekend 9 Dec, 1995, p. 2, 
I. Gillman, 'The Influence on Political Leadersliip of Clvristian Traditions in Australia', Journal of 
Religion, Ausfralian Broadcasting Corporation, 11 May, 1983 (audio); Walter, op, cit, p, 497, 
T, F, Torrance, 'The Eschatology of the Faith: Martin Luther' in Luther: Theologian for Catholics 
and Protestants, ed, George Yule, T, & T, Clark, Edinburgh, 1985, p. 165, For an interpretation 
of the doctrine which takes account of its complexity, see H, Borkman, Luther's Doctrine of the 
Two Kingdoms in the Context of his Theology trans, K, H. Hertz, ForU-ess Press, Philadelphia, 
1966 and G, Ebeling, Luther, An Introduction to His Thought, Uans, R, A, Wison, Fortress Press, 
Philadelphia, 1972. 
90 
willingly to the mle of the sword, pays tax, honours those in authority, serves, helps 
and does all he can to fiirther the government, that it may be sustained and held in 
honour and fear.'^' 
Opinions like these caused some theologians and critics to view Luther as a prophet 
of the authoritarian state and as a foremnner of Hitler, despite the fact that Luther 
legitimises resistance against the state if it causes the citizen to sin. His writings on 
this theme were used to justify resistance against National Socialism by Lutheran 
martyrs such as Dietrich Bonhoffer.''^ However, Luther makes it clear that there can 
be no support for mass rebellion against the state Because of the bloodshed and hurt 
to the innocent, Luther indicated that he would always 'be on the side of those against 
whom insurrection is directed, no matter how unjust their cause' and that he would 
always oppose 'those who rise in insurrection, no matter how just their cause.'''*' 
Some interpretations of the Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms suggest that it advocates 
separate spheres for the Church and State.'"' Anglican clergyman and German 
historian John Moses argues that: 
In the Lutheran experience people were taught that in secular affairs the State alone 
virtually implemented the divine will for humankind. Consequently, it was not 
permitted for Chnstians to question or criticise the State, There was a complete 
separation between the secular authority of the State and the spiritual authority of the 
Church,'"^ 
For many Lutheran theologians this is a distortion but it is one that numerous 
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remote congregations in Southern Queensland so interpreted Luther. Against such a 
background, it is at least conceivable that some of Bjelke-Petersen's anger as Premier 
at criticisms by the clergy and at demonstrators generally could be located in his 
understanding of the Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. Certainly, when groups such as 
the Concerned Christians protested against Bjelke-Petersen's street march legislation 
(1976-77), when the Archbishop of Canterbury defended the right to strike in the 
context of the 1985 SEQEB dispute and when the Uniting Church took issue with his 
government's denial of self-determination to the Aboriginal inhabitants of Aumkun 
and Mornington Island, Bjelke-Petersen was affronted. He argued; 'it's only the 
administration of the reserve government wishes to control - the church would 
continue with spiritual activities'.''*^ 
Bjelke-Petersen's refusal to countenance criticism or opposition provoked Ian 
Gillman to argue that Lutheranism permitted Bjelke-Petersen to believe in a version 
of the seventeenth century doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings. As an earthly mler, 
he acted with divinely given authority and was responsible for his acts to God 
alone.'"^ This theme was also pursued by Phil Muston who suggests that the spiritual 
doctrine of Lutheranism enabled Bjelke-Petersen to compartmentalise his life into 
public and private areas, so that the ownership of shares in companies which had 
dealings with the government could be constmed as a private interest.''*^ Such a belief, 
however, is not peculiar to the Lutheran faith. Pietism and ftindamentalism also stress 
the importance of personal morality, 'Good' men are recognised by their virtues such 
as church attendance, regard for family and sobriety; 'bad' men by their vices like 
lack of religion or intemperanceZ'*^ A 'good' man will not require political checks and 
balances His personal virtue is sufficient guarantee. That this was Bjelke-Petersen's 
view, whatever its religious foundations, is demonstrated by comments he made at the 
time of the Comalco share issue. In response to questioning by interviewer David 
Frost, on the propriety of cabinet ministers owning shares in companies with which 
they had public dealings, Bjelke-Petersen responded: 'We are men of integrity. We 
have been put there by the people year aft^r year. The people know us ,,, The people 
W. Brown, 'Canben :^ No Deal', 77?^  Courier Mail, 30 March. 1978, p, 1, 
Gillman, op, cit. 
Muston, op, cit,, p, 9, 
Underwood, p, 312 
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know and tmst me We fought an election on it,' In another interview, Bjelke-
Petersen re-iterated this position: '.,,the Christian faith and understanding is 
absolutely a must to get the real tme good strong positive leader who knows where he 
is going on all issues and can be tmsted and relied upon,'''*' Many of his supporters 
shared his view. The 'Fair Go for Joh' campaign, arranged to oppose a Christian 
Prayer Vigil conducted by Christian opponents of the Bjelke-Petersen style of 
government, declared that the Queensland Premier 'was like Jesus, a prophet never 
recognised in his own time. He is guided by his Christian ethics, so he cannot go 
wrong."''' 
Further support for the view that Bjelke-Petersen may have been influenced in his line 
of thinking as much by pietist influences as by Luther's Doctrine of the Two 
Kingdoms lies in the fact that his opinions were shared by non-Lutheran colleagues 
and were widespread in a denominationally plural society, where the separation of 
church and state was constitutionally guaranteed, and where there was an entrenched 
belief in the separation of public and private lives"' Industrial relations minister, 
Vince Lester, a Roman Catholic, was of the opinion that: 
The sooner some members of the clergy, and it seems to be minority groups in the 
major faiths, understand their role is really saving souls, and not mnning the politics 
of the country, the better"' 
Cabinet colleague, and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Ken Tomkins (Church of 
England) believed that 'the merging of religious belief with political acfion is not a 
wise path...''" On the subject of share ownership, a number of ministers accepted 
shares at par from Comalco, a company that had business dealings with the 
government Leader of the Liberal Party and Treasurer, Sir Gordon Chalk 
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Max Hodges (Church of England), Conservation Minister, Neville Hewitt (Church of 
England), and Health Minister, Doug Tooth (Church of England), all took shares. So 
did senior bureaucrats, a press secretary, Florence Bjelke-Petersen, journalists and 
Labor Party members 'Uproar was relatively muted in Queensland,'""' Lutheran and 
non-Lutheran alike subscribed to a similar ethic. As the previous two chapters have 
indicated, such 'easy going standards' are features of a political culture characterised 
by practical materialism. 
In any event, Bjelke-Petersen's desire to separate church and state was selective. As 
early as 1954, as a backbench Member of Pariiament he was happy to quote 
Protestant Church support for his opposition to the legalisation of off-course 
betfing,'" and, as Premier, he attempted to enlist support from the Churches in his 
opposition to condom vending machines,'^^ In addition, the fundamentalist churches 
whose allegiance he had, were politically interventionist, especially on issues such as 
education, sexual morality and support for a 'good' man such as Bjelke-Petersen. 
Pastor Clark Taylor of the Mansfield Christian Outreach Centre made no attempt to 
separate Church and state when he stated: 
I support any candidate who would stand for godly government. Christian morality in 
society and Christian education. If Joh supports that, we recommend they support 
him. We are for those who are for God, The church has to be involved.'" 
Yet, as the previous chapter revealed, many of the fundamentalist churches appeared 
relatively unconcerned by financial cormption, possibly because 'these cormptions 
require 'personal salvation for correction, not "political solutions".''^^ It is likely that 
the lack of interest reflected the predominantly individualistic ethic of Protestantism, 
which assumed that the relationship between people, their conscience and God was 
highly personal. Such an approach encouraged the development of a situafion where: 
Few among the Protestants were moved to espouse a 'social gospel' alongside or in 
E, Whitton, The Hillbilly Dictator, ABC, Crows Nest NSW, 1989, p, 19. 
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place of one concentrating on the individual. And those few who did so gained hardly 
any support from their fellow religionists, because, quite rightly, the latter detected an 
in-buih challenge to the socio-economic status quo,'^ ^ 
When Christians emphasised the social dimensions of Christianity rather than 
personal piety and argued that the Church should act in support of oppressed groups, 
like the Aboriginal people on Aumkun and Mornington Island, Bjelke-Petersen was 
uncomprehending,'^ Although, as a Sunday school teacher and lay preacher, Bjelke-
Petersen should have been better informed than most parishioners, and regarded 
himself to have 'obtained a deep insight into the Christian faith and religion'"^', he 
appears to have been like many Australian churchgoers, who have only a slender 
understanding of doctrine '^ " The transcript of a radio interview with theologian David 
Millikan indicates that Bjelke-Petersen's understanding of the Doctrine of the Two 
Kingdoms was as woolly as his understanding of the separation of powers,'^^ After 
intensive study Harrison argues that Bjelke-Petersen cannot be described as a 
classical Lutheran,'^ a view supported by Professor Bayer, Professor of Protestant 
Theology at Tubingen University who is also of the opinion that Bjelke-Petersen is 
not a 'genuine' Lutheran,'" 
That this is so, is understandable because Lutheranism in Queensland was taught by 
poorly trained pastors and influenced by the pietism that prevailed in all 
denominations. It appears unlikely, given these circumstances, that Bjelke-Petersen's 
view of the state was much affected by Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, 
Even if it had been, its effect would have been to reinforce prevailing cross-
denominational views on the separation of church and state. What religion seems to 
have given Bjelke-Petersen is a view of morality as personal rather than political. In a 
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that doing God's work meant 'that in due season he shall reap if he faint not,''^ He 
believed that 'nothing happens to you without God's permission'. It was only a small 
step from this to believe that whatever he did had God's approval. As Premier, he 
continued to hold such views, demonstrating the essentially Manichean mindset 
associated with authoritarian fundamentalism: 
I always frame the government on the policy: is it right or is it wrong; is it good or is 
it bad. I always said mnning a Government or anything to me is quite simple if you 
work on the basic principle of ,., your Christian faith and understanding of it. Then, 
people used to say to me how do you know if it's right or wrong, how do you know if 
It's good or bad? Well your whole instinct cries out whether it's good or bad.'^ ^ 
When pressed as to whether there were times when he was not sure, he replied: 'no, 
no' '^ ^ On another occasion he made a very similar statement but added a utilitarian 
gloss to the question of rightness or wrongness by asking 'will it be a benefit or 
blessing to people in other words?'"''^ The conviction that he knew the answers to 
such questions meant that opponents must always be wrong. Les Hoey observes of his 
cousin that he 'has an inner certainty that he knows the answers to our political and 
social woes,''™ As a 'good' Christian he expected to be tmsted and thus had no need 
for constitutional checks and balances. His religious beliefs led him in an 
authoritarian direction, thus enhancing attitudes formed within a patriarchal family 
and supported by the state's political culture. Education at a mral state school added 
another reinforcing layer to the socialisation process. 
Education and occupation 
As with other agencies of socialisation, it is difficult to measure with any precision 
the role of the school: 
Schools may show high variance in their capacity to shape the political outlook of 
'^ J. Bjelke-Petersen, 'The Teacher and His Class', Circular, ND. Lutheran Church Archives. 
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their charges. The size of the school, its quality, its curriculum, its locafion, its social 
composition and the like may all serve to dampen or increase its relative effects,'^' 
It is reasonable to surmise in the Queensland context, where state schools were 
authoritarian and bureaucrafic in stmcture, that the impact of schooling on Bjelke-
Petersen would be to fortify the values already acquired at home and in church. As the 
previous chapter indicated, Queensland lagged behind the other states in the quality of 
its education, but throughout Australia the State Education Departments exercised 
almost Napoleonic control over schools within the system, Australian Directors of 
Education 'were not anxious to foster freedom and variety in their schools,''^^ The 
prime goals of primary education were 'orderiiness, discipline and development of 
skills','" a set of goals entirely consistent with the Bjelke-Petersen family values. 
Because his formal schooling ceased at the end of primary school, he must be 
classified as a man with limited education, and as the previous chapter has suggested, 
low levels of education have been associated with the development of authoritarian 
attitudes. Certainly many of Bjelke-Petersen's pronouncements on education, as 
Premier, reflect the values of his own schooling rather than those of contemporary 
educationists 
Bjelke-Petersen's formal education started and finished at Taabinga Village State 
School where he claims he 'was about average' as a student.'^ '* By his own account, 
he, like the mral children of Mallee Town a generation later,'" was more interested in 
sport than lessons, 'a very self-confident, rather cocksure little boy who liked to be 
first at everything'.'^^ He recalls that the discipline of home prepared him well for 
school and that he was well behaved. He remembers being caned only once, for 
talking in class. Both crime and punishment were symptomatic of the prevailing ethos 
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than between peers. Until 1957, the Department of Educafion in Queensland was 
known as the Department of Public Instmction, a term which has as one of its 
meanings 'orders or directions' and which suggests a hierarchical relationship 
between teacher and pupil, 'Drill' before school, with children in lines on 'parade', 
followed by a 'march' into school was usual. Rote learning and preparafion for exams 
characterised the system and answers to questions were either 'right' or 'wrong'. The 
style of education was very close to that desired half a century later by the 
fundamentalist groups STOP and CARE who favoured 'the scriptural method of 
educating children ' This involved 'teaching by rote, memorising and learning from 
the examples of history ...'. '" The passive reception of factual material was further 
encouraged by the domination of the 'Scholarship' examination at the end of primary 
schooling,'^^ In this environment, teachers presented 'knowledge' in such a way as to 
suggest academic consensus on the topic: 
By presenting knowledge as established, available in texts or transmitted by the 
teacher, schooling implies it is independent of the person, to be accepted and 
accommodated to, and obscures or even denies that it is of human constmction, 
differentially interpretable and sustained by being accepted and acted upon. Such a 
conception functions to limit the learner's sense of power and competence, foster a 
passiveness and dependence in the student and enhance the probability of an 
accommodative response to existing social conditions. 
The Queensland syllabus remained much the same from 1905 to 1930,'^ ° Many of the 
teachers were pupil teachers whose training was minimal and who commenced their 
teaching careers at 14 years of age, A writer in the Febmary 1912 edition of the 
Queensland Education Journal quoted with approval the view that as far as teachers 
were concerned 'high character comes before competent knowledge','^' Even a school 
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must be large amount of ram, jam, cram.''*" In such an environment, it is easy to see 
how questioning was frowned upon and discouraged. 
There was no direct attempt at political socialisation through the teaching of 
government. Even if there had been, American research indicates that such instmcfion 
has little impact on the bulk of students, especially those in lower middle-class and 
working class communities.'*^ There was, however, instmction in 'Civics and 
Morals', which was a Bible Study course.'*" As well as Bible lessons there was an 
emphasis on King, Country, Empire and the symbols of nationality, and a 
concomitant abhorrence of 'aliens'. There was particular enthusiasm for the White 
Australia policy in Queensland and a clear desire to maintain a homogeneous white 
European population,'*' In 1912, the Queensland Governor expressed himself: 
well satisfied with the training in loyalty In one or two instances have I found the 
children weak in the National Anthem, Even at remote Ruby Vale the children sang 
"God Save the King" splendidly.'*' 
The declaration of war against Germany heightened the patriotic fervour. In 1915 
5000 costumed state school children took part in a display designed to represent the 
peoples of the British Empire,'*^ An early photograph of Bjelke-Petersen with 
Christian and Neta shows him dressed in neat white shirt and sporting a Union Jack 
fie, and Christian wearing an imitation Light Horse slouch hat and feathers.'** 
Possibly, his Scandinavian-born parents were keen to demonstrate their family's 
patriofism, although enthusiasm for the head of state is common among young 
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lifetime, A photograph of the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh hang next to an 
illustration of Jesus in the dining room at 'Bethany".'^ He never feU, like many 
Australians of non-British origin, that the British Royal family was irrelevant. Rather, 
as an outsider, he maintained a loyalty so fervid that it suggests a desire to 
compensate for his foreign ancestry. Hofstadter found second or third generation 
immigrants especially prone to pseudo-conservative demands for conformity in all 
areas of life: 
The nonconformity of others appears to such persons as a frivolous challenge to the 
whole order of things they are trying so hard to become part of Namrally it is 
resented, and the demand for conformity in public becomes at once an expression of 
such resentment and a means of displaying one's own soundness. This habit has a 
tendency to spread from politics into intellectual and social spheres, where it can be 
made to challenge almost anyone whose pattem of life is different and who is 
imagined to enjoy a superior social position,,"' 
In addition to immigrant status, Bjelke-Petersen's childhood left him with another 
difficulty to overcome. At nine years of age he contracted polio and was unable to 
attend school for a year. He eventually recovered, not through the assistance of 
orthodox medicine but by the massage treatment favoured by Sister Elizabeth Kenny. 
He was left with a slight limp, never caught up on the missed schoolwork and never 
regained his pre-eminent position in the sports field and school ground. Bjelke-
Petersen himself minimises the impact of polio and portrays it as a salutary and 
humbling experience"" It is possible, however, that his self-image was severely 
affected by paralysis and its aftermath. His later zeal for both work and politics may 
indicate in part a desire to recover from the blow to his self-esteem which polio 
caused and to seek approval from a wide audience, Lasswell has suggested that the 
desire to enter politics may be a compensatory reaction against low self esteem, a 
theme which Lewis Edinger pursued in his account of Kurt Schumacher's political 
career'^^ Schumacher, the leader of the German Social Democrats lost an arm as a 
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young soldier during World War 1. Edinger suggests that in this context, 'political 
behaviour that appears to some as arrogant and aggressive, and to others as 
charismatic and militant, may in fact derive ultimately from the need for self-
expression,''^'* In like fashion, it is conceivable that some of Bjelke-Petersen's 
aggressive political drive may have its origins in both his childhood polio and 
immigrant status. 
The combination of poor health and lack of interest meant that Bjelke-Petersen failed 
the Scholarship examination which marked entry to High School, and, rather than 
repeat the year, he returned to Bethany to work fijll time. The family was poor and, it 
was not unusual for children to leave school at fourteen, especially in the country 
where experience was often regarded more highly than leaming and where boys, 
especially, were less likely to continue their education than their city counterparts"^ 
Because of his father's ill heahh, Bjelke-Petersen was fiilly responsible for the day to 
day mnning of the farm. Like most farmers he derived high levels of satisfaction from 
his occupation and way of life despite the hardships and long hours of work,'^^ Much 
of the time was spent alone, living on other family properties. As a farmer, however, 
he would always be a price taker, at the mercy of markets, climate and middlemen. 
His ambition to put poverty behind him pushed him in an entrepreneurial direction. 
He added contract ploughing and threshing to his workload and by the 1930s, the 
Bjelke-Petersen's were a prosperous family. 
When war broke out Bjelke-Petersen failed to volunteer, a decision that was later held 
against him. He has reasoned that he would probably have been rejected on account 
of his childhood polio 'but before the question even arose I was rejected on the 
grounds that the work I did in the mral industry was essential to the war effort.''^^ 
Many farmers in similar circumstances, however, volunteered. Most did not have as 
additional motivation the history of hostility between Denmark and Germany, and the 





Edinger, Kurt Schumacher, A Study in Personality and Political Behax'iour, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, 1965, 
Edinger, p, 17, 
F, H, G. Gmen, 'Rural AusU-alia', in Davies and Encel, op, cit, p, 350, 
ibid,, p. 347, 
Bjelke-Petersen, op, cit,, p, 33 
101 
oddly with Bjelke-Petersen's enthusiasm for the Crown, but undoubtedly the 
burgeoning family business would have suffered if Bjelke-Petersen had joined up. 
The drive to prosper appears to have outweighed the demands of patriotism. 
The war effort, however, had its impact, Bjelke-Petersen had seen army bulldozers in 
operation and decided that these were the perfect machines for clearing scmb. In 
business, he was an innovative problem solver, with the purchase of these bulldozers 
and learning to fly being prime examples. If he resented being told what to do, he was 
always willing to listen to advice on how to achieve his goals. Allen Callaghan recalls 
that he took these skills with him into political life: 'Job had one attribute: he knew 
how to pick good staff and if he had a problem he would get somebody to solve it for 
him...' 
As a contractor, he was a zealous 'developer' of Queensland's brigalow country, 
pulling more than 100,000 acres of scmb, and delighting over the mastery of nature 
which these exploits demonstrated:'^* 
We were clearing as many as 100 acres a day. Today you would see a huge area 
covered with brigalows so thick that that you could hardly walk through it, and 
tomorrow you would not see a tree standing upright ,,, Anyone who has been there 
when brigalow scmb is being pulled by two big dozers is unlikely to forget the sound 
of it. On a clear day you can hear the cracking and the snapping of the trees from a 
mile away. It gives me a lot of satisfaction today to know that the land we cleared in 
those days is now producing great wealth for the state and the nation, 
Bjelke-Petersen never lost his enthusiasm for development that became, as it had for 
previous Queensland premiers, the unquestioned, dominant policy goal of his 
government. His embrace of development, progress and entrepreneurship were widely 
shared and culturally supported. Even when some Queenslanders began to question 
the inevitability of development, Bjelke-Petersen continued to retain his passion for 
projects such as the establishment of a resort on a section of national park on 
Lindeman Island, the constmction of the world's tallest building in Brisbane, and his 
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agreement to mine bauxite at Aumkun reserve, despite the objections of the local 
Aborigines and the Uniting Church. It may also explain his weakness for 
entrepreneurs such as Stephen Horvath, who claimed to have invented a hydrogen 
powered car, and cancer therapist, Milan Brych Allen Callaghan traced their 
attraction for Bjelke-Petersen to his reverence for successfijl people, his love for 
inventions and his belief that their schemes might work He would greet each dubious 
proposal with the optimistic words: 'Oh, he might have an idea . . . he might have an 
idea.' 
Ahhough Bjelke-Petersen's formal schooling ended at fourteen, his education 
continued. He enrolled in correspondence school under the tutelage of his sister, 
Agneta, and, more importantly for his fliture as a politician, joined the local Kingaroy 
debating society. Here, he learned to speak in public and think on his feet. His sister 
wrote in her diary that the adjudicator, rather surprisingly in the light of his later 
reputation for inarticulateness, 'highly complimented Joh for his flow of beautiful 
English',^'^ As Premier he spoke with affection and gratitude of the debt he owed his 
sister in teaching him to debate, although Hugh Bingham found that 'Job's sense of 
debating was not what the ordinary person's sense of debating was. It was a series of 
assertions,'^°' 
Bjelke-Petersen taught Sunday School and delivered sermons regularly in churches at 
Murgon, Kingaroy, Home Creek and Yarraman, commencing with a sermon at Home 
Creek in 1938 on the topic of swearing and ill-natured words.^°' The local pastor 
wrote that he was convinced 'that with a little training you can become an excellent 
speaker',^°^ Between 1939 and 1940, influenced by Agneta who had taken some 
Workers Education Association courses on a visit to Brisbane relations, he undertook 
a University of Queensland extension course on the 'Art of Wrifing'.^^ Among the 
examiner's comments on the embryonic Bjelke-Petersen style were some 
demonstrating a remarkable prescience On 'Camping Out' the examiner commented: 
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'... In this style your wordiness is of course permissible. The chatty style, however, 
has its drawbacks. It is apt to become trivial and long-winded ' On 'Getting Up Eariy' 
the marker noted ' .. there is a certain dogmatic harshness about your style,'-'^- In 
addition to these literary efforts, Bjelke-Petersen gave talks on the local radio station 
with such apparent success that he was tempted to apply for an announcer's job. With 
the assistance of his sister and father he had reached a modest proficiency in verbal 
communication. As Premier, however, he was famed for his inarticulate 
communication style, which, given his early successes, may have been exaggerated in 
order to enhance his simple 'man of the people' style. This will be considered fiirther 
in the last chapter. 
By the time Bjelke-Petersen was thirty, he was a prosperous farmer and businessman 
with moderate levels of skill and experience in public speaking. The political marks 
which had been left on his character by family, religion, schooling and occupation 
were mutually reinforcing and ensured a good fit between him, the farming region in 
which he grew up and the wider state arena. From his family, he had inherited his 
political allegiance, personal piety, courtesy, capacity for hard work allied with 
pragmatism and anti-intellectualism, and recognition of patriarchal authority. Religion 
was inextricably bound up with family influences. Antipodean Lutheranism taught 
piety, the value of hard work and an individualistic, rather than a social, morality. He 
was left with the strong belief that as a good Christian he must be right, and this 
influenced him to treat allegations of impropriety and opposition to his government 
with contempt. School reinforced the values acquired at home and at Church, 
Diligence, obedience and respect for authority were encouraged. Students were rarely 
stimulated to pursue knowledge for its own sake, so that when he became a farmer 
and entrepreneur it was easy to value practical experience above book learning. He 
was highly motivated to achieve success in order escape his family's early poverty, A 
desire to compensate for the damage polio had done to his self-image, and to make up 
for his status as an outsider of Danish extraction, may have been additional spurs. 
Once embarked upon a political career, he was tenacious and ambitious, making the 
most of every opportunity and refusing to give ground, no matter what the opposition 
-°^ ibid,, p. 178, 
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CHAPTER 4 
COUNCILLOR TO PREMIER 
For a professional politician, the socialisation associated with political activity is 
extremely important. Political institutions continue the shaping process that 
commenced in childhood, modifying both external conduct and inner life.' In the case 
of Bjelke-Petersen, the political milieu and institutions of Queensland were 
supportive of his values and important aspects of his political style. Many of his early 
beliefs remained intact because, in the environment in which he worked, they were 
challenged so infrequently,' Nevertheless, there was much to learn from experience 
and other people This chapter examines significant aspects of his political education 
from election to the Kingaroy Shire Council in 1946 to his assumption of the 
premiership in 1968, This period can usefiilly be seen as Bjelke-Petersen's 'first 
career' in politics, during which he achieved and secured power. His 'second career' 
spanned the premiership and his exercise of power.^ The 'first career' will often be 
characterised by deference, because in 'elective politics, deference is the mle of 
ascendance' and 'one cannot be too humble, too serving, too responsive to the wishes 
of others','* Once the goal of leadership is reached, however, 'controls give way and 
hubris takes over,'^ This pattern describes Bjelke-Petersen's political career, and, co-
incidentally, authoritarian behaviour styles in general, but as this chapter illustrates, 
conflict can occasionally occur between deferring to the wishes and needs of the 
electorate and to those of the party leader. In addition, there are tensions between the 
aspiring politician's need to be deferential and his or her own demand for deference,* 
In this context, it is probably inevitable that the suppression of ambition will not be 
1 H, Gerth and C, Wriglit Mills, Character and Social Structure, The Psychology of Social 
Institutions, Harcourt Brace & World, New York, 1953, p. 173, 
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A. Zaleznik, ' Psychopathology and Politics Reconsidered', Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, vol, 
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totally successful, and that a more grandiose and autonomous vision of the self will 
sometimes emerge. 
The young Bjelke-Petersen 'was a hard-working, serious, friendly' chap with no overt 
signs of ambition/' Bjelke-Petersen denies ever being politically ambitious with 
claims such as 'I didn't want to go in [to parliament] because I was making so much 
money in contracting'* and 'there wasn't any material gain for me in becoming a 
parliamentarian, I only look upon myself as a servant of the people ' ' Such comments 
need to be treated with caution. Most politicians promote the fiction that they are 
motivated by the ideal of public service rather than private ambition,'° For a populist 
leader, the notion of being drafted is more flattering than the suggestion that his 
political career was the result of calculating ambition, yet Bjelke-Petersen was well 
aware of the connection between success and careful planning," An examination of 
his unfolding career suggests both that his political ascent was not as serendipitous as 
he makes out and that he has persistently expunged any failure from his recorded 
memory. 
The proposition that calculation played a part in Bjelke-Petersen's political career 
does not contradict the conclusion of the previous chapter that possible motives for 
his ambition lie in the experiences of his childhood and youth. Many protagonists, 
ahhough not aware themselves of underlying motives, will sfill employ rational 
calculations in striving to attain desired goals,'' Bjelke-Petersen himself stressed the 
importance of 'forward thinking, forward planning ,,. You've got to be miles ahead 
of anybody else','^ Other evidence also suggests that like many ambitious people, 
Bjelke-Petersen began to prepare for future positions before actually filling them,''* As 
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wide network through his contracfing business, as a Shire Councillor, he 
simuhaneously developed a profile in the Country Party. As a backbencher, he flew 
around the state on behalf of the Premier and came to public notice by rejecting 
parliamentary salary increases and opposing party policy on road transport and 
leasehold land. As Works and Housing Minister he strategically used his portfolio to 
build a sense of indebtedness among his parliamentary colleagues. 
There is no suggestion that Bjelke-Petersen anticipated his career trajectory from 
councillor to premier, especially as, when he entered politics, the Labor Party 
appeared entrenched in power. Politics is too unpredictable for an aspiring politician 
to map out an undeviating route, but Bjelke-Petersen appeared to have a general 
objective of enhancing his power and status,'^ When opportunities created by the 
changing circumstances and chances of political life came, he seized them. Chance 
intervened most dramatically in Bjelke-Petersen's career in the spectacular downfall 
of the Gair Government which took the Country Party from near permanent 
opposition, to government, and in the untimely death of Jack Pizzey which permitted 
Bjelke-Petersen to assume the premiership at age 57. This combination of eariy career 
planning, combined with chance occurrences, is consistent with Paul Hain's findings 
in his study of ambitions and political careers among American politicians, Hain's 
research indicates that planning ahead was vital for advancement among young state 
legislators but that advancement of legislators in their late fifties was more dependent 
on chance or short-term factors,'^ 
As the individual continues to invest time and energy in political office, so the 
ahematives will appear less appealing and rewarding: 'In a sense, the individual's 
investments tend to pull him further and further into the sequence even though he may 
not have originally intended to follow the route on which he now finds himself'^ In 
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alcohol I suppose MS 
Backbencher 
The self-motivation sufficient to seek out political candidature appears typical of 
politicians, even if many like to maintain the fiction of responding to pressure from 
supporters. This was the case for two thirds of James Walter's sample of twenty two 
federal backbenchers. Only a third claim to have been recmited by others,'^ and it is 
possible that this number is inflated by wishful thinking. Walter hypothesises that 
people are drawn to politics by a desire to resolve conflict or by a belief that they 
have answers. Part of its appeal, he argues, is 'the confirmation of personal efficacy in 
contest (eg. preselection triumphs), and the enjoyment derived from such public 
activities as campaigning: a delight in public responses.''° 
Bjelke-Petersen took the first successful step in his political career at the modest level 
of shire councillor. He had, however, two years earlier contested a Country Party 
plebiscite for the seat of Nanango against the sitting member, J, B. Edwards, who 
received 325 primary votes to 275 for Bjelke-Petersen,"' There are no accounts of this 
loss in published versions of his career, but he has consistently expunged or rewritten 
defeat or failure. The fact that he had tried and failed before eventually achieving 
success, indicates keenness to become a parliamentarian rather than the reluctance 
which he has always feigned. He was not alone in this. Gordon Chalk was another 
politician who presented himself as a reluctant candidate: 
Declaring oneself as a would-be politician is making a claim to the possession of 
special qualities of value to the community. Custom and rimal require that ideally 
such a person's aptitude and promise should be recognised initially by others. The 
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modest man must be seen to have the necessary abilities, should be willing to respond 
to a call to serve, but ought not to appear too eager to assume the mantle of 
leadership." 
Bjelke-Petersen's own account is consistent with this pattern, but at odds with the 
reality of his unsuccessful first venture: 
...while I was in Kingaroy buying some equipment for my bulldozers, I ran into our 
local federal member, Charlie Adermann ...He said to me, 'Joh, as you know, Jim 
Edwards is pretty old and , and he's talking about getting out. If he does get out, you 
ought to stand.' Jim Edwards, a Country Party man, had been our state member for 
the past twenty-eight years, and soon after my conversation with Charlie Adermann 
he announced he was stepping down. Until the moment Charlie spoke to me that day, 
I am sure the idea of standing for Parliament had not once entered my head,"^ ^ 
After his failure to win preselection, Bjelke-Petersen turned to local government, a 
popular and advantageous starting point for political aspirants. Recent research 
indicates that thirteen per cent of candidates to federal office in Australia had been 
elected to a local council,''* In Queensland, Colin Hughes found from pemsing the 
1977 Parliamentary Handbook that just over one-third of the ML As had previous 
local government experience.'"^ This trend is even more pronounced among 
Queensland's National Party members of parliament. From 1929 to 1949, 43.9 per 
cent of National MLAs had prior experience in local government,^^ Of the 100 
Country/National Party members between 1946 and 1986, 44 had started their 
political careers as shire councillors or aldermen (the other common routes to a 
political career in the Country/National Party are through membership of a growers' 
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ofthe party).'^ Many continued as councillors or shire chairmen long after they had 
entered state politics, a practice which ceased only after the Goss Government 
introduced legislation in 1991 to prohibit the simultaneous holding of parliamentary 
and local government office. Aboriginal Affairs Minister, Ken Tomkins typified this 
pattem. He was a Councillor on the Bungil Shire from 1949 to 1967 and Shire 
Chairman from 1973-1976, Bjelke-Petersen's mentor. Sir Charles Adermann, 
remained chairman ofthe Kingaroy Shire Council after entering federal parliament. In 
this context, Bjelke-Petersen was unusual in that his local government apprenticeship 
was so short. A year after his election to Council, he won the state seat of Nanango 
for the Country Party and, on completing his three year term, did not stand again for 
Council. 
As a new councillor, Bjelke-Petersen appeared relatively unobtmsive. The Council 
minutes covering his three year term show that his activities in the chamber were 
largely confined to attending meetings and seconding the occasional motion. He was 
appointed to two committees, the General Purposes Committee and the School of Arts 
Committee.^* He was also elected as the Council's representative on the Wide Bay 
Burnett Regional Electricity Board. In addition and more significantly, he built his 
profile in the Country Party, giving radio talks and becoming Secretary of the local 
branch of the Party, a task in which he was aided by his sister Neta. One of the 
Secretary's tasks was to send receipts for membership subscriptions to Country Party 
members Neta recalls that she 'always had to sign Joh's name, so that was yet 
another way he became gradually known by the people'."^ Such a strategy suggests a 
candidate preparing the ground for a parliamentary career. 
The thoroughness with which he approached contesting the 1946 plebiscite to select 
the Country Party candidate for Nanango also indicates that he was keen for a 
political career, despite protestations to the contrary. Neta Bjelke-Petersen presents 
the family version of initial reluctance, but acknowledges her brother's efforts: 
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'Although Joh must have been the most reluctant starter ever known to stand for 
Parliament, he nevertheless did in fact visit a very large proportion of voters.'^" Apart 
from Bjelke-Petersen, there were three other candidates, including P.B, Edwards, the 
son of the previous member, Bjelke-Petersen won by a comfortable margin but 
Edwards' supporters raised the issue of Bjelke-Petersen's war service and made 
unsubstantiated allegations that plebiscites were not always honestly mn.^' After the 
intervention of the Party's leader, Frank Nicklin, Edwards was expelled from the 
party for standing against an endorsed candidate," P, B, Edward's bitterness at his 
defeat was evident during the campaign when he accused Bjelke-Petersen of branch 
stacking and campaigning against his father, the previous incumbent, John Harrison 
cites an attack by Edwards in the Kingaroy Herald: 
He was successfial in including many members in the organisation, not because they 
were, or ever had been Country Party supporters, but because they would be Bjelke-
Petersen supporters the great majority of solid Country Party members were 
unaware that during the past six years continued efforts had been made to dislodge 
Mr, J B, Edwards," 
In his election campaign, Bjelke-Petersen pursued themes which would also become 
familiar: state development, the connection between the Labor Party and communism 
and the virtues of individual initiative He campaigned throughout the electorate, 
supported-by advertisements in the Kingaroy Herald and election talks on the radio.^ "^  
There were four other candidates Bjelke-Petersen won easily, but the vigorously 
contested plebiscite combined with his failure in 1944 suggest that his entry into state 
politics came about not through anointment but through a hard fought battle which he 
strongly desired to win. 
Bjelke-Petersen recalls that when he entered pariiament, aged 36, he felt 'like a 
stranger in a strange land' where the ability to work hard physically was replaced by 
ibid. 
Harrison, op. cit, p. 220. 
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the politician's tool of trade, the ability to talk,^ "^  Sir Robert Sparkes remembers that 
his father, who served concurrently with Bjelke-Petersen befriended the raw recmit 
and 'took his part on a number of occasions'. Sparkes goes on to say that 'Joh was . , , 
like a new boy at boarding school. He was subject to a lot of teasing and criticism and 
personal attacks and that sort of thing,'^^ He remained, however, undaunted and 
sufficiently young to expect advancement, American studies of ambition and politics 
suggest that, as might be anticipated, political ambition declines with age of 
incumbency, Prewitt and Nowlin, in a survey of local government councillors, found 
that 30 per cent of those under 35 could be classified as ambitious. The figure 
dropped slightly to 25 per cent for councillors aged from 36 to 45 and dramatically to 
5 per cent of those 55 or older," Hain found in his study of state legislators that sixty 
per cent of those under 45 sought to advance and that three quarters of those who 
actually advanced had previously expressed career ambitions, thus bolstering the 
claim that 'a progressive political career is indicative of earlier progressive ambitions 
and advance planning '^ ^ 
Immediate progress for Bjelke-Petersen and other Country Party members was 
blocked by the Hanlon government's strong hold on power. The Labor Party had held 
confinuous office in Queensland from 1915, excluding the three year term of the 
Moore Government from 1929 to 1932, Politics in Queensland during the long years 
of Labor mle came to be typified by a preoccupation with material progress and 
development, as well as by 'gerrymanders, authoritarianism, anti-intellectualism, the 
use of office for private gain, a tendency to flamboyant rhetoric and anti-
communism',^^ Premiers like Theodore, McCormack, Forgan Smith, Hanlon and Gair 
were tough politicians and autocratic leaders. Indeed, even before the establishment 
of party government in Queensland, the pattern of strong, authoritarian leadership had 
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Legislative Council in 1922 which meant that premiers had only to concern 
themselves with control of the Lower House, So long as the leader was electorally 
successfiil, he was able to dominate his parliamentary colleagues, and through control 
of them, the parliament,"*' Although Bjelke-Petersen was strongly opposed to Labor 
governments, their vision for Queensland, policy priorities and their premiers' 
collective personal style provided a model to which he was personally well suited and 
to which he later conformed, 
Hanlon came from an Irish Catholic background and was opposed to Bjelke-
Petersen's side of politics, but there were some superficial parallels in the early 
experiences of the two men, Hanlon's family had farmed for a number of years at 
Barrambah Creek near Gayndah in the South Burnett before being forced off the land 
by drought. Hanlon too, left school at fourteen in order to begin earning a living. But 
it was in Hanlon's personal style and political priorities that the resemblance between 
the two men is most pronounced. In observing Hanlon, Bjelke-Petersen, as a new 
backbencher, must have learned what was expected of, and accepted from, a premier 
of Queensland, Hanlon was an autocrat who controlled the Parliamentary Labor Party 
absolutely,^" An astute politician who disliked criticism, he over-reacted with a loss of 
temper if people disagreed with him/*^ According to Sir Thomas Hiley, leader ofthe 
Liberal Party, 1949-54 and Queensland's Treasurer, 1957-65, 'there was no 
independence in the Hanlon cabinet',^ Hanlon was a vigorous defender of 
Queensland against 'the vested interests of the south',"*^ a strong opponent of 
communism, and, like his predecessors, continued to emphasise primary production 
and decentralisation to the neglect of manufacturing. Like Bjelke-Petersen as premier, 
he was not averse to confrontation. He declared a state of emergency in response to a 
lengthy strike by meatworkers who had been joined in support by miners and 
waterside workers. When two railway unions also threatened to join the strike, he 
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provocative language linked the strikers with the communist party by describing them 
as 'mimicking Molotov' and 'budding commissars from the south',''^ When the state 
of emergency failed to produce the desired effect, even more draconian legislation 
was mshed through parliament. The Industrial Law Amendment Act gave police 
extensive powers to arrest without warrant, prohibit picketing, enter union offices or 
meetings and use force whenever they considered it necessary. Under the aegis of this 
legislation, the police broke up a peaceful protest with such violence that three 
people, including Communist MP Fred Paterson who was an observer on the footpath, 
were hospitalised, 
Hanlon's mral orientation permitted him to rationalise bringing in to parliament the 
1949 Electoral Districts Bill which introduced the zonal system to Queensland to 
Labor's electoral advantage. On the old boundaries. Labor would have almost 
certainly been defeated,"*^ This was not the only act of political expediency to impact 
on Queensland over the next forty years. Hanlon's premiership was marked by 
scandal and accusations of cormption in much the same way that Bjelke-Petersen's 
came to be.'*'* 
On his death in 1952, Hanlon was succeeded as premier by Vince Gair who continued 
in his predecessor's vein. Gair, who had also failed to complete secondary school, 
was openly hosfile to academics, dominated his cabinet, was politically conservative, 
intolerant, arrogant and dictatorial.'*^ For the second time since entering parliament, 
Bjelke-Petersen was presented with an authoritarian model in the person of the 
premier. 
After the fall ofthe Gair Government, the first Nicklin Ministry was sworn in on 12th 
August, 1957,^ ° Nicklin had a reputation for courtesy, geniality and probity,^' Whilst 
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unsullied, there are numerous examples of financial conflict of interest among 
members of Nicklin's cabinet. There were also complaints of police cormption. 
Former Deputy Premier and Treasurer Sir Thomas Hiley claimed that he had 
confronted Nicklin and his Police minister Alex Dewar about Police Commissioner 
Frank BischofTs cormption. The Opposition made numerous complaints that senior 
police, including Bischof, campaigned on behalf of the coalition in country areas." 
The 1964 Gibbs Royal Commission into the alleged involvement of senior police into 
prostitufion at Brisbane's National Hotel led to no prosecutions but raised questions 
which were still being asked at the Fitzgerald inquiry. 
Whilst allegations of police cormption were widespread,^^ Nicklin nevertheless 
appeared to break from the autocratic mould in which Queensland premiers had 
previously been cast, but there are hints that he was tougher than his public image 
suggested and that he was 'an effective politician who could display an iron fist in 
private.'^ "* Bjelke-Petersen himself seems to concur with this opinion when he writes 
of living in dread of Frank Nicklin.^ "^  Occasionally Nicklin's iron fist was displayed in 
public. In actions reminiscent of Hanlon, he resorted to the proclamation of a state of 
emergency to deal with industrial strife at Mount Isa Mines in 1961 and in 1964. 
When industrial trouble resurfaced and the miners stmck, Nicklin issued an Order in 
Council which seriously curtailed civil liberties,^* The last year of Nicklin's 
premiership saw major demonstrations on the issue of civil liberties in Queensland, 
where it was necessary to obtain permits for demonstrations from the District 
Superintendent of Traffic and pay $1 per placard carried. No provisions were made 
for appeals in the event of an unsuccessflil application. State cabinet, guided by 
Nicklin, chose to treat the demonstrators 'with a combination of frivolity and the big 
sfick,'" Public support was limited and the local press warned the university, home to 
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Bjelke-Petersen acknowledges that he did not enjoy being a backbencher. He had 
never worked for a boss and was uncomfortable with his relative poweriessness. For 
many parliamentarians, being a backbencher is a fmstrating experience, especially in 
opposition where members are largely confined to responding to Government 
initiatives.^' In Queensland, this was exacerbated by the tradition of'strong' premiers 
which effectively curtailed the roles of subordinates both cabinet ministers and 
backbenchers alike.^" Committees, apart from domestic committees associated with 
matters such as the library and refreshment rooms, did not exist until 1974.^' Facilities 
for opposition members were poor. Country members shared bedrooms at the Lodge 
in Pariiament House grounds, with 'no privacy, no telephone, no desk ,,. The office 
facilifies were no better - three MPs shared a small makeshift office,'*' The role of 
most members of parliament was confined to the local pork barrel and ombudsmen 
functions." 
Many, like Bjelke-Petersen, continued with their business activities, unperturbed by 
any possibilities of conflict of interest, Gordon Chalk, for example, who was also 
elected to the Queensland Parliament in 1947, continued with his work at the 
Toowoomba Foundry where one ofthe proprietors, A. A, Griffiths: 
could see real advantages in having an M, P. in the state capital committed to 
furthering the interests ofthe company at a time when the ability to conduct business 
successfully depended in large measure on decisions undertaken by public servants,^ 
When a number of Chalk's constituents became annoyed over the preferenfial 
treatment he was obtaining for the Foundry, he resigned and bought a partnership in a 
property agency. His biographer notes that 'one sure way of capitalising on superior 
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agent in the property market.' h is clear that Chalk changed jobs for expedient, 
rather than for ethical reasons and that his activities in real estate raised for him no 
ethical dilemmas. Such was to be the case with Bjelke-Petersen. 
Much of Bjelke-Petersen's constituency work was undertaken on his behalf by 
Florence, who, like his mother and sister before her, ably supported him. Hugh 
Bingham, media adviser to Bjelke-Petersen in the early years of the premiership, 
always suspected that Florence 'was the brains behind Joh because she had a very 
acute mind, very unacute way of expressing it but a very instinctive mind,'^ By 
taking over much of his electorate work, she freed him for his business ventures and, 
after the fall of the Gair Government, for the strategic and more important visible 
tasks including flying around the state on jobs for the Premier, She attended many 
local functions on his behalf and deah with local problems, as well as taking full 
responsibility for the family finances and raising their four children. After his forced 
retirement, Bjelke-Petersen acknowledged that it was not easy to be a good MP and a 
good husband and father,^ ^ 
An indication of the workload is given by Charles Wanstall, the Member for 
Toowong, who estimated, in 1947, that during his three year term, he dealt with 1,261 
letters and attended 293 meetings, fetes and the like as well as interviewing 
constituents,^ ** It is highly likely that a mral M. P ' s constituency load would be 
greater Certainly, 'servicing electoral requirements' was the most onerous task 
mentioned by the backbenchers in James Walter's survey - at least until they had 
organised their electoral staff to take over much of the load.* '^ Recent estimates 
suggest that members spend on average 16 hours a week at community functions and 
19 hours a week dealing with constituents' problems,™ Thus Florence Bjelke-
Petersen's contribution to ftirthering her husband's career was substantial. Doubtless 
this could be replicated for many members, both mral and urban. 
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As a backbencher, Bjelke-Petersen spoke regularly in parliament, although Charles 
Russell recalls that Bjelke-Petersen was a problem for the party whip 'because he 
didn't like public speaking and very soon got tired of the performances in the 
house,'^' Although Bjelke-Petersen had considerable public speaking experience at a 
local level, he was not adept in parliament. Twenty years later, he still depended on 
notes and without them, was 'pretty ordinary, stammering so he certainly wasn't in 
the League of Camm or Chalk as a performer,'^- Bill Hewitt feels Bjelke-Petersen's 
unworldliness also contributed to his poor performances. He was uncomfortable at the 
theatre and could not relate to popular sports like cricket. Thus he was deprived of a 
staple of Australian public speaking: the sporting metaphor. He made up for lack of 
skill with stamina. Well into his premiership, he could be on the floor of Pariiament, 
exhausted in the early hours of the morning, his limp pronounced, and recover, to 
appear fresh faced the next morning at an 8,30 joint party meeting ." 
He was not alone, however, as a mediocre parliamentary performer. Additional 
reasons for his tardiness in the House may lie in the fact that his party was in 
opposition with few prospects of becoming the government. Also, as the next 
sentence of Russell's memoirs recalls: 'Joh was always in the party room working 
hard for his electorate and his own business,,,'^'* It is also possible that like many 
parliamentarians, both in Australia and abroad, he rated the institution's capacity to 
influence events modestly,^^ Given this, it is likely that the real centre of attention for 
most backbenchers was the party, rather than the parliament.^^ The trend to relegate 
private members of parliament to the background was deplored by Jack Duggan as 
early as 1939," The situation was not unique to Queensland. At the Commonwealth 
level, F, G, Green, former clerk of the House of Representatives claimed that 
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Members of Parliament found that they assessed their position as generally weak. In 
the United Kingdom, where slightly more autonomy to parliamentarians is allowed 
than in the Antipodes, one author suggested that a herd of sheep driven through the 
lobbies periodically might be substituted for modern parliamentarians.^" It would not 
have taken Bjelke-Petersen long to realise this. 
An analysis of his speeches shows both the issues which interested him and salient 
aspects of his personality. There is a remarkable degree of consistency in the traits 
and attitudes revealed throughout his long political career suggesting, not only a rigid 
personality, but a conservative parliamentary and political culture in which new ideas 
were either scarce, or unwelcome, or both. The speeches can be taken as a genuine 
measure of his concerns because, prior to 1975, parliamentary speeches were not 
subject to party discipline and strategy, 'Members were free to choose their topic 
areas, decide the frequency or otherwise and to make their own speaking 
arrangements',**' Frequently, speeches rambled over a number of points and were 
unconnected to previous speeches and arguments. An example cited in a 1964 study 
of M P's in New Zealand's unicameral parliament as typical ofthe Address-in-Reply 
debate might apply equally to the Queensland House ofthe same era: 
The speech .opened with an apology for not following the line of argument 
developed by the previous speaker, paid tribute to that speaker, congramlated at 
length the mover and seconder of the debate on the Address motion, dwelt 
extensively on his enjoyment of the Royal Tour of the previous year, got in a few 
words for some of his constituents who desired a power line not to be mn over their 
property, and concluded with . . a political criticism of some ofthe actions ofthe 
previous Labour Government [which left office in 1949!],^ " 
Despite the discursive style, some persistent topics emerge in Bjelke-Petersen's 
speeches. As well as the expected constituency issues, he discussed the importance of 
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of gambling, the perils of communism and made occasional statements in support of 
alternative medicine and its practitioners. He retained his opinions on most of these 
issues throughout his life, although public diatribes against gambling ceased when his 
government permitted legal casinos in Queensland and introduced lotto, bingo, pools, 
poker machines in clubs, punchcards, night dogs and trots during the 1970s and 80s " 
The interjections of opposition members during his speeches demonstrate that the 
extent and scope of his business interests were widely known, a state of affairs aided 
and abetted by Bjelke-Petersen's own repeated references to his business dealings, 
Ahhough his colleagues appeared to feel some unease with what Joan Delamothe and 
Brian Stevenson describe as that 'combination of mthless entrepreneurship and 
religious fundamentalism',^'* conflict of financial interest on the part of members of 
parliament and ministers was clearly accepted. 
In his maiden speech, which dealt primarily with the need to foster initiative and 
enterprise, Bjelke-Petersen spelled out his views on the role of the state. He argued 
that in order for a rapid rate of progress to be achieved, state investment may be 
required in support of private enterprise: '.., State policy must create and give 
opportunity to capital to play its part in providing the necessities and comforts that the 
people need and seek to enjoy"*^ In the same session, he introduced other favourite 
themes; the negative influence on production ofthe forty hour week,*^ the depressing 
impact which railway freight policy had on the development of primary and 
secondary industry" and the negative affect on the community of that section 'which 
owes allegiance to a foreign power.'^* 
During his six years on the opposition backbench he returned to these themes again 
and again and deviated little from them over his long political career,*^ For example, 
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workers' strike had already solidified during his early years as a backbencher. He was 
clearly influenced by the perception that primary producers bore the cost of strikes 
whilst being unable to take such action themselves. Bjelke-Petersen expressed 
concern at 'the tremendous power that unions exercise in all walks of life and in our 
economy' and anticipated the day when 'union leaders will prove to be not only the 
working man's biggest enemies but the biggest enemies ofthe people ofthe state.'^ 
Often his favourite themes were linked, as when he argued that socialism, the 40 hour 
week, long service leave and gambling all appealed to the same undesirable trait, the 
desire to get something for nothing,^' Similarly, he suggested that socialism was 
detrimental to development, ^^  the shorter working week increased freight costs and 
restrictionist policies regarding motor transport were an impediment to 'the urgent 
need to develop this vast State','^ 
Other speeches highlighted the pietist strand in his background. This was evident in 
his advocacy of temperance, his opposition to the legalisation of S,P, bookmaking and 
his abhorrence of the use of profits from the Golden Casket lottery to help fund 
Queensland's free public hospital system. It also coloured his feeling that the State 
Government should attempt to persuade the federal authorities to make money 
available for equipment and material rather than 'for the importafion of trashy 
literature and films',^ In his mind, gambling was linked with 'the less work and more 
pay' mentality which had introduced the shorter working week.^ ^ He was especially 
offended by 'that monster in our midst', the Golden Casket, because it encouraged the 
inclination to get something for nothing.'* He also chastised A L P branches for 
sinking 'to a low ebb morally' by resorting to chocolate wheels with cash prizes in 
order to raise flinds.'^ 
Bjelke-Petersen was not only concerned with moral wellbeing. In a lengthy Address 
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balanced diet' and advocated the establishment of 'a course in dietetics at the 
University', He quoted at some length the ideas of a Dr, Boyd, an enthusiast about the 
properties of soya beans, rice and fresh wheat germ who 'thought a balanced diet was 
one of which 75 per cent ofthe foodstuffs gave an alkaline ash as opposed to one that 
gave only a 25 per cent alkaline ash','* In the following year's Supply debate, Bjelke-
Petersen once again extolled the benefit of a balanced and wholesome diet and 
expressed concern that many people lived on a diet of white bread, jam and salt 
meat,'' In another address he endorsed registration of naturopaths and suggested 
University courses in naturopathy be established,"^ Advocacy of natural unprocessed 
food and ahernative health methods is commonplace now, but in the early 1950s such 
ideas must have seemed rather cranky. Bjelke-Petersen's susceptibility to the methods 
of altemative practitioners was clearly manifest before his meeting with cancer 
therapist Milan Brych, Its origins probably lay in the success of alternative methods in 
curing his own childhood polio. 
Another theme of his early parliamentary speeches was the expedient nature of Labor 
politics, especially the Hanlon Government's introduction of electoral zones, Bjelke-
Petersen referred to the Labor practice of 'saying if they were not elected people in 
those areas would not receive fair consideration""' and, in words which critics of his 
own electoral legislation would one day echo, he expressed the opinion that: 
In this legislation the people are given the right of voting, admittedly, but the odds are 
so greatly against them that to achieve the results they desire is impossible because 
the predetermined zones and the numbers set out will mean nothing but that the 
majority will be mied by the minority.'°^ 
Ahhough Bjelke-Petersen expressed outrage at Labor's tactics, he also saw what was 
possible and what could be got away with. During his own premiership, he implied to 
the electors of Mount Isa that a successful Labor candidate would be denied the right 
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to make representation to the State Government'"^ and one of his ministers. Ken 
Tomkins, implied to the electors of Redcliffe that their proposed rail link to Brisbane 
was conditional on a National Party win in the seat.'** In 1985, Bjelke-Petersen 
oversaw the final refinement ofthe zonal system to the advantage ofthe Nationals, 
Bjelke-Petersen did not, however, come to public notice because of these speeches. 
He first achieved prominence as a Member of Parliament when he refused to accept 
increases in salary in 1948, 1950 and 1953. He argued that, ahhough parliamentarians 
were worth the extra money and that high salaries were required to attract the ablest 
men, he could not accept the money without going before his electors,'"^ He reminded 
his colleagues that they were the servants of the people and increased emoluments 
must be justified before them,'°^ He also linked the rising costs which were used to 
defend salary increases with the 'steeply rising costs 'associated with the introduction 
ofthe 40 hour week.'°^ Instead of taking the increase personally, he used the money to 
improve the local showgrounds and schools. As a wealthy man, he had no need ofthe 
extra salary and as a Member of Parliament representing a safe Country Party seat, he 
had little to fear in going before the electors. The gestures may well have been a 
shrewd attempt at publicity with the ultimate aim of fulfilling his own career 
ambitions. Premier Hanlon took the view that Bjelke-Petersen's stand was 'political 
advertising' '°* Certainly Bjelke-Petersen was aware of press criticism and Courier 
Mail letters which questioned the need for salary increases.'"' 
Bjelke-Petersen also decided against joining the parliamentary superannuation 
scheme, and as with his decision not to take a salary increase, his reasons were 
couched in altmistic terms. He argued that 'the whole thing savours too much of 
feathering one's own nest, placing self-interest first',"" and, in a rather grandiose 
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the way for Communism by undermining public confidence in democratic 
government.'" On a more pragmatic level, he acknowledged that one ofthe benefits 
of superannuation might be to obviate the necessity for looking after defeated 
members by appointing them to 'lucrative positions, usually overseas. This was a 
most brazen and despicable position,'"' Nevertheless, the practice of appointing 
retired or defeated members to lucrative positions continued during Bjelke-Petersen's 
premiership. For example, after the seat of Bowen disappeared, Peter Delamothe 
accepted the job of Agent-General for Queensland in London, as did Wally Rae. Ron 
Camm was appointed to the Chair of the Queensland Sugar Board, former MLA for 
Wynnum, Bill Lamond was made Chairman of the Queensland Small Business 
Corporation, former MLA for Moorilyan, Vicki Kippin was given a departmental 
liaison job. Bob Moore, former state Liberal member for Windsor who switched to 
the Nationals was appointed a liaison officer with the Department of Survey and 
Valuation, former treasurer Sir Llew Edwards was made part-time chair of the Expo 
Authority and former minister Max Hodges was appointed chairman ofthe Brisbane 
Port Authority"^ Years later Vic Sullivan put a more self-interested constmction on 
Bjelke-Petersen's reluctance to be in the superannuation scheme: 
..the story is, by the fellows who were there at the time - the reason he didn't go into 
the superannuation scheme was because he wanted the money each week himself He 
didn't want anyone else doing anything with his money. Then as time went on, he 
could see the benefits .,, and you know he made overtures to get into it somehow or 
other,"^ 
Sullivan's view cannot be corroborated and certainly differs from Bjelke-Petersen's 
own recollection that he twice had the opportunity to join the fiand: 
Both Labor and our side have said to me I'll let you put a little amendment in, put in 
your money and you get in and get a million or more out of it 
I'm a man of principle, I can't do it. Twice that was offered me, just a little 
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amendment, put it through the House and nobody will even notice and they wouldn't 
debate it. But I have said no, 1 won't do that on principle. 115 
Although Bjelke-Petersen missed out on superannuation, Evan Whitton calculates that 
the package he negotiated prior to his resignation as Premier was worth $150,000 a 
year,"^ 
Throughout the series of debates on salary increases, his parliamentary colleagues 
drew attention to the Honourable Member for Barambah's prosperity and hinted that 
there were inconsistencies between his piety and his business ventures which were 
interfering with his capacity to devote his fijll-time attention to parliament,"^ The 
interjections came from the Labor opposition and Tom Aikens, who had split from the 
Labor Party and been elected under the standard of the Hermit Park Labor Party, 
Aikens had once remarked ' ...give me one fact and upon it I will build an edifice of 
assumptions'"* so some of his accusations may be unreliable. Nevertheless, the 
biographies of Peter Delamothe and Gordon Chalk, and an interview with Vic 
Sullivan, suggest that concerns about Bjelke-Petersen's business interests were not 
confined to the Opposition alone,'" Indeed Chalk records that Bjelke-Petersen had 
been 'carpeted' by Frank Nicklin and told 'being an MP, is a full-time job'.'^° 
Labor Minister, Bill Power echoed Nicklin's opinion by referring to Bjelke-Petersen 
as a 'part-fime member'"'' and Vince Gair added reinforcement when he charged 
Bjelke-Petersen with being too busy making money with his bulldozers to have read 
the Royal Commission Report into the Creighton affair,'^" There was even a hint of 
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use of a private aeroplane to conduct their business and other operations'^''^^and in 
Vince Gair's statement that: 
he is in such a good financial position that he is able to continue as a member of 
Parliament without any great responsibility, because he is in that happy position 
where 200 [pounds] is neither here nor there to him, where in fact it might embarrass 
him from the point of view of taxation, he adopts the attitude of the injured 
innocent,''^ 
The liveliest interjections, however, came from Tom Aikens, In response to a 
question from Bjelke-Petersen as to whether Aikens shared any of his salary, the latter 
responded: 'I exhibit more philanthropy with my salary than the hon, member for 
Barambah, who has a very unenviable reputation where the disbursement of money is 
concerned,''"'* By suggesting that Bjelke-Petersen was miserly, Aikens lends some 
support to Vic Sullivan's account of Bjelke-Peteresen's reasons for rejecting the 
parliamentary superannuation scheme. 
On another occasion, during a lengthy debate on S,P, betting, Aikens flashed a 
quesfion to Bjelke-Petersen which revealed fiirther knowledge of his business 
dealings: 'How much money did you make recently out of gambling in oil shares'!*''^ ^ 
he asked. This line of questioning was pursued by F, E, Roberts, the Labor member 
for Nundah who interjected during a Bjelke-Petersen speech on the search for oil; 'Do 
you call it a sphere of investigation or a sphere of gambling?''" Under fiirther probing 
from Aikens on the question of whether he gambled in oil exploration shares, Bjelke-
Petersen replied firmly: 'I never have and I never intend to,'"'^ Evan Whitton, 
however, records that from 1959 to 1969, Bjelke-Petersen profited substantially from 
sales of oil shares in circumstances which might easily be constmed as a conflict of 
interest.'^^ Despite Bjelke-Petersen's denial of stock exchange dealings, his interest in 
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him as an 'advocate of the oil companies' '^ ° Tom Aikens went fiirther when he 
accused Bjelke-Petersen of having a pecuniary interest in Australian National Airlines 
(ANA), During a speech on the 1950 (Air Transport) Bill, Bjelke-Petersen had 
advocated competition against the federal government-owned TAA, which he 
described in highly critical terms,'^' Aikens argued that Standing Orders 'state that 
any member possessing a pecuniary interest in the subject matter of legislation is not 
entitled to speak on it','^' Aikens, while overmled by the Speaker, had made his point, 
Bjelke-Petersen himself made frequent references to his business dealings as a farmer 
and entrepreneur.'" He was, after all, an ambitious man and one who probably hoped 
to alert his parliamentary leader and senior members of the parliament to his 
experience. As well as informing his superiors of his talents, Bjelke-Petersen also 
flattered many ofthe ministers, bureaucrats and constituents with whom he dealt.'^ "^  
Such courtesies were characteristic of parliaments of an earlier era and pemsal of 
Hansard of the time reveals it was a not uncommon ploy for parliamentarians 
desirous of advancement to shower praise on senior party colleagues. Bill Hewitt, 
who entered the Queensland Parliament in 1966 noticed that every member ended his 
speech by complimenting the relevant Minister despite the fact that some of them 
were 'very ordinary' and were paid handsomely to do their jobs.'^^ 
After the fall of the Gair Government the possibility for advancement into the 
ministry beckoned This depended initially on his colleagues but, after 1961, and a 
change of mles, Nicklin was enabled personally to select his ministry,'^^ As a 
government backbencher, Bjelke-Petersen pursued the same themes, but, with a 
ministry in his sights, continued to emphasise his talents and to flatter the Premier and 
other ministers 
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great pleasure the occasion brought him and criticised the previous Labor government 
who 'were in office for so many years that their vision became obscured and they did 
not know where they were going,''" As a consequence, they had failed in their 
charter to develop the state. Significantly, he also praised Premiers Playford and 
Bolte, aspects of whose style he was to share and whose governments supported 
'people of enterprise who are prepared to invest money and take risks'.'^^ He 
advocated concessional freight rates to encourage the development of industries in 
mral towns,'^^ drew attenfion to the high costs associated with the 40 hour week,'"*^ 
and deplored the Labour movement's apparent sympathy with communism and its 
'"down" on the ambitious man ''•*' All this was the stock in trade of a right wing mral 
member determined not to be overlooked after a decade on the opposition backbench. 
The piety and paternalism which he had absorbed from his father remained in his 
continued opposition to the liberalisation of liquor legislation and the legalisation of 
off-course betting His view of government, expressed in the context of his opposition 
to Sunday drinking, was that it should 'protect people from themselves as far as 
possible' '^' Governments's main role, however, lay in 'expanding and developing the 
state'."*^ He urged overseas investment on the grounds that: 'as long as the land is 
developed it is all to the good ofthe state ''** The desire to preserve the culture of his 
youth and childhood sat uneasily with the urge to change the state's physical 
landscape by development, but neither he nor his colleagues, then or later, perceived 
the tension. Bjelke-Petersen advocated both robustly, drawing on the utilitarian strand 
in the state's political culture to provide the link between asceticism and 
development. Wasting time and money on gambling, drink and leisure were, to 
Bjelke-Petersen, clearly injurious to that personal and state development on which 
long term happiness depended. Over time, Bjelke-Petersen modified his public stance 
on gambling and alcohol, but remained publicly committed to hard work and state 
development. This reflected the trajectory of his own party, which, once in office, had 
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softened its opposition to drink and gambling. By the 1963 State election, even the 
pressure groups were silent on the issue,''^ ^ It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, 
for Bjelke-Petersen, an increased facility for marrying his own concerns with those of 
his constituents came with political experience. Many of these undoubtedly enjoyed a 
drink and a "flutter", but nevertheless endorsed hard work and material progress. His 
government was to liberalise both drinking and gambling laws and ease restrictions 
on Sunday trading,'^ 
Because his upbringing had taught him that Sunday was sacrosanct, he initially 
opposed Sunday trading because its effect would be 'to change the whole character of 
our Sundays''"^ There were other changes which he also resisted. For example, he 
was concemed that the legalising of off-course betting might cause young people to 
squander their earnings, especially as the forty hour week had brought them increased 
leisure."'^ He drew a parallel with the attempts by Communists to destroy 'our way of 
life' and the destmcfion likely to be wrought by the liberalisation of drink laws,''*^ A 
possible solution to some of these problems, he believed, could be found in Bible 
Study at school which he advocated strongly, but on utilitarian, rather than moral 
grounds: 'very rarely does one find that a boy or girl who has been brought up with a 
Christian understanding and a Christian appreciation becomes a trouble or a burden to 
the State,'''° As well as spiritual well-being, physical heahh remained a concern. In 
one instance, he was able to promote his electorate's staple crop when he asked 
members to do all they could 'to advertise the food value ofthe humble peanut'. In 
support, he cited 'Dr Washington Carver ofthe U.S.A. 'who said he was sure that if 
people would eat a small handflil of peanuts every day they would never suffer from 
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As a Government backbencher, there was even more reason to flatter his superiors 
who might hold the key to a cabinet position. He continued to rain praise on the 
Premier, members of the ministry and senior bureaucrats,'" One of those he 
commended was his partner in oil exploration, Ernie Evans, the Minister for 
Development, Mines, Main Roads and Electricity,'" On the subject ofthe Petroleum 
Acts Amendment Bill, which was designed to increase interest in searching for oil in 
Queensland,'^ "^ Bjelke-Petersen told the parliament that the Minister 'has gained 
considerable experience in and appreciation ofthe problem in the course ofthe three 
years' activities that he and I had in this field when we had authority to prospect an 
area of country round Mackay' ' " He went on to congratulate his parliamentary and 
business colleague on his wisdom 'in his dealings with the various oil companies, 
particularly in his suggestion acted upon by the Federal Government that money spent 
on the search for oil should be allowed as a tax concession', "^ He chastised the 
doubters in the Opposition who feared that oil would not be found and quoted from 
the 35th chapter of Isaiah : ' Say no to them that are of fearfiil heart: be strong, fear 
not,''" Such was the political culture ofthe era, that revelations of conflict of interest 
provoked no outrage and did nothing to tarnish Nicklin's reputation as a Premier of 
great probity who enforced ministerial accountability. Later in the same session, 
Bjelke-Petersen again commended the Minister for Mines, his Under Secretary and 
officers 'on their initiative and help in the search for oil,''^^ He also thanked the 
Minister and staff of the Department of Main Roads for work in his electorate and 
expressed certainty that the Minister would soon help with a good road to the Bunya 
Mountains '^ ^ As the owner of sixteen acres of land in the Bunyas, Bjelke-Petersen 
had a vested interest in such a road. Indeed, he had bought the land in the expectation 
a road would come,'^ Such conflicts of interest raised not a ripple of parliamentary or 
public concern 
For example, see Queensland, Legislative Assembly 1957-58, Debates, vol. 219, pp. 471, 473, 
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References to his own experiences were as frequent as they had ever been, although it 
is possible that the relentless self-promotion was somewhat counter-productive. The 
Premier, Sir Frank Nicklin reportedly referred to Bjelke-Petersen as a 'self-
aggrandising Pharisee'.'*' However, on the issues ofthe conversion of leasehold land 
to freehold and a road transport levy, Bjelke-Petersen chose not to act in a manner 
designed to please or flatter the Premier, These were early examples of his refusal to 
budge once he had made up his mind. His strong stand provoked the displeasure of 
Nicklin and Chalk, but won the support of mral voters. During this period, the 
normally deferential, ascendant politician gave a hint of the premier he was to 
become. 
The road transport levy was a complex issue which remained on the boil for a number 
of years Before market forces were given the primacy they have today, all Australian 
govemments believed that they had a duty to protect state railways from competition 
from road haulage firms. They did this through a system of licensing which 
effectively allowed them to limit competition and maintain revenue, the majority of 
their income deriving from the transport of goods and livestock. However, in 1954, 
the Privy Council mled that such legislation contravened Section 92 of the 
Constitution, that all trade between states shall be absolutely free. In order to obtain 
the protection of Section 92 and to avoid paying licenses, road hauliers engaged in a 
range of practices, the most popular of which was 'border hopping', crossing the 
border into New South Wales, or pretending to have done so. The Queensland 
Government countered this practice with a new tax (designed to conform with Section 
92) on all tmcks with a load capacity of more than four tons. Because this included 
farm tmcks driven on public roads, it provoked a barrage of opposition and, prior to 
the 1957 election, Frank Nicklin promised to increase exemptions from the tax for 
primary producers Over the next few years, there were modifications to the 
legislation, but the mmblings of discontent continued. In 1961, the Acfing Transport 
Minister, H. W Noble appointed four Country Party members, one of whom was 
Bjelke-Petersen, to investigate this matter which was increasingly damaging the 
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As Hazlehurst writes: 
In one of those surges of passion and self-interest that periodically sweep through 
outback Australia, Country Party members in southern and central Queensland were 
increasingly finding a sense of purpose in opposition to the government's transport 
policies. As the protest grew and gathered momenmm it became for a short time an 
audience and a constituency awaiting a leader ... Into this arena of discontent stepped 
the little known Countr>' Party member for Barambah .,,'" 
During the new Government's first pariiament Bjelke-Petersen had announced that he 
was not happy with such a road tax ' " He felt that it was a particularly strong impost 
on people living in country areas, 'the hard-working section because ofthe long hours 
they work'.'*^ Undoubtedly he was under pressure from constituents to act on their 
behalf and, in mid-1961, he accepted an invitation to be one of a number of speakers 
at a rally in Dalby which both Nicklin and Chalk had declined to attend. Bjelke-
Petersen was the ninth scheduled speaker. His characteristic speaking style is evident 
in this early effort: 
Being here tonight as I am as a member of the government I am not here to, well, 
defend the minister as it were. But I'm here merely to, well, hear the various 
arguments ...No, I, Sir agree 100 per cent that it's good to organise, it's good to see 
you here tonight, to hear your views, to get to know your attimde, the way you think 
in relation to the laws in our particular state. I myself am a farmer, and as such I 
believe very definitely in private enterprise ... I believe in modem transport ,,. I 
believe, Mr, Chairman that we can't hold back progress ,., I want to say that I do not 
for a minute, if what Mr. Bolton [ a Toowoomba transport operator and leading 
opponent of Gordon Chalk] says is correct and I feel sure he's expressed his views 
here as he is experiencing at the moment that under the present legislation the 
govemment and this Act is killing transport, is killing this industry, is killing other 
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fight with Isic] them to see that this doesn't happen. There's not two doubts about 
that, (Applause), My word, we'll fight hard, don't make any mistake about that. 
The discontent about the issue deepened and Nicklin and Chalk could no longer avoid 
facing their troubled constituents. A month after the Dalby meeting, in July, 1961, 
they journeyed further west to Roma to put the government's case. Bjelke-Petersen 
was also a speaker. He recalls that Nicklin and Gordon Chalk were 'howled down' by 
the crowd. In contrast, 'the whole hall roared its agreement with him,'^ ^ At the end of 
the evening Bjelke-Petersen asked for a ride back to Brisbane in Chalk's ministerial 
car'^* Chalk's magnanimity in agreeing failed to deter Bjelke-Petersen from 
continuing to oppose the government on the transport issue. He proclaimed in 
parliament that the policy was out of line with previous policies and Country Party 
policy. In addition, he argued, it was out of step with progress which is 'is like the 
fide ofthe sea - you cannot stem it or stop it'.'^^He went so far as to agree on some 
aspects ofthe problem with the Leader ofthe Opposition and by implication, criticise 
the Minister for Transport,'™ He was so convinced that his position was right that he 
took the rather confrontationist step of counselling: 
... the Minister and the govemment to make every effort to meet the wishes ofthe 
people who are paying these fees, such as the pnmary producers, and also those 
acmally engaged in the transport business.,. In conclusion, I point out that I have 
never supported the Bill and I do not intend to do so on this occasion on the mere 
assumpfion that so-and-so will be done in the future. '^ ' 
In this early policy fight, characteristics which were to mark Bjelke-Petersen's 
leadership style as premier can be detected. Once sure that he was right, he was 
unwilling to change his views. He was not always totally inflexible, as his attitudes to 
liquor and gambling show, but on some issues, he would not budge. In his stand at 
Dalby and Roma his inflexibility won support, and despite, or because of, his 
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with the mral Queenslanders gathered before him. 
The triumphs in the West were not without cost Bjelke-Petersen had antagonised 
Nicklin by his public opposition to the government's policies. Thirty years later, he 
recalls that: 
He [Frank Nicklin] just ignored me and pushed me out and put me into the back for 
six years. He put other Ministers in as Premier but anyhow,,, he made me wait for six 
years, I didn't reciprocal, [sic] I kept on working hard and sort of making myself 
pretty indispensable ,,.'^' 
He was passed over on a number of occasions in favour of men who had been in 
parliament for a comparatively short time. Vic Sullivan remembers that: 
Johnny Rowe became Minister for Primary Industries fairly quickly, say within three 
years I think it was when Otto Madsen died ,,. it was a geographic appointment; they 
needed a Minister in North Queensland ,,, The next one was Ron Camm - again 
geographically because Ron had only been in four years .., Ronny Camm was from 
Proserpine so there needed to be a Minister in that area. Now Joh was much senior to 
them but you know he missed out and he missed out a few times! I think he was 
paying a bit ofthe penalty for his disloyalty,,.'" 
As Premier, Bjelke-Petersen, treated Mike Ahern in the same fashion. Sullivan 
suggests that it may have taken Bjelke-Petersen even longer to acquire a cabinet post 
if this had depended on election 'because he wasn't a popular bloke with the 
members','^'* This is confirmed by his defeat in 1960 in a ballot to replace Alf MuUer 
as Lands Minister, Bjelke-Petersen was one of seven candidates but was eliminated 
eariy,'" As with his eariy plebiscite loss, this defeat has been expunged from Bjelke-
Petersen's published recollections, although he did concede in a newspaper interview 
that he was 'intensely disliked by [his] own party' because of his stands on freeing up 
Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, pers, comm,, Oct 1993, 
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leasehold land and on road transport,'^^ In the former case, he had campaigned for the 
conversion of mral leasehold land to freehold, a 1957 election promise that Nicklin 
had reneged on because of its budgetary implications. His unpopularity may also have 
had something to do with his perceived disloyalty, his vigorous self-promotion and 
the personal asceticism which made it difficult for him to socialise with many of his 
colleagues. Over the next eight years, he turned around such perceptions sufficiently 
to be elected to the deputy premiership, undoubtedly assisted by the favour bank he 
was able to build as Minister for Works and Housing and, perhaps, by drawing on the 
charm he was capable of exercising. 
Bjelke Petersen found the lack of autonomy associated with outsider status fmstrating 
and he 'began to think the only way to get things done was to get up there and into 
Cabinet m y s e l f " Competition for cabinet posts was keen Bill Gunn, later to 
become Bjelke-Petersen's deputy - and Ahern's and Cooper's - recalls that for a 
backbencher 'a cabinet minister is out of this world because all his expenses are paid, 
his cars, he's got chauffeurs, everything you could think of ,'^ * Bjelke-Petersen finally 
succeeded in his goal, but not before being passed over for Primary Industries to 
which he thought he would be well suited. In September 1963, at the age of 52, 
Nicklin appointed him as Minister for Works and Housing, According to Hugh Lunn, 
Nicklin wanted Bjelke-Petersen on side rather than on the outer causing trouble for 
the govemment as he had over road taxes,'^^ Certainly, rebellious cabinet ministers 
are easier to control than rebellious backbenchers and Bjelke-Petersen had done his 
penance by being kept out of cabinet in favour of relative newcomers. In addition, 
when it came to making a choice for the ministry, Nicklin was not confronted by a 
range of talent. Bjelke-Petersen recalls that he was given the job on condition that he 
immediately sack 400 men. He accepted and 'left Frank's office feeling sorry for the 
men who were to lose their jobs but pleased about my own good fortune','^° For an 
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Petersen, the fact that, in his case, the appointment was to Works and Housing, was 
cmcial for his later deployment of patronage. 
Minister 
The Cabinet Bjelke-Petersen joined consisted of thirteen ministers whose 
deliberations encompassed matters both trivial and momentous. The Nicklin 
Govemment was the first state govemment in Australia to establish a Cabinet 
Secretariat, whose task it was to keep records of cabinet meetings.'*' Minutes are 
currenfiy available until 1966 and these, with attached submissions give a good 
indication of the issues of the moment and reveal something of the era's political 
culture. They also show, prior to the embrace of economic rationalism, how 
interventionist were governments of all political persuasions in Queensland. For 
example, in the seven months from June to December in 1966, Cabinet pledged 
assistance to farmers affected by drought,"*" deliberated on the milk quota for 
Brisbane,'" the allocation of tobacco quotas,'*" increased taxi fares,'*' licensing of 
tow tmck operators'*'' and the collection ofthe Commonwealth Hen Levy which was 
to go to state egg boards to equalise the returns from the local sale, and export, of 
eggs.'*^ The Minister for Primary Industry, John Row offered an explanation for such 
intervention, illustrating the huge shifts that have occurred in conventional economic 
wisdom: 'at present egg producers who do not market through boards enjoy the 
benefits of a reasonable local price without making any contribution to export 
losses."**' 
Cabinet met once a week, usually on a Tuesday, but on a Monday during 
parliamentary sittings. The submissions and related decisions were numerous. For 
example, between 2 June, 1964 and 17 August, 311 decisions were taken, and 267 
between 21 December, 1964 and 15 March, 1965, These varied in import and length. 
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legislation and other attachments. Occasionally, submissions were presented orally as 
were Frank Nicklin's throughout the industrial strife at Mt Isa. Among other things, 
ministers dealt with numerous submissions involving the purchase of vehicles for 
various government departments and agencies, with appeals over promotion in the 
police force, with requests for approval of official overseas travel for ministers and 
government employees, and with the extension ofthe services past retirement age of 
various teachers, matrons and wardsmen. Cabinet noted lists from various 
Departments concerning deferred recreation leave owing to staff. In an era of line 
item budgeting, ministers had to approve transfers of expenditure within departments. 
They considered the government float in the Warana Festival and whether notepaper 
and envelopes used by judges ofthe High Court should be embossed.'*^ Ministers 
were even required to agree to the amendment of the Health (Food Hygiene) Act to 
ban the wrapping offish and chips in newspaper!'^ 
They also dealt with more significant issues such as taxation, education and 
Aboriginal affairs On the last topic, attitudes towards indigenous Australians were 
nowhere better illustrated than in a submission to cabinet from Police Minister, Alex 
Dewar, dealing with an application from a Torres Strait Islander to join the police 
force. An attachment from the Police Commissioner recommended against such an 
appointment because 'I feel that there would be a strong reacfion . . by some members 
of our society if they were to be subjected to interrogation or investigation by other 
than "white" Police Officers...''^' Despite the misgivings of the Commissioner, 
cabinet approved the appointment, not because the failure to do so would be 
discriminatory, but for fear of criticism. Such pragmatic considerations also coloured 
cabinet's consideration of voting rights for Aborigines. A submission by Education 
Minister Jack Pizzey canvassed a range of options, including separate Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander electorates. Representatives from these electorates, however, 
would only have the right to vote on issues directly linked with Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Island Affairs. The most important consideration, however, was that fiill blood 
Aborigines were excluded from the population for the purpose of calculating 
Financial Assistance Grant Programs, Cabinet recommended that full blood 
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Aborigines be excluded from voting until such time as they were counted for this 
end.'^ -^
Cabinet also wrestled with the issue of equal rights for women. After considering a 
report by the Public Service Commissioner, Cabinet opted to retain the existing and 
unequal arrangements with respect to the employment of women in the State Public 
Service. The arguments which cabinet found persuasive suggested that: 
In considering the employment of women in the Public Service it must be recognised 
that the Public Service is a 'career' service and that the vast majority of women by 
reason of their physiological and psychological constitution are inherently home-
makers and not career-makers .., There is the fiarther factor ofthe resentment by male 
officers by female officers and to create such a dominance would be striking at the 
very fiindamental laws of nam re.'''^ 
Women would continue to be paid less for equivalent work and to have their 
permanent employment terminated upon marriage when 'their interests would be 
transferred to their homes and families','*^ Cabinet members also considered the 
social implications of married women's re-employment, which, the Public Service 
Commissioner assured them 'must surely add to the incidence of lack of parental 
control,' "^ In this era, women like Maren Bjelke-Petersen acted as the prevailing role 
model and continued to do so well into Bjelke-Petersen's premiership. In 1977, the 
Rockhampton City Council sacked a female library employee upon her marriage. 
Sixteen other local authorities maintained the same practice.'^ 
The issue of jury service for women provides additional insight into the patriarchal 
nature of Queensland government and society. Despite considering the matter for 
almost a year. Ministers were unable to agree to give women equal rights with men to 
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could be exempted 'by reason of issues to be tried'. In 1996, Queensland was the last 
Australian state or territory to remove blanket exemptions for women.'^* Cabinet 
appeared more relaxed, however, about giving approval for the wives of Members of 
Parliament to attend a Garden Party for the visiting Governor-General and his Wife, 
Lord and Lady Casey,'^ 
Bjelke-Petersen's first cabinet submission recommended the purchase ofthe Courier 
Mail property at the corner of William and Margaret Streets in Brisbane, He advised 
his colleagues that 'the acquisition of this property would resuh in the Governmental 
or Semi-Governmental ownership of all properties in the area with the exception of 
the Belle-Vue Hotel and William Collins' "°" As Premier, Bjelke-Petersen was to 
complete this early task of developing a government precinct with the controversial 
demolition of the Belle-Vue. Indeed, another cabinet submission from the period 
indicates the attitude of Bjelke-Petersen - and his cabinet colleagues - towards 
conservation. They agreed that the Water Police Building, believed to have been buih 
by convict labour, should be demolished.""' 
Compared with other ministers, Bjelke-Petersen brought few submissions to cabinet 
during this period. According to a senior public servant interviewed by Cameron 
Hazlehurst, Bjelke-Petersen did not do his homework very well either on his own 
submissions or on those of others He was 'easy going, unaggressive, courteous and 
quietly spoken '"°' Sir Robert Sparkes thought him at this fime 'a modest sort of 
fellow' with no ambitions to proceed further.'"^ Nevertheless, two public servants 
who worked closely with him noticed qualities which might take him further. David 
Longland, Under Secretary of the Works Department admired his minister's 'rapid 
grasp of problems and firm policy direction over the state's building programme'.^°^ 
Keith Spann, head ofthe Premier's Department predicted that Bjelke-Petersen would 
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one day be premier'"" Such prescience was not shared by the electorate as a whole 
The survey conducted by Colin Hughes in 1966 designed to test voter recognition of 
ministers showed that less than 10 per cent ofthe sample recognised Bjelke-Petersen, 
He could derive some consolation from the fact that he was more readily recognised 
than Harold Richter, Ron Camm and John Row,^ *^ 
Most of Bjelke-Petersen's submissions dealt with the purchase of land and 
constmction of public buildings such as courthouses. Housing Commission issues, 
and the transfer of funds from one line item to another. Many of the matters which 
ultimately involved his portfolio, such as the constmction of schools and hospitals, 
were brought to cabinet by the relevant ministers. It is difficult to gain much insight 
into Bjelke-Petersen's character from these early submissions because they are so 
mechanical in nature One document that does give a hint of his own feelings is a 
submission which he brought to cabinet on the supply of projectors, and radio and 
television sets to medium security prisons. Although Bjelke-Petersen does not make 
his opposition explicit, it is clear that he had doubts about the provision of 
entertainment facilities to prison inmates. His cabinet colleagues, however, were less 
puritanical and approved the purchase, "°^  
As the relevant minister, Bjelke-Petersen introduced a number of bills to parliament. 
These were uncontroversial, involving amendments to the Co-operative Housing 
Societies Acts,""* Building Societies Acts,^ *^ State Housing Act,"'° extensions to the 
Commonwealth and State Housing Agreement Bill,'"the introduction of the 
Chiropractors Bill,"'" and, after the death of Ernie Evans, the Alcan Queensland Pty. 
Limited Agreement Bill, which authorised the government to enter into an agreement 
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questioning from the opposition was desultory, but occasionally aspects of Bjelke-
Petersen's character were revealed. His personal asceticism was evident in the 
observation that: 
whereas in the olden days many of us had to acquire those things at a much slower 
rate, most people now expect to start off with them. The desire to have all the extra 
amenities is one ofthe reasons why today both husband and wife go to work." 
His attitude towards the environment was typical ofthe era in which development and 
progress, at any cost, were prioritised. Whilst acknowledging a great love of trees, he 
conceded that they had to be cleared from housing estates because of the difficulties 
associated with building and road constmction,"'^ Of considerable interest, given his 
prior opposition to Labor's electoral weightage and his later refinement of it, is his 
defence of deviations from the principle of equal representation. He dealt with the 
difficulties of representing people in vast electorates and also raised a favourite, but 
undemocratic. Country Party argument, that people who are wealth producers deserve 
a greater say in government.""' He told parliament that 'a comparison ofthe value to 
the State, in production, of 100 people in the city and 100 people in the country 
justifies a continuation of our present system,,,'"'^ 
The great advantage of a portfolio like Works and Housing for an ambitious man was 
the opportunity for doing favours. The Department of Works was responsible for the 
design, constmction and furnishing of all government buildings and the maintenance 
ofthe Government's capital assets. The Housing portfolio encompassed all Housing 
Commission constmction in the state, including houses for defence personnel, public 
servants, and more controversially, houses for the employees of major developers 
such as Queensland Alumina, Members of Parliament always need to create the 
impression for their electorate that they can achieve benefits for their constituents. At 
the local level, schools, police stations and public housing are important, both in 
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As Works and Housing Minister, Bjelke-Petersen had dealings throughout the state, 
across departments, and, according to him, with every member of parliament from 
both sides ofthe house. Vic Sullivan, however, does not recall such even-handednes: 
'I don't think Labor got a lot in their electorate when Joh was Minister for Works ,., 
He was pretty mthless in that regard.'^'* Sullivan's recollection is consistent with 
Bjelke-Petersen's later behaviour, when premier. 
As far as Government members were concerned, Bjelke-Petersen was a very good 
Works and Housing Minister, He met with backbenchers every Tuesday morning. 
Sullivan has suggested that Bjelke-Petersen's Departmental Under Secretary, David 
Longland should receive some ofthe credit for advising the fledgling minister ofthe 
strategic advantage of serving backbenchers to win their support. Bjelke-Petersen 
made a practice of responding to requests promptly, using the telephone, rather than 
writing, to get things done,"" Because ofthe reputation for reliability and efficiency 
which Bjelke-Petersen acquired in the Works and Housing portfolio, ministers going 
overseas would ask him to look after their departments,"^^^ In this fashion, he enlarged 
his experience and number of contacts by acting as Minister for Education, Police, 
Aboriginal and Island Affairs, Local Government and Conservation and Labour and 
Industry, 
In 1968, Frank Nicklin retired and Jack Pizzey was elected unanimously as Premier 
Bjelke-Petersen contested the Deputy Leadership against Ron Camm, the Minister for 
Main Roads, and Alan Fletcher, the Minister for Lands and Irrigation, Bjelke-Petersen 
won, without needing to go to preferences. He had the support of Pizzey who 
nevertheless had some concerns about the potential for distraction and possible 
embarrassment from Bjelke-Petersen's business interests,"^' His win came as 
something of a surprise to many because of his hitherto low public profile,"^^ In his 
autobiography, Bjelke-Petersen maintains his customary positions of surprise at his 
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.,,to my surprise (for there were several other Country Party ministers more senior 
than me) 1 was elected on the first vote, without even the help of preferences. What 
made it more surprising was that I had not lobbied any of the others beforehand for 
their support.""^  
He had, however, been working towards such an opportunity for many years. As both 
his early career and his premiership demonstrate, he was never reluctant to chase the 
numbers. In conversation, he conceded that his win was partly anticipated because 
'the boys were always coming to me for help. They came to me like bees to a honey 
pot when 1 was Works and Housing Minister,'""' Despite this knowledge, and his 
advancement to third ranking minister after Pizzey and Chalk, Bjelke-Petersen claims 
that he never imagined he would one day be premier: 
Never even thought about it. Never even worried about it, because first of all in those 
days it looked like Jack Pizzey, he was about 50 or about 51 or 52, right in the pnme, 
big strong man. Nobody would ever think that he would drop over with a heart attack 
so it never entered my mind." 
Pizzey, however, had already suffered a heart attack in September, 1962 causing one 
observer to suggest that his strong chances of succeeding Nicklin as Premier had been 
weakened, and another to report that speculation about Nicklin's eventual retirement 
had been quietened,"^ Gordon Chalk also notes that, with Pizzey's health in doubt, 
'an unexpectedly large gap had opened at the top ofthe principal party in coalition,'"^ 
In this context, Bjelke-Petersen's ingenuousness strains credibility. Whilst he may 
never have anticipated Pizzey's death, it is highly likely that a man committed to 
forward thinking, forward planning and 'being miles ahead of anybody else', would 
have given some thought to the ultimate prize ofthe premiership. 
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men hoped to fill. Deputy Premier, Liberal leader. Treasurer, and Bjelke-Petersen's 
antagonist on the road tax issue, Gordon Chalk, was sworn in as caretaker Premier for 
a week, but it is clear that he hoped for more permanent tenure As the preparations 
for Pizzey's fijneral commenced. Chalk and Bjelke-Petersen skirmished over the 
acting premiership and the ultimate prize ofthe premiership. Bjelke-Petersen argued 
that, as the leader ofthe senior party, he should have been sworn in as acting Premier 
whereas the Governor had sworn in Chalk, the then Deputy Premier who had acted as 
premier when Nicklin or Pizzey had travelled overseas.^^* The Governor had behaved 
appropriately because Bjelke-Petersen had not yet been elected as leader of the 
Country Party in Pizzey's place, but Bjelke-Petersen has always portrayed Chalk's 
actions at this time as opportunistic. For his part. Chalk wanted to capitalise on his 
incumbency and greater experience to remain premier. In this, he apparently had the 
support of many of Bjelke-Petersen's Country Party colleagues, but Bjelke-Petersen 
was not prepared to give up his prize without a fight."' He refiised to form a coalition 
government unless he was sworn in as premier, and, two days after Pizzey's death, 
despite his recorded aversion to lobbying, gathered the parliamentary party together. 
Some, like Bill Hewitt, were impressed by Bjelke-Petersen's initial claim: 'I don't 
want you to work for me; I want you to work with me.'"° Others 'were lured by the 
prospect of being chosen by their prospective leader as his personal nominee for the 
cabinet seat left vacant by Pizzey's death.'"^' Chalk bowed to the inevitable and, on 
the 7th August, 1968, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen became Premier of Queensland. The 
Courier Mail described him thus: 'a pleasant, persuasive talker, he is thought to be 
unworldly, but he has an alert political brain and an ability to organise,'"^ He was 
also well attuned to the state's political culture. His enthusiasm for development 
allied with pragmatism and ant-intellectualism were in harmony with the attitudes and 
expectations ofthe Queensland community, few of whom had demonstrated alarm at 
the disregard for civil liberties, the conflict of interest, and the poor parliamentary 
standards which prevailed in their state. No longer ascendant, he had no need to be 
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left no doubt that Queensland once again had a premier cast in the authoritarian 
mould. 
The next three chapters examine the way in which he exercised power by considering 
his relations with the Party organisation, the parliament and federal government, the 
public sector, the people of Queensland, and the media. This division is artificially 
tidy because there is considerable overlap between all these areas, but by the end of 
chapter seven, a comprehensive account of the Bjelke-Petersen premiership and his 
leadership style will have been presented. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PREMIER AND THE PARTY ORGANISATION 
The extensive literature devoted to political leadership agrees about little, but that it 
involves influence, authority, power and control over others.' The parental, school and 
religious authority to which Bjelke-Petersen was exposed as a child, and his experience 
ofthe power wielded by Queensland's political leaders, meant that he equated office 
with the exercise of power. He is reported as saying the premiership was a great job 
because 'you can do anything you like '" For much of his term of office, he was guided 
in what he did by a small network of advisers with good strategic and tactical skills 
The most important of these was 'Queensland's other strong man',^ National Party 
President, Sir Robert Sparkes. Whatever their differences, Bjelke-Petersen and Sparkes 
shared the agenda of winning elections and, when their interests converged, theirs was 
a formidable partnership. Although their relationship was never warm, their association 
had a symbiotic quality. 'Sparkes and Evans could say: " This is what the National 
Party thinks" and Joh would say: "This is what the government thinks . . .""' Each man 
had his own territory and neither wanted the other's job.^ Sparkes and the 
organisational wing of the party provided the organisational and financial stability 
which underpinned Bjelke-Petersen's electoral success. In addition, Sparkes' 
intervenfions and 'frank and fearless' advice, which few others had the courage to 
give, kept the Premier grounded in political reality. When their interests diverged and 
Bjelke-Petersen sought advice from a more sycophantic group, the foundations of his 
success began to cmmble. 
According to Mike Evans, National Party Secretary from 1970 to 1984, 'Job Petersen 
buiU up his power by virtue of his office, by virtue of his premiership. Bob Sparkes 
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buih his power through superior intellect '^  To Bill Gunn, Bjelke-Petersen was 
'shrewd' whereas Sparkes was 'a very clever man.'^ Bill Hewitt describes the latter as 
'astute'. Like Bjelke-Petersen, Sparkes was a long term strategist, but his focus was 
less personal and opportunistic than Bjelke-Petersen's, Sparkes' first priority was the 
party and this made his support more impartial than that ofthe coterie of advisers upon 
whom Bjelke-Petersen relied towards the end of his premiership. Bjelke-Petersen 
tended to focus more intently upon his own survival, but his capacity to dominate the 
public arena and strike responsive chords in many Queenslanders helped ensure his 
party's electoral success for almost two decades. This, in turn, guaranteed Sparkes' 
support. 
The culmination of their partnership was the 1983 election which, upon the defection 
of two Liberals, returned a National Party government in its own right. In the fifteen 
years of his premiership, Bjelke-Petersen learnt from experience and rarely made the 
same mistake twice Although often stubborn, he was willing to take advice and 
modify his position on issues on which his mind was not made up. As his premiership 
evolved, his confidence grew, he became less able to acknowledge the contributions of 
others to his success and increasingly intolerant of opposition. Such was the political 
environment in Queensland, that his progressive assumption of more and more power 
and increasingly immoderate policy positions brought no electoral penalty. The 1986 
election win seemed to vindicate his leadership style and polifical judgement. He 
became less tolerant of Sparkes and relied instead on advisers like National Party 
tmstee. Sir Edward Lyons and pilot. Beryl Young, who flattered him and encouraged 
his delusions of grandeur. Sparkes well understood the process, describing what 
happened in terms of family dynamics: 
. . the one that goes along and says "Dad's a great guy" is generally the popular one 
and the other one says: " Dad, you're making a mistake here and you're making a 
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mistake there" . . Eventually, slowK' but surely, they become hostile towards the critic 
even if it's constmctive criticism,' 
In Bjelke-Petersen's case, hubris, inevitably inviting nemesis, took over. 
Sir Robert Sparkes and the National Party Organisation 
Given Bjelke-Petersen's socialisation, it was to be expected that, as his confidence 
grew, he should resent encroachments upon his power. This coloured his relations with 
Sparkes which also may have been influenced by status difference. Whereas Bjelke-
Petersen's origins lay near the bottom ofthe mral hierarchy, Sparkes came from the 
top.'° His ancestors were landed gentry from Norfolk who migrated to Dubbo in New 
South Wales. Sparkes' father, James, moved north to Jandowie in Queensland where 
he established the family holdings, Dundonald and Lyndley, became the local shire 
chairman, and Country Party member for Dalby and later, Aubigny, Robert Sparkes 
was born in 1929 and educated at the prestigious The Southport School where, unlike 
Bjelke-Petersen who left school at 14, he completed his senior years. He followed his 
father into politics, joining the local branch of the Country Party on his return home 
from boarding school and eventually becoming chair ofthe Wambo Shire Council. 
Allen Callaghan confirms that Sparkes and Bjelke-Petersen never really liked each 
other and credits status difference as a factor Bjelke-Petersen belonged to the 'cocky' 
farmer segment of the party and Callaghan suggests that Bjelke-Petersen felt some 
resentment towards Sparkes based on feelings of inferiority. Mike Evans, State 
Secretary of the Party may also have been instmmental in fostering the animosity 
between Sparkes and Bjelke-Petersen. Evans' wife. Flora was a niece of Sparkes and 
there had been a family quarrel. Callaghan says that a situation arose where, perhaps. 
Flora 'was feeding into Mike, perhaps feeding into Joh, I think it was basically a tussle 
for influence, but there were dynastic reasons for it too.'" 
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Some observers of the relationship between the two men discount status difference as 
a factor'- but Sparkes' membership of the squattocracy and his comfortable Anglo-
Scottish heritage undoubtedly gave him a natural confidence, and eliminated the need 
for the compensatory striving of an outsider like Bjelke-Petersen. Sparkes moved in 
similar circles to Malcolm Fraser and his own politics were always more liberal than 
Bjelke-Petersen's, particulariy on social issues such as the legalisation of abortion.''' On 
this topic he clashed several times with Rona Joyner, whose style and opinions were 
closer to Bjelke-Petersen's.'" 
Sparkes also appeared more comfortable with the trappings of wealth than Bjelke-
Petersen who, despite his own prosperity, maintained a relatively modest household at 
Bethany, One observer who was acquainted with both men described Sparkes as a 
millionaire who 'knew it''^ whilst Bjelke-Petersen's religious upbringing and 'man of 
the people' style left him reluctant to indulge in ostentatious displays of wealth, at least 
in his private life. Within the Christian tradition, there is a teaching that the charisma 
vital to tme leadership can best be acquired by those who abandon possessions and 
titles.'^ Perhaps Bjelke-Petersen intuitively grasped this, for Derek Townsend saw in 
Bjelke-Petersen 'a genuine fear that to admit any trappings of affluence can in some 
way detract from his ability to lead,''^ Sir Edward Lyons told an interviewer that the 
Premier was reluctant to accept a knighthood because of fears that 'the people would 
no longer associate with a political leader so long known simply as Joh','^ Such 
populist considerations were far less relevant to an organisational leader like Sparkes. 
Nevertheless, despite the differences in social status and style between the two men, 
their beliefs and goals were sufficiently similar to produce an alliance, albeit somefimes 
uncomfortable, which survived beyond the 'Job for Canberra' campaign. They also 
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shared similar boyhood handicaps. Sparkes was afflicted by muscle damage to his legs 
which prevented him from playing sport. Whilst he had no need to compensate for 
outsider status, he appears to have offset his physical handicap by toughness and drive, 
Adrian McGregor describes him as The Southport School's 'resident heavy''' who was 
responsible for reviving the school's debating society, an interest shared with the 
young Bjelke-Petersen. Sparkes' lack of mobility was a factor in deciding him on an 
organisational, rather than a parliamentary political career. It also meant that he was 
less directly in touch with the electorate than Bjelke-Petersen, According to Evans, his 
immobility made him a very private person, 'very clinical in his approach', whereas 
Bjelke-Petersen was a 'people person' who travelled extensively throughout the state."° 
Evans suggests that in a stmggle of intellect 'Bob Sparkes would win every fime but 
when it came to native cunning and reading the electorate Joh won most ofthe time ... 
Bob wasn't a politician. He was a strategist'."' Hugh Bingham, also recalls Bjelke-
Petersen's 'farmer cunning', but adds, ' . . I tended to . . . underrate his intellectuality 
but I am not at all sure that I am right because there is something there which I don't 
understand .'"'^  
Conceptually, the organisational and pariiamentary wings of a party may be considered 
as separate spheres of activity, united by common goals and a community of interest. 
In such a model, a du-umverate could mle in harmony, each leader in his own sphere. 
Political reality, however, teaches differently and, 'to treat political parties as political 
unifies by definifion is a dubious assumption,'"^ Given the strong personalifies of 
both Bjelke-Petersen and Sparkes, it was inevitable that, despite their separate spheres 
of interest, there would be clashes between the party's political and organisational 
wings. This was especially likely because the Country/National Parties in Australia 
were similar to the Labor Party in the strength of the organisational wing and their 
applicafion of mles of solidarity and discipline. Although the shared interests of 
pariiamentary and organisational branches of the party meant that the disciplinary 
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machinery was rarely needed, it was there when required,'"* It would be false, however, 
to suggest that the only divisions within the National party were between the 
organisational and parliamentary wings. Frequently there were mmblings of discontent 
within both sections but, after 1970, Bjelke-Petersen kept tight control over the 
parliamentary party, and Sparkes and his management committee dominated the 
organisation. Often, Bjelke-Petersen and Sparkes worked together in support of shared 
goals but Sparkes also made frequent attempts to influence or change government 
policy. This happened either when the government deviated from party policy or when 
Sparkes felt that Bjelke-Petersen's extremism was impacting negatively on the party's 
chances of winning urban seats Sometimes, Sparkes and the organisation prevailed, 
but, more often than not, Bjelke-Petersen relied on the support of the pariiamentary 
party to achieve the outcome he desired For most of his term in office, Bjelke-
Petersen intuitively understood Queensland's political culture and the political context 
better than Sparkes, 
Originally, the National Party organisation in Queensland had been a low key 
organisation, united by shared sectional, social and political interests," When Bjelke-
Petersen succeeded to the premiership, the Country Party, as it then was, was headed 
by E.F.S Roberts who had succeeded John Ahern, father of Mike, as Party President. 
Before Ahern, the incumbents were Ellis Lawrie and Howard Richter. Sparkes, who 
already knew Bjelke-Petersen from the latter's eariy days as an aerial seeding 
contractor, became president in 1970. One of his first tasks, in a clear case of 
converging interests, was to quash an attempt to oust Bjelke-Petersen from the 
premiership. The move against Bjelke-Petersen in October 1970 did not arise suddenly, 
but in response to a series of events in his first two years as Premier which cast doubt 
upon his suitability for the role. 
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Bjelke-Petersen initially had trouble making a successfiil transition to power. The sure 
touch which he had shown in communicating with mral Queenslanders over the 
transport tax eluded him in his attempts to speak with a wider audience. His ascetic 
lifestyle and opposition to liberalising drinking and gambling laws had given him a 
'wowser' image. He was further damaged by mmours of investigations by federal 
taxation authorities and a claim that he had taken home a copy ofthe Queen's Birthday 
Honours list to discuss with his wife.^ ^ In addition, he faced opposition from 
conservafionists over sand mining at Cooloola, an issue which also provoked his first 
collision with Sparkes who, in this instance, favoured conservation Mike Evans 
remembers: 
some prett> bitter clashes several meetings I went to, they were at each other's 
throats and in the end Bob Sparkes won. Now that relationship , , , those behaviour 
patterns dominated , , . from 1970 right through to when Joh finally went. There was 
always antagonism but it never publicly surfaced until very late in the piece.^ ^ 
This series of incidents fuelled public speculation that business leaders would prefer the 
more gregarious Gordon Chalk as premier.^* When Jack Pizzey's previously safe 
Country Party seat of Isis was lost to Labor in November 1968, Bjelke-Petersen's poor 
public image was blamed The Country Party responded by hiring a public relations 
expert to help him acquire a more urbane image. He was subsequently photographed 
with racehorses and reported as visiting a pub in Ravenshoe,"^ It was clear that he 
would fight to maintain power, even if it involved compromising some of his long held 
beliefs. 
In 1969, wowserism was eclipsed as an issue clouding Bjelke-Petersen's future by 
controversy over his share holdings. Bjelke-Petersen's response, to deny any 
impropriety and refijse to concede an inch, was oft repeated throughout his 
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when Bjelke-Petersen was a backbench Member of Parliament.^° As is so often the 
case with profit making schemes, the various steps taken appear complex to the 
financial novice Conflict of interest is more readily perceived. 
In 1959, Bjelke-Petersen's former partner in oil exploration, Ernie Evans, the then 
Minister for Mines, had issued him an authority to prospect for petroleum for a fee of 
two pounds. The authority was issued with a written waming against trading in such 
authorities,^' A month later, Bjelke-Petersen incorporated a company, Artesian Basin 
Oil Co, He entered into an agreement to sell 51 per cent ofthe shares in Artesian to an 
American company for 12,650 pounds and to transfer his prospecting authority to 
them. This was a tidy return on a two pound investment and attracted the attention of 
the Commissioner for Taxation Bjelke-Petersen had not believed that the profit 
formed part of his assessable income for the year, a view not shared by the taxation 
authorities^" Bjelke-Petersen, represented by W B, Campbell QC, later to become the 
Queensland Governor who thwarted Bjelke-Petersen's last ditch plans to retain the 
premiership, subsequently lost an appeal in the High Court against the Australian Tax 
Office's mling Despite this setback, Bjelke-Petersen confinued his pursuit of 
entrepreneurial profit. In 1962, Artesian, of which Bjelke-Petersen still owned 49 per 
cent, was paid 190,000 pounds for the authority to prospect which Bjelke-Petersen had 
originally bought for two pounds. A large percentage of the money was used to take 
up shares in Exoil No Liability, which was chaired by Bill Siller who, three years 
eariier, had joined Bjelke-Petersen on the board of Artesian, Three weeks after Bjelke-
Petersen became premier, Exoil NL and Transoil NL, in which Bjelke-Petersen also 
held shares, were given six year leases to prospect for oil on the Great Barrier Reef 
Some observers saw Bjelke-Petersen's interests in oil exploration in the Great Barrier 
Reef and the Torres Strait as a factor in his opposition to redrawing the border 
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between Queensland and Papua New Guinea so as to give Papua New Guinea control 
over three small islands near its coast " 
In his public pronouncements, Bjelke-Petersen gave no inkling of understanding that 
there might be a conflict of interest. According to the individualistic moral values with 
which he had grown up, he had no doubts about his own probity. He declared to 
reporters that 'selling your shares will not make you an honest man.'^ "* To his worried 
media adviser: 
he was adamant, just adamant that he had nothing to explain. He had shares and that 
was his right and the thought that he might have to divest or something was completely 
anathema to him,^ " 
It was sufficient that according to his own lights he was honest. Perhaps many in the 
Queensland media agreed with him, for their treatment of the issue was low key. In 
addition, there was 'the extraordinary fact that the Premier himself [Hugh Bingham 
was the real author] was actually writing a column for the Sunday paper which would 
normally be expected to make the most of it '^ ^ With restricted media coverage and 
limited public interest, the Labor Party was unable to make sufficient political capital 
from the issue to win the 1969 election. 
Despite his election success, there was no respite for Bjelke-Petersen, Negafive 
publicity greeted the news that a Bjelke-Petersen family enterprise had been granted 
State government permission to extend kaolin mining on a family property. This was 
followed, in eariy 1970, by the loss in a by-election of the seat of Albert to the 
Liberals There were further destabilising attacks on the propriety of Bjelke-Petersen's 
premiership, with the disclosure that members of the Bjelke-Petersen cabinet had 
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government. Gordon Chalk bought 2,500 shares, Wally Rae took 1,200, Neville 
Hewitt, Max Hodges and Doug Tooth bought 1,200 and Fred Campbell accepted the 
comparatively paltry number of 700." Each of these ministers either had, or was about 
to have, dealings with Comalco in a ministerial capacity. Six senior public servants had 
also been beneficiaries,^^ Not only was Bjelke-Petersen pursued by the press, but his 
own party policy was changed to forbid the acceptance of preferential share offers by 
ministers or members of parliament." Labor criticism was blunted by the fact that Tom 
Burns had accepted 400 shares on his father's behalf and Jack Egerton had bought the 
same number for Labor's radio station 4KQ,'^ 
In Bjelke-Petersen's words, the issue 'blew over'"*' but his growing unpopularity began 
to alarm some of his parliamentary colleagues. According to Chalk: 
At the time there was fear within C.P. ranks that Petersen was losing ground 
particularly in provincial city areas such as Ayr, Mackay, Gladstone, Gold Coast etc. 
hence. Bird, Camm, Nicholson, Houghton, Hinze, etc, were worried about their own 
future,^ " 
As a consequence, members of this group decided that the Premier should resign. So 
confident were they of their support for this goal, that four representatives, David 
Nicholson,- Jim Houghton, Russell Hinze and Bill Lonergan, warned the Premier that a 
vote of no confidence would be moved at the next day's parliamentary party meeting if 
he failed to stand down from the leadership. They told him that a vote of 16 to 10 
against him was expected, Bjelke-Petersen's response is well known and in retrospect, 
predictable. After his long and patient climb to the top, it was unlikely that he would 
permit his leadership aspirations to be thwarted so soon. He spent the evening and 
following morning on the telephone, canvassing support. He asked Henry McKechnie, 
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by voting for himself and by producing a proxy for Neville Hewitt, whom no one had 
been able to contact. He remained premier but the dissidents were now contemplating 
a vote of no confidence, probably to have taken place in the Joint Party Room. Gordon 
Chalk had no doubt that Bjelke-Petersen would have lost."^ At this point Bjelke-
Petersen called upon Sparkes to intervene and arranged to have him flown from his 
property to Brisbane by charter pilot Beryl Young, who was later to join the Premier's 
staff, Sparkes recalls that there had been: 
general thinking that the job was too big for him, that he ought to perhaps be replaced 
and I, I must confess, had some reservations myself . . . I felt there was a question 
mark over his capacity to do the job properly.^ 
Sparkes believed, however, that the dissidents had to accept that their first attempt at 
unseating Belke-Petersen had failed and 'that you couldn't keep challenging'.'*^ He 
spoke to senior people in the party who concurred. Any further moves would 
destabilise the party, so he threatened the rebels with disendorsement and saved 
Bjelke-Petersen's political career. 
Although Sparkes' role in preventing a successful 'coup' was widely recognised, 
Bjelke-Petersen's own acknowledgment was gmdging As the 'coup' receded in time, 
and as the two men's goals diverged, Bjelke-Petersen's resentment of Sparkes' 
attempts to constrain him grew. In this frame of mind, Bjelke-Petersen minimised 
Sparkes' contribution. Derek Townsend, in 1983, refers to Sparkes' intervention as 
'one ofthe countless occasions where, according to Joh, Bob has played a key role in 
management ofthe Party over many years '^ By 1990, when Bjelke-Petersen published 
his own memoirs, history had been re-written to the point where Sparkes is depicted as 
a key player in destabilising the Premier According to this account, Sparkes had issued 
a statement saying that the party's stocks were low and 'within a few days of his 
making it, I discovered there was a move within the party to get rid of me, and I have 
1 'bid. 
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no doubt now it was prompted by Bob Sparkes' statement,"*^ In response to those who 
would defend the party president, Bjelke-Petersen reiterates: 
I cannot say I felt any gratitude to Sparkes at the time, for I blamed him for creating 
the leadership crisis in the first place. Someone once said to me, in defence of Sparkes: 
'Joh, don't forget he rescued you once from an awful mess,' I replied, 'Yes, he did 
rescue me fi-om an awfiil mess - but it was an awfiil mess he had created himself by his 
statement that we were not performing well,'''* 
Bjelke-Petersen's perception was that the triumphs of the National Party were his 
alone and that 'the party organisation consisted of armchair generals who stayed 
behind the lines, offering advice from time to time. I do not believe they made a figs' 
worth of difference to the number of votes we received at elections,"*^ This revision of 
history is characteristic. His near defeat in the 1970 'coup' was too public, and his 
profile too high to expunge this incident from the public record. Hence he restmctured 
events to cast himself in a more positive light and to shift the blame elsewhere. In the 
revised account ofthe attack on his leadership, he claims that 'I won by two, which 
meant that I had not needed Nev Hewitt's proxy after all'. This contradicts all other 
published accounts which have him scraping home to a tie through the use of his own 
vote and Hewitt's.^" If he had not done that, he would have joined the ranks of leaders 
like Hughes in 1916, Menzies in 1941 and Gorton in 1971 who had been brought 
down by lack of party room support.^' This bmsh whh failure did not deter him, but 
rather made him realise that he must cultivate loyalty within the parliamentary party 
and the ministry," It also made him reluctant to tmst anyone outside of his family and 
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group, to the detriment of his political survival." What he could never acknowledge 
was the importance of Sparkes to his political survival and hence to his success. 
Country to National 
Integral to that survival was the fiature ofthe Country Party itself Whilst the Party was 
strong in Queensland, it was apparent to Sparkes that a mrally oriented party was an 
anachronism in a modern, developed state. It was central to his vision that the Party 
develop a wider base and draw upon urban support. He was joined in implementing 
this vision and in managing the Party's electoral campaigns by Mike Evans who, in 
1970, had replaced Colonel Neville Hatton as State Secretary ofthe National Party. 
Evans was a Brisbane school teacher with a B.A. who saw himself as 'an academic so 
to speak, with a degree','^ His urban background and education were portents of 
fijture directions, even if old time members ofthe party could not see it. Evans tells the 
story that upon his appointment he had 'M,G. Evans, B,A, (Qld)' printed on his Party 
stafionery 'until some ofthe old blokes said "what is all this bulldust about?" so I took 
it off,'" Evans provoked Bjelke-Petersen's wrath when, in 1985, a year after his 
resignation, he argued publicly for 'coalition as the most desirable form of conservative 
government for Queensland.'^*' Allen Callaghan's opinion is that Evans provided a 
counterbalance to Sparkes and Bjelke-Petersen and that when Evans went, there was 
nobody there to provide this role He draws a parallel with the Premier's office 
triumvirate of himself, Stan Wilcox and Beryl Young.'^ 
The first strategy to widen the party's base, proposed in a confidential document in 
1973, was amalgamation with the Democratic Labor Party, This mirrored a proposal at 
the federal level which had prompted Gough Whitlam to observe that 'I have heard 
mmours about an impending union, but considering the parents it is likely to be 
barren,'^ * Liberal Party suspicions ofthe proposed merger, and the DLP's plummeting 
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up in 1974 its last state secretary urged its members to join the Nationals, Sparkes 
estimates that 80% of DLP members joined the Nationals, and DLP voters were 
encouraged to support the Nationals whenever the opportunity arose,'^ 
With the immediate objective of attracting urban voters and the longer term goal of 
government in its own right, the Country Party's name was changed to National in 
1974, Sparkes felt that the 'country' label gave the impression of a msfic organisation 
and was turning people away.^ Reactions to possible names were researched by W D 
Scott and Co, Possibilities included: Australian Conservative Party, the Democratic 
Party of Australia, the National Democratic Party, the Centre Party, the New 
Australian Country Universal Party, the Australian Democratic Centre Party, the Big 
Country Party and the Decentralisation Party,^' Sparkes believed that the party should 
project itself as 'a tmly national party with a stable middle-of-the-road philosophy,'" 
Bjelke-Petersen's reply to this proposition was to ask: 'You know what happens to 
people who walk down the middle ofthe road"^ '*^ ^ Nevertheless, despite his misgivings 
about a shift towards the political centre, he threw his support behind the name change 
and Sparkes' expansionary ideas The year before, at the Party's annual conference, the 
name change had been endorsed by 621 votes to 22. According to Mike Evans, a lot of 
the groundwork had been done before the conference so that 'when the vote was taken 
'all the work had been done '^ The Country Party was re-launched as the National 
Party in Brisbane, in an event which won the annual Public Relations Industry Award: 
. . we launched it with great fanfare and razzamatazz, beautifiil girls, Joh was all part 
of that , , it demonstrates the nature ofthe man, how he could be so pliable and accept 
all these things he went on touring up the coast with bands, all around Queensland 
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all part of It .. . this tension that was there was ver\', very much concealed and it only 
came up on the odd occasion but underneath it all, it was there.''^  
The move into urban areas brought the National Party into direct conflict with the 
Liberals, Alan Metcalfe suggests that for many Liberal supporters, at this point the 
coalition died,^ 
Negotiations with the DLP had given National Party officials an insight into the 
former's use of policy sub-committees. Under Evans and Sparkes, the number of 
National Party policy sub-committees expanded from two which dealt with probate 
and lands, to twenty-six, appointed by State Conference or Central Council,^'' The 
committees were chaired by party members but 'outside experts' were invited to 
participate in order to help overcome the perception that the National Party was still a 
narrow minded, mral party.*^ Many of these experts were Liberal Party members so the 
Nafionals achieved two things: competent advice and a shift in personal allegiance.*^ 
Before the annual conference. Party secretariat would invite each committee to 
formulate policy to be presented first to Central Council and then to State Conference, 
where, if passed, it would be endorsed as formal party policy,™ According to Ken 
Meissner, a National Party Federal Divisional President from 1983-87 and member of 
various policy committees, policy emanating from the committees was of variable 
quality. Whilst a minority of committee members was well informed, others either 
pushed their own barrow or had minimal levels of education. This meant that the policy 
making function ofthe committees was 'hit and miss ..professional bureaucrats could 
mn rings around them.'^' The Cribb Report provides support for this assessment 
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Other strategies were more consistently successfijl. With the assistance of senior vice-
president, Charles Holm, Sparkes and Evans worked fiirther to reinvigorate the party 
organisation which was perceived by senior members of the organisation as a war 
machine dedicated to the support of the political 'war horse', Bjelke-Petersen." 
Sparkes advocated a wider role for the Young Nationals and instituted regular attitude 
surveys of young people,^ '* Market research was also used to survey opinion in critical 
seats and, in non-traditional seats which had been identified as potential National Party 
successes, the plebiscite system was abandoned in favour of hand-picking well known 
community figures who were prepared to join the Party and contest elections. These 
candidates had very different profiles from the traditional farmer/grazier candidate. 
They were younger, better educated, and from a wide range of occupations,^^ The 
strategy was rewarded in the 1974 State election when the Party won 39 seats 
including the metropolitan seat of Wynnum and the urban seat of Ipswich West. The 
party lost these seats to Labor in 1977, but consolidated its position in a number of 
important provincial seats. Six years later, in 1983, the Nationals were able to govern 
in their own right with the aid of two defectors from the Liberal Party, The Liberal 
Party State President, John Moore, who had attended The Southport School with 
Sparkes, acknowledged that: 
one of the great strengths of the National Party is its complete dedication to a purpose. 
It is a disciplined party and has single-mindedness in achieving its purpose. Bob 
[Sparkes] epitomises that point of view. ^ ^ 
Margaret Cribb describes the National Party in Queensland during the Bjelke-Petersen 
era as a 'democracy, tempered by varying degrees of paternal authoritarianism.'" 
According to the formal stmcture of the organisation, party policy, which was not 
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about 800 delegates. Less important policy was deak with by the 210 member Central 
Council which met at least three times a year. In this context, the iron law of oligarchy 
prevailed and power within the organisation lay with the executive and the State 
Management Committee, a body of 41 members comprising the Party President, the 
Premier and his deputy, the Treasurer and assistant, other senior party administrators, 
and the three party tmstees. The latter were elder statesmen whose formal role was to 
protect the integrity of funds. Less formally, they were 'bagmen, fundraisers with 
sufficient status to go to big business,'^ ** 
In Evans' opinion, the Management Committee under Sparkes was 'just as bad' as the 
'faceless men' ofthe Labor Party He recalls that 'Bob wanted to interfere with , , the 
Government's workings' and that the gulf between the party organisafion and the 
parliamentary wing widened 'because of Bob's dictatorship,'^^ Sparkes denies such 
charges in a qualified fashion, 'I have never been a dictator to the extent that I have 
refused to accept majority decisions . , even though that has been damn difficult at 
times,'*° As with Bjelke-Petersen, he liked to get his own way and clashes were 
common although the tension between them was concealed from public view Evans 
remembers 'a meeting of the management committee in Rockhampton , , , it might 
have been 1977, 1979, . . . where Joh walked out angrily, just walked out and said 
"Bob you are a dictator.'" Nonetheless, Sparkes was a 'master craftsman at getting 
decisions through. He made everyone feel as if they'd won',^' Adrian McGregor, 
observing Sparkes in operation at a Wambo Shire Council Meeting, also comments on 
his skill and technique: 
He grasped the essentials of the dispute quickh'. It is something he prides himself on, 
the capacity to master detail. But don't ask him about it in a month's tune. His mind 
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For the next two hours ofthe council meeting, he listened, reasoned and probed. " 
As might be anticipated, Sparkes also dominated State Conferences, ahhough 
frequendy he shared the limelight with Bjelke-Petersen, Members of the Party 
complained to Margaret Cribb in 1990 that debate was 'choked off and that 
participants never knew the outcome of resolutions brought forward but not dealt with 
at the time,*^ According to Cribb, Sparkes sometimes gaveled through policies 
favoured by the Party hierarchy against opposition from delegates and Bjelke-Petersen 
'was capable of authoritarian intmsion into the debate'.*'* Evans, however, portrays 
Sparkes as the authoritarian ofthe pair: 'Job Petersen is not authoritarian, Joh Petersen 
is a gentleman . Joh was populist. He wasn't authoritarian,'*^ As earlier chapters 
indicate, however, populism and authoritarianism are far from being mutually 
exclusive, nor does authoritarianism necessarily preclude courteous and inclusive 
behaviour towards those of one's group. At the heart of authoritarianism lies the 
worship of power, the rejection of ambiguity and the repulsion of outsider groups, all 
characteristics which Bjelke-Petersen repeatedly demonstrated throughout his career. 
Part of Sparkes' strategy involved placing the Party on a sound financial footing to 
enable the funding of assaults on metropolitan seats. In 1978 each state parliamentary 
member was asked to contribute $200 to the party coffers to flind research.*^ More 
significantly, the Bjelke-Petersen Foundation was established in the following year with 
the aim of raising $2,5 million for the Party. The Foundation was the idea of Everald 
Compton, an accountant and consultant approached by the National Party for advice 
on hind raising. The setting up of the Foundation was a clear illustration of Sparkes 
and Bjelke-Petersen operating symbiotically. Without Sparkes' attention to long term 
financial and organisational planning, Bjelke-Petersen's position would have been less 
secure. By the same token, the Party benefited from Bjelke-Petersen's personal 
popularity which Compton recognised as vital to the party's electoral success: 
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there were niauN people in Queensland who were willing to support Joh Bjelke-
Petersen as Premier, who were not willing to support the Nafional Party, Their support 
of the Premier was based on their belief that he was responsible for the extraordinary 
economic prosperity of Queensland, They believed that if the Premier departed from 
the scene, that prosperity would wane . 1 recommended that any major appeal for 
capital funds should be based around the name of the Premier as the Party's most 
promotable product." 
The income from the Foundation was designed to supplement earnings from 
membership dues, fiind-raising activities and donations. As the senior partner in the 
Coalition, with ministers holding strategic portfolios such as Commerce and Industry, 
Mines and Energy, Lands and Tourism, the Party already attracted support from 
entrepreneurs and developers ** Donors to the Foundation were offered recognition of 
their generosity ranging from having buildings named after them for a donation of 
$100,000, to a private dinner with the Premier for $10,000,*' It was anticipated that 
funds for the Foundation would also come from the purchase of buildings in regional 
centres, to be used both as Party offices and rental properties. The Party established its 
headquarters at Bjelke-Petersen House, a property bought by the Foundation in one of 
Brisbane's inner suburbs. Spring Hill. 
It was not long, however, before allegations of bribery, cormption and cronyism 
surfaced, with the Labor Party claiming that government contracts were being awarded 
to Foundation subscribers.^ The allegations continued throughout Bjelke-Petersen's 
premiership and it soon became apparent that support for the National Party was 
essential to business success Two Liberal backbenchers alleged in Parliament that 
donations to the Foundation could bring about favourable government decisions, 
naming the minister responsible for land rezoning, Russell Hinze ' ' The Opposition 
Leader, Ed Casey, joined them in allegations that a donation of $100,000 by the 
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Bexley Corporation which wanted to build a shopping complex had achieved the 
rezoning of land to a 'retail' category, against the recommendafion ofthe Gold Coast 
City Council.'' The allegations were never adequately substantiated, but public 
misgiving lingered especially when questions were asked about the awarding of the 
Port of Brisbane contract and the granting of a knighthood to businessman, Justin 
Hickey, who confirmed that, at the Premier's request, he had donated $100,000 
towards the constmction of a hospice in Kingaroy.'^ Sir Justin made it clear that he had 
paid the money before receiving the knighthood.'"* It was later revealed that the 
Premier had personally approached the Maroochy Shire Council regarding a rezoning 
application by Sir Justin's company, Kabascel Pty Ltd, but that this intervention had 
been unsuccessflil.'^ Some time later, the Local Government Minister, Russell Hinze, 
threatened to sack the council because it was 'anti-development','^ Hinze himself told 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry that he was warned by Sir Robert Sparkes 'to donate to the fiand 
or he would not "get anywhere in Queensland politics.'"'^ The Fitzgerald Inquiry, 
whilst indicating that no conclusions of impropriety had been drawn, noted instances 
whereby Cabinet overmled the normal tendering process and awarded contracts for 
public works to substantial donors to the National Party,'* In 1986, it was revealed that 
the Queensland Government had overmled the Rural Reconstmction Board and the 
Agricuhural Bank and directed the latter to lend money to the National Party's 
Northern Director. Bjelke-Petersen's private affairs were not immune from suspicion, 
A tmstee company for the Bjelke-Petersen family, Ciasom Pty Ltd approached the 
Singapore-based European Asian Bank for a loan to provide working capital for a 
property owned by Ciasom and managed by the Premier's son, John, Following a 
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For a proper assessment of this request, the information available at this time is rather 
limited, but we think we have to go along as this would open up fiirther avenues in 
Queensland I am told we will always be approached first for Queensland Govemment 
and semi-Govemment finance requirements. If this application does not find your 
consent, we believe that it would affect negatively our business in this state , , ," 
A version of this story which referred to Bjelke-Petersen's attempts to raise a loan in 
Japan featured on Channel 9's 'Today Tonight' program in Febmary, 1983, Bjelke-
Petersen sued but Channel 9 did not expect the writ to proceed. When, two years later, 
Alan Bond purchased Channel 9, the writ still lay dormant. Bjelke-Petersen claimed $1 
million from Bond who negotiated the amount down to $400,000 in an out of court 
settlement. This was still at least ten times greater than the amount which would 
normally apply Bond subsequently told Jana Wendt on A Current Affair that 'the 
Premier made it under no doubt that if we were to continue to do business in 
Queensland then he expected the matter to be resolved,''°° In 1989, the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal found the arrangement, and Bjelke-Petersen's attempts to 
conceal the payment, 'improper,''°' 
Suspicions about the propriety of the Foundation had already been fuelled by 
revelations that Sir Robert Sparkes had written to businesses suggesting that donations 
to the foundation were a 'very essential investment', that the names of those declining 
to donate were kept on file and that government ministers were asking companies for 
donations.'°' Bjelke-Petersen was reported as saying ' . . . all sensible people give to the 
Nafional Party You can quote me on that. People know a good government when they 
see it and they know it will provide,''°^ The Labor Party fiirther added to the flow of 
allegations by asserting that Sir Thomas Covacevich, a Cairns solicitor who had been 
appointed as one of three members ofthe 1985-86 Redistribufion Commission, had 
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concern in the business community about the extent of cronyism was confirmed by 
National Party Tmstee, Sir Roderick Proctor, who alleged that 'it was fairly obvious 
that this [calling tenders] was only a charade and that it had already been decided who 
was going to be granted the contract'.'"^ Following such public criticism, it was said by 
several Brisbane businessmen that Sir Roderick's own business ventures were out of 
favour with the government."^ At no time was Bjelke-Petersen prepared to concede 
impropriety. When Llew Edwards had tried to introduce a code of ethics requiring, 
among other things, that ministers divest themselves of company directorships, Bjelke-
Petersen, tme to the individualistic Protestant ethic in which he had been raised, 
declared that 'no code written or otherwise, can make any man honest if he has not 
lived that way all his life,''"^ 
When Bjelke-Petersen's relations with Sparkes began seriously to deteriorate prior to 
the 1986 election, donations totalling $900,000 were increasingly being channelled 
through Kaldeal Pty Ltd, a private company, whose directors were Bill Roberts, 
chairman of both the Murgon Shire Council and Bjelke-Petersen's electorate council, 
and Sir Edward Lyons,'"* Lyons was reputed to have been close to Bjelke-Petersen 
from 1975, having achieved this proximity by the simple expedient of writing the 
Premier flattering letters and waiting outside his office until summonsed, "^ He was 
knighted for services to finance and commerce in 1978, became a National Party 
tmstee in the same year, and assumed the role of personal investment adviser to the 
Premier. His fund raising capacities brought him power and his influence eventually 
eclipsed Sparkes' despite the embarrassment he caused the Bjelke-Petersen 
government In 1981, Lyons, detained by the police for an alleged drink-driving 
offence, was neither charged nor arrested owing to the direct intervenfion of another 
Bjelke-Petersen crony. Sir Terence Lewis. Lyons was eventually charged on summons 
after the intervention of another police officer. The incident provoked the Bar 
Association of Queensland and the Council for Civil Liberties to press for an inquiry, 
but Russell Hinze, the Minister for Main Roads, Local Government, Police and Racing, 
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refused In 1985 Lyons was forced to resign as TAB chairman, as National Party 
Tmstee and from his post on the Channel 9 board which he had been offered by Alan 
Bond. Lyons, had, against the mles, spent $300,000 in credit betting. Liberal ministers 
had opposed this appointment, refusing to sign the Governor's minute, but Sir James 
Ramsey had approved it despite the lack of traditional Cabinet unanimity."° 
Kaldeal was set up after the deterioration in relations between Bjelke-Petersen and 
Sparkes, There were no public intimations at this time that Bjelke-Petersen intended to 
seek election to the Commonwealth parliament or that funds raised by Kaldeal were 
part of a federal election war chest. If this had been the case, non-disclosure of donors 
may have constituted a breach of Commonwealth electoral legislation.'" In 1987, 
Lyons said, Kaldeal contributed $12,000 to a campaign to oust Sparkes as party 
president."" Sir Robert testified that he had only become aware of Kaldeal through a 
donor. Kaldeal had paid $300,000 for television advertising during the 1986 elecfion 
campaign Donors to Kaldeal like Citra Constuctions and Electric Power 
Transmissions were awarded government contracts, although Bjelke-Petersen denied 
any connection between donations and government decisions."' Other donations 
remained anonymous and were made in cash. According to Sir Robert Sparkes, there 
was nothing sinister in this Rather, donors were afraid that they would be declared 
'black' by trade unions if they were found to be donating to the Coalifion,"'' One 
$200,000 donation, by Singapore businessman Robert Sng, led eventually to the 
charges of perjury against Bjelke-Petersen, The Crown alleged that Bjelke-Petersen 
had lied to the Fitzgerald Inquiry either to cover his role in fundraising or to hide a 
connection between the donation and an application by Sng's company. Historic 
Holdings, to develop the Port Office site in Brisbane. Cabinet had selected Historic 
Holdings although a committee advising cabinet had ranked Historic Holdings third."^ 
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resuh was deadlock, whh jury foreman, Luke Shaw, a member ofthe young Nationals, 
dismissing the general consensus of jury members. Special prosecutor, Doug 
Dmmmond mled against a retrial on the grounds of Bjelke-Petersen's age and the 
difficulty of getting overseas witnesses to Brisbane again. Florence Bjelke-Petersen 
saw the 'hand of God working in Joh's courtcase with Luke Shaw being there at 
exactly the right fime.'"^ 
In strategies designed to strengthen the National Party organisationally, Sparkes and 
his colleagues had a relatively free rein He also had considerable success at branch 
level, keeping National Party members quiescent with threats of disendorsement and 
ensuring that candidates favoured by him were pre-selected. For example, he had 
former Liberal Brian Austin nominated for the seat of Nicklin and Huan Fraser 
similarly pre-selected for Springwood after other candidates had been endorsed."^ 
Sparkes' intervention in matters of policy, was, however, a different matter. His 
motives in this arena were twofold. He preferred National Party parliamentarians to 
assume delegate status, and he believed that the transition from Country to National 
entailed liberalisation of the Party's image. His success was mixed, especially in 
attempts to moderate the most extreme of Bjelke-Petersen's utterances. In any case, 
Sparkes appears to have worried unnecessarily about the impact ofthe Premier's more 
extreme views. Far from alienating support, Bjelke-Petersen's term in office appears to 
have been sustained by his outrageous statements, support for charlatans, and 
authoritarian style."* Sparkes' opposition to Bjelke-Petersen, may, however, have 
reassured some voters, especially supporters of the Liberal Party, that moderating 
influences were at work in the coalition. Nevertheless, an examination of a series of 
strategic issues on which Sparkes tackled Bjelke-Petersen shows that, on most 
occasions, the latter's view prevailed. So long as Bjelke-Petersen continued to lead an 
electorally successfial government he had the upper hand and was able to resist the 
threat to his autonomy which Sparkes' intervention represented. 
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Before analysing a range of policies over which Sparkes and Bjelke-Petersen 
disagreed, it must be acknowledged that Sparkes was neither consistently liberal nor 
consistently opposed to Bjelke-Petersen, Both were at home in the National Party and, 
as might be expected, their beliefs, as well as their political interests, often converged. 
They shared the major goal of defeating 'socialism' in any of its manifestafions, 
especially the ALP, Sparkes, like Bjelke-Petersen, demonstrated little real concern 
about the erosion of civil liberties in Queensland or the disregard for parliamentary 
practice and tradition. He failed to acknowledge the right to strike, suggesting in 1982 
that the state government establish a military-style organisation to intervene in strikes 
in the power industry."' He was opposed to street marches and believed 
demonstrations to be the antithesis of democracy ''° His criticism of pastoral industry 
awards handed down in the State Industrial Court by Commissioner Pont, a former 
AWU organiser, provoked the government into announcing that it would appoint a 
sixth industrial commissioner to decide which cases would come before each 
commissioner '"' When matters impinged upon his own stake in the pastoral industry, 
Sparkes appeared to be as unconcerned by considerations of the separation of powers 
as was Bjelke-Petersen. 
On occasion, he publicly endorsed the Bjelke-Petersen leadership style: 'Even though 
Joh is often controversial, I say - thank God for his strong, honest, purposeful 
leadership in these turbulent times.''" He supported Bjelke-Petersen when there were 
moves by a number of National Party backbenchers, eariy in 1983, to revert to the 
situafion whereby ministers were elected by the parliamentary party.'"^ He also made it 
clear that he would brook no challenges to Bjelke-Petersen's leadership and shared 
Bjelke-Petersen's delight in the Nationals' governing in their own right after the 1983 
split with the Liberals '-"* 
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Despite such appearances of harmony, the two disagreed often although acrimony was 
usually hidden from the public gaze. An examination of issues over which they differed 
gives an insight into their priorities and the balance of power between them. Generally, 
Sparkes took a more considered view, weighing the issue ofthe day against the party's 
strategic direction. He acknowledged that in order to 'secure the support of a 
significant proportion of the middle-of-the-road people . . , we must get rid of our 
propaganda-created ultra conservative and fascist image,''" He was concerned by the 
influence ofthe League of Rights within the party, their backing ofthe Premier, and his 
apparent leanings in their direction Bjelke-Petersen had no such anxiety. His 
inclinafion was to tmst his instincts and shoot from the hip,''*' Until his last term, he 
rarely misjudged what he could get away with. 
An awkward compromise was agreed to by the parliamentary and organisational wings 
of the party over the 1977 referenda questions concerning casual senate vacancies and 
votes for Territorians in referenda Sparkes sided with Malcolm Fraser and Doug 
Anthony and advocated a 'yes' vote. Bjelke-Petersen opposed the proposals. The 
Central Council of the Party passed a motion recognising the rights of the 
organisational and parliamentary wings to differ, but the relationship between Sparkes 
and Bjelke-Petersen continued to deteriorate. Alan Metcalfe records that: 
Throughout this period, the Premier continued to attend State Management Committee 
meetings, but at times you could cut the air with a knife. It was obvious that the 
Premier believed very deeply that there was a need for the top echelons of the party to 
realign themselves in his direction.'" 
Sparkes, however, withstood such pressure and continued to disagree with the Premier 
on a series of issues Typical were sex education in schools and the demolition of the 
Belle-Vue Hotel. Sparkes warned that hard line views on both issues were counter-
productive to a party hoping to win city seats,'"** At the party's 1979 conference, in a 
speech in favour of sex education, Sparkes pleaded with members, 'if you want to 
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survive in the fijture, for God's sake, don't condemn us in the eyes ofthe people and 
the nation as a party dominated by narrow-minded, puritanical wowsers,''^' Bjelke-
Petersen's government, however, rejected the recommendation of the parhamentary 
select committee on education, chaired by Mike Ahern, that sex education be 
introduced into Queensland schools, Bjelke-Petersen's motive in appointing Ahern 
may have been to keep him busy and thus out of the way,'^° As a countervailing 
influence, he also appointed former primary school teacher Lin Powell to the 
Committee, 'put there to sabotage both its work and Ahern personally'.'^' The Premier 
urged Powell to bring down a minority report, thus providing him with the excuse to 
reject the Report's recommendations.'^' 
Abortion was another issue on which the Sparkes and Bjelke-Petersen differed. In 
1980, the Bjelke-Petersen Government proposed legislation banning abortion in all but 
limited circumstances. Sparkes branded the bill discriminatory and unworkable and 
called on National Party parliamentarians to oppose it.'^ ^ On this issue, Sparkes was 
successful. The Liberal and Labor parties adhered to the traditional policy of a 
conscience vote. Bjelke-Petersen suggested abstention as the appropriate course of 
action for National Party members who could not support the legislation but the 
legislation was defeated, 40-35, with four Nationals opposing it.'^ "* Five years later 
Sparkes again intervened successfully when police confiscated thousands of case 
records from fertility clinics in Brisbane and Townsville. Faced with a public outcry, 
Sparkes urged the Government to see that the files were returned. 
A loss for Bjelke-Petersen in this era was unusual but, on an issue of conscience, not 
critical to his continued domination It was far more important to him that his wishes 
be followed on the matter of the endorsement of Florence Bjelke-Petersen as a 
Nafional Party Senate candidate in 1980, The Nationals were placed in this situation by 
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the Liberals' determination to mn a separate Senate ticket, thus breaking a long 
standing arrangement State President, Yvonne McComb, was placed second, after 
Neville Bonner, in the belief that she could win one of the seats held by National 
Senators Ron Maunsell and Dr Glenister Shell.'^ ^ Sparkes had reservations about the 
proposal to stand Florence Bjelke-Petersen because her 'Snake Valley style' was 
incompatible with the Party's new, more woridly, image and direction,'^^ Her 
supporters felt, however, that apart from the Premier himself, she was the highest 
profile candidate they could find, A private survey had indicated that she had a 
recognifion rating of 90 per cent compared with 10 per cent for the Party's Ron 
Maunsell.'" The Nationals, in Sparkes' absence (he was attending his investiture in 
London), dropped Maunsell in favour of Florence Bjelke-Petersen. Bjelke-Petersen 
credits his friend, confidant and National Party Tmstee, Sir Edward Lyons, with 
achieving this result but he may have underestimated his own contribution.'^* Reports 
at the time 'asserted that the premier had thrown his considerable weight, actively and 
threateningly, behind his wife and was the instigator of the dropping of Senator 
Maunsell'.'" 
Bjelke-Petersen's instincts proved correct, Florence Bjelke-Petersen was an electoral 
winner, increasing the Party's vote from the order of 25-26 per cent to 33-34 per cent, 
with much ofthe gain in the metropolitan region.'** Her success cost Shell, who had 
been appointed by Malcolm Fraser as Minister for Veterans' Affairs in 1977, only to 
lose the position swiftly because of his support for apartheid, his Senate seat. His 
Senate term was not due to finish until end of June 1981, but, having already lost the 
seat, he resigned four months early in order to contest the by-election for the federal 
seat of McPherson This had been made necessary by the unexpected death of the 
sitting Liberal member, Eric Robinson, Shell's early departure created a casual Senate 
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additional superannuation benefit of $150,00 at the end ofthe six year term, and cost 
Shell $80,000 in lost payments. When Shell failed to win McPherson against the 
Liberal candidate, Peter White, pressure was applied whhin the National Party to 
appoint Shell to the casual vacancy but in defiance of the Party organisation, Bjelke-
Petersen successfully nominated his wife.'"*' 
Sparkes' battles with residual 'Snake-Valley' elements in the parliamentary party were 
not, however, over. In mid 1982, Vic Sullivan, the Deputy Premier and Ken Tomkins, 
the Minister for Aboriginal and Island Affairs, in the company of backbench 
parliamentarians, senior public servants and Sir Edward Lyons, were filmed fishing 
from the government vessel, the Melbidir, whilst ostensibly on a fact finding tour of 
the Torres Strait Bjelke-Petersen was slow to act Sparkes urged an immediate cabinet 
reshuffle, seeing an opportunity to select younger ministers, but Bjelke-Petersen 
prevaricated He had never yet dismissed a minister, a circumstance which Margaret 
Cribb attributes to his 'obdurate loyalty to old friends and colleagues'.'"*" It was also 
important to him to maintain the loyalty of his cabinet, and this, combined with Sir 
Edward Lyon's involvement, may have been a consideration. Eventually Sullivan and 
Tomkins resigned, but not before Tomkins had given a number of embarrassing 
interviews in which he demonstrated ignorance of his portfolio and a rather cavalier 
approach to the responsibilities of a minister '"*^  Both men blamed Sparkes and the 
Party organisation for their downfall, accusing them of 'treachery, cowardice, 
disloyalty and duplicity.''"" 
During 1982, conflict between Sparkes and Bjelke-Petersen persisted, with the Premier 
retaining the upper hand. An important illustration concerned their difference of 
opinion over Aboriginal land rights. Bjelke-Petersen's variety of Chrisfianity had not 
equipped him to understand Aboriginal spirituality and its relationship with the land. 
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To him, it was hypocrisy on the part of a Christian nation 'to preserve all the rituals 
and spirit ofthe Goanna and all the rest of it that they had in eariier days.''"*' In 1982, 
in a move widely believed to be a ploy designed to prevent federal intervention, the 
Queensland Government moved to abolish Aboriginal and Islander community reserves 
and to give title to the reserve lands to local councils elected by the communities. The 
titles were vested in the councils under a 'deed of grant in tmst' which meant that the 
title could be revoked by the Government for unspecified reasons, Sparkes argued that 
the legislation should be more specific regarding the nature of any transgressions which 
could lead to revocation of the deeds. His opinion was shared by Church leaders 
(especially in the Uniting Church which was responsible for Aumkun and Mornington 
Island) and the Commonwealth Government, which insisted that security of tenure 
should be provided Bjelke-Petersen, however, rejected such reasoning as irrelevant to 
the principal issue, which was not land rights, but defence and security, both of which 
were being compromised by a Communist plot to create a separate black nation in 
Australia.'"*^ In support of this view, he had, the year before, cited a lerter from Lady 
Cilento in which she indicated that her husband. Sir Raphael, had learned from 
undercover associates that the communists had long range plans to alienate Aboriginal 
lands. She congratulated Bjelke-Petersen on his 'political understanding of the 
situation' and reminded him that 'the Russians are not the best chess players in the 
worid for nothing!""*^ In the face of such eccentric scaremongering, Bjelke-Petersen 
could be sure of public apathy, if not latent support. 
Even on issues provoking wider interest and greater opposition within his own party, 
his opinions usually prevailed. It was apparent that such opposifion was becoming 
intolerable to him and that alternative positions were, increasingly, to be disregarded. 
One such issue was the proposed register of foreign land ownership. In the absence of 
the Premier on an overseas trip. Cabinet approved draft legislation, which Sparkes also 
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Bjelke-Petersen clashed heatedly Although Sparkes was backed by a majority of the 
delegates, Bjelke-Petersen persisted, telling journalists that the proposed land register 
'was not going anywhere. It is sitting still. Do you reckon that finishes it? There are 
more ways of skinning a cat than that,''^^ 
Such confidence that his own view would prevail, despite procedural constraints 
emanating from the organisation, was only enhanced by the Nationals' success in the 
1983 state election. The irritant of an, albeit for the most part compliant, coalition 
partner had been removed Bjelke-Petersen finally acquired the Treasury portfolio as 
well as the premiership Whilst, superficially, this was a fijrther enhancement of his 
power, his lack of ease with economic debate and a deterioration in the state's 
economic condition provoked considerable criticism Further, his dislike of Sparkes 
pushed him closer to Lyons and other admirers, Bjelke-Petersen became increasingly 
intemperate and questions began to be asked about his political astuteness,' 149 
Nemesis 
The very success which he and Sparkes had both desired and worked towards sowed 
the seeds of his eventual downfall:''''' 
Victory, in short, did not bring humility but hubris the dangerous reality was the 
ever increasing marginalisation of Sparkes as the circle around the Premier tightened 
assembling a court where the flatterers danced attendance upon him, urging their 
varied and personally ambitious political agendas. Bjelke-Petersen now believed he did 
not need Sparkes' skill and political wisdom, forged over years of political 
experience,'" 
The clash of interests between the new court and the old was clearly visible when, in 
1986, Bjelke-Petersen suffered a public, and humiliating defeat by Sparkes over the 
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Petersen's relationship with Sparkes, but in his political judgement and the quality of 
advice he was heeding The main issue was the Queensland Government's agreement 
to permit East-West Airlines to develop a resort on the island's national park land, 
with the prospect that, eventually, freehold would be granted if certain conditions were 
met. At the head of East-West's Queensland operations was Bjelke-Petersen's old 
friend and confidant. Sir Edward Lyons, 
Opposifion to the Lindeman Island proposal was vocal, wide-ranging and preciphated 
concern that the Nationals might suffer electorally in urban seats. Sparkes and Vice 
President, Charles Holm, expressed their 'grave concern' and recommended that the 
matter be considered by the party's State Management committee and Central 
Council,'" Ken Meissner recalls that in the Party's metropolitan branches members 
began casting around for the next premier, someone with a 'middle of the road, 
socially progressive approach' like Mike Ahern,'" Bjelke-Petersen rapidly lost control 
ofthe situation, accusing Sparkes of talking 'hot air' and telling him to mind his own 
business,'-"* Sir Edward Lyons told the Fitzgerald Inquiry that Bjelke-Petersen had been 
motivated by the employment prospects the development would bring and the fact that 
he foresaw 'an extra safe seat for the National Party.''" East-West withdrew its 
proposal, but it was clear that this was one battle the Premier had lost. 
The Lindeman Island affair brought the tensions between Sparkes and Bjelke-Petersen 
into the public arena but, thanks to the 1985 redistribution which took the zonal 
system to greater strength, the Nationals won the 1986 election with a majority 
increased from one to seven, Bjelke-Petersen announced in his victory speech that 'our 
assault on Canberra begins right now' '"^^ Privately, he indicated that he was going to 
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Canberra to 'sort the place out' '"^^ His principal hope was to once again remove a 
socialist government from power but he failed to recognise that circumstances had 
changed in the decade separating Hawke from Whitlam, 
There had been intimations of a possible federal campaign involving Bjelke-Petersen 
after the 1983 state election. At that time, calls for a new conservative political force 
to defeat the Hawke government were endorsed by both Sir Robert Sparkes and 
Bjelke-Petersen, who jointly suggested Queensland as the springboard for such a 
movement,'^* The central tenets ofthe Queensland movement were the dismantling of 
Labor's 'socialist' legislation, including Medicare, support for Queensland style free 
enterprise and the eventual introduction of a 'flat-tax' system, 'Job for Canberra' was 
not on the National Party Organisation's agenda. Sparkes recalls that the party 
organisation was 'aghast that he might be contemplating such a move.''^^ 
The origins of the 'Joh for Canberra' and the even more ambitious 'Joh for PM' 
campaigns lay in 'the culture of Gold Coast capitalism''^° personified by Gold Coast 
businessmen, Brian Ray and Mike Gore, Gore had already benefited from Bjelke-
Petersen's support and patronage. His Sanctuary Cove Resort had been made possible 
by special government legislation taken through all stages in the early morning, and a 
$10 million dollar loan. There is some confusion about who first thought of the 
possibility of a Bjelke-Petersen prime ministership. In one magazine interview Gore 
says 'It wasn't Joh's idea. He was sceptical at first'.'^' Allen Callaghan, by this time 
Chairman ofthe Queensland Film Corporation and Under Secretary ofthe Department 
ofthe Arts, National Parks and Sport, confirms this and recalls: ', , , the Premier knew, 
by the way, that he was being used. He knew it because he said it to us and it was 
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inspiration came from Bjelke-Petersen himself'^ ^ Bjelke-Petersen denies this, but it was 
usual for him to mask his ambition and appear the reluctant candidate: 
I had no personal desire to become Prime Minister: after nineteen years as Premier I 
was long past the stage of wanting to satisfy any private ambitions. The power and 
prestige of the job had not the slightest attraction for me. My only motive was to clean 
up the disastrous mess Australia was slipping into polifically,'^ 
Whatever the tmth ofthe movement's origins, Bjelke-Petersen was rapidly sucked in. 
Even Callaghan acknowledges that 'there was an element of vanity in it too. He might 
be the saviour ofthe nation ,.,''^^ 
Desphe Bjelke-Petersen's protestations, power and prestige were not meaningless to 
him. He was a modest man in private life and much of his political appeal lay in his 
ordinariness. It was inevitable, however, that power would bring changes. Under Beryl 
Young's tutelage, he became 'a very stylish dresser'. Even Florence, 'when she hit 
Canberra, she suddenly discovered the Kingaroy dressmaker wasn't quite the thing'.'^^ 
Bjelke-Petersen partook of the trappings of office, including his official Jaguar 
limousine,'" his own jet aircraft which, according to Hugh Lunn had 'seat-belt buckles 
and ashtrays plated with real gold''^ ** (Allen Callaghan says, however, that these were 
standard fittings) and sumptuous surroundings. His suite in the Executive building 
reportedly included a terra-cotta bust of the Premier in the style of a Roman 
emperor,'^' Bjelke-Petersen was encouraged in his own imperial ambitions by Beryl 
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As Sparkes and others realised, the 'Job for PM' campaign was an impossible venture. 
The political culture beyond Queensland was different. It was unlikely that Bjelke-
Petersen could gain the pariiamentary leadership of the federal National Party and, 
even if he had succeeded in this aim, the National Party could never become the senior 
coalifion partner Further, if Bjelke-Petersen decided to start a new 'Job' party instead 
of operating through the National Party, the federal electoral system would work 
strongly against any new party capturing power in the House of Representatives Not 
only did Bjelke-Petersen ignore such impediments, he convinced himself that they were 
irrelevant He also convinced other New Right figures including John Stone, John 
Leard, Lang Hancock, Charles Copeman, Andrew Hay, Ian MacLachlan, Robin Gray, 
Katherine West and Geoffrey Blainey to help his cause in some fashion.'^' Stone 
became the Premier's financial adviser and a National Party Senator, 
Sparkes tried to persuade Bjelke-Petersen against the Canberra campaign, but having 
failed, and to avoid splitting the party, he agreed to mn the 'Job for Canberra 
campaign'. The formal notice came in a motion drafted by him and passed by a Central 
Council meeting in Febmary, 1987: 
That the National Party of Australia (Qld) fiilly supports the move by Sir Joh Bjelke-
Petersen to attain the Prime Ministership so that he can put in place an anti-socialist 
federal govemment equipped with appropriate policies and the will to implement those 
policies .,. 
1. Recognising that no great battle can be won by great and chansmatic 
generalship alone, and hence that a vital prerequisite for the success ofthe Joh for PM 
campaign is adequate official organisational stmcture, we strongly recommend that, 
wherever practicable, existing Nafional Party stmcture be used ... 
The apparent convergence of interests represented by the shared campaign, masked a 
continued deterioration of relations between the two men, with Bjelke-Petersen 
undoubtedly aware of Sparkes' lack of authentic commitment. Joseph Siracusa, a 
Queensland academic recmited to become Bjelke-Petersen's national security adviser. 
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claims that, at this time, 'their hatred for each other overwhelmed the courtly setting 
and polite manners.''" 
Once Sparkes took over. Gore and the Gold Coast entrepreneurs whhdrew. Whether 
or not the funds they promised were ever a reality is debatable, but campaign funding 
was inadequate for an already impossible task. Bjelke-Petersen's ambitions forced a 
split in the federal parliamentary National Party, Sparkes ordered the Queensland 
Nationals to withdraw from the coalition, precipitating its end. This gave Hawke the 
opportunity to strike the final blow at the 'Job for PM' campaign by calling an early 
double dissolution election. Bjelke-Petersen, in Disneyland at the time, had not yet 
nominated for a federal seat and was totally unprepared. Sir Leo Hielscher, the State's 
Under Treasurer and others who were travelling with him, urged him 'to back off 
quickly' and make a deal with Howard ' " By this time, Hielscher says, Bjelke-Petersen 
'was listening to other people' and ignored their advice. In the end, however, he was 
forced to call off the campaign. Labor won the election, returned to office with four 
additional Queensland seats. Bjelke-Petersen denied any responsibility for coahtion 
losses or his own defeat. He blamed Sinclair, McLacblan,'^' even the Australian people 
for being so foolish as to re-elect Hawke and the National Party led by Sir Robert 
Sparkes, saying, "that's what went wrong ... I regret that I ever allowed them to come 
in,''^ ^ Sparkes, especially, he saw as culpable: ',,., if Sparkes hadn't gummed it up, then 
it would have worked.''" Bjelke-Petersen, ever the populist, summed up the difference 
between him and Sparkes: 'Bob always wanted to do things by the book, the 
constitufional way... I wanted to do them and worry about the mles later.''^^ 
The 'Job for PM' campaign bore all the hallmarks of what Angus Mclntyre'^^ refers to 
as 'an old-age immortality project' whereby narcissistic and self-made politicians defy 
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ageing Henry Parkes and his obsession with federation but, he argues, one may catch 
an echo of this, albek amplified, in Mao Zedong's cultural revolution: 
it is impossible not to see in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution an attempt by 
Mao to erect in his own life-time a monument to himself more lasting than the 
pyramids: a China which will apply his thought and revere his name for cenmries to 
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come. 
Leo Abse observed a similar urge amongst aging Westminster politicians 'to constmct 
their own monuments'.'**' On a smaller and less significant stage, Bjelke-Petersen 
appears to have been willing to defy political convention, and indeed reality, to press 
his own claims to immortality. His hubris knew no bounds. In the dying days of the 
'Job for PM' campaign, he told Ian McLaughlan, a potential recmit to the campaign: 
I'm not going to give up the premiership to be number two. You must understand that, 
I'll be prime minister, even if we don't win more seats than the Liberals I'll be prime 
minister. That's why I'm mnning, "*" 
After the failure of the assault on Canberra, Sparkes was in the ascendant. Not only 
had Bjelke-Petersen publicly failed in his bid for the prime ministership and been 
instmmental in Labor's re-election for a third term, but he had lost control of 
Queensland's political agenda. His Deputy, Bill Gunn, had initiated the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry into cormption in Queensland, He had also nominated Sparkes for another 
term as Party President Sparkes won comfortably, receiving almost 80% ofthe votes 
cast. As if to mb sah in Bjelke-Petersen's wounds, Sparkes' posifion on a number of 
key policy issues received endorsement at the Party's 1987 annual state conference. 
These included the introduction of condom vending machines, prostitution regulation 
and in some old sticking points between the two men, sex education in schools and the 
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watershed, marking a 'distinct movement from the Petersen era to the post-Petersen 
era','*"* The following year, Bjelke-Petersen, still denying reality, blamed this 
liberalisation of party policy for his demise: 
People wanted to change the policy of the party, they wanted to go into a freer, easier 
lifestyle . . . prostitution, abortion, condoms and loose living, . , therefore, they said 
"alright, we'll have to get rid of you,""*' 
It was clear to all, bar Bjelke-Petersen and those closest to him, that his premiership 
was over The last Bjelke-Petersen government had, in the words ofthe Cribb Report, 
become 'arrogant and self-serving'"*^ and, confronted with opinion polls showing 
declining support for the Premier, Sparkes indicated that Bjelke-Petersen should make 
way for Mike Ahern, The Morgan Gallup Poll of 4 December showed that approval for 
Bjelke-Petersen as Premier had reached an all time low of 22%. Even among National 
Party voters support was down 14% to 46%."*^ Despite this, Bjelke-Petersen persisted. 
Now isolated from organisational and bureaucratic advice, he relied instead upon Beryl 
Young, Senator Florence Bjelke-Petersen, and his new press secretary, Peter 
MacDonald,'^* His own account of his tactics at the time shows his lack of regard for 
parliament, party and due process. 
First, he tried to regain the initiative by announcing that his resignation would take 
place on his twentieth anniversary as Premier, 8th August, 1988, He attempted to 
continue as he always had, but his: 
actions were being perceived by many senior people within his party as those of a 
person who was convinced he was greater than his party, and who was prepared 
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Bjelke-Petersen, for his part, perceived a conspiracy by Sparkes 'to get rid of me , . . 
he and many management members were in league with Bill Gunn, Mike Ahern and 
Brian Austin'.'^ Bjelke-Petersen hoped to defeat the plotters by a repeat of the 
ingenious tactics used during the 1985 SEQEB dispute and the 1975 appointment of 
Patrick Field to the Senate In those days, however, he was well advised, knew what 
he was doing and, in the eyes of his ministers and the majority ofthe public, exercised 
legifimate power. These circumstances no longer prevailed but Bjelke-Petersen went 
ahead with a scheme which depended for its success on the Governor's approval: 
The one strategy which seemed to offer a glimmer of hope was to put together a new 
Cabinet which I could take into the next election. I could not have formed a new 
Cabinet while Parliament was sitting, because I would have been defeated on the floor 
of the House. A few days after Parliament closed, therefore, I decided to sack five of 
the ministers I felt were against me.'" 
Sir Waher Campbell, aware that Bjelke-Petersen's support within the parliamentary 
party had collapsed, advised the Premier that if he resigned, he may not be re-
commissioned and that he should discuss any restmcturing with his ministers. He also 
urged Bjelke-Petersen against sacking five ministers, eventually agreeing to dismiss 
three. Bill Gunn and Geoff Muntz were reprieved but Mike Ahern, Brian Austin and 
Peter McKechnie were told to leave. Two of the ministers he moved against were 
reportedly sacked because of their association with Sparkes, Austin because he had 
been seen speaking with Sparkes at the State conference, and Gunn for nominating 
Sparkes as President at the party's annual conference after Bjelke-Petersen had left"' 
Evan Whitton records Gunn as saying: 'Of course I knew what was on, Joh was going 
to be Minister of Police and close down the Fitzgerald Inquiry','^^ Ahern also beheved 
that this was Bjelke-Petersen's plan although this was denied by the Premier, The 
Governor was treated to the contempt which Bjelke-Petersen reserved for those whose 
authority prevailed over his. According to his autobiography, Bjelke-Petersen handed 
his resignafion to Campbell with the words: 
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Well, Walk', old fella, you ought to be proud of yourself You've done a mighty job, 
and I want to congratulate you. In the years to come I hope you have many proud, 
happy memories of what you've done. Good on you, old fella, Cheeno. 
Appointing 'Wally' Campbell as Governor was the only thing Bjelke-Petersen ever said 
he regretted doing"' 
Faced with an escalating crisis, the Party's management committee met and used its 
constitutional powers to authorise a meeting of the parliamentary party, at which 
Bjelke-Petersen's leadership was terminated. Don Lane remembers that 'despite the 
overwhelming vote that removed Joh from the leadership. Members were visibly 
frightened of his potential to outwit us.''^* Bjelke-Petersen tried. With his own survival 
paramount and outweighing any ideological squeamishness he may once have had, he 
contacted the State Secretary of the Labor Party, Peter Beattie, about a possible 
agreement. To defeat Sparkes and the rest, he was prepared to open dialogue with the 
enemy. His strategy was that the Labor and Liberal Parties would vote with remaining 
Bjelke-Petersen supporters in order to defeat the Ahern Government on the floor of 
the House.'" Ahern pre-empted him, however, by getting all other members ofthe 
Pariiamentary National Party to sign a declaration of support which he gave to the 
Governor:'^ '* Urged on by Sir Edward Lyons, Bjelke-Petersen persisted. At a meeting 
in a paddock at Bethany, he offered the Labor Party more staff and facilities and the 
dropping of eight defamation writs against ALP members, but refiised to commit 
himself to a redistribution.'^ Beattie abandoned the negotiations Bjelke-Petersen's 
pariiamentary and party support had totally evaporated but sfill he clung to power, 
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Parliament was not sitting, so for the time being there was not a power on earth which 
could have forced me out of office if I did not want to go. It was tempting to stay there 
for a few more weeks, but I saw no point in it,' 
He was aided in reaching this decision by his Party's decision not to pay the legal costs 
of outstanding defamation actions if he did not resign, 
Sparkes remained as President until he finally resigned in 1990, having survived a 
challenge in 1988 by Mike Evans. On his departure, Sparkes cited as reasons his desire 
to act in the best interests ofthe party, a family health problem, and home and business 
responsibilities, •"' 
His term in office had virtually overlapped that of the former Premier and, together, 
they had fashioned a regime that, when their interests converged, was virtually 
impregnable. Each brought to the partnership what the other lacked. Sparkes brought 
organisational and tactical skills, Bjelke-Petersen, political cunning and a populist 
leadership style which was in harmony with the attitudes and expectations of wide 
sections ofthe Queensland community The premiership did not collapse as a result of 
assauhs from without but because of internal tensions which deepened after the 
Nationals won government in their own right in 1983, 
Increasingly, Bjelke-Petersen distanced himself from Sparkes and relied on more 
compliant advisers who appeared oblivious to the possibility that Bjelke-Petersen's 
messianic streak could lead him to destroy the Party His childhood socialisation had 
left him resentflil of constraint, and his adult political socialisation had taught him that 
'strong' leadership was applauded in Queensland Sparkes was the only person whose 
power came close to matching the Premier's, In no other sphere of his political activity 
was there an equivalent restraining influence. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE PREMIER, CABINET AND PARLIAMENT 
If ever there was a golden age of parliament in Queensland, it had ended long before 
Bjelke-Petersen became premier. All modern parliaments have seen an erosion of their 
fiinctions and this was particularly marked in Queensland where the trend was 
exacerbated by the lack of an upper house, widespread ignorance of parliamentary 
convention and the expectation within pariiament and the community of strong 
political leadership Parliament in Queensland, as elsewhere, was dominated by cabinet. 
Within this framework, the Premier set the tone and determined much ofthe content of 
government action. There was no parliamentary equivalent of Sir Robert Sparkes. 
Labor, operating in a culture which barely gave legitimacy to the parliamentary 
opposifion, was seldom effective. Much of any residual parliamentary resistance to 
Bjelke-Petersen and his policies came from within the Liberal Party but with limited 
success. After 1983, when this largely ineffectual irritant was removed from cabinet, 
Bjelke-Petersen's position became superficially stronger, combining the roles of 
premier and treasurer. The loss of the Liberals' modest moderating influence and 
expertise in their portfolios, especially Treasury, coincided with the serious 
deterioration in his relations with Sparkes. His new circle of advisers was pohtically 
inexperienced and so admiring of him that they were unwilling, or unable, to oppose 
him, Bjelke-Petersen, who had long chaffed against constraint, was freer than ever 
before to chart his own course. 
An exploration of his relations with pariiament and cabinet shows the evolution of his 
leadership style, from diffident beginner, who leaned on Chalk's shoulder and could 
not persuade cabinet to buy him an aircraft, to aging autocrat who faced no opposition 
of any consequence.' Unlike many prime ministers who have seen advantages in an 
argumentative, challenging and intelligent cabinet," Bjelke-Petersen's psychology was 
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such that he needed to be in control of a subservient body. With no Sparkes to 
challenge him, his management of cabinet and parliament showed very clearly his 
growing quest for autonomy, his intolerance of opposing views once he had set upon a 
course of action, his populist disregard for the institutional checks and balances which 
a pariiamentary system is expected to provide, and the toleration of his increasingly 
authoritarian leadership style by the majority of Queenslanders, His management of 
cabinet and pariiament also demonstrated his political skills and intuitive understanding 
of what motivated his colleagues. Their recollections show a man with contrasting 
sides to his personality. He could be charming and helpflil, or given to displays of 
ferocious anger As his premiership grew, such displays became more common and 
frequently greeted attempts to thwart him. 
Cabinet 
Within state confines, a premier can exercise greater power than the prime minister. 
Both premier and prime minister are the point of contact between government and the 
Crown's representative, have the predominant say in timing elections, control the 
agenda for cabinet meetings, influence the composition and terms of reference of such 
cabinet committees as are formed, initiate administrative reorganisation, set guidelines 
for ministerial behaviour, are the centre of media interest, and dispense honours, titles 
and patronage. ^ A National premier, like a Liberal Prime Minister, can both choose 
and dismiss ministers. The most important decisions are made by the prime minister (or 
premier), usually after discussion with ministers or other advisers, but not necessarily 
in cabinet,'' Even allowing for the constitutional, legal, parliamentary, party and social 
constraints, the Australian leader is still possessed of 'a tremendous power',^ This was 
especially so in Queensland during the Bjelke-Petersen era, when many constraints 
were weak and the premier's power was enhanced by the personal and informal 
processes on which cabinet was based,^ Decision making was 'hit and miss'.^ There 
was no developed cabinet office and because, during the last years of his govemment. 
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cabinet submissions did not go to department heads fijrther concentrated power in the 
hands ofthe Premier and his advisers^ Personal briefing sessions were held for the 
Premier, prior to the cabinet meeting. These were attended by the permanent head of 
the Premier's Department, the Premier's press secretary and senior public servants as 
required and Beryl Young, the Premier's pilot.* Bjelke-Petersen, whom Chalk had 
early tagged 'a lone ranger','° confirms that often he got things organised before he 
went to cabinet. Under Treasurer Leo Heilscher remembers seeing him 'go into cabinet 
and , , . win a cabinet decision one to 17, He's the one.'" On some issues, like the Gair 
Affair, he 'didn't even tell my cabinet ministers a lot . because it would leak','' Mike 
Ahern told Evan Whitton that after 1980, when he finally joined it, cabinet had no say 
in imperial honours,'^ (Bjelke-Petersen and Police Commissioner Terry Lewis were 
knighted in 1984 and 1985 respectively). In Bjelke-Petersen's mind, cabinet was there 
to rafify his judgment. He adopted the practice of bringing forward, under oral matters, 
any topic he chose '"* For example, at the last Cabinet meeting he chaired, he proposed 
that the Government pay approximately $200,000 to terminate defamation actions he 
had taken against Opposition members,'^ Don Lane recalls the practice of '"late 
submissions", which were in fact sometimes dubious proposals that were held out of 
the Friday Cabinet bag and presented for first sighting at the meeting on the 
Monday,,,','* Major decisions were often treated in the most cursory fashion The 
decision to award the authority to prospect the giant Winchester South coal deposit 
was awarded to BP-Thiess-Westfield on the basis of a four page document presented 
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Leslie Thiess was a friend of the Premier and there were suggestions at the time that 
the decision 'was not unrelated to this relationship'.' . ' 18 
Bjelke-Petersen's position was strengthened by advice from officers ofthe Premier's 
Department which had a policy division, and some technocratic expertise as a result of 
a merger with the Co-ordinator-General's Department The Department served the 
Premier rather than cabinet and, with its help, Bjelke-Petersen enjoyed a monopoly of 
the information available in cabinet discussions.'^ His preference was to deal with 
topics at a general level, leaving ministers to defend the details."° They were aided in 
this task by ministerial committees, which not only helped in the drafting of legislafion, 
but also channelled the energies of ambitious backbenchers. '^ 
Hugh Emy has suggested that debate and compromise within cabinet are an 
impediment to unfettered power Cabinet ministers are not the agents of a leader's will 
and 'whilst he can insist getting his own way in cabinet, he cannot habitually do so,'^^ 
This, it is usually argued, is more likely to be the case in a coalition cabinet." 
Morrison, writing eariy in the Nicklin premiership, surmised that 'the posifion of the 
Premier in a Country-Liberal Coalition Government is unlikely to assume for quite 
some time, if at all, the dominance ofthe Premier under Labor Governments.'''' None 
ofthe four reasons Morrison put forward to explain the premier's pre-eminence under 
Labor was altered under the coalition: respect within the community for a strong 
personal executive, the way in which the role had evolved from the colonial era, the 
premier's general supervisory control over the whole administration and his election by 
caucus,"^ It had not taken long for Nicklin to become an authoritative figure and 
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affiliated unions and unhampered by an egalitarian ideology, became even more 
dominant than his Labor predecessors. This happened despite the presence of the 
Liberal leader in cabinet and despite the latter's retention ofthe Treasury portfolio 
Bjelke-Petersen's style of dealing with cabinet colleagues oscillated between that of 
'old world courtesy' and 'bold political disciplinarian' '^  Sir Robert Sparkes' most 
recent assessment is that Bjelke-Petersen was 'definitely schizophrenic to some 
extent'," Whilst probably not clinically accurate, the description captures, in 
layperson's terms, the dual characteristics of Bjelke-Petersen's personality and goes 
some way towards explaining the very different ways in which colleagues remember 
him. The fact that he might empt at any time undoubtedly encouraged a conciliatory 
and unthreatening approach on the part of his colleagues. Authoritarians operating in a 
sympathetic culture expect, and usually get, subservience from those below them in the 
hierarchy. 
Bjelke-Petersen's Jekyll and Hyde personality, which, with his capacity to fly into 
rages, was beginning to resemble his father's, is invariably recalled by those who 
worked closely with him in cabinet and elsewhere. Sparkes describes him as 'so soft 
natured, so gentle, quiet, then he'd "do his nana" and rant and rave like Adolf Hitler.''^ 
Bill Gunn remembers him as 'very good to work with, very easy to work with' and 'as 
very kind-hearted in lots of ways' Well into the premiership, Bjelke-Petersen sfill 
'would work half the night' but he was less puritanical than he used to be. Although he 
ate little, he had unbent sufficiently to enjoy a joke and a glass of wine,^' Gunn 
concedes, though, that the Premier 'had a bad temper when he wanted to.'^° Allen 
Callaghan's view is that 'he could be very inflexible if be wanted but on the whole he 
was a good politician and a good bloke,'^' Callaghan found that Bjelke-Petersen would 
adopt good ideas, like increasing the size of the National Park Estate, including the 
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When he made his mind up on an issue, that was it.'^' Sir Leo Hielscher who served 
him as Under Treasurer remembers him with affection as a 'Dutch uncle', someone 
'who seemed to be able to win anyone who came into close contact with him' but who 
could also be stubborn: 'The old Danish jaw would go out and that's the end of that. 
You may as well forget h because you'd lost him.'" A respondent to Hede and Wear's 
survey of cabinet leadership describes him as 'an enigma', adding that, for most ofthe 
fime, he was a 'benevolent dictator' but could also be a mixture of 'exchement, 
ratbaggery and down right vindictiveness.'^ Bill Hewitt's recollections are similar. He 
remembers: 
an incredibly courteous person and that is tme of him till the end ofthe premiership in 
his better moods. Quiet, courteous, accommodating, all of those things ...but at his 
worst,..quite terrible. 
He adds that Llew Edwards used to 'tell us how completely unreal he was, how he was 
ranting and he was raving,'^^ An anonymous ministerial source told a journalist that the 
Premier 'was shaking with rage' as he yelled at Mike Ahern for being unwilling to act 
against condom vending machines installed illegally by three university unions." Don 
Lane also describes the 'fantastic performances' which occurred when Bjelke-Petersen 
lost his temper: 
Those who experienced them will never forget them. Occasionally they would occur in 
Party meetings when he was confronted by Liberal members on issues on which he had 
taken a firm public stand, such as the right of appeal against the denial of a permit for 
street marches. 
Joh would start to yell and threaten the Member (usually with an ill-timed election) at 
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Most of his National Part>' members were in terror of him on such occasions. The 
Liberals generalK' agreed that the Premier was just a touch unbalanced and it fell to 
Knox and then Edwards to quieten him down, sometimes with the assistance of senior 
National ministers like Russ Hinze and Ron Camm. 
Sir Robert Sparkes, always a match for Bjelke-Petersen, describes the transition from 
'quietly spoken modest sort of bloke' to 'raving, roaring bull' when he got upset. Such 
behavioural swings became more pronounced as the premiership progressed. In the 
early days, 'he was very diffident but towards the end, he was even the reverse 
almost,'" 
Although Bjelke-Petersen's leadership style was typically authoritarian in the rigidity of 
his beliefs, on issues on which he had not made up his mind, it appears that he was 
prepared to seek advice, just as he had done as a businessman and entrepreneur His 
inclination may have been, however, 'to seek the advice of similar-minded confidantes' 
or even those who went along with him, whatever their private views.'*° Allen 
Callaghan says that Bjelke-Petersen would test his ideas widely before mnning with 
them and in that sense was a consensus politician, but whether or not such testing 
extended to those with a radically different Weltanschauung is unlikely. For example, 
he asked Sir Edward Lyons to assess cancer therapist, Milan Brych, hydrogen car 
inventor, Steven Horvarth and oil seed promoter. Dr. Oskar."" Presumably, given 
Bjelke-Petersen's public support for the men, Lyons went along with Bjelke-Petersen's 
optimistic assessment of their projects. 
Callaghan sums up Bjelke-Petersen's approach as: 'God had sent him and he had this 
faith that he was sent, so he had no doubts about that but he was also willing to 
listen, "'^  It appears, however that as the premiership progressed, the first part ofthe 
equation held more tme than the second. When he did seek advice, he was very 
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Lockyer), found that Bjelke-Petersen had a tendency 'to veer with the breeze of every 
new piece of advice',"*^ Gunn makes a similar judgment: 'You had to be the last one in 
. it didn't take a great deal to convince him on certain things,"^ Gunn cites the 
hydrogen car as an example. Sometimes Bjelke-Petersen's pragmatic bent would cause 
him to abandon principles. Gambling was a case in point, and, when his personal 
survival was at stake, his willingness to parley with the ALP, 
So dominant of cabinet did Bjelke-Petersen eventually become and so compliant hs 
members, that decisions made in his absence with which he disagreed were frequently 
rescinded upon his return,""^  Coaldrake illustrates this with an account of an incident in 
late 1984."^ At a meefing, at which the Premier was absent, cabinet rejected a 
recommendation which Bjelke-Petersen had supported regarding a clearer delineation 
of public service staff and resources. Before the next cabinet meeting, Bjelke-Petersen 
overturned the decision. No minister objected. As the previous chapter indicates, 
Bjelke-Petersen refused to accept cabinet's approval of a foreign land ownership 
register. Despite the fact that Sir Robert Sparkes and the National Party Organisation 
also supported a register, Bjelke-Petersen stated that it would never become law in 
Queensland/*^ His attitude towards foreign investment was the same as it had always 
been: 'There's a tremendous amount of money coming into Queensland for big 
business and after all, we're trying to encourage investment in the state,"** 
Although the most powerfijl influences came from outside cabinet, ministers who 
hoped to influence him needed to lobby him and their colleagues prior to the cabinet 
meeting,''^ Those most likely to exert influence in this fomm were the senior ministers 
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The closer > ou got to the Premier, he heard but if you were right down on that end, say 
if you were number 18, you had less chance. But I was very fortunate When I was in 
Education, I sat about half way down, I could get a bit of a say, but each one brings 
their submissions , . and you would seek the backing of a couple of other members,^ '^  
Bjelke-Petersen's control ofthe political agenda can be seen in the way he managed a 
series of major issues so that government policy reflected his wishes. It was not 
unusual for him to take decisions and report back to cabinet after the event. In these 
circumstances, cabinet was no more than a mbber stamp. Bjelke-Petersen was the 
driving force behind the most extreme and controversial decisions of his premiership, 
such as the declaration ofthe state of emergency during the Springbok tour in 1971. 
Prior to the Brisbane match, mgby games in the southern states had been intermpted 
by demonstrators protesting against apartheid, and Bjelke-Petersen determined that 
this would not happen in Brisbane He was told by the Police Commissioner that 
Ballymore oval, the usual venue for mgby games, could not be secured: 
I then was told by the Police Commissioner that the only place really was the 
showground so I rang the President ofthe Show Society and I said to him: 
" , , , I want the exhibition ground for playing the Springbok matches . , ," 
They said: " No way Mr Premier, we've got an exhibition coming up in three weeks , . 
and the unions will black ban us " 
So I said: "Well you had better all come into my office". 
So I had in the meantime, ready for the fact that they wouldn't do it, I had the papers 
to declare a State of Emergency drawn up and 1 just signed them in front of them when 
they said no , , , so I signed the State of Emergency' and handed it to the President and 
said: " Well the grounds are mine now and I'll take them,"'' 
Allen Callaghan provides a contradictory footnote to this explanation when he states 
'the idea to take over the exhibition grounds for the state of emergency was Sir 
Gordon Chalk's but Sir Gordon was not game to put his name to it. That was his 
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problem all the time.'" The state of emergency, provided for in Secfion 22 ofthe State 
Transport Act of 1938, was declared without reference to pariiament or to the 
McMahon Government in Canberra. This was despite the fact that the Queensland 
Govemment needed Commonwealth permission to use the army barracks at Enoggera 
to accommodate 600 regional police being brought into Brisbane," The state of 
emergency covered not just the RNA grounds but the whole state and was proclaimed 
for ten days before the first game and fourteen days after the last 'in case the police 
had any unfinished business,''"^ According to one legal expert, Section 22 was 
characterised by 'extraordinarily wide definition ofthe circumstances in which it may 
be invoked, an extraordinary width of resultant powers, and complete absence of 
parliamentary safeguards' '^  The original legislation had been introduced by Labor 
Premier, Forgan Smith, with only perfijnctory debate and without reference to its fijll 
implications/*^ 
Bjelke-Petersen recalls with satisfaction that 'the games . put me on the map.'" His 
response to the Springbok tour set the pattern for a premiership marked by 
confrontation between him and various dissenting groups. In the case ofthe Springbok 
tour, opposition came from the Labor Party, university students, some clergy and the 
union movement. Liberal backbencher, Bill Hewitt expressed his concern to no avail. 
Forty trade unions declared a twenty-four hour strike. This, and the demonstrators 
resisting police outside the Springbok's hotel, provided Bjelke-Petersen with the sort 
of conflict which he found politically rewarding and personally satisfying. He denies 
ever being stressed at these times declaring: '. . I enjoyed it. Relaxing, great fian. It 
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On this occasion, it was a game he won. Like previous Queensland premiers, he learnt 
that an authoritarian leadership style carried no electoral penalty. On the day of the 
Springbok's game in Brisbane, Liberal candidates won two by-elections, the Brisbane 
seat of Merthyr (thereby bringing Don Lane into parliament) and the regional seat of 
Maryborough, which had been held by Labor for forty years. On the following 
Monday, cabinet decided to grant every member ofthe state police one week's extra 
leave, a gesture which undoubtedly cemented the allegiance of many to the 
govemment and established a pattern of close relations between the Bjelke-Petersen 
govemment and the police force." 
Bjelke-Petersen also pushed an initially reluctant cabinet into supporting his 
confrontationist approach to industrial relations. As a backbencher, he had signalled his 
opposition to unions and the 40 hour week. His attitudes had not changed when, in 
1982, teachers commenced rolling stoppages on the issue of class sizes. He ordered 
that they be dismissed despite the opinion ofthe Solicitor-General's Department that 
the government had no legal authority to sack teachers Cabinet refiised to support the 
Premier on this issue and the government persuaded the Queensland Teachers Union 
to hah industrial action in anticipation of additional fijnding, Bjelke-Petersen was on 
shakier ground than usual in taking up a confrontationist stand because the teachers 
had the support ofthe parents and citizens organisation. 
Usually Bjelke-Petersen could rely on public and media impatience with strikers to 
outweigh community concern over breaches of civil liberties. Nevertheless Cabinet 
baulked at some ofthe proposed provisions ofthe 1979 Essential Services Bill, such as 
the loss of a driving licence for life for union members using their own vehicles to 
organise strikes. An amended bill was finally agreed to by cabinet after a 48 hour strike 
in the power industry but it still contained worrying implications for civil liberties,^ In 
1982, in his absence overseas, the Government agreed to 38 hour week for blue-collar 
employees of the government and railways, who had demanded a reduction to 35 
hours. On his return, Bjelke-Petersen denied there had been an agreement, thus 
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provoking industrial action. He responded to this in the hard-line fashion of previous 
premiers and invoked the Essential Services Act to declare a state of emergency. 
His approach to striking South East Queensland Electricity Board (SEQEB) 
employees in 1985 took a similar course and, in this instance, showed very clearly how 
little input cabinet had to the decision making process. He had reached the conclusion 
that 'you have to override people for their own good'*' and according to Bjelke-
Petersen this is what happened during the SEQEB strike. He says that he had to 
persuade Crown Law, different departments, Ivan Gibbs and Vince Lester not to give 
in to the strikers Sir Leo Hielscher confirms this saying that the Premier 'won that on 
his own . 1 thought he was going a bit too far but as it turned out, he was right.'" In 
the end, cabinet left him 'to do the front mnning' and he reported to them weekly. 63 
At the heart of the SEQEB dispute was the use of contract labour The Electrical 
Trades Union responded to its introduction to the industry with a series of rolling 
strikes, leading to blackouts which affected increasing numbers of consumers In 
response, the Queensland government invoked the State Transport Act 1938-1981 to 
declare a state of emergency, Bjelke-Petersen, re-playing an old theme, told pariiament 
that the strike was just a ploy to get the same money for less work,^ Cabinet, urged by 
Bjelke-Petersen, approved the dismissal of 900 striking workers, depriving them of 
superannuation benefits and replacing them with non-union labour who signed 
contracts with no-strike clauses. Sir William Knox suggested that the contract system 
be extended to other essential services such as teaching, nursing and garbage 
collection,*^ giving the lie to those who thought if the Liberals had remained in the 
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substitution of 'coercion for industrial relations in Queensland'*^ was, as Bjelke-
Petersen had anticipated, an electorally successfijl strategy. Despite pickets and 
demonstrations, including academic staff protests at the University of Queensland over 
the award of an honorary doctorate to someone with so little understanding of liberal 
democracy,** 'he had a pretty fair idea that if he took this step the people of 
Queensland would back him.'*^ 
He must also have been sure that Queenslanders would back the abolition of death 
duties. This stand by Bjelke-Petersen in 1977 showed his mthlessness, capacity for 
manipulation of cabinet, and political cunning. It also brought him into direct conflict 
whh Gordon Chalk. The topic was dear to his heart because he had been forced to pay 
death duties on his parents' estate. His father's refijsal to give him the property before 
he died, in order to avoid duty, had been especially galling and may have contributed to 
the passion and conviction with which he fought the issue. He recalls the procedure 
when his father died: 'they value every thing they can find, every fork and every knife 
is counted, everything I had, everything.'™ Many in the community had shared this 
experience. Death duties as an issue was especially meaningfiil to National Party 
members, because ofthe impact of duties on mral properties and their association with 
'Marxist doctrine'.^' National Party policy on death duties was already in place, having 
been designed by former Party treasurer Sir Neville Henderson who had made 
submissions to the federal government on the subject. 
Death duties was not the first source of conflict between Chalk and Bjelke-Petersen 
They had sparred over the road transport levy more than twenty years before and more 
recently over liquor law amendments, on the establishment ofthe Queensland Cultural 
Centre, and whether or not a casino licence should be issued in Queensland, Bjelke-
Petersen, at this point tme to his convictions, had opposed the last proposal whilst 
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his supporters overcame Bjelke-Petersen's opposition to the Cultural Centre which the 
latter argued would do nothing for country people, and the casino lobby eventually 
prevailed (Jupiter's Casino on the Gold Coast opened in 1985), Chalk, however, was 
outmanoeuvred by Bjelke-Petersen on death duties. 
Bjelke- Petersen recahs that in 1976: '...one day, whhout telling anybody I just went to 
the Cabinet and I said to Cabinet "I'm going to abolish death duties and gift 
duties",,.'^^ Chalk was irate because no written submission had been made on what, in 
his view, was a Treasury matter which would lose the state $26 to $28 million dollars 
in revenue." Cabinet divided along party lines so Chalk suggested a joint party meeting 
to resolve the issue. Bill Gunn remembers that Chalk 'made a great passionate 
speech'.^'' Bjelke-Petersen says that Chalk was well prepared and spoke for an hour 
and a half: 
He said: "Are you prepared to forego that high school that was going to be buih, that 
you had been promised and you know it's coming and you announced it? Are you 
prepared to forego that?" and you'd say "no" and he went through every item and 
when he finished he went to the next one. So I just sat alongside Gordon at the end of 
the table and all the boys were sitting around in the Chamber and when he finished he 
tumed to me and said: Well, there you are Mr, Premier, there's not one of them that 
would support you. They know that if they support your motion, they are not going to 
get these things because we just can't afford them," 
In response to Chalk's concern about potential revenue loss, cabinet made a quick 
decision to introduce football pools to Queensland, despite Chalk's argument that 
revenue from this source could not be used to offset losses incurred by the abolition of 
death duties.^* The latter was such an important issue to Bjelke-Petersen that he was 
prepared to jettison his eariier concerns about the evils of gambling and to threaten his 
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I'm going to make >ou one promise .,,any of you in the room today that support 
Gordon's motion .,, I'll have put on the front page ofthe local paper with a nice frame 
nght around it that you, John Smith, the member for the area, voted in favour of death 
duties and gift duties. Now, who's supporting Gordon's motion? Put your hand up so I 
can see who it is ,., and I'll keep my promise. , 
The strategy of asking members to raise their hands or respond individually was to be 
used again. On this occasion, according to Bjelke-Petersen's recollection, only Chalk, 
David Byrne (Liberal, Belmont) and Brian Lindsay (Liberal, Everton), who advocated 
a gradual introduction, raised their hands. ^ "^  Byrne and Lindsay lost their seats at the 
next election, held in 1977, not because of this issue, but in the swing back to Labor 
after the 1974 debacle. In addition, Byrne had received very bad publicity over 
accusations of arson which he made against Labor Senate candidate Mai Colston. 
Years later, Bjelke-Petersen claimed that if he had bothered to campaign against Chalk, 
he could have made it awkward for him.^' Gunn believes that the revenue lost from 
death duties was returned in stamp duties from property transactions when retirees 
from the rest of Australia mshed to the Gold Coast.*° 
The combination of electoral success, fear, charm and undemanding performance 
standards generally procured loyalty to Bjelke-Petersen from his ministers, Hede and 
Wear's survey of ministers in the Fraser, Hawke, Cain and Bjelke-Petersen cabinets 
found that Bjelke-Petersen scored the lowest rating on the item "Communicated 
expectations of high performance to me.'*' He was reluctant to dismiss poor 
performers like Sullivan and Tomkins Allen Callaghan recalls that Bjelke-Petersen was 
urged on many occasions to get rid of the logs' but 'there was this sort of loyalty and 
reluctance to sack ministers because they would sit on the backbench and foment 








Bjelke-Petersen, pers. comm., Oct., 1993. 
Lane, op. cit, p, 76. 
Bjelke-Petersen, pers. comm., Oct,. 1993. 
Gunn, pers. comm., June, 1997, 
Hede and Wear, op. cit, p, 477, 
Callaghan, pers comm., June, 1997, 
206 
some fijrther consideration of geographical representation. As Reynolds notes, the 
knowledge that they were moving incrementally towards a cabinet post provided an 
incentive for backbenchers to endure a long - and silent - apprenticeship,*^ Those who 
were perceived as critics, like Mike Ahern, forfeited their place in the queue In 
contrast was the group of Bjelke-Petersen loyalists to whom Liberal backbenchers 
referred as the 'dog squad'. This was: 
a small but powerful group within the party that sits at the front of joint party meetings 
and offers the Premier their unquestioning support, and verbal opposition to anyone 
with the temerity to express an altemative view.*"* 
One member of this group was the late John Goleby, Minister for Water Resources and 
Maritime Services, who regularly brought the Premier fmh from his farm.*^ Vic 
Sullivan remembers that Goleby would bring boxes of passionfmit: 'we'd get them for 
$2 each. Joh got his for nothing!"** 
Even if all Ministers were not so generous, there were no rivals to Bjelke-Petersen's 
hold on power between 1970 and the disintegration ofthe premiership in 1987, He had 
learned his lesson from the 'coup' and could enjoy the rare luxury for a political leader, 
relative security of tenure. Thus one ofthe constraints on a leader's power which Emy 
points to - the ambitions of the heirs apparent - was, if not absent, unable to reach 
fmition," Within cabinet, Bjelke-Petersen was the undoubted patriarch. Whilst there 
were aspirants to the premiership, among them Ron Camm, Vic Sullivan, Russell 
Hinze, Ivan Gibbs, Mike Ahern and Bill Gunn, none of them was a serious contender 
between 1970 and 1987. Bjelke-Petersen was too successful electorally and Sparkes 
too aware ofthe need for party unity to permit a rival to threaten the Premier's power. 
Speculation about a successor to Bjelke-Petersen presumed that he would eventually 
step aside, not that he would be deposed. 
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The fantasies about succession which occupied the minds of some cabinet ministers 
were based on this latter assumption. Vic Sullivan recalls a scenario which, rather 
fanciftilly, given the politician's tendency to hold on to power, permirted both him and 
Ron Camm, the likely beneficiary had the 1970 'coup' succeeded, to take turns at the 
premiership: 
Ronny Camm was another very good deputy to him. He was there for many years and 
you know he could have stepped aside and given Ron three years and diis is what Ron 
and I thought he might do. And Ron said to me, he said: "If it happens, three years will 
do me and then you can take over." 
But it didn't work out that wav . .^ * 
Camm's support of Millmerran as the site for a new power station in 1974 over the 
Premier's preference for Tarong, in his own electorate, impacted negatively on 
Camm's chances of succession. When Sullivan, as Primary Industries Minister, offered 
Camm the job of Chairman ofthe Sugar Board, telling him, 'I don't think you'll ever 
be premier ' Camm agreed and resigned from parliament at the 1983 election. He 
was duly followed as deputy by Sullivan. Sullivan was forced to resign after the 
Melbidir affair, but it is doubtfijl if he had the skills, or the numbers, to be premier 
Russell Hinze, although regarded in some quarters as a competent administrator was 
another without the numbers to be premier, or indeed deputy.^^ He, Gibbs and Mike 
Ahern (Ahern by one vote on the third ballot) were defeated by Bill Gunn for the 
poshion of Deputy Premier after Vic Sullivan's resignation, Hinze greeted this news 
with the observation that Gunn 'was not premiership material. )90 
Like Bjelke-Petersen, in his climb towards the premiership, Hinze had tried to build 
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buih bridges, roads and racecourses." He made no secret of his ambitions, announcing 
that he expected to take over as premier after the Commonwealth Games in 1982. Sir 
Robert Sparkes declared Hinze's announcement 'somewhat premature'.'' Peter Nixon, 
who Haised with Bjelke-Petersen on behalf of Malcolm Fraser, and who relied on 
Hinze as a conduit to Bjelke-Petersen, found him to be both tmstworthy and the 
possessor ofthe 'most astute brain in the Queensland cabinet.''^ Inside Queensland, 
judgments were less flattering. Mike Ahern's assessment of Hinze's premiership 
potential was negative: 'Nobody could tolerate Hinze, he was not in serious 
contention...''"* Gunn told him too, that he had no hope ofthe premiership and stood 
against Hinze in 1980 for the Deputy's position at the request of six or eight members 
whom Hinze apparently believed might support him. Gunn describes some of the 
machinations associated with this particular leadership contest: 
.1 said, 'Russ, this business of you going for Deputy Premier . . you haven't got a 
chance" and he said 'I think I have' and he pulled out a sheet of paper. He had all these 
ticks and these fellows had been in my room, 
'You think those chaps are supporting you? 
'Weir I said, 'Did they say they would?' 
'Oh, not exactly but I can tell by their attitude,' 
Anyway I think he only got six votes altogether . . so he hated me ever after... 
Hinze and Gibbs were eliminated on the first ballot. Gunn and Ahern tied on the 
second. 
There were other factors involved in Hinze's lack of success. The removal of Sir 
Edward Lyons from the chairmanship ofthe TAB had damaged Hinze's relationship 
with Bjelke-Petersen although the two remained on cordial personal terms until the end 
of the premiership Hugh Bingham surmises that such an odd relationship can be 
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development, progress and getting government out of the way of both.^ Bill Hewitt 
thinks Bjelke-Petersen saw Hinze as a protector, 'tough and buriy'.'' Allen Callaghan, 
however, says that Bjelke-Petersen 'was aware of Hinze and concerned about Hinze 
but again Hinze was one of those who would have gone on the backbench and really 
fomented trouble,''* as he did when Ahern demoted him. Given the publicity associated 
with him, h would have been difficult to remain oblivious to Hinze's acfivities. That he 
remained in cabinet, as minister in charge of racing, when he had commercial interests 
in gallopers, trotters and bloodstock, provides fiirther evidence of Bjelke-Petersen's 
blind spot regarding conflict of interest,^ He was supported in turning a blind eye by 
his coalition colleagues. Bill Hewitt feels that 'there is a sharing of guilt all round' but 
recalls the pressures: 
When Kevin Hooper started hitting Hinze with these accusations ,,,the backbenchers 
feel [sic] they have got to close ranks and be supportive of that minister and take on the 
opposition, rather than say: "Is there some tmth in this?"'°° 
Hinze had certainly taken risks. He had embarrassed the government by being 
photographed, shirtless, at 'beer belly' contests, but more importantly, faced a series of 
allegafions of impropriety, including the land rezoning scandal referred to in the last 
chapter. In the same year he had been accused of using his electoral office for private 
business dealings, of conflict of interest in dealings with the Moscow Narodny Bank 
and had been questioned about land transfers within his family group of companies. 
In 1983, allegations surfaced about wrongflil involvement in milk quota distribution. 
Two years later. Labor pariiamentarian David Hamill (Ipswich) alleged conflict of 
interest over the relocation of a road in Hinze's electorate which represented 
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Hinze family company, Junefair Pty Ltd, was alleged to be interested in securing a 
TAB branch licence in Oxenford, It was claimed that Hinze, as the responsible 
minister, had obstmcted a rival group's application.'°^ In 1985, the Auditor General 
found that by paying $12,500 for a private box at Doomben, Hinze had breached an 
act he administered."" The Fitzgerald Inquiry found that Hinze and related entities had 
received benefits of approximately $4.2 million from developers and others,'°^ He died 
of cancer before facing eight counts of official cormption, including allegations that he 
accepted $520,000 in bribes. Property developer, George Herscu was found guihy of 
bribing Hinze, and Albert Scheinberg, also a property developer, admitted to three 
counts of bribing Hinze,'"^ 
Ivan Gibbs' star shone briefly but his standing slipped after his handling ofthe selection 
ofthe successfijl tenderer for the Winchester South coal mine. Bill Gunn was generally 
considered to be the heir apparent because he most closely resembled Bjelke-Petersen, 
a likeness which even extended to physical appearance. He was, however, less 
infimidating than Bjelke-Petersen and, according to Don Lane, nervous members 
preferred to deal with him rather than the Premier Lane claims that Gunn combined 
this patronage power with his Masonic links to advance his own cause,'°^ but until the 
'Joh for Canberra' campaign and his establishment ofthe Fhzgerald Inquiry in Bjelke-
Petersen's absence, Gunn was a loyal and deferential deputy who posed no threat. 
Once Bjelke-Petersen indicated his federal aspirations, Gunn, Hinze and Ahern began 
canvassing their leadership options, 
Ahern, the most obvious successor on the grounds of talent, had long been perceived 
by Bjelke-Petersen as a threat. There is no doubt of the antipathy between the two 
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pronounced and 'for Joh's family, the real ogres were the Catholics','°^ leading to 
suggestions that Ahern's Roman Catholicism may have been a factor in Bjelke-
Petersen's dislike for him,'°^ Another suggestion traces the antagonism to an 
association with Ahern's father, a former National Party State President. Peter Beartie 
claims that 'old John told his son: "Joh's got a Bible in one pocket and a revolver in 
the other. Watch him.""° Both explanations may have been correct although Vic 
Sullivan's Catholicism appears not to have been a barrier to his advancement, nor in 
another arena, was Terry Lewis' religion, (Lewis was, however, worried that his 
Cathohcism might be a barrier to promotion. His diary notes 'No. 1 [Bjelke-Petersen] 
really a bigot - so worried re religion),'" Then again, many saw Sullivan as the 'token' 
Roman Catholic."" Unlike Ahern, though, Sullivan was not well educated, outspoken 
or critical, all characteristics which Bjelke-Petersen resented in others, Lewis was 
famously obsequious and this may have compensated for his Catholicism, 
Belatedly, Bjelke-Petersen gave Ahern the Primary Industries portfolio, accepting 
Hinze's advice that it would be preferable to have Ahern inside cabinet, bound by the 
doctrine of collective responsibility to display loyalty to his leader,"^ As a minister : 
There was a limit to the number of times Mike Ahem (or anyone else) could stand up 
to Bjelke-Petersen in Cabinet, If ministers senousi) took Bjelke-Petersen on, they faced 
instant dismissal from Cabinet and nobody in the Parliamentary National Party would 
support them.' '•* 
Bjelke-Petersen's domination was thus assured. Backed by his electoral success and 
the party organisation, his management of cabinet ensured that there were no threats to 
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views. Sometimes the extremity ofthe Premier's position concerned Liberal ministers, 
but, until the coalition split in 1983, and as long as the Bjelke-Petersen government 
kept winning elections, the Liberals wrestled with their consciences largely in private 
and very occasionally within cabinet. Only at the end of his premiership did Bjelke-
Petersen fail to dominate cabinet. For example, by late 1987, he was unable to 
convince cabinet to approve Sir Edward Lyons' application to build a hospital at the 
Gold Coast."' 
The Coalition 
During Nicklin's ten years as premier, the coalition had ftinctioned relatively 
harmoniously but, almost from the beginning ofthe Bjelke-Petersen premiership, there 
was a steady deterioration in relations between the partners. Discussions on 
amalgamation of the two parties petered out in acrimony. The underiying cause lay in 
competition between the two parties for seniority, exacerbated by the Nationals' push 
into urban seats. As a general mle. Liberal ministers were prepared to trade off their 
disquiet at some of Bjelke-Petersen's authoritarian stands for seats in cabinet. The 
backbench and the party organisation were less willing to accept both their junior 
status and the Government's hostility towards Liberal ideology and policy. Disputes 
empted around electoral redistributions, three-cornered contests involving sitting 
coalition members, pariiamentary reform, and issues such as street marches and 
govemment appointments,"^ An examination of coalition relations, culminating in 
the 1983 split, demonstrates the generally ineffectual nature of Liberal opposition. 
Of all the Liberal leaders, Chalk appears to have been least intimidated by Bjelke-
Petersen, who, in the early years of the premiership was the less experienced leader. 
Also, they were ofthe same political generation. Chalk had no qualms about airing his 
differences with the Premier publicly and was usually better briefed by his Treasury 
team than Bjelke-Petersen was by his departmental officers Despite this, and desphe 
Chalk's alternative power base in Treasury, as the premiership progressed the balance 
of power tipped increasingly towards Bjelke-Petersen, so that 'Chalk feh himself 
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gradually being engulfed by a malevolent rival sitting two floors above him in the 
Executive Building.'"' By the time Chalk resigned in 1976, Bjelke-Petersen was 
clearly ascendant and no Liberal leader, until Terry White's disastrous 1983 venture, 
was prepared to challenge him on a major issue. 
To Chalk, who had once harboured premiership ambitions, it became increasingly clear 
that he would advance no fijrther. After the 1974 election, he commented: ' It looks 
like we won the race but lost the prize,'"^ The Liberals ended up nine seats behind the 
Nationals, although they won 31.1 per cent of the primary vote compared with the 
Nationals' 27 9 per cent"' and were 'so close in many seats that a few thousand votes 
here and there would have seen Sir Gordon Chalk as premier.''^° Neither at this point, 
nor in 1971, had the Liberals tried to force a more equitable distribution of 
electorates,'"' They were afraid that a number of Liberals would join the Nationals 
rather than vote for the ALP.''^ Thereafter the Liberal parliamentary position 
deteriorated as, in 1977 and 1980, Labor took more Liberal than National seats. From 
1977, the Nationals were also outpolling the Liberals in the popular vote. Bill Hewitt 
feels that Chalk, with no hope ofthe premiership, resigned because ofthe workload he 
was carrying. Bjelke-Petersen excelled in travelling the state meeting people, 'but he 
was never a detail person. He didn't want to read long submissions,,,''" As a result he 
would depart Brisbane by midday Friday, leaving Chalk with the paperwork. Bill Gunn 
experienced the same thing when he was Deputy, He recalls that Bjelke-Petersen 
would leave Brisbane as early as Thursday,'"^ 
Chalk was succeeded as Party leader by Bill Knox who was notably acquiescent and 
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public announcement that he did not care if his own popularity rating declined 
providing there was a commensurate increase in support for the Premier did nothing to 
endear him to his backbench, nor indeed to party supporters polled in 1977, who 
perceived him as a weak leader.'^ ^ Nor did his assertion on assuming the leadership that 
a major target of his term of office would be amalgamation with the Nationals,'^^ Llew 
Edwards supplanted Knox as leader in 1978, in the expectation that he would be more 
successful in standing up to the Nationals. Although Bjelke-Petersen's reaction to 
Knox's replacement was 'chilly and one of veiled displeasure', Edwards failed to live 
up to expectations, scoring only limited successes against the Premier, One federal 
official, quoted by Pat Weller, expressed the opinion that, as far as influencing Bjelke-
Petersen was concerned, Edwards was 'utterly agreeable, [but] could never deliver,'''^ 
Liberal ministers had most to lose from upsetting Bjelke-Petersen because for much of 
the coalition's life they depended upon Bjelke-Petersen for advancement. This was also 
tme of backbenchers, Ofthe Liberal leaders, only Sir Gordon Chalk and Llew Edwards 
had some independent authority to nominate ministers, and, in the case of the latter, 
this may sometimes have been compromised.'"* Bill Knox had to defer to the Premier 
who allegedly vetoed the Liberal leader's nomination of Bill Hewitt (Greenslopes) for 
the ministry '"' Similar allegations were made regarding Edwards' nomination of 
Hewitt in the early months of his leadership.'^° Hewitt, however, accepts Bjelke-
Petersen's denial that he was instmmental in Hewitt's exclusion'^'despite the fact that 
during the 1977 election campaign a letter in support ofthe National Party candidate 
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Noel Cannon is the only candidate who stands b>' the coalition; the only candidate on 
whose wholehearted support the Deputy Premier, Mr Knox and myself, can rely on 
[sic] in the new Parliament '^ ^ 
Bjelke-Petersen had the ultimate responsibility for allocating portfolios, although he 
normally consulted with the Liberal leader. Once in cabinet. Liberal ministers who 
disagreed whh him were handicapped in making their feelings widely known by his 
insistence that the concept of ministerial responsibility be extended to joint party 
meetings. At these gatherings, Don Lane recalls that members would often 'quaver 
under his stare, or vie for his attention.''" The intimidating atmosphere was 
exacerbated by the Ministers' tendency to gravitate towards the Premier and join him 
in facing the backbenchers. Lane also recalls Bjelke-Petersen's skill in reading body 
language and his careftil observation of who was whispering to whom in the party 
room,'^ '* An examination of issues on which there was discord demonstrates Bjelke-
Petersen's management of coalition relations and where the balance of power lay. 
In 1977, the unilateral decision by Bjelke-Petersen to ban the MACOS programme 
from Queensland's education system and fiirther, to send public servants to schools to 
confiscate MACOS material, reportedly had 100 per cent ministerial agreement. Two 
Liberal ministers told journalist Peter Charlton that they had opposed the decision in 
cabinet,'^ ^ That they had been reduced to leaking news of their rebellion suggests 
fmstration at their inability to have any impact on cabinet decision making. Although 
there was reportedly similar disquiet in cabinet ranks about the banning of the SEMP 
programme, the majority were swayed by the submission to cabinet from Rona Joyner, 
whose advocacy had led to the banning of SEMP and MACOS.'^^ Mrs, Joyner was a 
National Party member and friend of Florence Bjelke-Petersen. Bill Knox's public 
response shows why he had Bjelke-Petersen's support. He agreed with the Premier, 
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indicating at a Liberal Party area conference that parliament (cabinet), not the 
Education Department, would make policy decisions.'" 
A more serious rift between the coalition partners developed in 1982 over the 
appointments of Chief Justice and Senior Puisne Judge to replace Sir Charies Wanstall 
and Mr, Justice Lucas respectively. This incident shows clearly some of the 
characteristics which marked the Bjelke-Petersen premiership: his reliance upon advice 
from outside the ministry, inflexibility once his mind was made up, resentment of 
opposition to his position and sense of betrayal if those perceived as loyalists 
disagreed. The incident also demonstrates that although the Liberals achieved a minor 
concession, they were ultimately compelled to bow to Bjelke-Petersen's will and back 
away from their original hard line stand. 
The origins ofthe dispute lay in Liberal Attorney-General Sam Doumaney's belief that, 
on the basis of seniority, convention favoured Mr, Justice James Douglas to replace Sir 
Charles. Bjelke-Petersen, advised by Sir Edward Lyons and Terry Lewis, had decided 
to elevate Mr Justice Dormer Andrews who had already had an unusual promotion 
from the District Court to the Supreme Court There were allegations at the time that 
Don Lane had established that Douglas had cast an absentee vote for Labor in 1972 in 
Lane's electorate of Merthyr, and that this had been a factor against Douglas' 
appointment. Journalist Quentin Dempster suggested that the Premier, who was never 
one to accept opposition, was annoyed with the judiciary for barring him from the 
opening ceremony ofthe new Supreme Court building because he was a litigant before 
the courts.'^* 
Doumany indicated that the future of the coalition hinged on the outcome of these 
judicial appointments. According to Terry White, Bjelke-Petersen lobbied National 
Party ministers to support him.'^ ^ Despite his support for the decision at the time, in 
retirement, Vic Sullivan described the failure to appoint Douglas as 'the most foul 
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decision that the government made'and also recounted the lobbying process, including 
Lyons' and Lewis' involvement: 
. . . Joh said: " Oh Vic . . . you know the three of them are Catholic .,." and I just 
nodded my head, I damned well knew that two of them hadn't been inside a church 
since they left school but old Jim Douglas was a practicing Catholic. , , Walk-
Campbell was a good bloke but he admits he's an atheist and the other fellow. Bob 
Andrews, similarly. But see. Sir Edward Lyons, he sold this idea to Joh and Joh 
listened to him. Matter of fact, he put on a little cocktail party one afternoon and he 
invited Ken Tomkins and myself along to it , , , Sir Terry Lewis was there, and Sir 
Robert, Bob Andrews . . . '"^  
At the Cabinet meeting, using a proven strategy, Bjelke-Petersen asked the ministers 
one by one for a decision. Cabinet divided along party lines. In a compromise, Walter 
Campbell was appointed Chief Justice and, against Liberal opposition, Andrews was 
elevated to Senior Puisne Judge, All Liberal Cabinet ministers indicated, on the 
Executive Council Minute for the appointment of Andrews, that the appointment did 
not have their support, Hewitt says that 'when it came to Bill Knox, Joh was 
disappointed and said, ' "even you. Bill", almost like Christ identifying Judas, "Even 
you. Bill"."" 
Nevertheless the Minute was signed by the Governor, Sir James Ramsey, It was 
mmoured at the time that upon Sir James' retirement in three years' time, Campbell 
would become Governor, and Bjelke-Petersen's choice. Dormer Andrews would then 
become Chief Justice,'"*" Despite outrage amongst the Liberals about this interference 
in judicial independence, and the use of party numbers in Cabinet in breach of the 
coalition agreement, they opted to remain in coalition. 
They also met defeat in the cmcial area of state development where Bjelke-Petersen 
sought to make his mark. Not only was this ideologically important to him, but the 
opportunities for pork barrelling make the provision of infrastmcture a subject of keen 
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interest to politicians of all complexions. In addition, there were claims that favoured 
treatment was given to donors to the Bjelke-Petersen Foundation, With this 
conjunction of circumstances, it comes as no surprise that the Liberals were outvoted 
on a number of strategic infrastmcture decisions. 
One ofthe most significant, in 1978, was the location of Queensland's new power 
station, an exercise which Cribb describes as 'an example ofthe kind of authority that a 
strong-willed premier can exercise over cabinet colleagues, when he chooses to do 
so.""^ After extensive consideration, the State Electricity Commission (SEC) had 
recommended Millmerran on the Dariing Downs, Bjelke-Petersen favoured Tarong, in 
his own electorate The SEC Report advanced a number of reasons for preferring 
Millmerran, including the possibility of eariier development, a rail link to Brisbane, less 
air pollution and a cost advantage of approximately $260 million,'*" In cabinet six 
Liberal ministers supported Mines Minister Ron Camm. The rest of the Nationals 
supported Bjelke-Petersen who, despite continuing controversy, announced that 
cabinet's (i,e, his own) decision was final. 145 
Bjelke-Petersen guided cabinet towards a similariy controversial decision on the Port 
of Brisbane Authority's recommendations regarding stevedoring rights over a new 
container terminal. The Authority recommended Associated Container Transportation 
Australia Ltd. Bjelke-Petersen favoured Brisbane Whai^es and Wool Dumping 
(BWWD) in a consortium with the Australian National Line. An independent 
assessment by a firm of chartered accountants cautioned against giving BWWD a 
monopoly over Brisbane's container operations but the Premier persisted, against a 
background of speculation about donations to the Bjelke-Petersen Foundation, 
A fiirther indication of Bjelke-Petersen's domination lies in the fact that, even on issues 
at the heart of small '1' liberal ideology, he was able to prevail, ensuring that Liberal 
cabinet ministers fell in behind the Nationals, In 1976, a student demonstrator was 
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stmck by a baton wielding policeman. Police Commissioner, Ray Whitrod, ordered an 
investigation but cabinet decided that there would be no inquiry. Announcing the 
decision, Bjelke-Petersen indicated that cabinet felt that if an inquiry were warranted, it 
was into the actions of the demonstrators, not the police. Liberal leader. Bill Knox, 
acquiesced,''*^ Later that year, the Premier announced, without contradiction from the 
Liberals as opposition to uranium mining grew, that: 
The day of the political street march is over. Anybody who holds a street march, 
spontaneous or otherwise, will know they're acting illegally , , , Don't bother applying 
for a march permit. You won't get one. That's Govemment policy novv.'''^  
Bill Hewitt remembers that the legislation for the street march ban resulted from a 
lunch hour meeting of the joint parties. He was absent, but in retrospect believes that it 
was scandalous that the Liberals did not oppose it.'"*** It became very clear that Bjelke-
Petersen was intolerant of opposition, rather than street marches per se, when 
exceptions to the policy were permitted. A planned march by miners at Collinsville 
protesting about unemployment and inflation was allowed, Bjelke-Petersen explained 
this apparent contradiction to Parliament: 
I referred, of course, to marches that would not be tolerated, that is, marches conducted 
by those who engage in violence and have the overthrow of our sort of life as their 
objective . , Obviously their march is aimed at what the Whitlam Govemment did to 
this nation - the high prices and high costs it forced on the nation - and everybody 
supports them in their protests,''*^ 
The National Party's Lin Powell offered a fijrther clarification when he suggested that 
'demonstrations of loyalty' such as the Anzac Day march and Brisbane's Warana 
parade would be given permits. Liberals Don Lane and Charies Porter, who had always 
been closer to Bjelke-Petersen than their own party, were vocal in their defence of 
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government policy so at odds with the spirit of liberalism,'''" Other Liberal ministers 
held their tongues, even when, in 1977, the Traffic Act was amended to remove the 
right of appeal to a magistrate against a refusal by police to issue a permh to march. 
An appeal to the police commissioner was substituted. Although the legislation did not 
change, permits began to be issued in September 1979, In the two year period prior to 
this, 1,972 people had been arrested in Brisbane during police-demonstrator 
confrontations. 
Llew Edwards confronted the realities of the distribution of power in Queensland 
cabinet when he found himself at loggerheads with the Premier on a number of issues. 
He was forced to back down on the question ofthe Iwasaki Resort at Yeppoon on the 
Capricorn Coast, Bjelke-Petersen had responded with enthusiasm to the 
entrepreneurial Iwasaki, whose 'initiative and drive'"'' he welcomed, bmshing aside 
conservationists' concerns about the project, and pushing the relevant legislation 
through parliament in a late night sitting. Throughout the development of the resort 
there were mmours about the real intentions of the company, prompting Edwards to 
ask for an enquiry into the progress ofthe project. His decision was reversed almost 
immediately, presumably in response to pressure from the Premier.'" Bjelke-Petersen 
also succeeded against Edwards' opposition in having Sir Edward Lyons appointed to 
chair the TAB Edwards had put forward Sir Gordon Chalk as his candidate but was 
told in cabinet by Bjelke-Petersen: 'I'm telling you it's my choice; I'm having my way 
on this,''" Edwards and the other Liberal ministers refijsed to sign the cabinet minute 
recommending the appointment of Lyons but they were overridden by the Nationals' 
superior numbers, 
Edwards' few victories over Bjelke-Petersen were not won in cabinet but because he 
had overwhelming outside support, either from the other states or from popular 
opinion. The former was the case when, as Health Minister, he, with Gordon Chalk, 
argued that Queensland should enter the hospital part of the Whitlam government's 
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Medibank scheme and accept the $52 million dollars on offer. Negotiations with the 
federal govemmem were handled skilftilly by Edwards despite the opposhion of 
Bjelke-Petersen. The latter was supported by National Party colleagues and Liberals 
Charies Porter and Dr Crawford, When other non-Labor states joined, Bjelke-Petersen 
and his supporters were isolated. The Premier signed the Medibank agreemem in 
August 1975. 
Edwards' other notable successes occurred when, as Health Minister, and with the 
support ofthe AMA, he refijsed to support Bjelke-Petersen when the laUer wanted to 
assist convicted cancer therapist Milan Brych in setting up a clinic, and when, as 
Treasurer, would not guarantee a loan for Paraguayan businessman, Shrian Oskar.""* In 
these instances the Premier had the tacit support of colleagues and the public, most of 
whom tolerated such lapses of judgment or regarded them as harmless eccentricities of 
relatively small importance. On major issues of consequence to Bjelke-Petersen, the 
Liberals were invariably defeated in cabinet. Members of the Party organisation, and 
the Liberal backbench, with less to lose, were always more restive than their cabinet 
colleagues but they proved more of an irritation to the Premier, than a substantial 
threat to his power. 
There were differences between Liberals and Nationals in organisational culture. The 
Liberals were more inclined to act as 'private members', who criticised Liberal 
ministers, whereas the Nationals were much more disciplined.'" Allen Callaghan 
compares the Nationals with Labor in that they would brawl in private but present a 
united front to the public. The Liberals, on the other hand, were 'like a bloody knife 
throwers' convention ..they could never agree amongst themselves half the time and 
leaked like a sieve ,,."^' As early as 1964 a 'Ginger Group' of Liberals led by John 
Murray (Clayfield) had criticised government policy and style and, in 1965, the Liberal 
Party State Convention supported a motion in favour ofthe principle of three-cornered 
contests, despite the existence of an agreement that neither coalition partner would 
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stand candidates against each other's sitting members. John Ahern, the National Party 
President of the time, showing that Queensland nationalism predated Bjelke-Petersen, 
castigated everyone on the Liberal Party executive as 'something less than a 
Queenslander '"^ 
Once Bjelke-Petersen's leadership style and policy direction became apparent, it was 
inevitable that sniping between the parties would increase in frequency and intensity. 
The gulf between government policy and liberal ideology was too great for some on 
the Liberal backbench, and their party organisation, to bear. In addition, the party 
organisation, with the long term interests ofthe party in mind, continued to favour the 
selective use of three cornered contests, despite the inevitable impact on coalition 
harmony, and their general lack of success in taking seats from the Nationals, In 1972, 
the Liberals stood candidates against sitting Country Party members in South Coast 
(Hinze), Redcliffe (Houghton) and Landsborough (Ahern), in addition to contesting 
seven vacant seats and eight held by the ALP, Of these, they won only Townsville 
Desphe this failure, the Liberal Party organisation continued its push to gain coalition 
seniority. From 1972, each election saw an increase in the number of three cornered 
contests, with the Nationals retaliating in earnest from 1976:'^ ^ 
. . . by embarking on three cornered contests, each coalition party is simultaneously 
waging offensive and defensive campaigns, as each seeks to expand into the other's 
temtory, while trying to preserve its own base from depredation 
Justification for these competitive manoeuvres was provided by the suggestion that 
such efforts increased the coalition vote,'^° The decision to embark on three cornered 
contests was one for the party organisation and was embraced whh enthusiasm by it 
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McComb called the Premier 'an affront to democracy','^' argued that 'we should not 
allow ourselves to be painted as unthinking acolytes ofthe Premier','" and pressed for 
more three-cornered contests and a separate senate ticket, thus provoking Sir Robert 
Sparkes to describe the Liberal strategy as 'a declaration of civil war'.'^^ After 1977, 
there was bound to be an increase in three cornered contests because ofthe creation of 
new seats which were unclaimed by any party.'^ The end result of such internecine 
warfare was a 'stand-off combined with inter party bitterness,'^^ Desphe this, the 
Liberal Party organisation and fmstrated backbenchers continued to challenge the 
Nationals' organisational and political supremacy, until their misreading ofthe situation 
culminated, in 1983, in the disintegration ofthe coalition. 
Throughout the seventies and eighties, Party officials and backbenchers periodically 
raised concerns about the direction of government policy. They made little impact on 
their ministerial colleagues and provoked a hostile reaction from Bjelke-Petersen. Party 
Secretary John Leggoe, in 1977, flagged the danger to democratic values represented 
by 'a pohce state atmosphere' and stated that 'no Liberal should be reluctant to press 
for a change in the oppressive street march law.'"^ Bjelke-Petersen stmck back 
claiming that the Liberals were 'anti-coalhion', 'anti-Job Bjelke-Petersen as Premier', 
and, in vintage style, accused 'some sections ofthe Liberal party of trying to ride on 
the National party's coat tails while trying to cut our throats','^^ The 1978 Liberal 
Party convention passed resolutions rejecting the National's street march policy and 
calling for pariiamentary reform Backbencher Bmce Bishop (Surfers Paradise) urged a 
change in the street march legislation, but his cabinet colleagues, bound by cabinet 
solidarity and threats by Bjelke-Petersen to make street marches a campaign issue, 









Quoted in editorial. The Australian. 15 March, 1979, p. 6. 
Quoted M, B. Cnbb, 'Chronicles', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 24, no. 3, 
1978, p. 377. 
M. B. Cnbb. 'Chronicles', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 23. no. 3, 1977, 
p, 431, 
Hamill and Reynolds, op cit. p 14. 
C. A. Hughes quoted in Hamill and Reynolds, op. cit, p. 20. 
Quoted in Brennan. op. cit. p. 161. 
Quoted in M. B, Cnbb, 'Chronicles' Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 24, no. 1, 
1978, p.93. 
Brennan, op, cit,, pp, 163, 169, 
224 
Aboriginal and Island Affairs, who continued his public defence of Government 
policy.''' 
There was fijrther backbench rebellion over the 1979 late night destmction of the 
Bellevue hotel, when 13 Liberal backbenchers supported a Labor motion condemning 
this action. This was cleariy a decision Bjelke-Petersen had made on his own. The 
Deputy Premier, Llew Edwards announced that he had not been informed of the 
proposed destmction.'™ Bjelke-Petersen ignored the fijrore and congratulated the 
contractors, the Deen Brothers, 'on a job well done ''^' The regard was obviously 
mutual and long-lived, for the brothers sent the former Premier a bouquet when he was 
confined to hosphal with a blood infection in eariy 1998.'^' 
In 1982, Liberal backbenchers disagreed with the Government's approach to tenancy 
conditions at shopping centres. In the same year, the Liberal Party executive and some 
of the backbench were critical of the Premier and the cabinet for agreeing to pay his 
costs in the defamation action taken against him by the president of the Fraser Island 
Defence Organisation, John Sinclair. Three Liberal backbenchers voted with the 
Opposhion on the issue of sand mining on Moreton Island.'" Throughout this period, 
successive conventions passed resolutions on electoral redistribution, parliamentary 
reform, a separate Senate ticket, street march laws, reducing National Party power in 
cabinet, asserting liberal values and establishing a public accounts committee.'^" While 
few made any real difference to government policy, the last was the straw which finally 
broke the coalition's back. 
The issue was symptomatic of a deep divide between some members of the Liberal 
Party and the government, and also between factions within the Liberal Party, On one 
side ofthe divide within the party was a group known variously as 'the trendies', the 
'Ginger Group' or the 'small "1" Liberals', Among the members of this informal 
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grouping were Angus Innes (Sherwood), who, in 1982, had challenged Edwards for 
the leadership but bad been defeated, John Greenwood (Ashgrove) who had been 
dropped from cabinet in 1980 after Edwards became leader, Guelf Scassola ( Mt. 
Gravatt), Ian Prentice (Toowong), Terry Gygar (Stafford), Rosemary Kyburz 
(Salisbury), Rob Akers (Pine Rivers), Bill Hewitt (Greenslopes), promoted to cabinet 
by Edwards in 1980, and Terry Whhe (Redcliffe) who had been elected at the 1979 
Redcliffe by-election on a platform which sought eventual Liberal Party seniority in the 
coalition in order to ensure 'responsible democratic government.''" To National Party 
stalwarts, like Alan Metcalfe, the Ginger Group's priorities were awry: 
Parliamentary reform is hardh' one of the raging issues that anse in public opinion 
polls in Queensland. As far as the average voter is concemed, as long as he has a job 
and food on his table and prospects for the future he has the confidence that his 
govemment is doing its job.'^ ^ 
Liberal leader Llew Edwards concurred with this pragmatic analysis when he observed 
that 'Ninety-nine per cent of the people wouldn't even understand what a public 
accounts committee is, let alone the people of Queensland .,. ' '" In retrospect. Bill 
Hewitt feels the Liberals should have spHt the coalition on the issue ofthe appointment 
of the Chief Justice, because on the matter of a public accounts committee, 'who 
understood what you were talking about?''^ "^ Edwards, who urged Liberals to become 
'good coalitionists','^' had earlier warned the Party against 'the propagation of trendy 
policies under the banner of small "1" liberalism - basic, stupid policies with little or no 
electoral appeal to the average Australian' '*" Later events were to suggest that this 
reading of Queensland's political culture was correct, but years of fmstration impelled 
the ginger group to act For a long time, backbenchers and members of the Liberal 
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Government's excesses. In many instances, this was combined with a state of denial 
regarding the realities of their junior status in Queensland. Finally, on the part of Terry 
Whhe and his supporters, there was a misreading of Bjelke-Petersen's character which 
was inevitably hostile to any challenge to his supremacy. Bjelke-Petersen, however, 
demonstrated a consummate understanding of both the political landscape and the 
psychology ofthe majority of his Liberal cabinet colleagues. 
In March, 1983, the Liberals had a small measure of success in achieving the first 
major revision of pariiamentary procedures in 30 years when amendments were passed 
by pariiament to permit, among other things, the Standing Orders Committee to report 
to parliament on proposals for the establishment of a public accounts committee and 
other committees of review and accountability,"*' Following on this, when parliament 
resumed on 4th August, Ian Prentice moved to bring forward debate on the possible 
establishment of a public accounts committee. If the Speaker, Selwyn Muller, had 
better understood standing orders, the division could have been avoided but Terry 
Whhe, then Minister for Welfare Services, and the other members ofthe Ginger Group 
crossed the floor to vote for the motion whh the ALP"*" Bill Hewitt absented himself 
Whhe argued that the principle of cabinet solidarity did not apply because there was no 
Government policy on the issue but Llew Edwards interpreted events differently and 
dismissed White immediately with the Premier's vocal support. In a tumultuous 
sequence of events. White replaced Llew Edwards as Liberal leader only to find that 
Bjelke-Petersen still would not permh him to return to cabinet. Bjelke-Petersen had 
already signalled what his approach would be when, in 1982, he had indicated that he 
would prefer to form a minority government rather than work with Angus Innes in the 
event of a victory over Edwards Despite this warning, Bjelke-Petersen's attitude came 
as a blow to the Liberals who had expected the Premier to relent rather than take the 
risk of sacrificing the coalition,'" Such an expectation demonstrates a misreading of 
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authority was threatened, Bjelke-Petersen showed no such miscalculation in his 
dealings with the remaining Liberal ministers. 
At the behest of their Party organisation, the Liberal ministers reluctantly tendered 
their resignations but Bjelke-Petersen suggested to six of them (Bill Hewitt did not 
meet whh him) that he would recommend to the Governor not to accept their 
resignations. The ministers were relieved but their reprieve was shortlived. All were 
compelled by the terms ofthe Liberal Party constitution and by the insistence of White 
and the Party organisation, now headed by John Herron, once more to tender their 
resignations. This time Bjelke-Petersen accepted their move and replaced them with 
National Party ministers until the October election. 
Just prior to the Liberal leadership ballot, Bjelke-Petersen, in a move which 
demonstrated his political savvy, had, with the assistance of the Speaker, indefinitely 
adjourned state parliament. As the Speaker, Selwyn Muller, took the chair, both 
Bjelke-Petersen and Keith Wright, the Oppostion leader, jumped to their feet, with 
Wright indicating a privilege motion, Muller ignored him - thereby ignoring the 
convention that matters of privilege take precedence - and called on the Premier to 
speak,'*"* The Premier moved that the House do now adjourn. The Liberals, who 
welcomed this hiatus in which to regroup, voted with the Nationals, without fiilly 
recognising the implications. The new National Party minority government was thus 
able to govern in the nine week lead-up to the election without the handicap of 
pariiamentary scmtiny and with all the advantages of incumbency.'*^ 
Those who suggested that the need for a public accounts committee was not a burning 
issue were proven right by the campaign. Alan Metcalfe records that: 
184 
185 
Miller and Koch, op, cit,, p, 16. 
P. Coaldrake, 'Chronicles'. Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol, 30, no, 2, 1984, 
pp. 259-260 
228 
the issues of public accountability and electoral refonn that promised so much fire and 
brimstone in the early days ofthe crisis were lost in the race when the campaign proper 
settled down,,, '*^  
Bjelke-Petersen, with a rationale more revealing of his own pragmatic bent than the 
Liberals' motivation, dismissed the need for a public accounts committee by claiming 
that advocates were primarily interested in the hundred dollars a day they would get 
for attending committee meetings,'" The Nationals' campaign reverted to traditional 
themes, suggesting that 'Now, more than ever, Queensland needs Joh and the 
Nationals' and featuring a map of Australia with Queensland in green and the rest of 
Australia in red,'** The cause ofthe family featured, and, in deference to the voters' 
utilitarian instincts, Bjelke-Petersen, as the Treasurer in waiting, released details of 
anticipated budget 'goodies' throughout the campaign.'*'' The Nationals outpolled the 
Liberals in 15 of the 18 seats they both contested, with the Nationals eventually 
winning 43 seats, the ALP 32, the Liberal Party 8 and 1 Independent, Although the 
Liberals had been decimated, their preferences delivered government to the Nationals. 
Ofthe 'Ginger Group' only Innes and White retained their seats. 
After the election, former Liberal ministers Don Lane and Brian Austin defected to the 
Nationals. Despite his ideological compatibility with the Nationals, Lane occasionally 
found decision making in an all-National cabinet disturbing. The Liberals, generally 
speaking, had been competent ministers, especially in the Treasury portfolio and in 
command of potentially troublesome portfolios like Aboriginal Affairs, Labour 
Relations and Health. With these in the charge of National ministers, fiill responsibility 
for decision making had to be assumed by the Nationals, many of whom were more 
comfortable with mral oriented portfolios. According to Lane, the National Cabinet 
was so preoccupied with mral issues to the detriment of the city, that it could debate 
issues pertaining to the dingo fence for half an hour, but take only thirty seconds to 
approve Brisbane's seven-year town plan.'^ The quality of decision making was also 
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'" ibid, p 137, 
'^ ' ibid,, p. 194 
ibid., p. 227. 
Lane, op. cit, p, 65. 
229 
affected by the reduction in expert advice provided to ministers. After the Liberals left 
the ministry, Bjelke-Petersen, fearfijl of leaks, decreed that senior public servants, with 
the exception of the Co-ordinator-General, the Under Treasurer, and the chair of the 
Public Service Board, were not to have access to cabinet bags. This concentrated the 
premier's authority but ministers were deprived of their traditional sources of advice.'" 
If Lane is to be believed, many of them were needfijl of assistance: 'They were too 
dense to know, half of them were dills who couldn't conduct a bus to the Valley.'"''" 
Vic Sullivan agreed, saying 'that four years from '83 to '87 was the worst government 
that Queensland's ever had.''^^ 
If Lane had reservations, Bjelke-Petersen was comfortable in this environment in which 
virtually all opposition had been removed."'' Although the Liberals had done little to 
contain his power, they had, on occasion, forced him to respond to their arguments. 
Most of the pressure, however, had come from the party organisation and the 
backbench, rather than the ministers who valued their cabinet membership. While this 
Liberal opposition bad been occasionally annoying to Bjelke-Petersen, and possibly 
gratifying to some Liberal supporters, it was ultimately fijtile in having an impact on 
Bjelke-Petersen's leadership style. After 1983, with treasury as well as the premiership 
in his grasp, Bjelke-Petersen reached the pinnacle of his authority. If neither cabinet 
nor coalition could contain him, it was unlikely that a pariiament, dominated by the 
executive, would represent a serious impediment to his exercise of power. 
Parliament 
As a means of securing government accountability, the Queensland pariiament was, 
during the Bjelke-Petersen era, a failure. Its relative impotence was well established 
before Bjelke-Petersen became premier, but under bis government the process was 
accelerated by a combination of ignorance and design Bjelke-Petersen showed lirtle 
knowledge of pariiamentary procedures, was known to have voted with the wrong side 
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in divisions and left the chamber as soon as he could after question time.'''^ There is 
little doubt that Bjelke-Petersen, as a backbencher during Labor's regime, had 
observed the processes which denied the opposition a legitimate role. This well 
entrenched characteristic of the state's pohtical culture was enhanced by Bjelke-
Petersen's populism, whereby due process was perceived as an impediment to the 
people's will Bjelke-Petersen's comment, quoted in the previous chapter, that he 
preferred to get things done and worry about the mles later, gives the flavour of this 
mindset. An additional factor, Coaldrake suggests, was Bjelke-Petersen's perception 
that he was accountable to a higher authority than state pariiament, namely God, the 
Bible and his own morality"^ 
The most cursory examination of its procedures shows that parliament was unable to 
provide effective scmtiny ofthe Bjelke-Petersen government. Although the parliament 
during his era averaged greater numbers of sitting days than its other state 
counterparts, there were long recesses. For example, almost six months elapsed 
between the 41st pariiament in 1977 and the 42nd in 1978. There was an eight month 
break between the 39th parliament in 1971 and the 40th in 1972. In 1983, the 
parliament sat for 29 days, and, in the same year, only for 15 days in the ten months to 
October, During these long stretches ministers were accountable only to their party 
colleagues.'^ ^ Even more damaging to the principle of accountability was the practice, 
started by Labor, of not sitting for some months prior to elections, thereby avoiding 
opposhion and media scmtiny As an example, prior to the October 1986 election, 
pariiament did not sit beyond 12 days, in Febmary and March. 
During the eariy years of Bjelke-Petersen's premiership, there was no systematisation 
of pariiamentary proceedings, Reynolds suggests that this was because parliament was 
accorded neither high priority by government nor a meaningful role in the legislative 
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business was not prioritised The arrangements were left to Bjelke-Petersen and Chalk 
who frequently squabbled over the order of business.'^ '^  Important legislation was often 
left till the small hours of the morning when most of the media representatives had 
gone home or sat exhausted in the Strangers' Bar. 
Local variations on traditional parliamentary practice fijrther impaired accountabilhy. 
For example, the Australian custom of a partisan Speaker was pushed to the limits in 
Queensland where the post was described 'as one ofthe plums of office, to be handed 
to a faithfijl party supporter,^ °*^ Queensland speakers have persistently eroded the 
opposition's parliamentary role by actions ranging from the censoring of Questions 
Without Notice to excessive naming of opposition members.'^ °' For example, from 
1957-1977, ofthe 30 members 'named', 29 were Opposition members."°' In Bjelke-
Petersen's era, the most celebrated example of partiality was Selwyn Muller, who 
announced that it was the Speaker's duty to apply the wishes ofthe government,'"^ but 
some of his predecessors had also strayed as far from the Westminster tradition. 
During its long years in office. Labor argued that impartiality disenfranchised the 
Speaker's constituents,'*^ an argument resurrected by Speaker David Nicholson, a 
member ofthe deputation which urged Bjelke-Petersen to resign as premier in 1970. 
At the time, Nicholson distinguished between his role as Speaker and his role as 
constituency representative.'"^ 
Bjelke-Petersen unblushingly supported the idea of a partisan Speaker under his direct 
control. On occasions when the incumbent erred, the premier's 'openly-displayed 
hostility' brought about an altered mling,'"* In 1978, he took the opportunity ofthe 
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Jim Houghton, the Speaker, had approved the longstanding, but unethical practice of 
pariiamentarians' conversion of domestic travel vouchers to international tickets. An 
investigation by the Auditor-General revealed misuse of funds, prompting Bjelke-
Petersen, supported by Sparkes, to demand that all concerned pay back the money and 
to wam that he would legislate to prevent this happening again. In due course, 
amendments to the Audit Act transferred responsibility for parliamentary 
appropriations from the Speaker to the Premier's Department."'^ * Other pariiamentary 
staff were responsible to the executive, not the pariiament."'^ On his retirement in 
1980, Houghton described pariiament as a 'cess-ph.'"'" Bjelke-Petersen's stocks in the 
community rose as a result of what was widely perceived as a principled stand against 
abuse of parliamentary position. The transfer of power to the executive went largely 
unnoticed. 
Other practices fiirther curtailed parliamentary scmtiny ofthe government. Until 1979 
most debate on bills at the First Reading stage occurred before they had been printed. 
This meant that the opposition had no chance to read the bill before debating it. Inured 
as they were to the system, opposition members did not press for change. Possibly, 
they felt that the system offered them some advantage because, without a printed bill, 
the speaker could not order MPs to speak to it, thereby creating an opportunity for 
grievance style debate over a minister's portfolio. It is also possible that the 1979 
change, dispensing with debate at the first reading stage, may have been introduced to 
protect one or two poorly performing National Party ministers rather than out of 
concern for the parliamentary institution."" 
Such changes when they came, did little in practice to improve pariiamentary scmtiny. 
For example, although Questions Without Notice were allowed after 1970, ministers 
often insisted that they be placed on Notice before being answered, A fiirther 
impediment to any Opposition member desirous of a response from the government 
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possible for a minister to make accusations against Opposition members who had no 
formal right of reply. The Opposition also complained of ministers' absence at 
Question Time and the lack of provision in the pariiamentary schedule for debate on 
matters of current interest and concern,"'" 
Permanent policy or investigative pariiamentary committees did not exist and such 
committees as there were, were pooriy resourced and staffed, Bjelke-Petersen 
regarded all-party committees with suspicion, declaring that 'we have the responsibility 
as an elected Government of mnning the state'."'^ Given that he had largely avoided 
being accountable to cabinet and to his coalition partner, he had no desire to be the 
subject of scmtiny by a pariiamentary committee. Although he sent Ahem and Hewitt 
on a trip to study parliamentary committee systems in other states, he refused to 
countenance the pair's recommendations that a Public Works Committee and a Public 
Accounts Committee be established, whilst accepting a Subordinate Legislation 
Committee and a Pariiamentary Privileges Committee.'"' Of the five committee 
members. Labor was allowed only one. Government backbenchers who had objected 
to the speed with which Bjelke-Petersen often pushed legislation through pariiament, 
urged the establishment of these committees, which, because they were composed of 
backbenchers, did provide a smah measure of accountability,"'^ For example, in 1982, 
the Parliamentary Privileges Committee criticised the government for changing 
important legislation without reference to Pariiament and reported that 50 Acts had 
been altered by either proclamation or order-in-council,"'^ 
Bjelke-Petersen's atthude towards committees had been shared by previous 
governments and such committees as there were, namely Library, Parliamentary 
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Buildings, Printing, Refreshment Rooms and Standing Orders, rarely met,"'^  For 
example, the Standing Orders Committee, which was responsible for parliamentary 
procedures, did not meet at all between 1950 and 1980,''^ This meant that such 
modifications to parliamentary procedures as occurred during this period were never 
referred to, let alone considered by, the Committee, Other necessary modifications, 
such as increasing the number of members constituting a quomm in hne with increases 
in the parliament's size, were never made,^'' 
Select Committees, although they had been used in the Queensland pariiament prior to 
the development ofthe party system, were abandoned under Labor, being replaced by 
departmental inquiries or Royal Commissions, both of which reported to the executive, 
rather than to the legislature, Queensland was the only Westminster parliament with no 
Public Accounts Committee, fostering 'an environment in which virtually no thought 
was given to the principle of ministers, parliamentarians or officials differentiating 
public duty from private interest'."'^ The lack of proper scmtiny extended to 
govemment departments. There were no committees to deal with estimates of 
expenditure, while cabinet decreed only one third to one half of all ministries would 
have their estimates annually scmtinised by parliament. While, in theory, the 
departmental estimates were to be rotated over time, some, like Treasury, avoided 
having estimates discussed at all, while the Premier's portfolio was not dealt with after 
197922] 
At an informal level, pariiament changed during the Bjelke-Petersen era to an 
institution reflective of his leadership style. He was prone to see issues in terms of right 
and wrong and to give no quarter to those he perceived to be wrong. Prior to Bjelke-
Petersen, there had been a 'great sense of camaraderie'""" and friendships crossed 
pariiamentary lines For example, Charies Russell (Dalby) 'recalls his affection for Jack 
Duggan, Minister for Railways and later Leader ofthe Opposition after Labor's defeat 
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in 1957.'-'^ Chalk and Duggan and their respective wives were also friendly."'"' After 
pariiament adjourned, the gregarious Chalk would sometimes buy a beer for his 
opponents.^'^ With Bjelke-Petersen ascendant, the camaraderie of parliament 
evaporated,"*' Because of the paucity of committees, there was little opportunity for 
friendships made in that context to flourish, as they did in the PCJC during the first 
Goss government. Bill Gunn recalls friendships with Peter Beattie and Margaret 
Woodgate which extended to drinks in the evening."^ National Party parliamentarians 
were forbidden, by the Premier, from drinking or dining with members of the 
opposition. Some of the more gregarious, or independent. Nationals ignored the ban. 
Bill Gunn says that he often went and sat with Labor members, and Allen Callaghan 
was friendly with Labor counterparts Greg Chamberlin and Jack Stanaway,""* In itself, 
such segregation may not have mattered. The British Parliament functioned in much 
the same manner although it was eight times larger. In Queensland, however, what 
happened in the dining room was translated to the parliament. There was little chance 
that the Opposition, denied legitimacy, adequate staffing levels and resources, could 
enforce accountability. 
The Opposition 
Liberal Ginger Grouper, John Murray, claimed that 'no parliament in Australia set out 
more deliberately to prevent the opposition doing its job','"^ Oppositions rely, to a 
great extent, on pariiamentary mechanisms to keep them informed, but pariiament in 
Queensland was woefiilly inadequate Bjelke-Petersen refiised to accord the 
Opposhion, nor indeed the government backbench, any recognition.^^° Labor had not 
been generous to his party when it was in opposition and he reciprocated. His 
philosophy was to ignore the opposhion: '.,. Don't promote the other fellow .,,1 never 
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mention them the better. Concentrate on yourself'^' The taint of socialism, it seemed, 
put Labor beyond the pale, so that he never saw them as a potential alternative 
govemment. They remained, rather tautologically, 'Her Majesty's defeated 
opposition'."" In his retirement, after experiencing the Fitzgerald Inquiry and his own 
trial for perjury in 1991, he told a journaHst that he 'used to think the Labor party were 
the lowest form of human activity . . .'"^ ^ At this point, they rose one notch in his 
estimation, to be replaced at the bottom by the legal profession. 
The Leader ofthe Opposition was provided with a private secretary, a press secretary, 
three clerk-typists and a chauffeur/general assistant. The Deputy Leader had a research 
assistant. For many years, opposition offices were a kilometre and a half away from 
Parliament House. The 1979 decision, to upgrade opposition facilities, was taken in 
Bjelke-Petersen's absence by the acting Premier, Llew Edwards, and the parliamentary 
chairman of committees. On his return Bjelke-Petersen was reportedly angered by this 
concession.'^ '* It did not, however, amount to a great deal. The Opposhion leader's 
space in the parliamentary annexe was the same as a backbencher's, a room four 
metres by three metres, with a desk, three chairs and a wash basin,'^ ^ There was no 
access to the government plane. Tom Burns asked, in 1974, if be could join the 
Premier on a visit to bushfire ravaged regions in the south west corner of Queensland, 
but was refiised."'" Opposition leaders were fiinded for travel on scheduled airline 
services, a considerable handicap during election campaigns. On election eve. Labor 
was allocated the smallest room in the tally room,"" Bjelke-Petersen's strategy of 
denying the Opposition legitimacy was all-encompassing. For example, neither Labor 
nor Liberal MPs were present on the dais at the opening of the new pariiamentary 
annexe"* and the Queensland delegation to the 1983 constitutional convention in 
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This was contrary to the tradition of sending equal numbers from the major political 
parties."^' In no other state was the opposhion treated so parsimoniously, 
A strong opposition may have surmounted these problems, but the ALP in Queensland 
stmggled for many years to overcome the impact ofthe 1957 split and the subsequent 
loss of office. From this point h slid downhill, after a brief revival in 1972, to the nadir 
of 1974 when it was reduced to 11 seats, its losses including the Townsville West seat 
of Perc Tucker, then party leader, Dennis Murphy blamed Labor's demise on its too 
ready acceptance of the myth of Queensland difference, which, he argued, prevented 
Labor Party leaders from properly examining their own organisational stmcture and 
practices.""^ Murphy's analysis is too charitable. Throughout the Bjelke-Petersen era, 
the ALP was riven by factional hatreds, exposed to federal intervention, almost 
bankmpt and, until Wayne Goss, could not find a leader who captured the public 
imagination as did Bjelke-Petersen. Opposition was largely left, by default, to the 
churches, civil libertarians, unionists, and other concerned groups and individuals, all 
of whom made easy targets for the government, lacking as they did, the umbrella of an 
effective parliamentary opposition, and, it might be added, widespread public 
support.'"' 
Desphe his loathing of the ALP and its supposed socialism, Bjelke-Petersen was not 
averse to doing deals with his opponents. When it suited his purposes, pragmatism 
overrode principle Reynolds produces evidence that in 1980 Bjelke-Petersen 
concluded a secret electoral pact with Labor to disadvantage the Liberals.""*' Seven 
years later, he turned to Labor again, in a last ditch effort to preserve his premiership. 
On this occasion Sir Edward Lyons acted as a go between, setting up a meeting 
between Bjelke-Petersen and Peter Beattie, then State Secretary ofthe ALP,""^ 
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Denied legitimacy, the Labor Party stmggled to hold Bjelke-Petersen to account. As 
was the case with the Liberal backbenchers when in coalition, any blows Labor stmck 
were easily deflected. The federal government, outside Bjelke-Petersen's control, was 
much harder to contend whh, but it, too, learnt to tread cautiously in dealing whh 
Queensland, 
The constraints of federalism 
Just as a prime minister must accommodate to the constitutional rights and political 
realhies of a federal system, so must a premier, however much s/he might like to act as 
the head of an autonomous state. This was always difficuh for Bjelke-Petersen, who 
required ideological and personal autonomy. Given this, it was inevitable that he would 
clash with Gough Whitlam, and in a less celebrated way, with Malcolm Fraser. With 
the Labor Prime Minister, there were two reasons for his antipathy: opposition to 
socialism and hostility towards someone who would constrain him. Bjelke-Petersen 
likened Whitlam to a 'feudal lord','"" an analogy which suggests that Bjelke-Petersen 
occasionally felt like a vassal. It was inevitable that such a feeling would provoke 
hostility. 
All state premiers were wary of Wbitlam's 'centralism' and resentful of his 
governments use of'tied' grants, but Bjelke-Petersen's stance of permanent opposition 
was extreme. So persistent were his attacks that 'Queenslandism', defined by Margaret 
Cribb as 'the continuous opposition of the premier to almost every domestic and 
international policy of the federal Labor Government',"^'' became the leitmotif of this 
period. In announcing the 1974 state election, he said that it would be fought on 'the 
alien and stagnating, centralist, socialist, communist-inspired policies of the federal 
Labor Government'.'"*^ As Treasurer, Gordon Chalk was willing to deal with the 
federal government and accept what benefits he could. Similariy, Eric Robinson, State 
President of the Liberal Party, called on Bjelke-Petersen to moderate his antipathy 
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towards Labor.'"'^  Bjelke-Petersen however, was unmoved and remained determined to 
thwart Wbitlam's reform agenda despite the Labor Government's generous handing of 
projects like the Ross River Dam, the Julius Dam, beef cattle roads, irrigation, public 
hospitals and Aboriginal housing health and education."^* 
During the Whitlam era, the Premier fijelled the Bjelke-Petersen mythology whh a 
series of unexpected manoeuvres which appeared to trounce Whitlam and reinforce the 
Premier's reputation for political cunning. In his attacks, Bjelke-Petersen appealed to 
the notion of Queensland difference and tapped into the rich vein of anti-intellectualism 
present in his state. Of most significance were the 1974 'Gair affair'""*^ and Bjelke-
Petersen's 1975 proposal that Albert Patrick Field replace the late Labor Senator Bert 
Millner,"^° thus giving the opposition the majority it needed to defer consideration of 
Labor's budget. Both incidents involved a disregard for political convention and 
probity, but also created the impression in Queensland that Whitlam had been 
outsmarted by Bjelke-Petersen and his advisers."''' His success in damaging the Labor 
government undoubtedly added to his confidence and belief in the righteousness of his 
cause, a view reinforced by Labor's loss of government in 1975. 
Malcolm Fraser, whose 'new federalism' initially had been enthusiastically endorsed by 
Bjelke-Petersen, fared little better While the two were theoretically on the same 
ideological side, Fraser was a strong man who threatened Bjelke-Petersen's autonomy. 
He also eschewed populist politics. As one official told Patrick Weller: 'Fraser saw 
himself playing by the mles, whereas Joh and Court never played by the mles,' '" In 
addhion, under Fraser and Whitlam, many federal programmes, especially in the social 
welfare area, were innovative, Queensland public servants, used to a paternalistic 
model, were unable to fully use fijnds for programmes which were unfamiliar to 
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presumably giving him the autonomy he craved and leaving him free from interference 
from Canberra."'"^ 
Despite the difficulties, Fraser tried to please Bjelke-Petersen in order to obtain 
agreement, only to find that the Queensland Premier would renege In another context. 
Ahem remarked that Bjelke-Petersen 'never honoured any deal.'"'- In these situations 
he relied on Peter Nixon, Hinze or Sparkes to be intermediaries in what would 
invariably be protracted negotiations, such as the issue ofthe border between Australia 
and Papua New Guinea and the Queensland Government's 1978 decision to remove 
the Aumkun and Mornington Island settlements from the Uniting Church, to place 
them under the control ofthe state government."^^ There were fijrther Commonwealth 
- state clashes over the issue of the boundary of the Great Barrier Reef marine park 
and the sand mining of Fraser Island Despite the mediation of Sparkes and Edwards 
over the Great Barrier Reef Bjelke-Petersen refijsed to compromise, declaring a 
'political war' against Fraser."'" Fraser, on the other hand, was prepared to 
compromise, and the federal government often backed away from overriding its state 
counterpart. 
Bob Hawke, like Fraser, had no desire to repeat Wbitlam's experiences in dealing with 
Bjelke-Petersen. When the Hawke Labor Government was elected, Bjelke-Petersen 
once again portrayed himself as a defender of states' rights against the depredations of 
a 'socialist' government in Canberra. Hawke's union background undoubtedly gave a 
fillip to Bjelke-Petersen's antipathy. Hawke, however, was a consensus polhician and 
something of a populist himself so that the edge of Bjelke-Petersen's antagonism was 
blunted. His opposition to Hawke never achieved the cause celebre status of his 






See Lunn, op. cit, p. 257. 
Reynolds, pers. comm., August, 1998. 
M. B. Cribb, 'Chronicles' Australian Jornal of Politics and History, vol. 22, no. 3, 1976, p. 412. 
M. B. Cribb, 'Chronicles' Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol, 28, no. 1, 1982, p,99. 
24 i 
Bjelke-Petersen could not ignore the constraints of federalism, nor override prime 
ministers as be did opponents within state boundaries. He could, however, marshall 
support within Queensland in opposition to interventionist socialist or southern forces. 
In the case of Whitlam, he stmck some damaging blows to a government already 
weakened by internal disarray and operating in a hostile economic and political climate. 
Prime Ministers Fraser and Hawke were wary in their dealings with him, not wanting 
to arouse the state's rights fervour, never far from the surface in Queensland. 
Eventually hubris drove Bjelke-Petersen to seek the place in federal politics held by 
Whhlam, Fraser and Hawke. As the previous chapter indicated, this was an impossible 
dream which preciphated the collapse of his premiership He had made the long 
transhion from diffident beginner to a state premier who, eventually, faced no 
meaningful opposition. Cabinet was compliant, parliament ineffective, potential rivals 
powerless, government policy reflective of his wishes A steady stream of accusations 
of conflict of interest, impropriety and breaches of civil liberties failed to prevent his 
re-election on seven occasions. At each election, a skilful campaign would point to 
Queensland's booming economy and the Premier's commitment to state development. 
All other considerations were either subordinated to these themes, or skilfully managed 
by the National Party to prevent them impinging on the main electoral game. Thus did 
Queensland elections from 1969 to 1986 routinely confirm Bjelke-Petersen and his 
govemment in power, rather than posing serious threats to his hegemony. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, POLITICS AND PEOPLE 
At hs heart, Queensland politics was 'the politics of development, concerned with 
things and places, rather than people and ideas,'' One source indicates that within a 
broad developmentalist framework,'Bjelke-Petersen lets the administration get on with 
hs job unless he wants a special interest represented: then he intervenes and usually 
gets his way.'^ The former Premier confirms that this was the case, saying: 'I didn't 
interfere a great deal.'^ Intervention on behalf of special interests, however, led to 
politicisation ofthe public service, conflict of interest and downright cormption. As his 
premiership progressed, and his government became more entrenched, Bjelke-Petersen 
became increasingly absolutist in his identification of himself whh the state. The 
leadership style he had shown in relationship to the party organisation, cabinet and 
pariiament was reproduced in his relations with the bureaucracy. At first, he heeded his 
advisers, but, as his confidence grew, his wishes became government policy and the 
usual, albeit limhed, checks and balances of party organisation, parliament, coalition 
partner and senior bureaucrats gave way to the advice of self-interested flatterers like 
Lewis and Lyons. 
As Verba observes, where mastery of the physical environment is part of the basic 
cultural orientation, then it is likely that government will be expected to be an active 
agent in the process.^ All Queensland governments had been interventionist in support 
of state development and Bjelke-Petersen's was no exception. When Hugh Bingham 
joined Bjelke-Petersen's staff, he asked the Premier what his visions and ambitions for 
the premiership were. The response was: 'progress, Hugh, progress,'^ That this was a 
legifimate and virtually unquestioned priority was entrenched in the state's political 
C, A, Hughes, 'Queensland' in Politics at StateLevel-Australia ed. J, Rorke. Department of 
Adult Education, University of Sydney, 1970, p 44. 
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culture. Local members appealed for votes whh promises of dams, schools and bridges 
and were judged more often by their lobbying prowess than their views,^ Correct 
bureaucratic procedures regulating tenders and contracts were bracketed whh 
pariiamentary and constitutional constraints as impediments to getting things done. 
As well as the historical reasons for supporting state development, Bjelke-Petersen 
also understood that the success of his own leadership was inextricably linked with the 
economic growth of the state. An apparently booming economy would secure his re-
elecfion and increase his power in relation to the rest of Australia,^ It might also permh 
him to 'go h alone', or, alternatively, as the politician most closely identified with such 
a prosperous state, he could step forward to ensure similar progress at the national 
level. Support for progress had another dimension. It allowed Bjelke-Petersen and the 
National Party to foster business loyalty through government funding and legislation 
favourable to business entrepreneurs. The prioritisation of economic development 
meant that other issues, not directly associated with wealth creation, were devalued. 
For example. National Party member, Claude Wharton argued against the introduction 
to parliament of a day set aside for Private Members grievances on the grounds that: 
Things of the moment in this State are big things; for example, the economy of the 
State, 1 come to this house to try to achieve something for the people I represent , . . 
However there is no way in the world we can achieve anything by receiving a lot of 
whingers' complaints , .** 
The equanimity with which the electorate greeted the steady trickle of reports of 
cormption and parliamentary neglect suggested that Wharton was not alone in his 
opinion. So long as Queensland appeared to prosper, politicisation of the public 
service, conflict of interest, the routinisation of cormption and the neglect of social 
services, made few dents in Bjelke-Petersen's staying power. 
Public policy and the Queensland Public Service 
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Bjelke-Petersen's strong commitment to state investment in support of private 
enterprise had its origins in his own climb out of poverty, and a religious worid view 
which prioritised personal responsibility. This background made it impossible for him 
to understand that the poor and disadvantaged were not individually to blame for their 
condition. He demonstrated that strain of Christian moralism which Hofstadter 
observed among Americans with fijndamentalist leanings, whereby economic life is 
looked to 'not just for hs efficacy in producing goods and services but as a vast 
apparatus for moral discipline, of rewards for virtue and industry and punishments for 
vice and indolence'.' The economic policies which he favoured, like flat tax, 
govemment support for private investors, including chariatans like Brych and Oskar, 
favoured the rich (and industrious) over the poor and (indolent). As premier, economic 
development became his government's first priority and fijelled his vimlent anti-
socialism because socialism, in his mind, was antithetical to economic progress. This 
eclipsed all other considerations such as concern for heritage and the environment. 
Aboriginal land rights, equitable and democratic public administration and any checks 
and balances which might impede 'progress' Inevitably, state development became 
entwined with states' rights when the federal government failed to share Bjelke-
Petersen's enthusiasm for sand mining on Fraser Island, or drilling for oil on the Great 
Barrier Reef Domestic critics were less welcome than the foreign investors whom 
Bjelke-Petersen courted. Big transnational corporations prized the 'stability' of the 
Bjelke-Petersen regime as well as finding its anti-unionism and 'frontier capitalist' 
flavour appealing,'" There was a high proportion of non-Queensland ownership and 
control ofthe state's resources. Mining, in particular, was more closely tied to foreign 
capital than other sectors of the Australian economy. Because the Queensland 
government was keen to attract overseas investment, many of the large infrastmcture 
costs were met by the state government, as well as by some mining companies, despite 
the free market rhetoric which Bjelke-Petersen and his ministers employed. 
Quoted in J. Sosso, The Roles ofthe Parliamentary Oppositionp: Queensland a Case Study; A 
Pariiamentary Perspective, BA (Hons) thesis. University of Queensland, St, Lucia, 1978, p, 39. 
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Property development in the state also became increasingly reliant on government 
backing. For example, Mike Gore's Sanctuary Cove development was treated very 
generously by the government which passed a special Act of Pariiament dealing with 
the resort and built two bridges at the cost of $6 million dollars linking the 
development area to the Gold Coast, In a speech at the opening of one stage of the 
development. Gore made clear the nature of the transaction. He thanked Russ Hinze 
for providing 'a shoulder to lean on' and promised the Premier: 'I know I have much 
more to give and you will have it while I live.'" The govemment also proved willing to 
overmle local councils in favour of developers, as it did with the Toowong Railway 
Stafion development which did not conform to Brisbane City Council planning 
requirements. When, at a press conference, reporter Peter Chariton, as a resident ofthe 
westem suburbs, objected to this development Bjelke-Petersen turned on him and 
accused him of being 'anti-development'. 
Like other developmentalists, Bjelke-Petersen's government assumed that wealth 
created by resource development produced a trickle down effect, ahhough this fahh 
was never tested by benefit-cost analysis.'- During election campaigns, the employment 
creating potential of projects such as Norwich Park, Gregory, and German Creek was 
stressed.'^ One consequence ofthe untested conviction that wealth from such projects 
would flow throughout the community was the neglect of welfare and other social 
services. This was exacerbated by the state's low tax base which was a source of great 
pride to Bjelke-Petersen but contributed to the relatively low levels of per capita 
expenditure on health, education, welfare, and law and order. In the areas of policing 
and health, for example, Queensland's per capita expenditure did not approach those 
of the other states despite Queensland's more favourable treatment by the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission.'"* The Commission estimated that Queensland 
could add $800 million to its budget if it adopted taxes and charges common to other 
II Quoted in D. Fagan, 'State Keeps Finger on Building Pulse', The Courier Mail. 24 July, 1986. 
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states,'^ The 1975 Poverty Commission reported Queensland as the state whh the 
highest percentage of very poor adult income units, yet Queensland's per capita 
expenditure on welfare services was considerably less than that of the other states. In 
1980-81 Queensland spent 20 per cent less than the six state average on child welfare 
and 60% less on aged care.'^ Such welfare services as there were conformed to a 
residual, paternalistic model, based on the premise that an individual's needs should be 
met by the market and the family.'^  
Despite Bjelke-Petersen's market rhetoric and his government's neglect of social 
services, he was not, in practice, an exponent of small government nor of a deregulated 
market. In addition to the support offered to private investors, there were a plethora of 
agricultural marketing authorities, the State Government Insurance Office was 
transformed into Suncorp, a large shareholder in most of Brisbane's listed companies, 
and the Queensland Tourist and Travel Corporation was mmoured to be the nation's 
second biggest marketer of packaged holidays."* Throughout his premiership, the state 
public service often enjoyed annual growth rates well in excess of population and 
labour force growth rates." 
The Queensland Public Service during this era was an old fashioned one, relatively 
untouched by the public service enquiries and managerialist reforms undertaken by the 
Commonwealth and other state jurisdictions. The Coalition government was so 
entrenched that there seemed no prospect of change, leading to cosy relations between 
govemment and the administration, and to the view that the Opposition was not as an 
ahernative government but an enemy to be kept at bay,'° In such a situation: 
Public servants , . , tend to give advice which supports predetermined policies. People 
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in harmonious control, are resented and treated as impertinent outsiders. The process 
of giving advice becomes incesmous. It is more about confirming opinions than 
challenging them. Research or new information, if it manages to penetrate at all. is 
rejected if it does not fit the rigid but unwritten agenda,•' 
This suited Bjelke-Petersen but it did not make for effective administration. During his 
premiership, the Queensland Public Service was characterised by centralised decision 
making, lack of planning, lack of inquiry and analysis into problems and inadequate 
informafion with which confidently to make recommendations." 
This pattern bad been established by Labor, to the point where 'the bureaucracy was a 
servant ofthe Labor party.'"^ When the coalhion took over in 1957, the Public Service 
continued to conform superficially to the Westminster model of a neutral career 
service, but continued, in practice, to be highly politicised at the senior levels. In 
addhion, Bjelke-Petersen's interventions on behalf of special interests meant that the 
predicability and equality of treatment associated with the tradhional bureaucratic 
model were seriously compromised As the Bjelke-Petersen government became 
further entrenched, the boundaries between the public and the private blurred. It was 
not seen as untoward that Cabinet ministers were provided with $1000 worth of tickets 
each for the Commonwealth games."^ Russ Hinze's Christmas parties, with abundant 
food and drink, all publicly funded, were legendary.'^ Other ministers went fijrther in 
confusing their own and the public's resources. Former ministers, Don Lane, Brian 
Austin, Geoff Muntz and Leisha Harvey were all imprisoned for misappropriating 
public ftinds. Don Lane based his defence on the grounds that this was common 
practice. In an oblique fashion, the former Premier confirmed this in a response to a 
question about the revelations ofthe Fitzgerald Inquiry He indicated: 
Report of a Commission of lnquir\ into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police 
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diat every member of parliament in Australia should be jailed for 50 years if thc\ 
..what's his name? Lane and Brian Austin, did these things for three or four thousand 
dollars. You wouldn't believe it but they do all sorts of things . . . Everybody takes 
their family out to dinner in polifics, . , ''* 
adding that be believed that judges and the legal profession did the same. 
Most public servants entered at the base grade and worked their way through the 
various levels till retirement. Academic qualifications were rare. Typical was Railway 
Commissioner Alby Lee, 'who started off on the railway platform and became 
Commissioner '-^  There was virtually no lateral recmitment and none at all at the level 
of permanent head of department or major sub-departments.'^ When the Coalition took 
power. Labor appointments like Sir David Longland and Sir David Muir remained as 
did the practice of detailed administration from the top with limited delegation down 
the line.'^ 
Over time, however, as the Coalition consolidated its position, appointments at senior 
level became more partisan. Nominations were scmtinised by Premier and cabinet and 
where there were doubts about loyalty to the coalition, appointments were delayed or 
cancelled.^° By the mid-1980s, the fastest track to the top was by means of one ofthe 
central agencies or service as a ministerial private secretary.^' Allen Callaghan's 
elevation from news and information officer to head the Department of Tourism, 
National Parks, Sport and Arts, and Bjelke-Petersen's former private secretary Stan 
Wilcox's rise to become Callaghan's deputy, were typical of this trajectory, Callaghan 
and his wife Judith, who administered the Queensland Day Committee, both 
succumbed to the tendency to confijse public and private resources and were jailed for 
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To external observers, Callaghan's downfall was part of an emerging pattern of 
cormpt government in Queensland but Bjelke-Petersen discounted this and insisted 
that his repeated re-election was proof of the people's tmst and of the fact that 
accountability mechanisms were therefore superfluous Economic progress and anti-
communism remained the unquestioned, and in his mind, related, twin pillars of his 
premiership. In prioritising economic progress, he was aided by the Queensland 
Treasury, which under the leadership of Sir Leo Hielscher, shared his vision of state 
development. 
Treasury and Economic Policy 
Hielscher, and the Co-Ordinator General, Sir Sydney Schubert, belonged to Bjelke-
Petersen's 'kitchen cabinet', advising him on a range of issues which extended beyond 
economic matters. As did Sir Robert Sparkes, they kept him grounded in reality but 
along whh Sparkes, they were eventually eclipsed by Sir Edward Lyons and the 'Joh 
for PM' group, Bjelke-Petersen was by this time (1987) Treasurer, and, whhout the 
Liberals to act as political scapegoats, and as workhorses in pohtically difficuh 
portfolios and deliverers ofthe middle class vote, the Nationals came under increasing 
pressure over their management of the economy." Criticism even came from within 
their own ranks, when, at the time of the Lindeman Island Affair, National Party 
Tmstee, Sir Roderick Proctor, accused the government of cronyism in hs tendering 
practises. 
Until the mining boom ofthe 1960s, Queensland had been a poor state. Governments 
of all complexions traditionally had been fmgal, with a balanced budget assuming 
almost totemic significance In an environment where farmers, small business people 
and others were forced to balance their domestic budgets, deficit spending would have 
been a huge electoral liability. As Hofstadter writes, in the American context, deficit 
spending is an affront to those who have been raised, or forced by circumstances, to 
live abstemious, thrifty, pmdential lives,^ ^ Some economists threw doubt on whether or 
not Queensland's budget was, in fact, balanced, pointing to high levels of public debt. 
Bjelke-Petersen would not divulge the actual figures, but the investment house. 
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Salomon Brothers, estimated that public debt in Queensland was growing at a faster 
rate than in all other states except Western Australia '"• In 1983, the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics released figures that showed that Queensland had the highest budget 
deficit of all the states in both absolute and relative terms and second highest in the rate 
of increase in its budget taxes,^ ^ Bjelke-Petersen and his critics continued to produce 
conflicting statistics on these and other economic indicators, but as far as electoral 
polifics were concerned, Bjelke-Petersen relied on the tried and tme formula of more 
development, fewer taxes and a balanced budget.' 36 
Desphe the stagnation of the public service as a whole, there was a long tradition in 
Queensland of competent senior public servants and, as a minister, Bjelke-Petersen had 
been guided by Sir David Longland, Sir David Muir and Keith Spann. During his 
premiership, the most powerfijl public servants were the Co-Ordinator General and 
later permanent head ofthe Premier's Department, Sir Sydney Schubert, and the head 
of Treasury, Sir Leo Hielscher. 
Hielscher joined the Queensland Public Service as a sixteen year old, subsequently 
obtaining tertiary qualifications in commerce and accountancy and, being awarded, in 
1972, an Eisenhower Fellowship to the United States. He held the post of Under 
Treasurer from 1974 to 1988, having been Deputy Under Treasurer for ten years prior 
to 1974. He was closely involved in resources policy and was highly regarded as a 
tough negotiator whose approach was 'more that of a corporation negotiator than of a 
public servant,'" Ken Wiltshire rated him as 'one ofthe most informed and effective 
public servants in Australia',^* Under Hielscher, Treasury 'became king pin',^' and as 
hs power grew, so too did the influence ofthe Treasurer who, unfil 1983, was the 
Parliamentary Liberal Party leader and hence Deputy Premier This was a key term in 
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Treasury portfolio when he broke the agreement in 1983 foUowing White's elevation 
to the Liberal leadership. 
Hielscher saw one of his principal tasks as 'tactically positioning Treasury in the 
scheme of things."*^ He acknowledges that most ofthe Treasurers he served did not 
know much about finance, but he is quick to praise Sir Thomas Hiley and Sir Gordon 
Chalk, Hiley, he says, was a brilliant man whose personal stamp on financial and 
economic policy was real. Chalk was: 
a wonderfijl fellow and good fighter, with animal cunning and a lot of streetwise 
pugnacious attitudes , . . his influence was tremendous but he was taking our point of 
view, Tom Healey was taking more or less his own point of view but backing it up 
with what we'd said , . ,"*' 
Hielscher shared the Premier's prioritisation of development and his belief that benefits 
would flow on to ordinary Queenslanders, One of his most successfijl policies, in 
conjunction with Chalk, was the insistence that mine development companies meet a 
series of infrastmcture costs, such as the provision of township accommodation, 
services and regional roads for the project workforce and their dependents. They also 
insisted that the railway lines constmcted for coal haulage be common carrier, rather 
than being privately owned. Development companies had to meet the costs of railways 
by way of a security deposit. Providing the companies proceeded as planned and 
specified quantities of coal were railed to port each year, deposit monies plus interest 
were refunded. The Government obtained the funds to meet these refunds from freight 
charges paid by the companies for the haulage of coal.'*' Queensland was able to raise 
nearly $400 million annually through its charges on the transport of coal. 43 
Desphe such successes, there was tension between Treasury and the rest of 
govemment which could be traced 'right back to Chalk's time', a situation which 
40 
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Hielscher attributes to the negative, restraining role which Treasury played. Mike 
Ahern confirmed this opinion "" With the Liberals' departure and the end of the 
Coalition, this negative role fell to Bjelke-Petersen, adding one more component to the 
mix which was to bring about his political downfall. An additional factor was that 
Bjelke-Petersen did not have a good grasp of economics and that 'he didn't hang in 
very long on any issue. I think his span was about three minutes. On economic issues it 
might have been two and a half minutes.'^^ One mark of his leadership, however, that 
he had already demonstrated in other spheres, was the capacity to delegate. He 'sorted 
out very quickly the people he could tmst and who would supply him whh the 
information which was needed and the people he could send away and not worry 
about.' ^ Prior to becoming Treasurer, Bjelke-Petersen relied on the Liberal 
Treasurers, especially Chalk, to whom he played second fiddle at Loan Council 
Meefings and Premier's Conferences. In these fomms, Queensland's economic 
awakening was attributed to the Liberal treasurers, especially Chalk, and his 'accurate, 
contained and conservative budgetary policy'.'*^ Don Dunstan recalls that at Loan 
Council meetings: 
Bjelke-Petersen used to give forth with speeches which were not germane to the matters 
before the conference, and for most ofthe time when he was speaking people just used 
to look out ofthe window."*** 
Sir Leo Hielscher is more charitable, saying of Premiers Conferences that 'you haven't 
got to be a real rocket scientist. They're horse trading.'"*^ He says that Bjelke-Petersen 
knew what was going on because Treasury had told him. He does acknowledge, 
however, that if debate got away from what the Premier had been told, then be was 
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After 1983 Bjelke-Petersen was deprived of this advice when, despite his two and a 
half minute attention span for matters economic, he became treasurer. He was aided by 
another economic novice. Bill Gunn. Labour was divided between the two of them so 
that Treasury consulted with Bjelke-Petersen on policy whilst Gunn signed the official 
papers,^° Gunn also dealt with deputations, a task which Bjelke-Petersen disliked. On 
an issue like rail freights, he would summon Hielscher and Gunn, and make an excuse 
to leave after five minutes. Gunn says: 'Anyway, we would always tell him beforehand 
what we intended to do and he would be happy and satisfied with that.'^' 
Treasury developed a system whereby policies were stripped of economic jargon 
before presentation to the Premier. One which Bjelke-Petersen embraced 
wholeheartedly was a Treasury proposal for a flat tax. The process involved in this 
proposition shows the ad hoc nature of policy making in Queensland. Hielscher recalls 
that, three weeks before the federal tax summit in 1985, 'we bad no idea of what we 
were going to do for it.' One of his staff approached him and said: 'We've been doing 
a few scratches on a piece of paper and it does seem as though a single rate tax would 
work providing it was universally applied.' The idea appealed to the Premier who took 
h to the summit and adopted it as a major plank in his 'Job for Canberra' campaign. 
As Treasurer, Bjelke-Petersen continued his pattern of intermittent involvement in the 
policy process on behalf of special interests. In 1983, his old friend, Ted Lyons, 
contacted him seeking approval for the investment of T A B , fijnds with Rothwells Ltd 
and other institutions. Lyons at the time was chairman of both the T,A. B, and 
Rothwells, Leo Hielscher noted on the application 'Draft reply please, (It would be 
unwise for this investment to proceed).'" There was fijrther correspondence, but after 
Bjelke-Petersen's intervention, Rothwells was approved and the T A B , invested in h." 
In retrospect, Hielscher sees Bjelke-Petersen's greatest weakness as his quick 
friendships with charlatans: 
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He'd stick by them too until they were finally shown up. That was a serious weakness. 
That was a weakness we had to face as principal advisers to him quite a lot. We had to 
steer him away from them. This might also descnbe the people who were advismg him 
to be prime minister.^ " 
Hielscher and Schubert, however, could not breach Bjelke-Petersen's loyalty to this 
group. His increasing dependence on them coincided whh his assumption of the 
Treasurer's role. 
Until this point, Bjelke-Petersen had been able to rely upon the state's apparently 
booming economy and bis government's pmdent economic management to convince 
Queenslanders that he should be repeatedly re-elected Debate among economists and 
financial journalists about public debt or low levels of expenditure on health, welfare 
and education had little impact whilst the Premier could point to cranes on the skyline 
as a symbol ofthe state's progress. He was ably supported by an Under Treasurer who 
shared his commitment to economic progress and by various Liberal Treasurers who 
bore the bmnt of resentment towards Treasury's perceived negative role. As 
Treasurer, however, Bjelke-Petersen had to accept responsibility as well as revealing, 
on a more public stage, his limited grasp of economic principles. Further, his reliance 
on the advice of supporters without political or government experience led him to 
neglect the state's governance in pursuit of federal office and to interventions in the 
policy process ehher on their behalf or those ofthe interests they both represented and 
espoused. 
Intervention 
Intervention on behalf of loyalists and in pursuit of opponents marked his entire 
premiership. He was a leader who demanded total personal loyalty. In some instances, 
this demand extended to the lower ranks of the public service. Two schoolteachers 
who were unsuccessfijl as Labor candidates in the 1977 state election found that their 
teaching positions were no longer available to them. Their union was told that 'the 
Hielscher, pers, comm., June, 1998, 
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teachers got what they deserved for opposing the coalition and criticising its policies."' 
Former Country Party member, public servant and conservationist, John Sinclair, who 
had led the battle to stop sand mining on Fraser Island from his home town of 
Maryborough, was transferred to Ipswich and subsequently bankmpted by Bjelke-
Petersen's relentless pursuit of him in various court actions, Bjelke-Petersen's 
suspicion of outsiders extended to interstate recmits to the Public Service who lost all 
prior enthlements upon relocating, Queensland was the only state not to grant 
reciprocity on such matters but Bjelke-Petersen felt that people should be prepared to 
make sacrifices in order to avail themselves ofthe benefits of working in Queensland,^^ 
Other interventions in public policy occurred when he wanted to enforce a policy about 
which he felt strongly or at the behest of special interests who sought financial 
advantage or the achievement of particular social goals Sometimes be interceded just 
to do someone a favour, showing no understanding of bureaucratic regulations 
designed to ensure predictability and equality of treatment. Bill Hewitt explains: 
If a constituent had been a good supporter of Joh and went and said: 
"Look, my daughter has been transferred to Birdsville State School. That's horrible. 
Joh, what can you do about it?" 
I don't think he would see anything wrong in giving a directive: "Don't send that girl 
out there." ^^  
On another occasion, a caller on talk back radio, who complained that her husband had 
lost his job as a result of the contracting out of road works to private firms, was 
assured by Bjelke-Petersen that the problem would be fixed if her husband phoned 
him.^ * The resuh was the arbitrary and intermittent polhicisation of what had 
previously been fairly routine departmental issues. 
Bjelke-Petersen's intercession on behalf of the pressure groups STOP and CARE, in 
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demonstrated the lengths to which he would go in imposing personal judgments on 
government departments. These groups received support in their aghation to ban a 
series of "unsuitable" books from school libraries among which were To Kill a 
Mockingbird, Black Like Me and The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith. '^ A booklet 
dealing whh uranium mining, approved by both mining companies and conservationists 
was banned, as was a film dealing with the dangers of drink driving, because it used a 
colloquialism for dmnkenness.^ 
Although the banning of STOP and CARE was heavily crificised by the educated elite, 
Bjelke-Petersen appealed through the mral press to his supporter' anti-inteUectuahsm, 
dislike of southerners and grassroots sentiments. *^' He told readers that SEMP was 'the 
second dubious social studies course which Cabinet has had to stop in the interests of 
wholesome and genuine education for Queensland children'. He managed a swipe at 
the Whitlam Government even though it had been out of office for over two years: 
Many have been distmbed [sic] that SEMP enjoyed federal fundmg, but from past 
expenence, I have found that many strange things anse in Canberra, especially if they 
were percolated during the Whitlam era. 
Finally, he acknowledged his Government's mandate 'to carry out the will of the 
people' aixi made an oblique threat that 'those in educafion who do not understand this 
fact of life, should quickly reassess their duties as servants ofthe Crown.' A press 
release on SEMP and MACOS which was sent to the Sunday Mail by Allen Callaghan, 
and published with little alteration, fijrther appealed to the anti-elifist, pragmatic and 
anti-intellectual sentiments of Queenslanders.*' In statements attributed to the Premier, 
fears were raised that education 'was not fitting their children for the real worid'. In 
advocating technical training, the Premier was quoted as saying: 'The notion that 
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graduates must go ' Teachers who defied the Government's authority were threatened 
with the sack and reminded that there were 700 unemployed teachers in Queensland 
'plus Bill Wood' (a reference to one ofthe teachers who had stood unsuccessfijlly for 
Labor), 
The confrontationist approach continued when, five years later, in 1982, teachers went 
on strike over class sizes. He threatened them whh the sack, although the Solicitor 
General pointed out that the Premier was not legally enthled to sack striking teachers.*^ 
Bill Gunn's recollection of another of Bjelke-Petersen's attempts to sack teachers, 
demonstrates the latter's disregard for due process, and the involvement of his wife as 
a member of his 'kitchen cabinet', in the public policy process. The incident began 
when the Premier phoned Gunn, the then Education Minister, with instmctions to sack 
50 teachers who were 'playing up' An alarmed Gunn refused, but defijsed the 
situation with a quick phone call to Florence Bjelke-Petersen, The episode was 
resolved happily but not before evincing some 'Dad Rudd MP' qualities: 
..I rang Florence and said: "Hey, listen , , , where's Joh?" 
"He's down the paddock, you can talk up", she said: "It's OK," 
I said: "Look, he'll make a martyr out of all those. You can't sack 50 teachers like that 
from that particular area just over a thing like that , . , Anyway, she said: "No way. 
Who's been advising him on that?"^ 
Florence assured Gunn that she would have a talk to her husband and also suggested 
that he solicit the aid of a school principal on the Sunshine Coast who was the 
Premier's 'white haired giri'^^ The tactic was successful and Bjelke-Petersen did not 
pursue the matter On another occasion, Florence Bjelke-Petersen used pumpkin scone 
diplomacy to intervene in an Ipswich miners' strike over the closure of their mine. She 
visited the site with a batch of scones, talked to the workers and persuaded her 
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If relations with teachers were marked by discord, those with loyal members of the 
Queensland Police Force could not have been closer. In no other area of public 
administration was the relationship between loyalty to Bjelke-Petersen and reward 
more closely demonstrated. Rewards came in the form of pay and conditions, 
promotion, and, most significantly, turning a blind eye to cormption. Although the 
polhicisation of the Police Force was a hallmark of the Bjelke-Petersen government, 
members of the force in Queensland had traditionally shown allegiance to whomever 
was in power. In 1963, Labor Member of Parliament, Colin Bennett QC, alleged that 
leading police officers, including Commissioner Frank Bischoff, travelled to country 
areas to support the government during election campaigns,^^ In the Bischoff era 'in 
some respects police cormption had acquired a quaint quasi-legitimacy'^* and reached 
to the top. Although Bischoff s cormption was known to the then Premier, Sir Frank 
Nicklin and his Police Minister, Jack Pizzey, Bischoff remained as Commissioner and 
Nicklin retained his reputation for probity.'''' 
Considering his socialisation in such an environment, it is unsurprising that Bjelke-
Petersen demonstrated no understanding that the obligations of a police force were to 
the community and the law, rather than to the government of the day. When he, in 
turn, became Premier, turning a blind eye to cormption was the price he was prepared 
to pay in order to have a Force he could rely upon to implement the government policy 
on, among other things, the contentious street march issue. Whilst always willing to 
increase police powers, he remained reluctant to investigate the steady stream of 
allegations of police cormption. On the occasions when public pressure forced 
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Initially, Bjelke-Petersen appeared intimidated by Bischoff, perhaps recognising the 
depth of police power in Queensland Hugh Bingham recalls that he wrote a script for 
the Premier to follow when the latter rang Bischoff on the unpopular issue of police 
radar traps, reminding him: 'You're the boss, Job'/ ' Bjelke-Petersen recognised the 
polifical importance ofthe police, opting to retain the police portfolio for the first year 
of his premiership. In the case of police promotions. Cabinet reserved the right to 
scmfinise appointments down to senior sergeant level, ensuring that loyalty was 
rewarded.^^ Allen Callaghan reinforced Bjelke-Petersen's inclinations in this direction 
by advising him to look after the police 'for when the cmnch comes'." This his 
government did, providing police with outstanding retirement and superannuation 
benefits.^ "* When Bjelke-Petersen travelled, the first people he spoke to when he got off 
his plane were the police who were always present to greet him. These men, who were 
usually ignored by other politicians, appreciated the gesture, just as they appreciated 
his support against the reformist Police Commissioner, Ray Whhrod.^' 
Accounts of Whitrod's personality suggest that it was inevhable that he and Bjelke-
Petersen would clash. Whitrod's style has been described as that of 'an autocrat in a 
hurry'.^* He was articulate, forceful and well educated, with a Bachelor of Economics 
degree and a postgraduate Diploma of Criminology from Cambridge, He was also an 
outsider, from South Australia, and had served as Commissioner in the Northern 
Territory and New Guinea. His attempts to reform the Queensland Police Force 
brought him into conflict with the Police Union, which, at a meeting after the 
Springbok tour, passed a unanimous vote of confidence in Bjelke-Petersen before 
successfully passing a vote of no confidence in Whitrod, Bjelke-Petersen's attitude 
towards reform, especially the recommendation for further educational requirements 
for police promotion, reflected that of the ordinary member of the force, rather than 
the educated elite represented by Whitrod, Whitrod was supported in attempts to 
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Police Minister in 1969, but the Premier over-mled them both, referring to his long 
held belief that 'you can't beat experience ' " The Police Union correctly pointed out 
that Queensland cabinet ministers had no better education than the average 
policeman.^ * 
In a fijrther demonstration of his confrontationist leadership style and his technique for 
ensuring the support ofthe rank and file, Bjelke-Petersen also rejected Whitrod's and 
Hodges' recommendation for an inquiry into police behaviour during a protest march 
in mid-1976 when a student was stmck by a police baton. Bjelke-Petersen informed 
Whitrod that Cabinet, not the Commissioner, would decide if an investigation was 
warranted, receiving a letter from the Police Union thanking him and pledging its 
support.™ Such support eventually extended to the government's payment of legal 
costs of a police officer arising out of a demonstration, *° Soon after the baton incident, 
Hodges was replaced as Minister by Tom Newbury According to Hugh Lunn, Bjelke-
Petersen's stand was part of a deliberate strategy to win the support of the police,*' 
Lunn notes that support was soon forthcoming with Brisbane Traffic Branch police 
passing a motion commending the Premier for 'his distinct stand against groups acting 
outside the law' and censuring Whitrod.*' 
The police, secure in the knowledge that they had the Premier's backing, continued to 
act provocatively, most notably during a raid on a commune at Cedar Bay in North 
Queensland In October, 1976, Police and Customs officers, while searching for 
cannabis, torched houses and destroyed residents' belongings." Whitrod ordered an 
inquiry but the resulting report was never made public and charges resulting from the 
incident were unsuccessfijl. There was no pariiamentary debate on the topic because, 
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a Supreme Court writ claiming he had been defamed in a television report of the 
incident. The Speaker mled against debate because the matter was sub judice.*'* Once 
again, the Police Union conveyed its thanks to the Premier,*^ 
Three months after the Cedar Bay raid, Whitrod resigned after seven years as 
Commissioner, saying that he could no longer tolerate pohtical interference and that 
the posifion of Police Commissioner had become that of a pohtical puppet *^  Whhrod 
felt that under Bjelke-Petersen, he was no longer in command of the force which he 
headed. For his part, Bjelke-Petersen, never one to compromise, expected 
acquiescence once he had made his opinion known. When Bjelke-Petersen failed to get 
compliance, he responded to Whitrod as to all other forcefijl personalities who had 
opposed him. 
Terry Lewis, on the other hand, presented the face of an unquestioning loyalist. At the 
time of his appointment, Lewis was stationed at Charleville, His strategy for 
ingratiating himself with Bjelke-Petersen was similar to that of Ted Lyons. He met 
with Bjelke-Petersen when the latter travelled west, bombarded the Premier with 
letters singing his own praises and intimated that Whitrod had Labor connections," 
Another factor in his appeal to Bjelke-Petersen may have been that the Premier knew 
that Lewis was out of favour with Whitrod,** Lewis' appointment as the Assistant 
Commissioner, over 16 officers of higher rank and 106 of equal rank, was made 
despite opposition from Whitrod, who, in the circumstances, had no alternative but to 
resign Lewis' was not the only unusual promotion. The police officer who had 
allegedly hit a student demonstrator with his baton was promoted to superintendent.*^ 
The Police Officers' Association was satisfied with Lewis' appointment, although he 
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Whhrod's list. It is difficuh to ascertain the precise details of his nomination because 
the only notes missing from Cabinet over a period of many years relate to the meeting 
dealing with Lewis' extraordinary promotion.^' 
The C I B . section of the union sent Bjelke-Petersen a congratulatory telegram 
supporting Lewis' promotion,'^ despite public murmurings that he had been a 'bagman' 
for cormpt former Commissioner Bischoff. Bjelke-Petersen has persistently denied that 
he knew anything about cormption but the evidence suggests that this is untme. It is 
more likely that be chose to ignore the allegations in return for loyal and deferential 
service. These allegations were discussed in Cabinet and dismissed.^^ Bill Gunn, who 
became Police Minister in 1983, confessed to 'having an inkling there was a problem 
whh Lewis because of anonymous phone calls alleging cormption.'^ His secretary, 
Gwen Butler, who had previously worked for Max Hodges, also alerted him to a 
'problem with cormption.'^^ As Minister he was critical of Lewis for bringing forward 
cabinet briefs at the last minute and found the Police Commissioner reluctant to attend 
meetings as requested.'^ Lewis also procrastinated when Gunn asked him to provide 
answers to a list of questions submitted by The Courier Mail.^^ 
Desphe his Deputy's concerns, Bjelke-Petersen remained deaf to allegations of 
cormption. He could hardly have been unaware of them, given that each ofthe publicly 
fijnded writs issued by members of his government against both their political 
opponents and media organisations concerned alleged cormption.'* Notwhhstanding 
these proceedings, his protestations of ignorance continued. With the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry still sitting, he continued to insist that 'we had no suspicions at all,' a denial he 









Report of a Commission of Inquin, p. 46 
B. Hawker, 'Police, Politics. Protest and the Press, Queensland 1967-81', Alternative 
Criminology Journal, vol, 4, July, 1981, p. 78. 
Whitton, op. cit, p, 38, 
M, Fishpool, 'Corrupt Police Escaped Punishment: Gunn', The Courier Mail 1 May, 1998, p, 11. 
P. Dickie, 'Joh Man Who Tipped a Bucket on his Boss", The Sunday .Mail. 3 Dec, 1995, 
p 6 . 
Gunn, pers. comm., June 1997, 
Dickie, 'Joh Man'. 
Report of a Commission of Inquiry, p.l 19, 
Quoted in Whitton, op cit, p. 160. 
264 
doubt on these assertions. 'Vern MacDonald, a former deputy police commissioner, 
told the Inquiry that he had informed Sir Joh that it was general police belief that 
Lewis had been a member ofthe ratpack who had been bagmen for Bischoff.'°° Bill 
Gunn, too, is 'certain he [Bjelke-Petersen] had an idea','°' In a conversation with the 
then Premier about the need for a Royal Commission to look into the Police Force he 
remembers that Bjelke-Petersen 'looked around at me and said: It's Terry, isn't it'j'''°^ 
Lewis was found guilty of cormption and imprisoned, 
Bjelke-Petersen chose to ignore cormption because to acknowledge it was to hand a 
weapon to his political enemies. This is suggested by a remark he made when refusing 
to make public a Scotland Yard Report into 'allegations of misconduct, malpractice 
and cormption in the Queensland Police Force'. One ofthe Report's authors briefed 
the then Queensland Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Bill Lickiss when the 
latter was in London, warning him that cormption and sectarianism were rife in the 
Queensland Police Force and alerting him to the activities of a group of cormpt police, 
known as the 'the rat pack'."^' Bjelke-Petersen refijsed to table the Report, saying: 
'This is a report to the Government If you table this report something will be 
misconstmed by our political opponents and those opposed to the police,' As with his 
supporters in the Logos Foundation, perhaps he believed that cormption was a lesser 
evil than socialism, or that turning a blind eye was a price worth paying for loyalty of 
the kind Lewis demonstrated when, in a speech at the Police Academy, he told those 
assembled that: 'The people of Queensland and the police force owe the Premier a 
very deep gratitude,''^ Bjelke-Petersen returned the compliment, telling a radio 
interviewer: 'We have a very good police force . , , I don't have to ring him [Lewis] up 
and tell him to do this or that.''"' 
Bjelke-Petersen's leadership became progressively more authoritarian, Opposhion to 
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escalated. Police sought a copy of a petition to the Brisbane City Council calling for 
public speaking to be allowed in the Brisbane City Mall on the grounds that it was their 
responsibility 'to watch closely the activities of suspected subversive and radical 
groups which could pose a threat.''"* Journalists covering industrial disputes and 
picketing were afraid of arrest and in 1985, the Australian Journalists Associafion was 
forced to withdraw from the system for police passes for joumalists because of police 
refusal to accredit certain journalists.'"^ Other journalists and critics of the Bjelke-
Petersen regime experienced police harassment,'"* Even members ofthe Coalition were 
not exempt from police scmtiny Evan Whitton reports that a Special Branch sergeant 
was asked 'to find something on [Angus] Innes,.,''"*' The interference was not one-
sided. Bjelke-Petersen would contact Lewis' office directly if he wanted a matter 
pursued. For example, he directed an officer in Lewis' office to investigate alleged 
breaches ofthe Electoral Act by Dr Denis Murphy, President ofthe Labor Party."" 
Bjelke-Petersen also gave a member of Lewis' staff advice on how to interrogate Keith 
Wright, the Leader ofthe Opposition, about allegations the latter made in July 1983, of 
cormption in the granting of a power station contract.'" 
Lewis remained similarly unbound by conventions governing the relationship between 
govemment and senior police officers. He cultivated government contacts, especially 
Bjelke-Petersen, and Don Lane, with whom he discussed police matters, despite the 
fact that Lane was never Police Minister,"" He also began meddling in political 
appointments, persuading Bjelke-Petersen to remove Russell Hinze, who had replaced 
Newbury's successor, Ron Camm, as Police minister in 1980. Hinze became 
unsatisfactory to Lewis on a number of grounds, among them, the establishment ofthe 
Police Complaints Tribunal."^ The Commissioner lobbied Bjelke-Petersen directly and 
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and whom he accompanied to the America's Cup Yacht Races in Perth, Bjelke-
Petersen, after first checking with Lewis to see if the move was acceptable, appointed 
Bill Glasson, in 1982, to the Police portfolio. Lewis also lobbied ministers on behalf of 
barrister and former police officer, Eric Pratt and Crown Prosecutor, Angelo 'Vasta, 
regarding their appointments as Queen's Counsel. Both achieved their goals. Pratt 
became chair of the Police Complaints Tribunal and a District Court judge. Vasta 
became a Supreme Court judge but was eventually removed from the bench by 
Pariiament after an inquiry by three retired interstate judges, inaugurated by the Ahern 
Govemment, found that he had deceived tax authorities and given false sworn evidence 
in a defamation case about his friendship with Terry Lewis. The Police Commissioner 
contacted Lyons on a number of occasions regarding his knighthood. He also spoke to 
Bjelke-Petersen about his likely successor as Premier and the next gubernatorial 
appointment, Lewis also ventured into areas removed from political patronage. It was 
revealed at the Fitzgerald Inquiry that he had raised electoral matters, including the 
1985 redistribution, with Bjelke-Petersen, and with various ministers and Sir Edward 
Lyons. Lewis' diaries reveal that between 1976 and 1987, he saw Bjelke-Petersen 134 
times while the Premier telephoned him 197 times,""* 
Just as parliamentary convention meant nothing to Bjelke-Petersen, and indeed 
frequently appeared an impediment to 'getting things done', so conventions concerning 
relations between the government and its public servants were similarly abandoned. 
Bjelke-Petersen intervened in public policy on behalf of his own interests and at the 
behest of his friends, bmshing off allegations of cormption in the police force and 
turning upon the critics who dared to question his leadership, Nehher crifics nor 
allegafions prevented Bjelke-Petersen from being re-elected and both were countered 
by a steady stream of reportage emphasising Queensland's progress whh Bjelke-
Petersen at the helm. 
The people/media 
Bjelke-Petersen treated the media with the same mix of characteristics which he 
employed in other arenas. He could be engaging, but he demanded total loyalty and 
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was unforgiving and vindictive if reporting was not to his satisfaction. Just as he could 
conceive of no legitimate role for the Opposition, neither could he accept that the press 
had a legitimate role in making government accountable. The National Party managed 
his election campaigns and he, and the people he hired, managed the media almost as 
effectively as he had managed Pariiament and Cabinet, As Huey Long realised at the 
beginning of the mass communication age, effective communication is essenfial in 
generating the loyalty necessary to sustain a regime. Long had claimed in 1929 that 'a 
document prepared by me in the evening could be printed and placed on the porch of 
pracfically every home in the State of Louisiana during the morning of the following 
day',"^ Bjelke-Petersen, through his use of the state's media, could have made a 
similar claim 
He was quick to punish members of the media who offended him, either by 
withdrawing government advertising, by denying interviews and, eventually, by issuing 
defamation writs. In 1986, confronted by escalating media criticism he revealed the 
same intolerance he had shown to other critics, telling The Austrahan Financial 
Review, 'the greatest thing that could happen to the state and the nation is when we 
get rid of the media. Then we would live in peace and tranquillity and no one would 
know anything,'"^ He had said much the same during the 1980 campaign,'" In 
retirement, he contrasted the Queensland and national press, who, he believed, 
distorted news, with the media in Tasmania who were 'delightfijl, pleasant people. 
They print what you tell them'. 118 
The authoritarianism thus revealed had long been acknowledged as a Bjelke-Petersen 
characteristic. Separate surveys conducted in 1977 on behalf of the National Party and 
the University of Queensland Sociology Department found that whilst Bjelke-Petersen 
rated more highly than other party leaders on 'his ability as a polhician, knowing how 
to handle his job, standing up for the interests of Queenslanders and the strength of his 
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principles', he also outpolled them on being dictatorial and the degree to which 
respondents could believe what be said.'" More than half the Nafional Party supporters 
polled by the Sociology Department, rather surprisingly, thought of him as a good 
speaker, although this opinion was not shared to the same degree by Labor 
supporters.'"" Being perceived as dictatorial and dishonest had no negative impact on 
his party's electoral performance. Hugh Lunn observed that in Queensland, to be 
considered dictatorial may be to be rated highly,'"' Certainly, Labor polling showed 
that Bjelke-Petersen's iron mle was linked in the public mind with stability'"^ and 
strong leadership had long been admired and expected. Positive images, such as 
standing up for Queensland and getting things done, appeared to count for more than 
perceptions of dishonesty. Whilst, in other parts of Australia, Bjelke-Petersen's 
leadership was seen as authoritarian and cormpt, in his own state, his identification 
with Queensland became a staple of National Party campaigns, most notably in 1986 
when the National Party slogan was simply 'Job Queensland', The two had become 
flised. 
Desphe, or possibly because of his perceived failings, Bjelke-Petersen's Government 
was re-elected on seven occasions. Part of the reason for this was the appeal his 
leadership style held for electors which, in turn, was linked whh the way in which he 
and his government's activities were reported. Under the direction of Sparkes and 
especially Evans, the National Party organisation had become increasingly 
sophisticated in its use of polling and in the production of election campaign materials. 
These consisted of brochures containing details of candidates, newspaper 
advertisements, and television clips featuring Bjelke-Petersen. As a mle, both sides of 
his personality were displayed in these campaigns: the aggressive leader and the 
benevolent grandfather. In 1977, the campaign jingle reflected the results of market 
research linking as it did the person of the Premier with the fijture of the state, and 
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subsequent campaigns picked up this theme as well,''^ His final state campaign in 1986, 
ran on the theme 'Nationals. There's never been a greater need' and promised 
'Strength - not weakness. Decisions - not summits, [and recalling the bitter 1985 
SEQEB dispute]. Obedience to the law - not union anarchy,''""* Bjelke-Petersen told 
Hugh Lunn 'that you can campaign on anything you like, but nothing is more effective 
than communism'.'"^ 
He took his message to the remotest parts ofthe state, ignoring critics who constantly 
questioned the use ofthe govemment jet for party pohtical purposes. Bjelke-Petersen 
had a system for ensuring that he visited every part of Queensland. Once a place had 
been visited, coloured pins were stuck in a map on the wall of his private secretary's 
office, green for one trip, blue for twice and red for three or more By the end of the 
year h was easy to see if any area had been neglected.''*^ In addition to the use ofthe 
govemment aircraft for political campaigning, the government also used its well 
resourced public relafions arm. In 1972, one government public relations officer 
announced, with no apparent dismay, that: 'We had three groups campaigning in this 
elecfion - the Country and Liberal Parties, the ALP Opposition, and the Government, 
in hs own right,''"^ 
As Bjelke-Petersen's tenure in the premiership lengthened, Queenslanders' interest in 
his pronouncements grew. This, of hself, was no different than other polifies where 
elite newsmakers attract the greatest interest: 'The biggest name for comment is 
invariably the person at the centre of power,''"* In Queensland during the Bjelke-
Petersen era this trend was especially marked, as the Opposition was treated badly by 
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before mnning them as newsworthy in their own right.'"^ For most of Bjelke-Petersen's 
premiership, the state's newspapers were supportive ofthe government. For example, 
on the street march issue, the majority of press reports and editorials supported the 
police and the Government,'•'° The state's most important newspaper. The Courier 
Mail, endorsed the return of a coalition government in every state election between 
1957 and 1986, In the last case. The Courier subscribed to the view that the Liberals 
were a moderating influence,'^' despite the fact that the Coalition had collapsed in 
August 1983 and the Nationals had fought the 1983 and 1986 elecfions alone. Indeed, 
Bjelke-Petersen specifically mled out any coalition whh the Liberals on both occasions. 
It was not unusual for news organisations to publish press statements released on 
behalf of the Premier even when he was absent.'" From 1971 to 1978 these were 
issued by Allen Callaghan who argued that 'because I work with him, I know him, I 
can speak in his name.''^'' Callaghan was a former ABC journalist who became Bjelke-
Petersen's news and information officer, a title designed to give him maximum scope 
and flexibility in the tasks he undertook. In this role, he worked closely whh Stan 
Wilcox, the Premier's private secretary, and Beryl Young, his pilot, a triumvirate 
which Callaghan feels were good advisers, because of the checks and balances they 
offered. He told the Premier: 'My greatest value is to tell you things you don't want to 
hear,'"' When he and Wilcox left, 'you only had Beryl',"' 
Callaghan's predecessor had been Hugh Bingham who had tried to soften Bjelke-
Petersen's 'wowser' image and simplify his name to 'Job Petersen', a move which the 
Premier disliked. At this stage Bingham recognised that the Premier was on a steep 
learning curve, but that he was persistent and unlikely to give up. Unlike Gough 
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Petersen learnt the importance ofthe leader's presence at the scene of natural disasters. 
When storms destroyed much of the small Southern Queensland town of Killarney, 
early in Bjelke-Petersen's premiership, his initial reaction, consistent with his personal 
philosophy of self reliance, was to stay away, insisting that those affected should have 
been insured. His media adviser persisted and the Premier visited with such success 
that Bingham says ofthe Premier: 'He never forgot the Killarney lesson. ... You only 
had to have a lirtle zephyr that blew the roof off and Joh would be there'.'^^ 
Bingham's management of the Queensland media was never as all encompassing as 
Callaghan's proved to be, but, in order to bring the tyro Premier to the artention both 
ofthe public and to Co?//'/erA^a/7journalists, he bought columns one and two on page 
two of The Truth and began writing a column in the Premier's name. Bingham also 
travelled with the Premier and his party. In these early days of the premiership, 
journeys were made by train. Bingham was impressed by the way in which Bjelke-
Petersen engaged country audiences with simple stories and by the friendliness which 
Bjelke-Petersen and Florence displayed towards the travelling media contingent. The 
couple would appear in their dressing gowns 'and the blokes would be drinking 
stubbies and they would have a cup of tea.' '" The only ones who failed to warm to the 
Premier and his wife were the shunters at Rockhampton, who, upon recognising the 
Premier's carriage, 'used to bash the cars all over the yards,'' >138 
When Callaghan took over, he defined his fijnctions as being 'to promote the 
Govemment, promote the Premier and also to more or less be an intelligence 
service,''^^ So successfijl was Callaghan, that Gough Whitlam told a Queensland Press 
Club luncheon that he saw in Bjelke-Petersen 'the hand of Jacob in the hairy paw of 
Esau'.'"^ Gordon Chalk, who found himself and the Liberals sidehned by the Premier's 
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was known variously as Kissinger, manipulator, hidden persuader and puppeteer. "*" 
Callaghan, however, is adamant that he 'didn't make Joh. I provided words and music 
but he was still a consummate politician,''^^ Bjelke-Petersen, too, minimises 
Callaghan's role, but he has always been reluctant to acknowledge the contribufion of 
others. The one point Bjelke-Petersen concedes is that Callaghan pointed out 
joumahsts, like Quentin Dempster, who were negative and not worth wasting time 
whh."^ Under Callaghan's tutelage, Bjelke-Petersen learned to make himself available 
to the media and to be himself- only more so. His home number was listed in the white 
pages, he handed out the number of his private office line 'like confetti'"^^ and held 
daily press conferences. He was naturally courteous and friendly to those not his 
enemies. He always had calls routed directly to his office and Leo Hielscher recalls 
frequent intermptions. On one occasion during discussions with the Under Treasurer, 
the Premier spent three minutes-the length of time he usually gave to policy - chatting 
to a caller who had dialled a wrong number,"^ 
Bjelke-Petersen's ability to communicate with ordinary Queenslanders was part of his 
homespun charm, Callaghan recognised this when he insisted that Bjelke-Petersen 
remain himself even to the point of retaining his rambling style of communication. 
According to Callaghan 'smooth talking is for toastmasters and confidence men''"*^ 
and, he might have added, the Premier's critics from the upper echelons of the 
churches, academe and federal politics. It seemed as if the more the well-educated 
scoffed, the greater the appeal of the Premier and his wife.''** Bjelke-Petersen's 
famously awkward speeches, where mistakes were sometimes greeted by cheering and 
applause,'"' lend support to the proposition that small flaws, 'if slight and empathefic', 
bring a leader closer to ordinary people.'^" His verbal stumbling communicated decent 
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Petersen appears to have exaggerated, or at least, not tried to rid himself of, his famous 
speaking style When he negotiated in the international arena, he showed no signs of 
h.'^' Nor did he in a retirement interview he gave Bob Elhs.'" Peter Beattie, who says 
that he believes Bjelke-Petersen's incoherence was genuine, nevertheless observed that 
the Premier was 'coherent and relaxed' during negotiations in the dying days of the 
premiership,''^ ^ The rambling in response to media questioning had another function. It 
gave Bjelke-Petersen time to think of an answer, or to avoid giving one ahogetber.'"^ 
In addifion to refining Bjelke-Petersen's interview techniques, Callaghan prepared 
parliamentary speeches and released a steady stream of press releases to the state's 
news media, timing them to coincide with the periods when news editors were most 
desperate for news. Often these were used without alteration. During Callaghan's 
tenure, the Premier was estimated to receive at least 20 per cent of all state political 
news in Queensland's daily press.'^' 
Television was not neglected either. Bjelke-Petersen employed a cinematograpber who 
travelled whh him (at considerable expense) both within Queensland and overseas. The 
resuhant film clips of his exploits were then used by television news programmes.'^^ In 
the lead up to the 1972 election, five minute clips extolling state development and 
featuring the Premier, and sometimes his deputy, were broadcast on Brisbane 
commercial television There was no way in which the Opposition could match these 
resources. By 1973, all ministers employed press secretaries who, unlike their 
Commonwealth counterparts, enjoyed the security of tenure of public servants and 
some of the highest pay rates in Australia, Allen Callaghan, however, recalls that 
inifially there were some drawbacks when he was expected to keep public service 








1. Schiffer, Charisma: a Psychoanalytic Look at Mass society. University of Toronto Press, 
Buffalo, 1973, p. 170, 
Hielscher, pers, comm,, June, 1998, 
B, Ellis, Goodbye Jerusalem, Night Thoughts of a Labor Outsider. Vintage Books, Milson's 
Point NSW, 1997, p 244, 
Beanie, op cit, pp. 7, 117. 
H. Brown, 'Out of E.xile', The Courier Mail, 9 Dec, 1995, p, 4. 
Wallace, op, cit, p. 213. 
ibid., p 212, 
274 
hours.''" Estimates of expenditure on salaries and related PR matters were virtually 
impossible to find"** 
Engaging as the Premier could be, he had shown in other areas of his life that he could 
be vindictive towards his critics, and he showed no difference in his treatment of the 
media. He banned a Courier Mail journalist who had been critical of his excessive use 
ofthe government aircraft. The Australian Journalists Association retaliated with a ban 
on copy from the Premier's office, but it was short-lived because so much Queensland 
news was focussed on the Premier.'^^ Other journalists who wrote critical articles 
became the subject of mmour mongering or were harassed by traffic police,'^ When 
Bjelke-Petersen perceived an anti-government bias in The Courier Mail, he retaliated 
by removing the million dollar government advertising account and placing it whh The 
Daily Sun, which had commenced publication in 1982, and lasted ten years before 
folding. It became clear, however, that a situation of mutual need characterised Bjelke-
Petersen's relationship with the media. Neither, it seemed, could live without the other. 
There were cultural and institutional reasons making Callaghan's task easier than it 
might have been in other environments. There was limited competition among the 
news media in Queensland, a situation which in other contexts had affected the 
standards of journalism and the nature of newspaper content.'^' What competition 
there was sometimes led to pettiness, where a story would not be used by one 
organisation if it had been broken by another, leaving some issues which were 
damaging to the government to die.'" This occurred in 1982 when the ABC's 
Nationwide program interviewed police who revealed the attempted cover-up of Sir 
Edward Lyons arrest for drink driving, and described cormption in the Queensland 
Police Force Other media failed to follow up the story. 
For most of the premiership, 77?^  Courier Mail was the only statewide morning 
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AAP which provided news to almost all commercial news organisations outside 
Brisbane, Within Brisbane, commercial radio and television also relied heavily on the 
AAP service, and ultimately on The Courier Mail. 
The lack of competition had another, more hidden, dimension. It meant that there were 
few career options available to journalists who wanted to live and work in Brisbane, 
The state government was second only to Queensland Newspapers as an employer of 
joumahsts,'^^ It was, and is, a common career path for journalists to move between 
govemment work and the media. As eariy as 1972, eight previous govemment 
roundsmen and press gallery reporters had taken government employment. In one 
instance, a reporter who had accepted a senior government position was still assigned 
to government rounds, even though his employer knew of his imminent departure.'^ 
Many journalists may have been capable of wearing the two hats required, but the 
perception of compromise lingers, that journalists hopefijl of joining ministerial staff 
might be less probing than they would otherwise be Similariy, journalists returning to 
newspapers or television after a period of government service might have absorbed a 
govemment 'line' and be overly reliant on government sources for their information. In 
Coaldrake's opinion, 'there has been (and remains) a risk that members ofthe media 
might view themselves as part ofthe system, and not so much as observers of it,'"'^ 
Even when joumalists wanted to undertake investigative reporting, many complained 
that they were insufficiently fijnded,'^ Chris Masters, whose Four Corners program 
was instmmental in finally bringing about an inquiry into cormption in Queensland, had 
three months to research and prepare the episode. Few, if any, in Queensland had those 
resources. Instead, reportage often substituted for investigative journalism, and the 
information contained in government press releases and handouts was often nehher 
confirmed nor subjected to critical evaluation before being used. Government 'leaks' 
to selected journalists secured favourable coverage for the government. 'Leaks' would 
dry up or be redirected if reporters failed to toe the line. Reporters considered reliable 
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by the government would be given rebuUals of negative stories or 'puff pieces' which 
made controversial subjects like cormpt police, look good,'" 
Relatively small numbers of reporters were allocated to government rounds, and these 
were vastly outnumbered by government PR employees, Derek White reports that in 
1972, the government round was normally occupied by no more than six people, 
supplemented by others when Pariiament was sitting: 
Essentially however, six men are expected to keep almost two million people informed 
of their State Govemment activities and decisions, from a city which boasts three 
metropolitan newspapers, four television stations, and six radio stations, plus agency 
and networking services for the provincial media of Australia's most decentralised 
state,'^ ^ 
According to another source. The Courier Mail employed more food writers than 
finance or political writers.'^^ Further, the attitude was fostered by the Government 
that to criticise anything other than the Labor Party was to be 'un-Queensland, 
unpatriotic, and treacherous','™ 
Joumalists, editors and producers were also quietened both by Bjelke-Petersen's 
increasing use of defamation actions in order to try 'to stop talk about a cormpt 
Government','^'and his advice to potential critics, to 'sfick to the tmth and don't say 
things that are wrong and you won't have anything to worry about.''^^ Although 
Queensland defamation laws appeared to be less inhibiting than such laws in some 
other states, the climate of opinion in Queensland was such that media self censorship 
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ministers were publicly fijnded.'^'^ These included action taken against the then Leader 
of the Opposition, Nev Warburton, other Labor MPs, the general secretary of the 
Trades and Labour Council of Queensland, Ray Dempsey, and the ALP's state 
secretary, Peter BeaUie, John Moore, then State President of the Liberal Party and 
federal MP, was sued for stating in 1986 that 'cormption in Queensland appears to 
have become the norm, rather than the exception','" In this instance, Bjelke-Petersen 
stated that he would pay for the defamation action himself 
The lack of an effective fourth estate added to the isolation from diverse ideas which 
flowed from regionalism, an economy dominated by agriculture and mining, low levels 
of education and comparatively low incidence of migration from non-English speaking 
sources. Although Queensland journalists did, from time to time, report allegations of 
cormption, these were invariably countered by a steady stream of positive news which 
emanated from Bjelke-Petersen's office This continued to identify the Premier with 
Queensland, development and stability, whilst tainting his opponents with communism, 
malevolence and subservience to outside forces and instability. As an additional 
insurance against being defeated at the polls, the Nationals relied on the zonal electoral 
system. 
The electoral system 
As an Opposition backbencher, Bjelke-Petersen had railed against the zonal electoral 
system introduced by the Hanlon Labor government in 1948 but he had also correctly 
recognised it as one of the props which kept Labor in power. When his own turn to 
lead Queensland came, he presided over three redistributions in 1971, 1977 and 1985-
86, all of which entrenched non-urban vote weightage with the intention of favouring 
his own party. As a leader who treated pariiament, cabinet, public administrafion and 
the media as institutions to be bent to his will, he treated the electoral system no 
differently. Bjelke-Petersen shared the belief of other Nationals that a manipulated 
system was essential to the maintenance of power in Queensland, although Allen 
Callaghan claims that he advised the abolition of the zonal system on the grounds that 
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it made lirtle difference to the end result. He says, however, that its retention 'was an 
article of faith' for the Nafionals.'^^ 
Under the system of electoral weightage so established, the idea of 'one vote, one 
value' was rejected and the state divided into four zones; the South Eastern, Provincial 
Cifies, Western and Far Northern and Country Zones.'" Votes cast in electorates 
whhin the Western and Far Northern Zone were worth between two and three times 
those cast in a South East Zone electorate. Votes cast in the Country Zone electorates 
were worth one and a half times those of city voters. Bjelke-Petersen told the 
Pariiament that 'the one vote, one value policy is short sighted''^^ because the zonal 
system ensured a balance between country and city. Unusually, given his customary 
low regard for academics, he drew upon research by Professor Colin Hughes in 
support of his argument, citing a study which showed 'that there is only a 1.5 per cent 
bias in the electoral system to the conservative parties in Queensland whilst, in New 
South Wales, there is a massive 6 per cent bias to the ALP,''^^ Other research has 
indicated that compared with South Australia's "Playmander", 'Queensland's 
experiments in electoral manipulation and maldistribution have been relatively mild 
affairs. "^ '^  
There have been worse cases of malapportionment in Australia and the fact that the 
Queensland system was based on single member electoral districts with preferential 
vofing needs to be borne in mind when considering electoral outcomes.'^' Although the 
zonal system in itself did not keep Labor out of office, there is little doubt that the 
intent of the system was to maintain the National Party as the senior partner in the 
coalifion, and, after the 1985 redistribution, in power in hs own right. The 1985 
redistribufion, the first after the Nationals had won government in their own right, and 
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electorates from 82 to 89, The Nationals claimed the increase was in response to the 
state's population growth, but the Liberal and Labor Parties saw it as a strategy to 
enable the Nationals to protect the number of seats in the Country, Westem and Far 
Northem zones, while taking advantage of population growth on the Gold and 
Sunshine Coasts. In addition, several seats in the metropolitan area were abolished. 
Whilst changing demographic patterns justified ahering the pattern of seats within the 
South-Eastern zone, the redistribution failed to take into account changes between the 
zones'*^ 
While election results in Queensland during the Bjelke-Petersen era were within the 
margins expected in any system based on single member electorates, the zonal system 
worked systematically to disadvantage both the Labor and Liberal Parties.'*^ This did 
not come about by chance, nor did it occur randomly: 
Rather, is it the deliberate outcome of the long standing govemment policy, 
exacerbated by the provisions ofthe Elections Act 1983-85 which require the electoral 
commissioners to conduct their deliberations in private, not to reveal their submissions 
and to report solely to the Premier, not to the Parliament,'*'* 
There were other ramifications of the zonal system. Clearly, the National Party 
believed in its efficacy, giving them a sense of invincibility and the psychological 
advantage that conferred. The Labor Party found it extremely demoralising, with the 
added irony that Labor had introduced it in the first place,'^ ^ Instead of finding rigged 
boundaries a spur to action. Labor lapsed into torpor, using the zonal system as an 
excuse for abandoning the field to Bjelke-Petersen and the Nationals.'*^ The zonal 
system also reinforced the decentralised nature of Queensland's pohtical culture, 
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representatives The zones entrenched such politics, to the advantage of the 
Nationals,'" 
Even if this advantage were not, in practice, as great as ehher the Nationals or their 
opponents believed, the zonal system was of great symbolic significance, depriving of 
legitimacy any government elected under its auspices. To its supporters, however, 
history had taught that it was an essential prop for power and, for Bjelke-Petersen, 
holding on to power eventually became his raison d'etre. Power had not always been 
quite an end itself, for he appears to have believed that he had 'made' Queensland and 
that his agenda was essential for keeping Queensland on the 'right' path. His belief that 
his agenda matched those of ordinary Queenslanders meant that he disregarded the 
checks and balances of political life. 
To many observers, the autocrat he became was a far cry from the diffident politician 
he had once been. Yet an examination of his career shows that, armed whh a strong 
belief in his own rectitude, he seized every opportunity which presented itself Once in 
power, he held it tenaciously, as his survival ofthe 1970 'coup' demonstrates. As with 
Labor govemments before him, he used every device possible to remain Premier. Yet, 
by becoming increasingly reluctant to share power, he sowed the seeds of his downfall. 
His relations with Sparkes cooled, the coalition with the Liberals was broken, 
competent ministers like Ahern and Hodges, who opposed him, were ignored or 
demoted, even senior bureaucrats were eventually sidelined. Thus abandoned, there 
was litfie they could do but watch as the Bjelke-Petersen era drew to a close. As a 
backbencher, in 1955, Bjelke-Petersen told the pariiament that the Labor government 
was about to lose office despite rigged elections. More than thirty years later his words 
could have been applied to his own regime: 
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CONCLUSION 
As his long incumbency reached its ignominious conclusion, Bjelke-Petersen was left 
bereft of the support of all but family, a few close advisers and diehard followers. 
Paradoxically, the seeds of his downfall had been sown at the moment of his greatest 
triumph when in, 1983, he led the Nationals into government in their own right. This 
was the culmination of an ambition shared with National Party President Sir Robert 
Sparkes. It also represented a milestone in his own political life which saw his 
evolution from diffident backbencher to autocratic leader. Throughout his premiership, 
he had become increasingly reluctant to listen to voices which urged caution or 
restraint. His extremism, contempt for democratic practice, disregard for pariiamentary 
tradition and civil liberties, politicisation ofthe police and public service, and toleration 
of cormption had brought no early electoral penalty and doubtless enhanced his appeal 
to his constituency. His success brought hubris and the fijrther desire to slough off all 
constraint. After 1983, the irritation of a coalition partner had been removed. In 
addhion, he substituted for Sparkes more sycophantic but less experienced advisers. 
This group encouraged him in his assault on Canberra but this attempt to build a 
fijrther monument to his own ambitions was doomed. For any populist leader, 
especially Bjelke-Petersen, failure on such a grand scale speh disaster. He lost the 
support of his pariiamentary colleagues, his party organisation and, most significantly, 
the people themselves. 
Despite his excursions into extremism, Bjelke-Petersen had been able to obtain the 
acquiescence, if not the active support, of many Queenslanders both for his pohcies 
and leadership style. These deviated from contemporaneous Australian patterns, 
leading to the commonly rehearsed argument that Queensland differed from Australia 
as a whole. Although Queensland shared many characteristics with the rest of 
Australia, there were sufficient differences during the Bjelke-Petersen era for 
Queensland's political culture to warrant separate consideration. These differences lay 
in Queensland's decentralisation, lower levels of education, relatively small numbers of 
non-English speaking migrants and lack of media diversity Together, these 
characteristics meant that Queenslanders generally lived in the constricted social 
circumstances which various researchers have linked with the development of 
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authoritarian tendencies. Similar factors are associated with support for populism. 
Indeed populism is almost always authoritarian because it craves a worid in which 
difference and division cease to exist. Insofar as these do not disappear naturally, 
popuhsts are prepared to achieve the satisfaction ofthe people's will by disregarding 
democratic checks and balances and fighting off threats from outsiders. Bjelke-
Petersen appealed to his supporters on both material and psychological grounds, by 
promising economic development and the retention of traditional ways and values. The 
fact that these were incompatible goals passed largely unnoticed, 
Bjelke-Petersen's own upbringing in mral Queensland mirrored the circumstances 
associated with the development of authoritarian attitudes. While the influence of his 
family and religion gave him an asceticism not widely shared in the Queensland 
community, no major discord existed between the values and attitudes of his mral 
immigrant environment and those of Queensland's wider political culture. His family 
was an extremely important influence. From them he acquired both his party 
idenfification and his fundamental values. As he grew older, he became increasingly 
like his father who is remembered by those who knew him as an autocrat with a quick 
temper. From his mother, whom he joined in mnning the family farm, he acquired the 
habh of hard work. As a result of family circumstances, he formed the desire to escape 
from poverty by branching out from farming into various entrepreneurial activities. 
His diligence and fmgality prompted various analysts to portray Bjelke-Petersen as an 
exemplar of the Protestant work ethic, but, as a Lutheran, Bjelke-Petersen had learnt 
that salvation comes from grace and faith alone, not from works. What Bjelke-Petersen 
received from his religion were asceticism and a highly personalised morality, both 
drawn from the pietism which had strongly influenced Antipodean Lutheranism, 
According to Bjelke-Petersen's lights, his Christianity meant that his path was guided 
by God and that, therefore, he was a person to be tmsted. His conviction that he was 
right meant that he could see no need for checks and balances and his lack of doubt 
made it easy for him to assume that his opponents were always wrong. Religious and 
family influences were closely linked and both led him in an authoritarian direction 
which was fijrther reinforced by his education at the local state primary school. 
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Bjelke-Petersen's childhood socialisation fitted him well for the role of State Premier. 
Previous incumbents had established a pattern of authorharian leadership, which, in 
Queensland, was equated whh strong leadership. As a novice politician, however, the 
fit was not immediately apparent, Bjelke-Petersen's 'first career' in polhics was 
characterised by the deference associated with a politician who, in seeking power, 
encouraged the widespread perception that he was reluctant to assume h. There is, 
however, much evidence (cited above) to suggest that the ambition which drove him to 
expand beyond farming, also drove his political career. No politician can plot with 
precision the path that his or her career will take, but an ambitious person, with a 
general objective of enhancing his/her power and status, will seize and utilise such 
opportunhies as they arise. Such was the case with Bjelke-Petersen. 
As a backbencher, Bjelke-Petersen combined his business interests with his 
pariiamentary career, unperturbed by any possibilities of conflict of interest. The issues 
which he raised as a backbencher were also to dominate his premiership. State 
development, the need for hard work and the perils of communism were staples. With 
the fall ofthe Gair Labor Government, Bjelke-Petersen set his sights on a ministry, but 
he had offended Nicklin by opposing the Government's road transport levy and was 
passed over on a number of occasions. Eventually, however, Bjelke-Petersen was 
appointed to the Works and Housing ministry. From this point, his progression 
towards the leadership gathered momentum. He used his portfolio strategically to do 
favours for his Coalition colleagues and, in 1968, on the retirement of Frank Nicklin, 
easily won the Deputy Premiership. Later the same year, and after the death of Premier 
Jack Pizzey, he became Premier. 
His 'second career' in politics had begun Eariy caution rapidly gave way to 
increasingly immoderate policy positions. Despite the concerns of some of his advisers, 
these brought no electoral penalty, with each win apparently vindicating his leadership 
style. Apart from Sparkes, there was no one in Queensland whose power came close to 
that ofthe Premier, but until the 1986 Lindeman Island affair, Sparkes was neariy 
always forced to concede to the Premier on policy issues. The Labor Opposition was 
barely granted legitimacy. Such parliamentary resistance as there was came from the 
Liberal Party but it was largely ineffectual. Cabinet neariy always ratified the Premier's 
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position and Pariiament was totally dominated by the executive. Opposhion came from 
extra pariiamentary groups, such as civil libertarians. Christian groups and unionists. 
They however were effectively marginalised by Bjelke-Petersen who publicly linked 
them with subversion and communism. Such groups, by their very nature and foci, 
were unable to generate widespread, enduring public support, despite a steady stream 
of allegations concerning police cormption, conflict of interest, breaches of civil 
liberties and contempt for Parliament. 
Much ofthe support for Bjelke-Petersen was based on the belief that "Joh gets things 
done". Just as Bjelke-Petersen was willing to turn a blind eye to police cormption in 
return for police willingness to implement Government policy, many Queenslanders 
were prepared to weigh the state's prosperity against accusations of impropriety. 
Economic development was his government's major priority in a climate wherein 
bureaucratic, parliamentary and legal procedures were routinely seen as unnecessary 
and unwelcome impediments to action Development and anti-communism were linked 
in his mind and became the twin pillars of his election campaigns. Under the tutelage of 
Allen Callaghan, he learnt how to use his rambling, incoherent speaking style to 
enhance his appeal to voters, Callaghan also developed the Premier's formidable media 
machine. This, combined with a lack of media competition in Queensland, meant that 
Bjelke-Petersen's policies were rarely subjected to thorough media scmtiny. As an 
additional' insurance against electoral defeat, his government relied on the zonal 
electoral system. 
The ambhion which had driven Bjelke-Petersen from the family farm into agribusiness 
propelled him towards a political career. Chance, in the form of the collapse of the 
Gair government and the early death of Jack Pizzey presented him with the 
opportunities for his ambition to flower. As this ambition became overweening, so it 
finally drove him beyond the confines of his home state to Canberra, in the hope that 
he could transpose his domination of Queensland to the national stage. While this 
enterprise failed for many reasons, one major contributing factor was that the pohtical 
culture outside Queensland was less supportive of both his leadership style and 
Queensland developed policies. 
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With the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation, and her party's success in 
winning eleven seats in the 1998 Queensland state elecfion, the quesfion of so-cahed 
Queensland difference has arisen again. It is not yet clear whether One Nation's 
success is largely a Queensland phenomenon or whether h can be replicated ehher 
federally or interstate. Bjelke-Petersen has, at the time of writing, re-emerged as a 
political figure, albeh in the background. He has become an eminence grise and adviser 
to One Nation. He bad always evinced some sympathy whh fringe groups like the 
League of Rights, despite the party and electoral measures taken by Sparkes and others 
to provide distance between the Nationals and the political fringe. It is possible that, in 
his advisory role, he may be responsible for the rather anachronistic pursuit of 
communism engaged in by some One Nation Queensland parliamentarians in their 
maiden speeches to the Queensland parliament following the 1998 election, 
PopuHsm has evidently not yet died in Queensland, thereby suggesting an avenue for 
fijrther research It needs to be borne in mind, when comparing Hanson whh Bjelke-
Petersen, that Bjelke-Petersen was the leader of a mainstream party which benefited 
from incumbency and advantageous electoral arrangements, Hanson's party has no 
such assistance. Like Bjelke-Petersen, however, Hanson makes the most of 
opportunities presented by chance. Like him, too, she relies on skilled organisational 
advisers who complement her ability to tap into grass roots feelings. She shares whh 
other populist leaders the ability to pit her apparent ordinariness against the 
affectations of elites. She and her followers are profoundly anti-intellectual, treating 
academics, artists and journalistic critics with contempt. Authoritarianism is evident in 
her movement's racism, hs intolerance of those who disagree, and desire to remove 
agencies established to ensure protection for minorities. She even shares with Bjelke-
Petersen an unpolished speaking style. In her case, it is accented by a nervous quaver 
which, given her current familiarity whh public speaking, leads to the suspicion that h 
is assumed. 
In economic policy, however, her Fortress Australia approach owes as much to John 
McEwen as to Bjelke-Petersen, The latter was never averse to government 
intervention in the economy but he was unconcerned by foreign ownership and 
investment, to which Hanson and her followers are antagonistic. Indeed, one of the 
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longest mnning duels between Bjelke-Petersen and the Party organisation was his 
refijsal to establish a register of foreign land ownership. To Bjelke-Petersen, anything 
which furthered state development was acceptable. Hanson is, to a much greater 
degree, an isolationist. She is also unlike Bjelke-Petersen in that religion appears to 
hold little significance for her. What role, if any, fundamentalist religion plays in 
support for One Nation warrants fijrther exploration. We may be witnessing, in 
Queensland, the development of a secular based populism. 
Bjelke-Petersen's seven election wins demonstrated that, until 1987, his familiar, 
populist leadership style was accepted, if not endorsed, by a majority of 
Queenslanders. Political cultures evolve slowly, and fijrther research is needed to 
ascertain the degree to which change has occurred in Queensland's political culture 
since the Bjelke-Petersen era, and to what extent such changes, if any, have been 
largely confined to the urban South East corner ofthe state. Without further research, 
it remains unclear whether the emergence of One Nation in Queensland represents 
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